

## Operationalising Sustaining Peace: Lessons Learned from the Sustaining Peace Roundtable Series

*Recommendations for the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review*

The 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review (2025 PBAR) is mandated by the 2020 dual resolutions on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace as a **'comprehensive' review with a focus on impact** ([A/RES/75/201-S/RES/2558](#), OP5). It requires a substantive resolution as an outcome of the process to further operationalise peacebuilding and sustaining peace. The 2025 PBAR should build on the findings of the previous reviews, as well as the developments in the UN Peacebuilding Architecture since 2020<sup>1</sup>. During the informal phase of the 2025 PBAR, Member States should develop a shared understanding of the outcomes they expect of the 2025 PBAR to maximise the effectiveness of the formal phase.

**This submission aims to support Member States in identifying key priorities to be discussed during the formal phase of the 2025 PBAR.** It draws on and synthesises the findings of the [Operationalising Sustaining Peace](#) roundtable series between 2021 and 2024<sup>2</sup> to support the continued operationalisation of peacebuilding and sustaining peace.

Ahead of the 2025 PBAR, Member States could consider the following recommendations:

### **Recommendation 1: Strengthen the role of the UN System in supporting regional and national prevention strategies and approaches<sup>3</sup>**

In recent years<sup>4</sup>, there has been growing interest in regional and national prevention strategies and approaches in the global policy debate. Countries from different regions and income levels have presented their prevention strategies and efforts at the Peacebuilding Commission (the

<sup>1</sup> Some of the developments include the adoption of the General Assembly Resolution ([A/RES/76/305](#)) on Financing for Peacebuilding, the 5th Anniversary of the [Pathways for Peace](#) Report, the launch of [the Peacebuilding Impact Hub](#), and ongoing implementation of [the UN reforms](#). NYU's Center on International Cooperation has [indexed](#) nearly 1,000 recommendations submitted for the 2020 PBAR, extracted from 77 papers, where the most common topics were inclusivity, cross-pillar approach, financing, and national ownership. Many of these recommendations have not yet been implemented, as is true of many of those from the 2010 and 2015 reviews.

<sup>2</sup> The series has been organised by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation (the Foundation), and the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), in partnership with the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP), Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), and the NYU Center on International Cooperation (CIC) at different times throughout the 2020-2024 period.

<sup>3</sup> This recommendation is developed on the basis of the following discussions:

- DHF, GPPAC, NYU-CIC (24 July 2024). National Prevention Strategies: How Can the UN Peacebuilding Commission Provide Support?  
<https://www.daghammarskjold.se/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/20240826-osp-rt-national-prevention-strategies-how-can-the-un-peacebuilding-commission-provide-support-summary-note.pdf>
- DHF, GPPAC, NYU-CIC (16 May 2024). Looking Ahead to the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review: Exploring Innovative Approaches to assess the Implementation of Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace:  
[https://gppac.net/files/2024-06/OSP%20RT\\_ToR%20PBAR\\_Summary.pdf](https://gppac.net/files/2024-06/OSP%20RT_ToR%20PBAR_Summary.pdf)
- DHF, GPPAC, NYU-CIC (1 February 2024). 2024 in Preview: How to Leverage the Summit of the Future and Peacebuilding Architecture Review to Strengthen the Implementation of Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace?:  
[https://gppac.net/files/2024-03/OSP%20RT\\_2024%20in%20Preview\\_Summary%20Note.pdf](https://gppac.net/files/2024-03/OSP%20RT_2024%20in%20Preview_Summary%20Note.pdf)
- DHF, GNWP, GPPAC, NUPI (30 August 2023). What is after the New Agenda for Peace? Assessing opportunities and next steps for the Peacebuilding Commission:  
[https://gppac.net/files/2023-10/NA4P%20Opportunities%20for%20the%20PBC\\_Summary%20Note\\_Final.pdf](https://gppac.net/files/2023-10/NA4P%20Opportunities%20for%20the%20PBC_Summary%20Note_Final.pdf)
- DHF, GNWP, GPPAC, NUPI (16 June 2023). Lessons Learned from the Peacebuilding Commission's Work: The Impact of Political Accompaniment at the Country Level:  
[https://gppac.net/files/2023-09/Summary%20Note\\_Lessons%20learned%20from%20the%20Peacebuilding%20Commission%20E2%80%99s%20Work-The%20Impact%20of%20Political%20Accompaniment%20at%20the%20Country%20Level\\_16%20June%202023.pdf](https://gppac.net/files/2023-09/Summary%20Note_Lessons%20learned%20from%20the%20Peacebuilding%20Commission%20E2%80%99s%20Work-The%20Impact%20of%20Political%20Accompaniment%20at%20the%20Country%20Level_16%20June%202023.pdf)

<sup>4</sup> The reinvigoration of the discussion on prevention in the global policy debate can date back to the Our Common Agenda process and [the New Agenda for Peace](#) policy brief of the UN Secretary-General.

