# ADDRESSING THE INTERLINKAGES BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN SECURITY

## An Analysis for Member States of the 2015–2023 UN Agreed Language on the Interlinkages between Climate Change, Peace and Security

*This aide-mémoire to the Member States of the United Nations provides an overview of how the UN's development and peace and security actors address the interlinkages between climate change and insecurity.*

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## ABOUT THIS AIDE-MÉMOIRE

*This aide-mémoire to the Member States of the United Nations (UN) provides an overview of the ways in which the UN's development[1] and peace and security actors[2] engage in addressing the interlinkages between climate change and insecurity. The central question this aide-mémoire seeks to answer is whether UN peace and security actors should support the development system in addressing the interconnection between climate change and security and if so, how.*

*It brings together the 2015-2023 UN 'agreed language'[3] directly and indirectly related to the interlinkages between climate change and peace and security issues within the UN intergovernmental bodies, including the General Assembly, UN Security Council (UNSC), Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and UN Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and its Conferences of the Parties (COPs), among others. See additional selected relevant resolutions, conventions, and other documents in Annex 4.*

*The authors of this aide-mémoire interpret the interlinkages between climate, peace and security from the perspective of **human security** that 'identif[ies] and address[es] widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of [the] people' (A/RES/66/290, OP3) and 'calls for people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people and all communities' (A/RES/66/290, OP3(b)). Looking at the interlinkages between climate change and peace and security from a human security perspective implies the analysis of diverse risks, including economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political risks[4]. The Boe Declaration on Regional Security and the 2050 Blue Pacific Strategy of the Pacific Islands Forum draw out this connection, serving as an example of Member States' vision of broader and more comprehensive security[5]. The aide-mémoire, as such, looks at the interlinkages between climate change and water security, food security and other aspects concerning the security of all people.*

## I. INTRODUCTION

Most UN Member States acknowledge the complex interlinkages between climate change and conflict. While positions of the UN Member States are evolving over time, the majority of Member States agree that peace and security risks are 'exacerbated by the challenges of climate change' (A/RES/77/104, Annex, PP3). Member States also recognise climate change as one of the 'compounded risks', along with armed conflict, natural disasters, violence (E/RES/2022/10, PP5). At the same time, 'violent conflict also increases vulnerability to climate change [as it] harms assets that facilitate adaptation, including infrastructure, institutions, natural resources, social capital and livelihood opportunities' (A/RES/77/104, Annex, PP3).

With the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 2015 Paris Agreement, Member States have built consensus around the avenues to address climate change within the development realm. Most UN resolutions and declarations

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[1] For the purpose of this aide-mémoire, we consider the efforts of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the High-Level Political Forum (HLPF), and the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) to the UN Framework Convention of Climate Change.

[2] For the purpose of this aide-mémoire, we consider the efforts of the UN Security Council and Peacebuilding Commission.

[3] For the purpose of this aide-mémoire, agreed language is understood as the language from the resolutions, presidential statements, and other negotiated documents produced by relevant UN intergovernmental bodies. The aide-mémoire is also supplemented by other important documents considered by the UN intergovernmental bodies, including findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and reports of the UN Secretary General.

[4] UN & World Bank (2018), Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict. Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/4c36fca6-c7e0-5927-b171-468b0b236b59, p. 66.

[5] The Boe Declaration 'affirm[s] an expanded concept of security which addresses the wide range of security issues in the region, both traditional and non-traditional, with an increasing emphasis on: 1) human security, including humanitarian assistance, to protect the rights, health and prosperity of Pacific people; 2) environmental and resource security; 3) transnational crime; and 4) cybersecurity, to maximise protections and opportunities for Pacific infrastructure and peoples in the digital age' (para. 7). Available at: https://www.forumsec.org/2018/09/05/boe-declaration-on-regional-security/.

suggest that UNFCCC is 'the primary international, intergovernmental forum for negotiating the global response to climate change' (i.e., A/RES/70/1, OP31; S/RES/2677, PP24; E/RES/2022/10, PP13). There is also a specific Goal (SDG13[6]) focused on the action to combat climate change and its impacts.

To ensure that the development mechanisms offered by the UNFCCC are operationalised, the Conferences of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC established financial mechanisms – the Global Environment Facility (GEF), with its Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) and Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), and the Green Climate Fund (GCF). Further, the Adaptation Fund (AF) was established under the Kyoto Protocol, and a 'loss and damage' fund was established during the COP27 in Egypt. Apart from the funds established by the UNFCCC, there are other important multilateral funds, such as the Climate Investment Funds (CIF) and many bilateral and private funds, as well as other tools such as green bonds, debt swaps and guarantees.

Even though the UN development system has mechanisms to address climate change, there is a prevailing belief among Member States that these mechanisms are underfunded and under-resourced. The UN General Assembly (GA), on several occasions, expressed deep concerns about the lack of financial resources to confront the negative impacts of climate change (A/RES/70/149, PP19; A/RES/72/172, PP19; A/RES/73/169, PP19). The perception is that if such mechanisms were effectively used, they could potentially address the existing vulnerability and fragility through development programs, rendering UN peace and security actors unnecessary. However, due to the lack of action in addressing the risks exacerbated or even created by climate change, many Member States that face the impacts of climate change directly are now calling upon UN peace and security actors, such as the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), to support the climate action. Within the PBC alone, representatives from countries such as the Solomon Islands[7], The Gambia[8], and South Sudan[9], among others, have pointed out that their peacebuilding needs are influenced by climate change. The UNSC noted 'possible security implications of climate change, when such issues are drivers of conflict, represent a challenge to the implementation of Council mandates or endanger the process of consolidation of peace' (S/PRST/2011/15, para. 8). Altogether, the UNSC discussed 10 contexts where climate change affected the matters of peace and security, while the PBC discussed climate-related risks in 15 contexts. *See* Section II.3 below.

The current realities give rise to a considerable debate at the international policy level regarding whether UN peace and security actors should complement the development system to address the challenges posed by climate change and, if so, how. While some Member States are asking for UN peace and security actors' support, the existing mandates of these actors do not clearly articulate ways to support the development system in addressing the impact of climate change. Contemporary research highlights the need for peace and security actors to monitor the impact

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[6] The SDG 13 encourages Member States to 'take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts', addresses climate change while clarifying explicitly that 'the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is the primary international, intergovernmental forum for negotiating the global response to climate change'.

[7] Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands, H.E. Mr. Manasseh Sogavare, listed climate change as one of the challenges faced by the country and requested that the UN, the PBC and the PBF support the Solomon Islands in addressing this. PBC (7 June 2017), Informal Meeting on the Solomon Islands. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_solomon_islands_chairs_summary_-_final.pdf, p. 1.

[8] Permanent Representative of The Gambia, H.E. Mr. Lang Yabou, called on the PBC to continue to mobilise support and forge partnerships for helping address the impacts of climate change'. PBC (27 Oct. 2021), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on The Gambia. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/20210211-pbc-gambia-chairs_summary-meeting_27-10-2021_-_final.pdf, para. 6.

[9] The Minister of Peacebuilding of South Sudan, H.E. Mr. Stephen Par Kuol, highlighted the adverse effects of climate change, such as, recurrent floods and extreme weather events that have a direct impact on peace and security in the country, which has been evidenced by the tensions between pastoralists and farmers. PBC (26 Oct. 2022), Ambassadorial-level meeting on South-Sudan Building Peace through Institutions and Governance in South Sudan. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/20221026_pbc_meeting_on_south_sudan_chairs_summary_clean.pdf, para. 3.

of climate change on security. Findings reveal that extreme weather events and volatility in temperatures and precipitation influence inter-state (international) disputes[10]. Discussions within the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) similarly stressed climate change as an ultimate accelerator of resource tensions in the future.[11] Additional evidence from the local communities in fragile settings can be found in Annex 2.

Currently, the interventions of UN peace and security actors are context-specific. It is generally acknowledged that interactions between climate and security vary across regions, countries and localities[12]. Consequently, UN peace and security actors act within their existing mandates to support governments that expressed interest in engaging them on the issue of climate change.