Commission hereafter). By offering a platform for this kind of exchange, the Commission is helping to normalise and destigmatise prevention and driving political support for such strategies and approaches while affirming national ownership of these processes. References to prevention have increased in the Commission's annual reports and discussions over the years as a result of the increased focus on prevention at the Commission's meetings.

Moving forward, the Commission can further strengthen its role in advancing prevention action within its existing mandate in a number of ways. *First*, the existing [working methods of the Commission](#) suggest specific focused meetings in which diverse countries can share their national peacebuilding plans in an attempt to elicit support and for sharing progress, lessons learned and experiences that could be useful in other contexts. This could be expanded to include regional and national prevention strategies and approaches, alongside national peacebuilding plans. *Second*, the Commission could accompany Member States in developing their prevention strategies, similar to the support provided to Liberia and Burkina Faso in their transition processes and in developing peacebuilding strategies<sup>5</sup>. *Third*, the Commission's convening capacity could bring in experts and mobilise the UN system to support Member States in developing and implementing national prevention strategies. The Commission has provided accompaniment to Timor-Leste to engage with the broader UN System, regional organisations, and international financial institutions (IFIs) to assist the country's post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts<sup>6</sup>. *Fourth*, the Commission can utilise its advisory role vis-à-vis other intergovernmental bodies to advance the broader UN System's awareness of and support for national prevention strategies.

The [Pact for the Future](#) highlights the role of the Commission and the UN System in supporting nationally-led prevention efforts. At the same time, there are several aspects that pose potential barriers to progress in the engagement of the Commission and broader UN system in prevention. *First*, there is a lack of common understanding among Member States of the term 'prevention'. The universality of prevention, as highlighted in the Secretary-General's [the New Agenda for Peace](#) policy brief, is interpreted by Member States differently<sup>7</sup>. The references to prevention through the prism of national prevention strategies (and thus national ownership) in the Pact for the Future can help to galvanise political support for Member States accepting their own responsibilities for the universal commitment to prevention in [the UN Charter](#) and assuage the fear that prevention will be used for interference. The universal approach to prevention and references to all forms of violence also contribute to normalising and destigmatising prevention, thus increasing buy-in from Member States. *Second*, there is no shared understanding of what constitutes an effective national prevention strategy. Reaching a shared understanding of what national prevention strategies entail is essential to enhance their effectiveness and to build trust among Member States in prevention efforts. *Third*, the content of the prevention toolbox mentioned in the [New Agenda for Peace](#) needs to be elaborated, with a mapping of how different parts of the UN system contribute to prevention, to articulate their specific roles and capacities, and how these parts coordinate. This could be addressed by the development of a comprehensive UN prevention strategy called for by the Security Council in [S/RES/1366](#) (OP6). This will guide Member States interested in developing and strengthening their national prevention strategies and approaches on where they should go to receive support, while providing them with tools they could use without UN support. This approach could also help

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<sup>5</sup> DHF, GNWP, GPPAC, NUPI (16 June 2023). Lessons Learned from the Peacebuilding Commission's Work: The Impact of Political Accompaniment at the Country Level: [https://gppac.net/files/2023-09/Summary%20Note\\_Lessons%20learned%20from%20the%20Peacebuilding%20Commission%E2%80%99s%20Work-The%20Impact%20of%20Political%20Accompaniment%20at%20the%20Country%20Level\\_16%20June%202023.pdf](https://gppac.net/files/2023-09/Summary%20Note_Lessons%20learned%20from%20the%20Peacebuilding%20Commission%E2%80%99s%20Work-The%20Impact%20of%20Political%20Accompaniment%20at%20the%20Country%20Level_16%20June%202023.pdf).

<sup>6</sup> DHF, GPPAC, NYU-CIC (24 July 2024). National Prevention Strategies: How Can the UN Peacebuilding Commission Provide Support? <https://www.daghammarskiold.se/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/20240826-osp-rt-national-prevention-strategies-how-can-the-un-peacebuilding-commission-provide-support-summary-note.pdf>

<sup>7</sup> DHF, GNWP, GPPAC, NUPI (30 August 2023). What is after the New Agenda for Peace? Assessing opportunities and next steps for the Peacebuilding Commission: [https://gppac.net/files/2023-10/NA4P%20Opportunities%20for%20the%20PBC\\_Summary%20Note\\_Final.pdf](https://gppac.net/files/2023-10/NA4P%20Opportunities%20for%20the%20PBC_Summary%20Note_Final.pdf).

link different prevention-related activities at the UN (e.g., conflict, violent extremism, and violent crime), create better synergies at the field level, and save resources by minimising duplication. *Additionally*, it is important to ensure that the toolbox is relevant across a wide variety of contexts, including high-income countries, in line with the universal approach to prevention. UN Country Teams, with support from DCO, should similarly be capacitated to provide leadership in engagement on prevention and increase field-level coordination among UN actors in this area.

*Below are recommendations for the consideration of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture:*

- The Commission should support **the development of the UN comprehensive prevention strategy** called for by the Security Council in [S/RES/1366](#) (OP3) that would encourage system-wide coherence within the UN system, including at the field level, in support of nationally-led prevention strategies and approaches. Such a strategy calls for effective coordination within the UN System and should take into account all forms of violence.
- The Secretary-General should **articulate the components of the prevention toolbox** mentioned in the [New Agenda for Peace](#) that can be relevant across a wide variety of contexts, including high-income countries. The Peacebuilding Contact Group should explore how the UN System can better support Member States interested in the development of national prevention strategies and communicate its reflections to Member States through the Commission's meetings.
- Member States should **discuss options within the Commission's mandate and working methods** to support national prevention strategies and approaches. The Commission should assess how often and through what modalities it can accommodate requests to utilise its convening role – and what expertise it has – to support the development of national prevention strategies and approaches. The current working methods of the Commission can be expanded to include the focus on regional and national prevention strategies and approaches, alongside national peacebuilding plans. Its advisory role vis-à-vis other intergovernmental bodies should be more actively used to advance the broader UN System's awareness of and support for national prevention strategies.
- Member States of the Commission should **promote the adoption of an approach to national prevention strategies that is evidence-based and anchored in inclusive national ownership**. National prevention strategies will be effective when they are context-specific and at the same time informed by expertise of what works in preventing violence.

## **Recommendation 2: Strengthen quality and quantity of financing for peacebuilding<sup>8</sup>**

There is still a significant gap in funding available for peacebuilding. With the growing political shift from prevention towards securitisation and the increase in budget allocations for military

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<sup>8</sup> This recommendation is developed on the basis of the following discussions:

- DHF, GPPAC, NYU-CIC (16 May 2024). Looking Ahead to the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review: Exploring Innovative Approaches to assess the Implementation of Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace: [https://gppac.net/files/2024-06/OSP%20RT\\_ToR%20PBAR\\_Summary.pdf](https://gppac.net/files/2024-06/OSP%20RT_ToR%20PBAR_Summary.pdf)
- DHF, GNWP, GPPAC, NUPI (16 June 2023). Lessons Learned from the Peacebuilding Commission's Work: The Impact of Political Accompaniment at the Country Level: [https://gppac.net/files/2023-09/Summary%20Note\\_Lessons%20learned%20from%20the%20Peacebuilding%20Commission%E2%80%99s%20Work-The%20Impact%20of%20Political%20Accompaniment%20at%20the%20Country%20Level\\_16%20June%202023.pdf](https://gppac.net/files/2023-09/Summary%20Note_Lessons%20learned%20from%20the%20Peacebuilding%20Commission%E2%80%99s%20Work-The%20Impact%20of%20Political%20Accompaniment%20at%20the%20Country%20Level_16%20June%202023.pdf).
- DHF, GNWP, GPPAC (3 February 2022). Operationalization of Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace: Donors' Support and Coordination at the Country Level: <https://gppac.net/files/2022-08/Donor%27s%20Support%20and%20Coordination%20and%20the%20Country%20Level.pdf>.
- DHF, GNWP, GPPAC (26 May 2021). Investing Smarter: Assessing structural transformation in financing for impactful peacebuilding: [https://gppac.net/files/2021-06/Investing%20Smarter\\_Meeting%20Note\\_10%20June%202021.pdf](https://gppac.net/files/2021-06/Investing%20Smarter_Meeting%20Note_10%20June%202021.pdf).

spending, the margin is widening<sup>9</sup>. The limited available funding that is rooted in traditional donor-recipient power dynamics prevents peacebuilding action from delivering the most impact. Both *quality and quantity* of financing for peacebuilding must be enhanced.