Following the increased attention to climate, peace and security within the UN's intergovernmental bodies, UN agencies, funds, and programmes started developing practical avenues to address the interlinkages between climate and security. The PBC works 'in synergy' with the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), including its Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative (GYPI), which, between 2017-2021, invested $161.7 million to address farmer-herder conflicts, land tenure, and competition over natural resources, women's engagement in natural resource management, as well as to support climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies and other related initiatives[13]. The 2020-2024 Peacebuilding Fund's Strategy further commits to providing more support to managing conflict risks emanating from climate-change-related pressures on people and resources[14]. The UN Climate Security Mechanism (CSM) of the DPPA, UNDP and UNEP was also established in 2018 to 'address climate-related security risks by leveraging capacities and coordinating inter-agency activities' (A/74/976–S/2020/773, para. 24).

At the same time, some Member States believe that: 1) UN peace and security actors do not have the tools and/or mandate to address the interlinkages between climate change and security, 2) confusion is created when development and peace and security actors work on the same issues, and 3) peace and security action diverts attention from the development sphere and climate finance commitments, leaving climate change action underfunded. The findings of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) supported this position of Member States[15]. The Panel suggests that 'violent conflict and migration patterns [are] driven by socioeconomic conditions and governance more than by climate change'[16].

As the discussion on climate, peace and security evolves throughout the UN system, there is growing recognition of the crucial role played by local communities[17] in addressing climate

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[10] Schmidt, C. J., Lee, B. K., & Mitchell, S. M. (2021). Climate bones of contention: How climate variability influences territorial, maritime, and river interstate conflicts. Journal of Peace Research, 58(1), 132–150. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343320973738.

[11] ECOSOC & PBC (29 June 2023), The Importance of the SDGs in Linking Peace and Development on the Ground. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/joint_meeting_ecosoc_and_pbc_informal_summary_final.pdf.

[12] GPPAC (2023), Localising Climate, Peace and Security Documenting, Assessing, and Addressing Climate Security Challenges at the Local Level. Available at: https://www.gppac.net/files/2023-03/Localising%20Climate%2C%20Peace%20and%20Security_A%20Practical%20Step-by-Step%20Guide.pdf, p. 5.

[13] PBC (18 Mar. 2022), Special Meeting of ECOSOC on Natural Resources, Peaceful Societies and Sustainable Development: Lessons from the Kimberley Process. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/20221026_pbc_meeting_on_south_sudan_chairs_summary_clean.pdf, para. 3.

[14] PBF (2020), The 2020-2024 Strategy. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbf_strategy_2020-2024_final.pdf, p. 6.

[15] It should be noted that the IPCC reporting is structured in two levels: the high level documents (including the Synthesis Report and the Summary for Policy Makers) and the underlying chapters. Only the most important findings are elevated to the higher level, that is subjected to government review and approval.

[16] IPCC (2022), Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report. Available at: https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6/wg2/IPCC_AR6_WGII_FullReport.pdf, p. 11.

[17] A localisation approach to climate, peace, and security action empowers local community actors to work with relevant national, regional, and international actors to integrate their local experiences, observations, and perspectives into climate, peace and security programming and policy. Read more at: GPPAC (2023), Localising Climate, Peace and Security Documenting, Assessing, and

change. For instance, Member States of the PBC and ECOSOC have repeatedly emphasised that local communities and civil society, particularly women and youth, could be engaged in efforts to address climate change, sustainable development, and peacebuilding and sustaining peace[18]. They have also discussed the critical importance of including indigenous people in peacebuilding solutions and local development initiatives[19], and recognised already existing national and local initiatives in building resilience to climate change[20]. The IPCC similarly stated that 'risks to peace are reduced by supporting people in climate-sensitive economic activities'[21] and that 'prioritising measures to address social vulnerability and equity underpins efforts to promote fair and just climate resilience and sustainable development, and can be helped by creating safe community settings for meaningful public participation, deliberation and conflict resolution'[22].

While the debate continues on whether UN peace and security actors should complement the development system in addressing the interlinkages between climate change and (human) security, it is recognised that 'development, peace and security, and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing' (S/RES/2282, PP3). As such, effective responses to challenges presented by climate-related security risks need to consider avenues to promote coordination and complementarity between development and peacebuilding efforts, including strengthening consideration of climate change and climate-related security risks in UN joint analysis, risk assessment, and strategic planning efforts[23].

## II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE UN AGREED LANGUAGE

The following section provides a brief analysis of the relevant (human) security references in the 2015-2023 period in the agreed language across the work of the General Assembly (GA), development space, and the peace and security architecture.

- ### 1. General Assembly (GA)

Under the Charter of the United Nations, the GA occupies a central position as the main deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the UN. Among the main functions, the GA 'discuss[es] any question relating to international peace and security and [...] make[s] recommendations on it'[24].

Most GA resolutions suggest that the UNFCCC is the main framework for addressing the challenge of climate change (i.e., A/RES/70/205, PP4; A/RES/71/228, PP2; A/RES/73/232, PP1). The GA recognises that addressing climate change is important for 'livelihoods, food and water security'

Addressing Climate Security Challenges at the Local Level. Available at: https://www.gppac.net/files/2023-03/Localising%20Climate%2C%20Peace%20and%20Security_A%20Practical%20Step-by-Step%20Guide.pdf, p. 5.

[18] Joint Meeting of the ECOSOC and PBC (13 Nov. 2018). Linkages between Climate Change and Challenges to Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace in the Sahel. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/20181220_joint_meeting_of_the_economic_and_social_council_-_finalrev.pdf; PGA (10 July 2020), A Letter to the PBC on Independent Eminent Persons. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pga_letter-pbc-10_july.pdf, p. 6.

[19] ECOSOC & PBC (3 Dec. 2019), The Impact of Cross-Border Transhumance on Sustainable Peace and Development in West Africa and the Sahel. Available at: https://www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/files/en/2019doc/Summary_PBC-ECOSOC-joint-meeting.pdf, p. 2.

[20] PBC (9 Sept. 2020), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on the Impact of COVID19 in the Lake Chad Basin. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_sumamry_pbc_mtg_lake_chad_basin.pdf, para. 9. See also, A/74/688, para. 42.

[21] IPCC (2022) Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report. Available at: https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6/wg2/IPCC_AR6_WGII_FullReport.pdf, p. 25.

[22] IPCC (2019) IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate. Available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/3/2022/03/01_SROCC_SPM_FINAL.pdf, p. 35.

[23] PBC (2020), Virtual Consultation on the 2020 Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture: 'Institution Building and System-Wide Engagement for Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace': Chair's Summary. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_of_pbc_consultations_on_institution_building_and_system-wide_support_22_may_to_2_june_2020_-_final.pdf, para. 9.

[24] UN (n.d.), Functions and powers of the General Assembly. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml.

(A/RES/77/104, Annex, PP4), that 'land degradation [...] poses serious threats to human societies, ecosystems and peace stability (A/RES/70/206, PP9), and that climate change has 'increased vulnerabilities and inequalities and have adversely affected development gains, in particular in developing countries' (A/RES/70/155, OP25; A/RES/73/166, OP26). Further, the GA recognises that 'environmental consequences of armed conflicts may be severe and have the potential to exacerbate [...] climate change' (A/RES/77/104, Annex, PP3) and emphasises that 'environmental factors are to be taken into account in the context of the implementation of the principles and rules of the law applicable in armed conflict' (A/RES/77/104, Annex, PP5).

The GA encourages climate action that is responsive to many root causes of conflict and violence, including the economic, social and environmental impacts of climate change (i.e., A/RES/73/233, OP10; A/RES/74/118, OP18; A/RES/75/127, OP18; A/RES/76/216, OP28; A/RES/77/28, OP18). This includes achieving poverty eradication (i.e, A/RES/76/218, OP37; A/RES/77/179, OP40), ensuring food security (i.e., A/RES/76/128, PP20; A/RES/76/140, PP16; A/RES/77/186, PP42), and addressing displacement and pressure on host communities (i.e., A/RES/72/132, OP13; A/RES/73/139, OP33;). Further, the mid-term review of the 2018–2028 Decade of Action on Water for Sustainable Development (A/RES/71/222; A/RES/73/226) established by the GA highlighted that 'climate change is increasing water insecurity'[25], many participants to the dialogues highlighted 'the link between water and conflict potential' noting the 'risk of increasing conflicts and competition over access to water in the future'[26]. The GA also endorsed the 2015 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) aimed at achieving 'the substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities and countries' (A/RES/69/283, Annex II, para. 16). The Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction – a multi-stakeholder forum that reviews progress in the Framework's implementation – recognised the interplay between climate change, environmental degradation, and fragility, including in the context of water-related risk[27].