Some progress has been made since the 2020 PBAR, particularly with the adoption of General Assembly Resolution [A/RES/76/305](#) (2022) and the General Assembly adopted resolution [A/RES/78/257](#) (2024). The latter has secured assessed contributions for the Peacebuilding Fund (hereafter, the PBF), reflecting the shared responsibility to finance peacebuilding. However, the PBF is just one mechanism with limited resources, restricted channels, and a short timeframe. A coordinated approach that delivers quality financing and uses diverse funding mechanisms is crucial for impactful investment in peacebuilding. Several proposed actions from Resolution 76/305 have yet to be implemented. The UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), in collaboration with civil society and think tanks, can guide Member States on implementing Resolution 76/305.

Resolution 76/305 recognises that the Commission's advisory, bridging, and convening roles could support resource mobilisation for nationally owned peacebuilding priorities in the countries and regions under its consideration (OP2). This includes not only the synergies between the work of the Commission and the PBF, but also the capacity of the Commission to bring together diverse financial stakeholders and advocate for quality and quantity financing via its advisory role. At the same time, the Commission does not have a mandate to directly contribute to financing national peacebuilding priorities, as it is not an implementing entity, and does not have the tools or capacity to do so. The Commission can however engage IFIs, including regional development banks, and the private sector more effectively. Additionally, the Commission should track and document how it has been helpful to countries in mobilising funding.

In light of the growing recognition of localisation as critical for impactful peacebuilding efforts<sup>10</sup>, the provisions of resolution 76/305 in support of financing for local peacebuilding should be implemented in line with the quality financing principles that serve to maximise the potential of local action. Existing financial mechanisms rarely offer adequate modalities to support local action. Specifically, many of these funds have high eligibility criteria and favour long-standing relationships with organisations rather than quality proposals. The main disbursement windows of the PBF, for example, are not set up to provide small grants. However, the launch of the pilot small grants program in the Sahel, which purports to distribute grants ranging from USD 5,000 to USD 50,000 is a promising development. Similarly, disbursement of small grants through in-country embassies, who know the local landscape and are more easily accessible to local civil society, is a potential avenue to increase quality financing for local actors. Pooled funds that include civil society on advisory boards or steering committees as strategic partners also provide more impactful funding for local action.

Finally, limited coordination among donors, especially at the country level detracts from achieving adequate, predictable, and sustained peacebuilding financing.<sup>11</sup> Many donors resort to informal channels and ad-hoc information exchange, rather than systematic coordination on

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<sup>9</sup> Roundtable participants noted that funding for peacebuilding and conflict prevention tends to be de-prioritised or cut in contexts of crises and emergencies and shifted to humanitarian and health responses: DHF, GPPAC, GNWP (26 May 2021). Investing Smarter: Assessing structural transformation in financing for impactful peacebuilding: [https://gppac.net/files/2021-06/Investing%20Smarter\\_Meeting%20Note\\_10%20June%202021.pdf](https://gppac.net/files/2021-06/Investing%20Smarter_Meeting%20Note_10%20June%202021.pdf).

<sup>10</sup> When well invested in activities that are grounded in a local analysis and deep knowledge of the context, USD 1,000 spent by local actors can have a greater impact than USD 1,000,000 spent by international organisations. Forthcoming: GNWP (2024). Why Women's Participation in Conflict Prevention Matters: A Policy Brief on the Value Added of Women's Participation in Prevention Efforts.

<sup>11</sup> Consider a specific case-study on donor coordination in the MENA region in the DHF-GPPAC joint study titled 'Financing for Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace: Lessons Learned for Impactful and Inclusive Financing for Peacebuilding and Resilience in the MENA Region' (24 April 2024): <https://www.gppac.net/resources/financing-peacebuilding-and-sustaining-peace-lessons-learned-impactful-and-inclusive>.

peacebuilding. Existing coordination mechanisms have challenges, including their multiplicity, lack of coordination mandate, and lack of resources to enable effective coordination. These challenges contribute to fragmentation, duplication and lack of coherence. At the global level, the UN Funding Compact<sup>12</sup> provides a framework to enable the UN to implement strategic, accountable and results-oriented assistance at the country level with quality funding and the flexibility required. This framework is suitable for and inclusive of peacebuilding activities and allows for significant flexibility depending on respective contexts. At the country level, donor coordination mostly takes place through pooled funding mechanisms that allow for exchange among donors and joint analysis.

*Below are recommendations for the consideration of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and the donor community:*

- Donors should **increase their investment in peacebuilding** and ensure that it is not diminished or deprioritised in times of crisis and emergencies, when peacebuilding needs are usually at their highest. Particular attention should be paid to the knock-on effects of crisis and emergencies and their potential for increasing risk factors for violence. All investments should follow [quality financing principles](#).
- The outcome document of the 2025 PBAR should emphasise the need for **advancing implementation of all commitments on financing made in Resolution 76/305 (2022)**.
- PBSO should support efforts to increase **the availability and quality of data on financing for peacebuilding**, including all the UN Funds that contribute to peacebuilding, through its Funding Dashboard and Impact Hub.
- Member States should explore **the Commission's capacity and modalities to serve as a platform to mobilise funding**. For example, the Commission's Member States could support more systematic discussions on resource mobilisation for nationally-owned peacebuilding and prevention priorities through the Commission's advisory, bridging and convening roles. Member States could also explore ways to engage IFIs, including regional development banks, and the private sector more effectively. Specifically, the Commission could encourage and evaluate pilot efforts to expand and improve investment. Specifically, Member States should encourage the Secretary-General to develop a strategy for peace-responsive resource mobilisation from the private sector in support of financing for peacebuilding, noting that such a strategy would help the Commission define its own work with private sector actors.
- Donors should encourage **optimisation of coordination mechanisms**, as called for by resolution 76/305. This includes prioritising systematic models of engagement that are based on coordination mandates and have dedicated funding for coordination. When there is no dedicated coordinator in donor coordination efforts, UN senior leadership could take a coordinating role. The coordination leads should ensure that civil society is engaged at all stages of assistance (from assessment to evaluation of implementation).

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<sup>12</sup> See more about the Funding Compact for the UN's Support to the Sustainable Development Goals at: <https://unsdg.un.org/funding-compact>.



### Recommendation 3: Enhance the UN Peacebuilding Commission to realise its full potential<sup>13</sup>

Over the past few years there has been growing consensus among Member States about the relevance of and opportunity to strengthen the Peacebuilding Commission, enabling it to fulfil its mandate and its roles in supporting peacebuilding. While at present there is no systematic mechanism to track the Commission's impact, it can potentially be effective in several areas. *First*, through its convening capacity, the Commission has facilitated learning, providing an opportunity for Member States to get a better overview of available peacebuilding tools and approaches. *Second*, the Commission has supported peacebuilding efforts in specific country contexts, such as Timor-Leste, Liberia, and Burkina Faso. Further expanding the work of the Commission to include more country and regional contexts (based on their request) could both increase opportunities to learn what has sustained peace in diverse settings and advance peacebuilding action in diverse contexts. *Third*, the Commission's advisory and bridging roles vis-a-vis other UN intergovernmental bodies supported the integration of peacebuilding across the work of the UN system. The Commission and the UN Security Council (UNSC) supported Burkina Faso with the development of a national peacebuilding plan<sup>14</sup>. The PBC also provides an opportunity for host countries to share their priorities and efforts with the Security Council through PBC advice. (However, the UNSC provides little feedback on how advice provided by the Commission is used in its work.) *Fourth*, informal interactive dialogues (IIDs) provide a platform for holistic and frank exchange, especially when discussing agenda items that tend to elicit and further drive polarisation among Member States. *Fifth*, the Commission is effective in building consensus in country-specific meetings. It plays a role in providing space to discuss issues that are difficult to put on the agenda of the UNSC, including conflict prevention. However, it remains difficult to formalise the Commission's positions on certain topics (e.g., human rights and climate security) due to its consensus-based decision making.

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<sup>13</sup> This recommendation is developed on the basis of the following discussions:

- DHF, GPPAC, NYU-CIC (1 February 2024). 2024 in Preview: How to Leverage the Summit of the Future and Peacebuilding Architecture Review to Strengthen the Implementation of Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace?: [https://gppac.net/files/2024-03/OASP%20RT\\_2024%20in%20Preview\\_Summary%20Note.pdf](https://gppac.net/files/2024-03/OASP%20RT_2024%20in%20Preview_Summary%20Note.pdf)
- DHF, GNWP, GPPAC, NUPI (30 August 2023). What is after the New Agenda for Peace? Assessing opportunities and next steps for the Peacebuilding Commission: [https://gppac.net/files/2023-10/NA4P%20Opportunities%20for%20the%20PBC\\_Summary%20Note\\_Final.pdf](https://gppac.net/files/2023-10/NA4P%20Opportunities%20for%20the%20PBC_Summary%20Note_Final.pdf)
- DHF, GNWP, GPPAC, NUPI (16 June 2023). Lessons Learned from the Peacebuilding Commission's Work: The Impact of Political Accompaniment at the Country Level: [https://gppac.net/files/2023-09/Summary%20Note\\_Lessons%20learned%20from%20the%20Peacebuilding%20Commission%E2%80%99s%20Work-The%20Impact%20of%20Political%20Accompaniment%20at%20the%20Country%20Level\\_16%20June%202023.pdf](https://gppac.net/files/2023-09/Summary%20Note_Lessons%20learned%20from%20the%20Peacebuilding%20Commission%E2%80%99s%20Work-The%20Impact%20of%20Political%20Accompaniment%20at%20the%20Country%20Level_16%20June%202023.pdf)
- DHF, GNWP, GPPAC, NUPI (16 June 2023). Lessons Learned from the Peacebuilding Commission's Work: The Impact of Political Accompaniment at the Country Level: [https://gppac.net/files/2023-09/Summary%20Note\\_Lessons%20learned%20from%20the%20Peacebuilding%20Commission%E2%80%99s%20Work-The%20Impact%20of%20Political%20Accompaniment%20at%20the%20Country%20Level\\_16%20June%202023.pdf](https://gppac.net/files/2023-09/Summary%20Note_Lessons%20learned%20from%20the%20Peacebuilding%20Commission%E2%80%99s%20Work-The%20Impact%20of%20Political%20Accompaniment%20at%20the%20Country%20Level_16%20June%202023.pdf)
- DHF, GNWP, GPPAC, NUPI (13 October 2022). The Evolution of the Role of the Peacebuilding Commission: Strengthening Financing for Peacebuilding through Convening and Political Accompaniment: [https://gppac.net/files/2023-04/Sustaining%20Peace%20Roundtable%20Series%20the-evolution-of-the-role-of-the-peacebuilding-commission-strengthening-financing-for-peacebuilding-through-convening-and-political-accompaniment\\_0.pdf](https://gppac.net/files/2023-04/Sustaining%20Peace%20Roundtable%20Series%20the-evolution-of-the-role-of-the-peacebuilding-commission-strengthening-financing-for-peacebuilding-through-convening-and-political-accompaniment_0.pdf)
- DHF, GNWP, GPPAC, NUPI (20 April 2022). Building Peace across the United Nations: The Advisory Role of the Peacebuilding Commission: [https://www.gppac.net/files/2022-08/PBC%20Advisory%20Role\\_summary%20note.pdf](https://www.gppac.net/files/2022-08/PBC%20Advisory%20Role_summary%20note.pdf)

<sup>14</sup> Supporting the situation in Burkina Faso, the Commission's senior experts engaged country officials in the development of the Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment (RPBA), which offered a prevention-based rather than a securitised approach to analysing security threats and played a crucial role in supporting a comprehensive assessment of the prevention and peacebuilding needs in the country, particularly in the most insecure regions. The UNSC was actively involved in all stages of this process and their request for PBC advice gave space for the Commission to inform a more holistic national peacebuilding plan. DHF, GNWP, GPPAC, NUPI (16 June 2023). Lessons Learned from the Peacebuilding Commission's Work: The Impact of Political Accompaniment at the Country Level: [https://gppac.net/files/2023-09/Summary%20Note\\_Lessons%20learned%20from%20the%20Peacebuilding%20Commission%E2%80%99s%20Work-The%20Impact%20of%20Political%20Accompaniment%20at%20the%20Country%20Level\\_16%20June%202023.pdf](https://gppac.net/files/2023-09/Summary%20Note_Lessons%20learned%20from%20the%20Peacebuilding%20Commission%E2%80%99s%20Work-The%20Impact%20of%20Political%20Accompaniment%20at%20the%20Country%20Level_16%20June%202023.pdf)

Building on the Commission's strengths, there are several areas where the work of the Commission could be enhanced. *First*, the Commission could identify opportunities to engage more effectively with a variety of peacebuilding stakeholders, including IFIs, regional organisations, civil society and diverse intergovernmental groups (i.e., g7+, OECD). *Second*, the awareness of the Commission's work must increase among Member States, and the sense that being 'on the Commission's agenda' reflects poorly on a Member State needs to be addressed. For this, Member States need to better understand its mandate and more actively engage with the Commission.<sup>15</sup> *Third*, assessment of impact of the Commission's engagement needs to be systematised, especially the impact at the country level. In addition to the Commission's impact on the mobilisation of resources as mentioned above, results should be harvested from its work in promoting exchange of good practices, political accompaniment, its advisory role, and strengthening coherence within the UN System. *Fourth*, the quality of the Commission's advice to the UNSC could be strengthened in terms of timeliness and specificity, especially in support of countries going through political transitions. *Fifth*, recognizing that the Commission's capacity is stretched as a result of larger demand for its engagement, options to strengthen the Commission's capacity should be considered, including greater leadership from all Member States and enhancing the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), which hosts the Commission's Secretariat. The informal coordinator system (i.e., with the UNSC, General Assembly and ECOSOC) eases the burden placed on the Commission's Chair. In the past, Member States were active to take the lead on specific thematic areas.