The GA promotes inclusive climate change action. This includes addressing the adverse effects of climate change on and ensuring the full, equal and meaningful participation in climate action of women, youth, older persons, indigenous peoples, local communities, persons with disabilities, migrants, refugees, academia, scientific and research entities and networks, business, professional associations, private sector financing institutions, and the media (i.e., A/RES/71/226, OP16; A/RES/77/189, OP14). Noting that 'local communities are the first responders in most disasters', the GA stressed the need to ensure that existing responses are 'tailored to context, make use of appropriate tools and support local systems, including by building on local expertise and capacities' (A/RES/71/128, PP19).

Addressing climate change requires a context-specific approach through strategic partnerships. The GA highlights the need to 'tak[e] into account the specific needs and special circumstances of developing countries, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change (A/RES/75/217, OP2). For example, the GA recognises that Africa contributes the least to climate change but is one of the regions most vulnerable and most exposed to its adverse impacts (i.e., A/RES/76/297, OP13; A/RES/77/270, OP15). The GA further encourages closer partnerships between the UN and the Caribbean Community (i.e., A/RES/69/265, OP4), the International Organization of la Francophonie (i.e., A/RES/69/270, OP 20(d)), the Economic Community of Central African States (i.e., A/RES/75/79, PP23; A/RES/77/86, PP30), among others, to increase the capacity of these organisations to address climate change.

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[25] Summary of Proceedings by the President of the General Assembly. United Nations Conference on the Midterm Comprehensive review of the implementation of the objectives of the decade for action 'Water for Sustainable Development 2018-2028', pp. 13.
[26] Ibid, pp. 17.
[27] PBC (2019), Co–chair Summary of the Sixth Session of the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction. Available at: https://www.unisdr.org/conference/2019/globalplatform/assets/pdf/58809_chairsummary.pdf, para. 6.

The GA proposes a variety of mechanisms to address the economic, social and environmental impacts of climate change, such as the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies (i.e., A/RES/77/271, OP10), early warning systems (i.e., A/RES/74/9, OP59; A/RES/75/90, OP55; A/RES/77/282, PP13), common risk analysis, including the use of the Index for Risk Management (i.e., A/RES/70/107, OP48; A/RES/71/128, OP60; A/RES/72/132, OP63); strengthened adaptation strategies (i.e., A/RES/74/115, OP9; A/RES/75/90, OP55; A/RES/76/128, OP9; A/RES/77/29, OP10), and adequate financial support (i.e., A/RES/71/228, PP5; A/RES/74/3, OP30(s); A/RES/74/115, OP9; A/RES/75/90, OP55; A/RES/75/217, OP2; A/RES/76/128, OP9; A/RES/77/29, OP10).

As there can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development (A/RES/76/258, Annex, para. 2), the GA encourages cooperation among diverse actors in addressing the challenge of climate change. For example, enhancing resilience in Africa requires the implementation of both development (i.e., the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme and the African Union Green Recovery Action Plan) and the security, stability and sustainability initiatives (i.e., the Climate Responses for Sustaining Peace (CRSP) initiative by Egypt at COP27) (A/RES/77/271, OP10). The GA also notes that human security questions, including food security, are integrated into agriculture policies and investment plans in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Pacific (A/RES/71/245, PP18).

- ## 2. The UN Development System

In this aide-mémoire, the authors consider the relevant UN development actors to be the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), High Level Political Forum (HLPF), and Conference of the Parties (COP) for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Even though the UN development system does not directly recognise the interlinkages between climate change and conflict, there are some notable indirect references.

- *The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)*

ECOSOC is the central forum for coordinating and guiding the UN development system. Its resolutions recognise that climate change is 'one of the greatest challenges of our time' and 'its adverse impacts undermine the ability of all countries to achieve sustainable development' (i.e., E/RES/2018/05, PP27), threatening food security, water availability and livelihoods (i.e., E/RES/2022/7, OP30). ECOSOC draws linkages between climate change and displacement – a phenomenon generally understood as a driver of conflict, including as displacement places additional pressure on host communities (i.e., E/RES/2021/17, OP63).

Similarly to the GA, ECOSOC resolutions also recognise that the 'least developed countries and small island developing States and their communities' should be particularly considered when addressing 'the need to strengthen international cooperation to prevent, reduce and address sustainably vulnerabilities related to climate change and natural disasters' (i.e., E/RES/2019/14, para. 24). Highlighting the necessity for a comprehensive response, ECOSOC recognises 'the need for an improved understanding of the multidimensional nature of disaster and the adverse effects of climate change to effectively manage risk (i.e., E/RES/2021/17, PP11).

Practically, ECOSOC resolutions include various recommendations and outline various mechanisms for addressing climate change. These include 'incorporating climate resilience in early action and increasing response preparedness' (i.e., E/RES/2022/10, para. 28), supporting 'adaptation to and mitigation of climate change, [strengthening] disaster risk reduction and multi-hazard early warning systems' (i.e., E/RES/2019/14, para. 23), and incorporating 'climate-related vulnerability [...] into national development plans and strategies for eradicating poverty and reducing inequality' (i.e., E/RES/2018/05, para. 32), among others. In line with the Sendai

Framework, the ECOSOC also 'underline[d] the importance of tackling the underlying disaster risk drivers, of considering the impact of climate change, and of integrating a disaster risk reduction perspective into preparedness, response and recovery, taking into account longer-term climate projections and multi-hazard risk assessments, focusing on people in vulnerable situations' (i.e., E/RES/2019/14, para. 22).

- *Sustainable Developments Goals*

The 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) recognise that climate change is 'one of the greatest challenges of our time' and that 'its adverse impacts undermine the ability of all countries to achieve sustainable development' (A/RES/70/1, para. 14). A specific goal (SDG13) focuses on combating climate change and its impacts and prompts action towards climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction and early warning, and the fulfilment of climate finance commitments, in conjunction with other SDG goals[28]. Ultimately, all SDGs support climate action, as all the goals are interdependent. Follow-up ministerial and political declarations adapted during the annual High-Level Political Forums (HLPF) recognise 'that sustainable development cannot be realised without peace and security and that peace and security will be at risk without sustainable development' and consequently 'factors that give rise to violence, insecurity and injustice, such as inequality, corruption, poor governance and illicit financial and arms flows, are addressed in the 2030 Agenda' (E/HLS/2022/1, para. 131). Member States 'acknowledge that climate change has already caused and will increasingly cause loss and damage and that [...] impacts from climate and weather extremes [...[ will pose an ever-greater social, economic and environmental threat (E/HLS/2022/1, para. 106).

There are various tools to address climate change risks through the SDG framework. The political and ministerial declarations call to limit the "increase in the global average temperature' (E/HLS/2022/1, para. 98), and 'accelerate the development, deployment and dissemination of technologies and the adoption of policies to transition towards low emission energy systems' (E/HLS/2022/1, para. 101), and emphasise that 'mitigation of and adaptation to climate change represent an immediate and urgent priority' (A/RES/74/4, Annex, para. 11).

The Addis Agenda provides a global framework for financing sustainable development, which supports implementation of the 2030 Agenda, including the SDG13. It recognises that 'extreme climate events endanger the lives and livelihoods of millions' and specifically promotes an investment 'in promoting inclusive and sustainable industrial development' (Action 15) through 'funding from all sources, including public and private, bilateral and multilateral, as well as alternative sources of finance' (Action 60). It calls for specific attention to 'developing countries, including least developed countries, landlocked developing countries, small island developing States, African countries and countries in conflict and post-conflict situations' (Action 115). The Addis Agenda established an annual ECOSOC Forum on Financing for Development (FfD Forum), an intergovernmental process with universal participation mandated to review the means of implementation of SDGs and the 2030 Agenda.

- *The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)*

While 'the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the primary international, intergovernmental forum for negotiating the global response to climate change' (A/RES/70/1, para. 31; 2021 HLPF Ministerial Declaration, para. 20), the UNFCCC sessions do not openly draw the linkages between climate and security. The Paris Agreement, adopted by 196 parties at COP21

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[28] The most direct connection to SDG13 is found in SDG6 on clean water and sanitation (because of the impact of climate change on water resources and water security), SDG7 on affordable and clean energy (because the pollution caused by fossil energy sources is one of the causes of climate change) and SDG12 on responsible consumption and production (as those patterns impact climate change). However, SDG13 cannot be implemented without peaceful, just and inclusive societies (SDG16) and gender equality (SDG5), among others.

in 2015 and entered into force in 2016, remains confined to the development sphere, referring to 'the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty' (Paris Agreement, Art. 2) and mentioning only food security and vulnerabilities of food production systems. The Glasgow Climate Pact, adopted at COP26 in 2021, 'acknowledges that climate change [...] will pose an ever-greater social, economic and environmental threat' (Glasgow Climate Pact, para. 61) and 'underscore[d] [...] the need to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change in the context of sustainable development' (Glasgow Climate Pact, para. 50), while 'acknowledg[ing] the important role of a broad range of stakeholders at the local, national and regional level, including indigenous peoples and local communities, in averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change' (Glasgow Climate Pact, para. 62).

The Egyptian Presidency of COP27, at the same time, launched the Climate Responses for Sustaining Peace (CRSP) initiative that aims to strengthen the interlinkages between climate adaptation and peacebuilding, advance durable solutions to the climate-displacement nexus, and accelerate climate finance for sustaining peace. While not constituting 'agreed language' among Member states or an official product of the COP27, the Presidential Initiative illustrates the growing importance of climate, peace and security in international policy discussions.

- ### 3. The UN Peace and Security Architecture

The role of the UN peace and security architecture in addressing the interlinkages between climate and peace and security is determined by the mandates of two of the intergovernmental bodies relevant to the UN peace and security architecture: the UN Security Council (UNSC) and Peacebuilding Commission (PBC).

- *The UN Security Council (UNSC)*

Under Article 24 (1) of the UN Charter, the UNSC is the primary organ of the UN with the responsibility for 'the maintenance of international peace and security'. However, the precise definition of 'peace and security' remains open to interpretation by Member States, especially in the context of the interlinkages between climate change and peace and security.

Member States hold at least three different positions regarding the Security Council's relevance in addressing the impacts of climate change.

- First, some Member States encourage considering climate change as a peace and security issue, suggesting that it is in line with the UNSC's determination 'to enhance the effectiveness of the UN in preventing armed conflicts and to monitor closely situations of potential armed conflict' (S/RES/1625, PP6), suggesting, for example, that 'the dangers that small islands and their populations face are no less serious than those faced by nations and peoples threatened by guns and bombs' (S/PV.5663, pp. 28-29). Member States highlight 'mounting evidence of how climate change increases instability and insecurity in places as diverse as the Sahel, the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caribbean and Pacific Island States' (S/PV.8451, p. 10). Some of the proposed ways for the UNSC to support climate action could include 1) the deployment of dedicated staff such as the Climate Security Advisors and the appointment of a special representative of the Secretary General on climate and security; 2) leveraging existing mechanisms such as the Climate Security Mechanism; 3) integrating climate data in Early Warning Systems and other data and reporting tools, including regular reporting of the Secretary General to the UNSC; 4) incorporating climate risks in mandates of peacekeeping and special political missions; 5) encouraging climate-informed mediation, peacebuilding initiatives, and peace operations; among others.

- Second, some Member States oppose the consideration of climate change as a peace and security issue, suggesting that 'an optimal and effective solution to the problem of climate change can be found only through an integrated approach addressing climate change in the context of sustainable development' and via the tools offered by the UNFCCC (S/PV.5663, pp. 9-10) because 'the Security Council lacks expertise in climate change and the necessary means and resources' (S/PV.6587, p. 9).
- Third, some Member States believe the Security Council's engagement in addressing climate-induced risks should be nuanced. In this, Member States suggest that, while the UNSC should support the host countries' efforts — at their request — to increase local resilience, this does not mean that the organ should have a mandate to address climate change (S/PV.9345, p. 18) and must 'assist based on actual needs and priorities' (S/PV.8451, p. 11).

In a Presidential Statement, the UNSC 'expresse[d] its concern that possible adverse effects of climate change may, in the long run, *aggravate* certain existing threats to international peace and security' (S/PRST/2011/15, para. 6). See Annex 3 for an overview of the evolution of the climate, peace and security in the UNSC.

**The UNSC Context-Specific Action:**

Country- and region-specific UNSC resolutions and presidential statements recognise that climate change may exacerbate security vulnerabilities and risks. These include:

- *Africa*: The UNSC stressed that Africa is 'one of the regions that contributes the least to climate change yet is extremely vulnerable and exposed to the adverse effects of climate change' (S/PRST/2022/6, para. 15), and that Africa still faces 'enormous challenges, including the effects of climate change and natural disasters' (S/RES/2457, PP5). It highlighted several climate change risks that have an impact on the stability of a number of the AU Member States, including floods, droughts, heatwaves, forest fires, storms, cyclones, and slow-onset events such as the rise of sea levels, and changing and unpredictable rainfall patterns, that contribute to the stability of the region' (S/RES/2457, OP18, S/PRST/2021/21, para. 35, S/PRST/2021/10, para. 17; S/PRST/2022/6, para. 15). To guide action, the UNSC 'call[ed] upon the UN and international community to support risk assessments, regional and national dialogues, and capacity building to mitigate risks' (S/PRST/2022/6, para. 15).

- *Cyprus*: In 2021, the UNSC 'urg[ed] the sides to step up their efforts to promote intercommunal contacts, reconciliation and the active engagement of civil society, in particular women and youth, and recognis[ed] that regular, effective contact and communication between the sides [...] helps to address island-wide matters, including migration, health, crime, environmental protection, and issues related to the adverse impacts of climate change' (S/RES/2561, PP14; S/RES/2587, PP13; S/RES/2646, PP13; S/RES/2618, PP13; S/RES/2674, PP13).

- *Haiti:* The UNSC recognised the impact of severe weather events, such as droughts and natural disasters (earthquakes, hurricanes, and other weather phenomena) on Haiti's stability and security situation, including on food security and nutrition, health security, internal displacement, and access to social infrastructure (S/RES/1840, PP5; S/RES/2243, PP 15(2015)); S/RES/2313, PP20; S/RES/2476, PP7; S/RES/2692, PPs1, 2) and emphasised 'the need for adequate disaster risk assessment and response capabilities by the Government of Haiti relating to these factors' (S/RES/2476, PP7; S/RES/2600, PP9).

- ***Iraq***: In 2021, the UNSC 'recognis[ed] that the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes, and natural disasters, among other factors, can contribute to desertification and drought, the humanitarian situation and stability in Iraq', and 'emphasis[ed] the need for comprehensive risk assessments by the Government of Iraq with the support of the UN, upon the request of the Government of Iraq, to take meaningful actions to adapt to or mitigate challenges posed by climate change' (S/RES/2576, PP8; S/RES/2631, PP11; S/RES/2682, PP9). The UNSC further 'request[ed] that the Special Representative of the Secretary–General [to] further advise, support, and assist the Government of Iraq on facilitating regional dialogue and cooperation, including on issues of border security, energy, trade, environment, water, adverse impacts of climate change in particular those contributing to desertification and drought, resilience building, infrastructure, public health, and refugees' (S/RES/2576, OP4(b)(iv)); S/RES/2631, OP2(b)(iv)); S/RES/2682, OP2(b)(iv)). In 2023, the UNSC encouraged the government to deliver on reforms, aimed at 'combat[ing] climate change and environmental and water related challenges' (S/RES/2682, PP5)

- ***Lake Chad Basin***: In 2017, the UNSC 'recognis[ed] the adverse effects of climate change and ecological changes among other factors on the stability of the [Great Lakes] Region, including through water scarcity, drought, desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity, and emphasise[d] the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies by governments and the United Nations relating to these factors" (S/RES/2349, OP26).

- ***Mali***: Since 2018, the UNSC 'recognis[es] the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, on the stability of Mali, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity, and emphasis[ed] the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies by the government of Mali and the United Nations relating to these factors' (S/RES/2423, PP28; S/RES/2480, PP15; S/RES/2531, PP17; S/RES/2640, PP17). Further, the UNSC 'note[d] the importance for the Government of Mali and the UN to take into consideration, as appropriate, the security implications of the adverse effects of climate change and other ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, in their activities, programs and strategies in Mali' (S/RES/2423, OP68).