*Below are recommendations for the consideration of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture:*

- PBSO should develop a system to more systematically **collect the evidence of Commission's impact**, including at the field level. Identifying areas with a proven track record could help to optimise the Commission's working methods. The Commission's annual reports should further highlight, beyond outputs and activities, the key lessons learned from the work of the Commission. Other intergovernmental bodies should provide feedback on the impact of Commission's engagement and advise on their decision-making.
- The Commission should **provide high-quality, action-oriented advice in areas where it adds the most value**, rather than increasing the volume of advice. Emphasis should be placed on offering early-stage support to countries in transition. The Commission's Chair should collaborate with Chairs and Presidents of other intergovernmental bodies, including through informal coordinators, to better align schedules and agenda items, enhancing the relevance and timeliness of the advice. The UN Secretariat should share advanced copies of the Secretary-General's reports with the Commission whenever possible.
- Member States should use the Commission's platform to **share evidence-based best practices, lessons learned, and successful prevention and peacebuilding initiatives**. As many Commission's Member States argue that the Commission is not a think tank, alternative forums, such as the Aswan Forum and the Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development could be utilised.
- The Commission should **enhance its engagement with a variety of peacebuilding stakeholders**, including IFIs, regional organisations, civil society and diverse intergovernmental groups (i.e., g7+, International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS), OECD, experts in UN HQ in Geneva). Consideration should be given to the specific context and the needs in facilitating such an engagement.

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<sup>15</sup> The 19 June 2023 PBC Meeting on Indigenous Peoples, Peace and Reconciliation featured Canada, Colombia and Norway, sharing their experiences in addressing indigenous issues, reconciliation and promoting indigenous voices. Such conversations showcase the PBC's strength as a platform for diverse actors to focus peacebuilding conversations on root causes and prevention: DHF, GNWP, GPPAC, NUPI (16 June 2023). Lessons Learned from the Peacebuilding Commission's Work: The Impact of Political Accompaniment at the Country Level: [https://gppac.net/files/2023-09/Summary%20Note\\_Lessons%20learned%20from%20the%20Peacebuilding%20Commission%E2%80%99s%20Work-The%20Impact%20of%20Political%20Accompaniment%20at%20the%20Country%20Level\\_16%20June%202023.pdf](https://gppac.net/files/2023-09/Summary%20Note_Lessons%20learned%20from%20the%20Peacebuilding%20Commission%E2%80%99s%20Work-The%20Impact%20of%20Political%20Accompaniment%20at%20the%20Country%20Level_16%20June%202023.pdf)

- Commission's Member States should **establish a clear mechanism for diverse and independent civil society engagement**, including women and youth, to hear diverse perspectives on the contexts being discussed. Capitalising on the presence of groups like the New York Peacebuilding Group (NYPG) and [the CSO-UN Dialogue Initiative on Peacebuilding](#) can ensure civil society inputs are taken into account in the Commission's deliberations. PBSO should ensure that requests for civil society input are made with time frames that consider the limited capacity of civil society. Further, the Commission could establish more frequent field visits and meetings with civil society networks and coalitions operating at the regional and country levels.
- Member States should explore options to **strengthen the Commission's capacity**. Member States - either through secondments or through the Fifth Committee resolutions - should strengthen the capacity of PBSO to ensure sufficient support for practical implementation and operationalisation of the Commission's activities, including knowledge management. To alleviate capacity constraints, more Member States should take active leadership roles within the Commission. Beyond holding meetings in the Chair's absence, Vice-Chairs should engage more in strategic efforts to advance the Commission's initiatives. Strengthening the role of informal coordinators, facilitating informal interactive dialogues (IIDs), and leading on specific issues can further improve the Commission's support systems and align joint efforts.
- The Commission could **facilitate informal, expert-level dialogues on challenging topics that are difficult to bring to the UNSC agenda** (i.e., climate change). These dialogues should be initiated at the request of Member States and include participation from local peacebuilding actors and relevant experts.
- PBSO should continue to **develop clear communication resources and training to ensure that diverse Member States understand its mandate and know how to engage with the Commission**. To further address the persistent stigma of being discussed at the Commission, diverse Member States, including from the Global North, should bring their own contexts to the consideration of the Commission.