- ***Somalia***: Between 2018 and 2023,  the UNSC continues to 'recognis[e] the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters among other factors on the stability of Somalia, including through drought, desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity, and emphas[e] the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies by governments and the UN relating to these factors' (S/RES/2431, PP 22; S/RES/2408, PP 18; S/RES/2461, PP 15; S/RES/2472, PP9; S/RES/2520, PP14; S/RES/2540, PP 22; S/RES/2568, PP15; S/RES/2592, PP 24; S/RES/2628, PP25; S/RES/2657, PP15; S/RES/2687, PP21). In 2019, the UNSC 'requested the Secretary General to provide information of such assessments in mandated reporting as appropriate' (S/RES/2461, OP21; S/RES/2540, OP13; S/RES/2592, OP15) and emphasised the need to 'mak[e] maximum use of development financing in Somalia, including in response to climate change, flooding, [and] drought' (S/RES/2592, OP6(m)). In 2022, the UNSC 'recall[ed] its Presidential Statement S/PRST/2011/15 [and] the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement' (S/RES/2657, PP15) and expanded language to encourage '[the] coordination with OCHA to ensure a needs-based distribution of humanitarian aid, [and the] develop[ment of] an inter-ministerial strategy for enabling proper adaptation, reducing the risks and mitigating the impacts of climate change in Somalia' (S/RES/2657, PP14).

- **Sudan - South Sudan**: In 2018, the UNSC 'recognis[ed] the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, on the situation in Darfur, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity' (S/RES/2429, PP21) and 'request[ed] the UN and the Government of Sudan to consider the adverse implications of climate change, other ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, in their programmes in Darfur, including by undertaking risk assessments and risk management strategies relating to these factors and further requests the Secretary General to provide information of such assessments in mandated reporting as appropriate' (S/RES/2429, OP47). In 2021, the UNSC updated the language and 'emphasis[ed] the need for comprehensive risk assessments and risk management strategies by the GoSS and the UN to inform programs relating to these factors' (S/RES/2567, PP26; S/RES/2524, PP7; S/RES/2579, PP9). Follow-up resolutions 'acknowledg[ed] the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement' (S/RES/2625, PP25; S/RES/2677, PP24). The UNSC called upon the UN 'to contribute, in close coordination with humanitarian actors, to the creation of security conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, [...] including by providing gender-sensitive risk assessments on the adverse effects of climate change' (S/RES/2625, OP3(b)(i)); S/RES/2677, OP3(b)(i))). Finally, in 2023, the UNSC also 'request[ed] the Secretary General to [submit] a comprehensive written report [and] underscor[ed] that such reporting should provide integrated, evidence-based and data-driven analysis, strategic assessments and frank advice to the Security Council and should include attention to: analysis of risks associated with climate change that may adversely impact peace and security in South Sudan, and implementation of the UNMISS mandate' (S/RES/2677, OP32).

- **The Central African Region**: In 2018, the UNSC 'recognise[d] the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters among other factors on the stability of the Central Africa Region, including through drought, desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity' and 'continue[d] to stress the need for long-term strategies by governments and the UN, based on risk assessments, to support stabilisation and build resilience' (S/PRST/2018/17, para. 9). Between 2018 and 2022, several resolutions cited the same language regarding interlinkages between climate change and stability in the Central African Region (S/RES/2448, PP21; S/RES/2499, PP15; S/RES/2552, PP18; S/RES/2605, PP22; and S/RES/2659, PP23). The UNSC 'further encourag[ed] UNOCA to take into consideration climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters among other factors affecting the stability of the Central African Region, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity, continues to stress the need for long-term strategies by governments and the UN, based on risk assessments, to support stabilisation and build resilience' (S/PRST/2019/10, para. 5).

- **The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)**: In 2019, the UNSC 'recognis[ed] the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes, natural disasters, and lack of energy access, among other factors, on the stability of the DRC, including through increasingly frequent and extreme weather phenomena, flooding, forest fires, erratic precipitation and food insecurity, welcoming the leadership of the DRC in the development of national strategies to address these issues and in the preservation of the Congo basin forest' (S/RES/2502, PP13; S/RES/2556, PP15; S/RES/2612, PP15; S/RES/2666, PP15). In 2022, the UNSC also 'express[ed] concern regarding the activities of armed groups in protected areas that lead to environmental damage and acknowledg[ed] the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement' (S/RES/2666, PP15).

- **West Africa and the Sahel:** In 2015, the UNSC 'encourage[d] further progress by the United Nations system and its partners towards the implementation of the United Nations

Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS), [...] in order to assist in addressing the security and political challenges to the stability and development of the Sahel region and reaffirm[ed] its continued commitment to address such challenges, which are interrelated with humanitarian and development issues as well as the adverse effects of climate and ecological changes' (S/PRST/2015/24, para. 1; S/PRST/2016/11, para. 18). The UNSC echoed this language in 2017, while also 'highlight[ing] the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies relating to climate change impacts' (S/PRST/2017/10, para. 21; S/PRST/2017/2, para. 17; S/PRST/2018/3, para. 18; S/PRST/2019/7, para. 25; S/PRST/2020/7, para. 18; S/PRST/2020/2, para. 18; S/PRST/2021/16, para. 7; S/PRST/2021/3, para. 13). Since 2017, the UNSC expressed concern over the overall humanitarian situation in the region, 'characterised by [...] adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes, natural disasters and epidemics, which contribute to the high levels of structural, chronic and acute vulnerability in the region and continue to affect populations' (S/PRST/2018/16, para. 18; S/PRST/2018/3, para. 21), including 'increased tensions between pastoralists and farmers in the region driven by competition for natural resources, rapid population growth, weak governance, pressures related to climate and ecological factors, and the circulation of small arms and light weapons, and encourage[ed] ECOWAS and its Member States, with the support of UNOWAS, to address these challenges in a coordinated and holistic manner' (S/PRST/2018/16, para. 15; S/PRST/2019/7, para. 20). In 2019, the UNSC 'welcom[ed] the decision of the Secretary General to conduct a strategic review[29] regarding the scope of UNOWAS' mandate and activities [and] invite[d] the Secretary General to present to the Council its recommendations as well as his observations on these recommendations, including on potential areas of improvement or new or refocused priorities, including on [...] effects of climate change on security' (S/PRST/2019/7, para. 5).

**The UNSC Thematic Action:**

The UNSC is less likely to refer to climate, peace and security in thematic resolutions and presidential statements. However, the following exceptions are notable:

- ***Women, Peace and Security and Climate:*** As a result of the leadership of women peacebuilders[30], the 2015 UNSC Resolution 2242 on Women, Peace and Security noted 'the changing global context of peace and security, in particular relating to [...] the impacts of climate change' and reiterated 'its intention to increase attention to women, peace and security as a cross-cutting subject in all relevant thematic areas of work on [the UNSC] agenda' (S/RES/2242, PP13). In its following resolutions on South Sudan, the UNSC encouraged 'gender-sensitive risk assessments on the adverse effects of climate change' (S/RE/2625, OP3(b)(i)); S/RES/2677, OP3(b)(i))).

- ***Youth, Peace and Security and Climate:*** In 2020, the UNSC 'recognised that [...] that young people play a unique role in strengthening the national, local and community-based capacities in conflict and post-conflict situations to prepare for and respond to increasingly frequent and severe weather events and natural disasters' (S/RES/2535, OP10).

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[29] UN Secretary General (19 Nov. 2019), Report on the strategic review of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel, 10 September–17 October 2019. Available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2019_890.pdf

[30] GPPAC (12 Aug. 2020), Operationalising the Peace-Development-Humanitarian Nexus through the Boe Declaration in the Pacific. Available at: https://gppac.net/resources/operationalising-peace-development-humanitarian-nexus-through-boe-declaration-pacific, p. 2.

- *The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)*

The PBC was established as intergovernmental advisory body with the main purposes of 'bring[ing] together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery', [...] support[ing] the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development', and 'provid[ing] recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the UN' ([S/RES/1645](), OP 2(c)). Since its inception, the PBC has engaged with a total of 26 countries and regions, the majority in Africa but also Latin America, Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands.[31] In 15 of these contexts, the interlinkages between climate and peace and security were discussed. See the description of country- and region-specific discussions below.

Member States discussed that 'the PBC bridging role on UN systems coherence coupled with stronger synergies between the PBC and ECOSOC can contribute to improved support for coordination of partners and policy coherence at various levels [and] to sustain international partners' attention [and support resource mobilisation] on ongoing and new initiatives [, including in the Sahel] that aim to tackle development and peace challenges triggered by climate change effects'[32]. The PBC Chair highlighted the PBC as uniquely placed to demonstrate that peacebuilding goes beyond security issues, referring to socioeconomic and environmental issues, including climate change and human rights challenges, as recurring causes of conflict or exacerbating fragile situations[33]. Specifically, the Chair noted that the PBC can address the adverse impacts of climate change on peacebuilding, including through utilising existing efforts to collect climate data, incorporating climate-related indicators in the nationally owned peacebuilding efforts, and supporting adaptation measures at the local and national level[34].

In the eyes of its Member States, the PBC provides a platform to develop a holistic approach interconnecting peace, humanitarian and development nexus at the community and national levels[35] and a coherent approach, which addresses all drivers of conflict, from the adverse effects of climate change to weak governance and human rights challenges is required to build more inclusive societies, based on trust, social cohesion, and human rights[36]. Such a holistic and coherent approach is seen to be conflict-sensitive and context-specific [and responsive] to the

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[31] GA& UNSC (17 Feb. 2023) Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its sixteenth session. Available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/A_77_720%20S_2023_86.pdf
[32] ECOSOC & PBC (13 Nov. 2018), Joint Meeting on Linkages between Climate Change and the Challenges of Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace in the Sahel. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_chair_remarks_at_the_joint_pbc-_ecosoc_meeting_13_nov_-_final.pdf, pp. 4-5.
[33] PBC (29 Mar. 2023), Chair's Summary of the Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on Mozambique. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/draft_chairs_summary_29.03.2023_mozambique.pdf, p. 1.
[34] PBC (30 Jan, 2023), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on Peacebuilding on the New Agenda for Peace: Chair's summary. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/230130_chairs_summary_pbc_new_agenda_for_peace_final_0.pdf, para. 4.
[35] ECOSOC & PBC (19 Nov. 2020), Joint Meeting on 'Fostering global solidarity and conflict-sensitive responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and its socio-economic impacts'. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/ecosoc-pbc_joint_meeting_informal_summary.pdf, p. 4; ECOSOC & PBC (2 Dec. 2022), Joint Meeting on 'Peacebuilding, Sustaining Peace and Sustainable Development: Towards Coherence and Impact on the Ground': Informal Summary. Available at: https://www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/documents/2023/joint-meeting-of-ecosoc-and-pbc_summary.pdf, p.5; PBC (31 Jan. 2023), Ambassadorial-level meeting on South-Sudan Building Peace in Communities through Local Governance and Community Reconciliation in South Sudan. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/230131_pbc_meeting_on_south_sudan_chairs_summary_final.pdf, para. 5.
[36] PBC (30 Jan. 2023), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on Peacebuilding on the New Agenda for Peace: Chair's summary. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/230130_chairs_summary_pbc_new_agenda_for_peace_final_0.pdf, para. 3.

priorities of the governments involved[37]. The PBC discussions touched on the link between conservation efforts, peace, security and sustainable development[38], the effect of the degradation of the maritime environment associated with climate change on the livelihoods of coastal communities and the hurdle for engaging in illicit activities,[39] the ways in which climate and environmental changes undermine human security and social cohesion, as land degradation due to drought and the fall in forage production are adding more pressure on the renewal of natural resources and pastures,[40] among others described below. In many of these meetings, the PBC recognised that the challenges to peacebuilding and sustaining peace have been exacerbated by climate change and the changing nature of conflict dynamics[41] and that the adverse effects of climate change have pushed the most affected countries further off track from achieving SDGs.[42] Many Member States of the PBC called for leveraging the concepts of climate-resilient peacebuilding and conflict-sensitive adaption optimally to advance prevention and the 2030 Agenda, particularly in conflict-prone countries[43].

**Context-Specific PBC Discussions:**

The PBC listens to countries that have raised concerns about the interlinkages between climate and security. It focused on delivering the support that the PBC can offer, including by providing a platform to raise awareness about climate security challenges.[44] In several contexts where the PBC has been engaged, environment and climate-related challenges were considered as factors that could have a negative impact on peacebuilding and sustaining peace efforts. Specific country and regional contexts, where the climate challenges were discussed by the PBC include:

- *Africa:* Several PBC meetings have been convened in the period from 2015-2023 regarding the growing consensus over the implications of climate change hazards on security in Africa, and the ways in which Africa as a continent has been increasingly

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[37] ECOSOC & PBC (19 Nov. 2020), Joint Meeting on 'Fostering global solidarity and conflict-sensitive responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and its socio-economic impacts'. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/ecosoc-pbc_joint_meeting_informal_summary.pdf, p.4; ECOSOC & PBC (15 Dec. 2021), Joint Meeting on 'Promoting Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in the Context of Recovery from the COVID-19 Pandemic': Informal Summary. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/informal_summary_of_the_ecosoc-pbc_joint_meeting.pdf, para. 10.
[38] PBC (12 May 2020), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on Papua New Guinea. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_chairs_summary_png_-_final.pdf, para. 4.
[39] PBC (20 June 2021), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary._piracy_in_the_gulf_of_guinea_mtg.pdf, para 2.
[40] PBC (29 Nov. 2022), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on Guinea-Bissau: Chair's Summary. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/29112022_chairs_summary_pbc_meeting_on_guinea-bissau_final.pdf, para. 5.
[41] ECOSOC & PBC (2 Dec. 2022) Joint Meeting on 'Peacebuilding, sustaining peace and sustainable development: Towards coherence and impact on the ground': Informal Summary. Available at:
https://www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/documents/2023/joint-meeting-of-ecosoc-and-pbc_summary.pdf, p. 5; PBC (20 Dec. 2022), Arria Formula Meeting of the Security Council: Inputs for the PBC Chair's remarks. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_chair_remarks_to_sc_arria_formula_mtg_-_approved.pdf, para. 2; PBC (26 Jan. 2023), UNSC Open Debate on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace: Investing in people to enhance resilience against complex challenges: Remarks by the Chair. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/230118_chairs_remarks_to_open_debate_on_pb_and_sp_-_approved.pdf, para. 2; PBC (20 Feb. 2023), UNGA Meeting on causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa: Statement by the Chair. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/20_feb_2023_pbc_statement_to_the_ga_on_sustaining_peace_in_africa_rev3_-_approved.pdf, para. 3.
[42] Supra, note 41.
[43] ECOSOC & PBC (2 Dec. 2022), Joint Meeting on 'Peacebuilding, sustaining peace and sustainable development: Towards coherence and impact on the ground': Informal Summary. Available at:
https://www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/documents/2023/joint-meeting-of-ecosoc-and-pbc_summary.pdf, p. 5.
[44] PBC (17 May 2020), Chair's Remarks at the UN University World Institute for Development Economics Research Conference Plenary Session on 'conflict legacies and post-conflict recovery'. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/051722_pbc_chair_remarks_-_wider_conference.pdf, para. 2.

exposed to climate change risks. In November of 2021, during the Fourth Annual informal consultative meeting between the AU's Peace and Security Council and the PBC, Member States underlined the necessity to do more for climate change and environmental protection to enable effective peacebuilding in Africa[45]. In October 2022, in its advice to the UNSC, the PBC noted that climate change 'may undermine Africa's long-term stability and sustainable development'[46] and encouraged 'more coordinated efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change on development and peacebuilding in some regions of Africa [...], underscor[ing] the primary role of UNFCCC to address the issue of climate change comprehensively'[47]. At the November 2022 Fifth Annual informal consultative meeting between the AU's Peace and Security Council and the PBC, Member States recognised that climate change is a multifaceted challenge that disproportionately affects vulnerable groups and communities, particularly women and youth, and called for proactive and effective measures to avert the effect of climate change on peace and security, including 1) the use of official and accurate data to guide response to climate threats, 2) increased investment into early warning and prevention systems along with the AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) policy framework, 3) support for strong regional, national, and local leadership of climate-related initiatives, 4) strengthening institutions, 5) building community capacity in climate change mitigation and adaptation, 6) increased coordination with international partners, 7) gender and youth-responsive approaches in climate-related peacebuilding, noting the need for interventions to be sensitive to the needs and amplify the voices of women and youth, [and] mainstream[ing] climate-induced security risk in the AU peace and security architecture and its ongoing reforms[48].

- ■ ***Burundi***: The PBC discussions acknowledged that 'climate change adversely affects the population of Burundi, as natural disasters have led to high numbers of internally displaced persons[49], as the government called upon the international community to mobilise resources to help combat negative effects of climate change[50].