#### **Recommendation 4: Strengthen leadership for peacebuilding at the country level<sup>16</sup>**

UN leadership at the country level, from Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs) and resident coordinators (RCs) to staff of UN agencies, funds and programs, has a significant influence on setting the direction for operationalising the peacebuilding and sustaining peace resolutions. The implementation of the new resident coordinator system has helped to integrate peacebuilding and sustaining peace across all activities of UN Country Teams, promoting greater operational and policy coherence. Regular appointments of Peace and Development Advisors (PDAs) and gender advisors has strengthened the analysis of multi-dimensional risks, connected different parts of the UN system at the regional (where possible) and country level, and supported RCs in understanding conflict drivers and opportunities for advancing peace at the national and sub-national levels.<sup>17</sup> When sustainably financed, these mechanisms provide effective capacities for the implementation of peacebuilding and sustaining peace.

However, competition and duplication among diverse partners operating in the same context persist. Largely, this is due to various UN entities relying on different financial streams for sustainability of their functioning and leads to different and at times conflicting priorities. The

<sup>16</sup> This recommendation is developed on the basis of the following discussions:

- DHF, GNWP, GPPAC, NUPI (13 December 2022). Building Peace Regionally: What does the UN Peacebuilding Leadership look like at the Regional Level?: <https://gppac.net/files/2023-04/Sustaining%20Peace%20Roundtable%20Series%20building-peace-regionally.pdf>
- DHF, GNWP, GPPAC (23 March 2021). UN Leadership for Sustaining Peace at the country level: Expectations and realities: <https://gppac.net/files/2021-06/summary-note-un-leadership-for-sustaining-peace-at-the-country-level.pdf>

<sup>17</sup> For more analysis on the outcomes of the work of PDAs and gender advisors see [https://dppa.un.org/sites/default/files/undp\\_joint\\_annual\\_23\\_web\\_single\\_page\\_0.pdf](https://dppa.un.org/sites/default/files/undp_joint_annual_23_web_single_page_0.pdf).



stabilisation process in Iraq in 2015 is an example where the absence of shared analysis and common understanding of the crisis challenged the mission's effectiveness. Financial challenges also cause UN actors to take the role of implementer, rather than facilitator and convenor. UN leadership should promote the inclusion of different partners, improve coordination between diverse stakeholders within and outside the UN system (including civil society), focus on outcomes rather than outputs, and allow for the clear identification of funding and operational gaps. Further, the lack of clarity in the division of roles between the UN, regional organisations and other development partners undermines impactful peacebuilding action.

*Below are recommendations for the consideration of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and relevant UN and donor partners:*

- UN field presences should have explicit deliberations under the auspices of the RC to determine where and how to **prioritise their role as a convenor and advisor over that of being an implementer**. To accomplish this, it is necessary to address the internal problems of competition and clarify roles between UN Agencies, Funds, and Programmes (AFPs), and promote effective relationships with civil society, regional bodies and development banks. The Development Cooperation Office (DCO) could support RC Offices in developing and enhancing mechanisms to advance peacebuilding coordination and collaboration among teams, including building mutual trust, clarifying roles, and improving information management. Such mechanisms could facilitate joint peacebuilding assessments, the development of coherent coordination frameworks, and the temporary co-location of staff from different entities.
- UN field presences should utilise multi-stakeholder mechanisms at the national and regional levels to **promote the exchange of lessons learned and good practices** and to **allow for the transfer of responsibilities to national and regional stakeholders**.
- UN leadership should **strengthen the profile of RCs**, underscoring the priority of supporting national priorities and advancing the interests of the local population. A candidate should also be able to apply gender sensitivity and intersectional analysis. As the needs at the country level are rarely separated into sectors, RCs ideally should be well versed in the interactions between peace and security, development, and human rights. This requires a solid understanding of the tools available, mandates and expectations of all stakeholders, and capacities within their team. To support such expertise, the UN system should value and promote easy transitions of roles for staff, especially in leadership positions, across agencies and pillars.
- Donors should ensure that their **funding decisions and modalities strengthen peacebuilding leadership**. Further inquiry is required into how engagement at the country level with IFIs and funding available through the Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office can enable RCs to advance peacebuilding and sustaining peace. Member States should advocate that PDAs and gender advisors are funded out of core contributions and added to the standard set-up of RC Offices.
- The Commission should **enhance UN leadership at the country level** by providing a convening space to articulate, generate support for, and address critical issues in a variety of peacebuilding settings. This could be especially useful in contexts where peace operations are drawing down.