- ■ ***Chad***: In 2021, the PBC Member States noted that climate change could trigger intercommunal conflicts related to the transhumance period in Chad and called upon international partners and UN entities to enhance integrated support developing a holistic multidimensional approach with the aim of sustaining peace and development[51].

[45] PBC (11 Nov. 2021), Fourth Annual informal consultative meeting between the AU's Peace and Security Council and the PBC. Chair's Summary. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_of_aupsc_and_pbc_mtg.pdf, para. 6.
[46] Chair of the PBC (10 Oct. 2022), Letter dated addressed to the President of the UNSC. Available at:
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3990689, para. 2.
[47] Ibid, para. 13.
[48] PBC (28 Nov. 2022), Fifth Annual informal consultative meeting between the AU's Peace and Security Council and the PBC. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary-_annual_informal_consultative_meeting_between_the_aupsc_and_unpbc_final.pdf, paras. 8, 11, 13, 14.
[49] The Chair of the Burundi Configuration of the PBC (24 Mar. 2020), Letter on Burundi to the President of the UNSC. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3856426?ln=zh_CN, p. 4; *see also*, PBC (17 Mar. 2021), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on Burundi: Chair's Summary. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary._burundi_config_meeting_17_march_2021.pdf, p. 4; PBC (30 Nov. 2022), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on Burundi: Chair's Summary. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_pbc_burundi_30_nov_2022_.final.pdf, para 4.
[50] PBC (17 Mar. 2021), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on Burundi: Chair's Summary. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary._burundi_config_meeting_17_march_2021.pdf, p. 4; *see also*, PBC (6 July 2021), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on Burundi: Chair's Summary. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_6_july_2021_meeting_on_burundi.pdf; PBC (2 Nov. 2021), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on Burundi: Chair's Summary. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/211209_pbc_chairs_summary_on_burundi.pdf.
[51] PBC (2 Dec. 2021), Meeting on the transitional roadmap on Chad. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_of_chad_meeting_2_december_2021.final_.pdf, p. 4

- *Colombia*: In 2021, the PBC Member States highlighted the interrelationship between peace and development and referenced the importance of climate security in advancing sustaining peace in Colombia, as the country needs further support to resolve conflicts around land distribution, titling and adaptation, as well as fighting against illicit economies and organised crime and its direct effects on climate security[52].

- *Great Lakes Region*: In 2022, the PBC Member States recognised the adverse effects of climate change on the region and stressed the importance of sustainable natural resource management, increased investment and support to adaptation and mitigation measures, with a view to preventing its worsening implications on the overall peace and security of the region[53]. Later, in the follow-up, PBC advice to the UNSC noted that 'the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the adverse effects of climate change have hampered socio-economic progress, causing additional strains on social cohesion and peacebuilding efforts thereby exacerbating instability and negatively affecting development in the region'[54].

- *Lake Chad*: During the meetings on Lake Chad Basin in 2020 and 2022, the PBC Member States discussed the multi-faceted challenges facing the region, including climate change, and its impact on livelihoods[55] and the direct linkages between the herders-farmers conflict and climate change and environmental degradation[56].

- *Liberia*: The PBC supported Liberia's priorities, including mitigating the impact of climate change. The 2017 Liberia's Peacebuilding Plan recognised that 'the impacts of climate variability and change, which further exacerbate the country's socio-economic development challenges, [including] the exploitation and competition for natural resources, which contributes to ongoing social tension and conflict' and underscores 'the fragile nature of peace consolidation in circumstances where the commercial interest in exploiting ecosystem assets and human security priorities intersect'[57]. The Chair of the PBC Liberia Configuration similarly noted that 'Liberia had been identified as a country at extreme risk of vulnerability to climate change and climate-related shocks and emphasised the need for continued attention to the adverse effects of climate change on peacebuilding efforts in Liberia'[58].

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[52] PBC (15 Nov. 2021), Ambassadorial-level meeting on Colombia. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/211115_pbc_chairs_summary_colombia_meeting.pdf, paras. 8-9.
[53] PBC (31 Oct. 2022), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on the Great Lakes Region. Chair's Summary. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_-_pbc_meeting_on_the_great_lakes_region.pdf, para. 7.
[54] PBC (26 Oct. 2022), Advice to the UNSC on the Great Lakes. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/20102022_pbc_draft_advice_great_lakes_region_-_approved.pdf, para. 2
[55] PBC (20 Apr. 2022), Ambassadorial-level meeting on Lake Chad Basin. Chair's Summary. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/220420_chairs_summary_lake_chad_basin_commission_meeting_final.pdf, p. 4.
[56] PBC (9 Sep. 2020), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting of the PBC on the impact of COVID19 in the Lake Chad Basin: Chair's Summary, Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_sumamry_pbc_mtg_lake_chad_basin.pdf, para. 3.
[57] Republic of Liberia and UNMIL (4 Apr. 2017), The Liberia Peacebuilding Plan. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/040417_sg_letter_of_4_april_liberia.pdf, p. 13.
[58] PBC (May 2021), Report of the Chair of the Liberia Configuration's consultations with International Financial Institutions. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/report_of_pbc_liberia_configuration_chairs_consultations_with_ifis_.pdf, p. 5; PBC (Mar. 2023), Report of the Chair of the Liberia Configuration's consultations with International Financial Institutions. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/report_of_the_chair_of_the_liberia_configuration_of_the_pbc_consultations_with_ifis_march_2023.final_.pdf, p. 3.

■ *Mozambique:* In 2023, the PBC Chair highlighted that peacebuilding goes beyond security issues, referring to socioeconomic and environmental issues, including climate change and human rights challenges, as recurring causes of conflict or exacerbating fragile situations.[59] In this vein, development challenges, such as poverty, limited human capital accumulation, and lack of job opportunities, are recognised as being compounded by the impact of climate change and other peace and security threats present in the Cabo Delgado province'[60].

■ *Pacific Islands:* The PBC discussions on the situation in the Pacific noted that climate change represents one of the most pressing security challenges and the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific[61]. Member States from the Pacific emphasised cross-cutting and force-multiplying nature of the climate threat, which already undermines health, food security, development goals, disaster resilience, COVID-19 pandemic recovery efforts, territorial integrity and social cohesion in the region, and has disproportionate effect on the disadvantaged, persons with disabilities as well as women and girls[62]. The PBF supported climate security projects, including strengthening the capacities of national and regional authorities in the Pacific for climate risk assessment and responsiveness[63]. In 2017, discussing the situation in the Solomon Islands, the PBC Member States highlighted the importance of adopting a coherent approach that takes into account the direct linkage of climate change impact on political, development and security issues and the need to build upon some of the key sources of resilience, including the strong customary institutions surrounding land and kinship, to help manage the current-day challenges facing the country, including those associated with climate change[64]. Member States also reiterated the critical value of supporting local solutions, placing people at the centre so as to learn from those practitioners and grass-root organisations who are directly affected by climate change[65]. The follow-up 2021 and 2022 PBC discussions stressed the impact of climate change could threaten social cohesion, political stability and security in the region and the need for National Adaptation Plans to be more ambitious in response to climate-related security risks, including by building resilience protecting habitability which is affected by coastal erosion, drought and sea level rise, and to be fully funded with both public and private investments, [...] the importance to amplify the collective Pacific voice in relevant regional security fora[,] support local knowledge, roles of local leaders and context-sensitive approaches and strengthen state capacities, in order to address climate related

[59] PBC (29 Mar. 2023), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on Mozambique. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/draft_chairs_summary_29.03.2023_mozambique.pdf, para. 2.
[60] Supra, note 59.
[61] PBC (28 July 2020), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on theI mpact of COVID-19 on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace in the Pacific Islands: Chair's Summary. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/28072020._pbc_meeting_on_the_pacific_-_chairs_summary._final.pdf, paras. 2, 3; PBC (31 May 2022), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on the Impact of Climate Change on Peacebuilding in the Pacific Islands. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_of_pbc_meeting_on_the_pacific_islands_.pdf, para. 2.
[62] PBC (31 May 2022), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on the Impact of Climate Change on Peacebuilding in the Pacific Islands. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_of_pbc_meeting_on_the_pacific_islands_.pdf, para. 2.
[63] PBC (28 July 2020), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on the Impact of COVID-19 on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace in the Pacific Islands: Chair's Summary. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/28072020._pbc_meeting_on_the_pacific_-_chairs_summary._final.pdf, paras. 3, 7.
[64] PBC (7 June 2017), Informal Meeting on Solomon Islands. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_solomon_islands_chairs_summary_-_final.pdf, p. 3.
[65] PBC (28 July 2020), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on the Impact of COVID-19 on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace in the Pacific Islands: Chair's Summary. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuildPeacebuilding Commission Informal Meeting on the Solomon Islands 7 June 2017ing/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/28072020._pbc_meeting_on_the_pacific_-_chairs_summary._final.pdf, para. 4.

security challenges, [and the urgency] to identify, examine and monitor climate security risks, as well as to develop scalable solutions[66].

- ■ **_Sahel / Lake Chad Basin_**: From the period of 2015-2023, nineteen (19) PBC documents include references to climate change issues and its interlinkages with peace and security issues in the Sahel[67]. The Sahel was coined by the PBC as an increasingly complex and vulnerable region where many nomadic, pastoral and farming communities have been affected by conflict and tensions linked to climate change, security dynamics and competition over natural resources[68]. Climate change is regarded as an 'underlying' and 'structural' driver of instability and insecurity in the region[69]. At these meetings, the PBC highlighted that climate change impacts on the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin – including desertification, droughts, floods and food insecurity — all pose grave threats to generations of human and development gains.[70]  The PBC Member States reiterate[d] the

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[66] PBC (31 May 2022), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on the Impact of Climate Change on Peacebuilding in the Pacific Islands. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_of_pbc_meeting_on_the_pacific_islands_.pdf, paras. 3, 4.
[67] The President of the UNSC and the Chair of the PBC (19 June 2017), Informal interactive dialogue between the UNSC and PBC on the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, and the PBC Advisory role to the UNSC. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/sc-pbc_iid_19june2017_-_summary_-_final.pdf; The Chair of the PBC (13 Nov. 2018), Statement to the ECOSOC-PBC Joint Meeting on Linkages between Climate Change and the Challenges of Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace in the Sahel. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_chair_remarks_at_the_joint_pbc-_ecosoc_meeting_13_nov_-_final.pdf; PBC (16 Dec. 2019), A letter to the UNSC on the UNOWAS Mandate Review. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/12.12.19_letter_of_the_chair_of_the_pbc_to_the_sc_on_the_unowas_mandate_renewal_-_approved.pdf; PBC (22 Apr. 2020), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on the Impact of COVID-19 in West Africa and the Sahel: Chair's Summary. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_of_pbc_meeting_on_covid-19_in_west_africa_and_the_sahel_22_april_2020_-_final.pdf; PBC (14 Oct. 2020), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on the Sahel region and the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS): Chair's Summary. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/20201014_chairs_summary_pbc_meeting_on_sahel_and_uniss_final.pdf; PBC (23 Oct. 2020), The Meeting of the AU's Peace and Security Council and the PBC. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/201023_-_summary_of_aupsc-pbc_mtg_-_clean.pdf; PBC (28 Apr. 2021), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on the Sahel region and the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel: Chair's Summary. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_pbc_meeting_on_sahel_and_uniss_28_april_2021.pdf; The Chair of the PBC (27 Aug. 2021), Remarks by at the UNSC Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_chair_remarks_to_sc_ad_hoc_working_group_on_conflict_prevention_and_resolution_in_africa_.pdf; PBC (22 Mar. 2022), Meeting on Climate-Related Peace and Development Challenges in the Sahel: Chair's Summary. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/20221111_g5_sahel_-_pbc_written_advice_-_approved.pdf; PBC (20 Apr. 2022) Press Statement: Peacebuilding Priorities in the Lake Chad Basin. Available at:
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2022-04-22/note-correspondents-peacebuilding-commission-press-statement-peacebuilding-priorities-the-lake-chad-basin; The Chair of the PBC (20 June 2022), Remarks to the Roundtable Session on Recurrent Crises and Sustainable Solutions: Building Resilience and Addressing Rising Food Insecurity. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/ecosoc_rountable_on_buildingresilience_and_addressing_food_insecurity.pdf; The Chair of the PBC (7 July 2022), Remarks at the UNSC Meeting on West Africa and the Sahel. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/unowas_pbc_chairs_remarks_to_the_sc_.pdf; PBC (15 Nov. 2022), Written Advice to the UNSC on the G5 Sahel. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/20221111_g5_sahel_-_pbc_written_advice_-_approved.pdf; PBC (6 Jan. 2023), Written Submission to the UNSC on West Africa and the Sahel. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/unowas_pbc_written_advice_-_approved.pdf; PBC (23 June 2023), The Ambassadorial-level Meeting on the Sahel. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/230623_chair_summary_on_the_pbc_meeting_on_the_sahel.pdf
[68] PBC (18 July 2018), Meeting of the African Union Peace and Security  and the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. Available at:  https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/180718_-_summary_of_pbc-psc_meeting_-_final.docx
[69] PBC (23 June 2023), Ambassadorial-level Meeting on the Sahel. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/230623_chair_summary_on_the_pbc_meeting_on_the_sahel.pdf
[70] ECOSOC & PBC (13 November 2018), Joint Meeting on the Linkages between Climate Change and Challenges in Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace in the Sahel: Informal Summary. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/20181220_joint_meeting_of_the_economic_and_social_council_-_finalrev.pdf, p. 2; PBC (22 April 2022), Press Statement on Peacebuilding Priorities in the Lake Chad Basin. Available at: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2022-04-22/note-correspondents-peacebuilding-

need to address the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes, natural disasters, drought, desertification, land degradation, energy access and food insecurity.[71] To this extent, the PBC Member States commended the peacebuilding efforts in the region, including mainstreaming the humanitarian development and peace nexus in the Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) as the nexus approach helps address the multitude of challenges relating to conflict, terrorism, intercommunal violence, the inclusion of women and youth, and climate change.[72] They also stressed the need to strengthen resilience to climate-related risks[73] and encouraged comprehensive and cross-border approaches to address root causes of conflict in the Sahel[74], the need to build national capacities to address climate change and sustaining peace issues, including through technology transfer to enhance longer-term recovery and resilience building[75], and the need for effective mechanisms governing access to natural resources across the region, calling on partners to adopt a common and holistic climate-sensitive approach to addressing the root causes of human insecurity in the Sahel, while also taking into consideration the importance of meaningful participation and inclusion of diverse civil society actors, including women and youth in climate and security policy and programming.[76]

- **■** *Sierra Leone*: In 2021, the PBC Member states noted the need for economic diversification as well as Sierra Leone's vulnerability to climate change and related pressures to natural resources that cause instability and stressed the importance of empowering youth green entrepreneurs[77].

- **■** *South Sudan:* The PBC Member States noted the extreme vulnerability of South Sudan to the effects of climate change, such as floods and extreme weather events, which adds to the complexity of humanitarian challenges, including livelihoods, insecurity, and infrastructure fragility[78]. During the December 2022 visit of the PBC to South Sudan,

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commission-press-statement-peacebuilding-priorities-the-lake-chad-basin, para. 2; The Chair of the PBC (20 June 2022), Remarks to the Roundtable Session on Recurrent Crises and Sustainable Solutions: Building Resilience and Addressing Rising Food Insecurity. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/ecosoc_rountable_on_buildingresilience_and_addressing_food_insecurity.pdf, p. 2; PBC (6 January 2023), Written Submission to the UNSC on West Africa and the Sahel. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/unowas_pbc_written_advice_-_approved.pdf, p. 2; PBC (25 July 2023), Peacebuilding Commission Advice to the Security Council on West Africa and the Sahel. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_advice_on_unowas_july_2023_-_approved.pdf.
[71] PBC (6 January 2023), Written Submission to the UNSC on West Africa and the Sahel. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/unowas_pbc_written_advice_-_approved.pdf, p. 2.
[72] PBC (20 April 2022), Ambassadorial-level meeting on Lake Chad Basin. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/220420_chairs_summary_lake_chad_basin_commission_meeting_final.pdf, para. 11;
[73] PBC (23 June 2023) Ambassadorial-level Meeting on the Sahel. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/230623_chair_summary_on_the_pbc_meeting_on_the_sahel.pdf
[74] PBC (16 December 2019), A letter to the UNSC on the UNOWAS Mandate Review. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/12.12.19_letter_of_the_chair_of_the_pbc_to_the_sc_on_the_unowas_mandate_renewal_-_approved.pdf, p.1.
[75] ECOSOC & PBC (13 November 2018), Joint Meeting on the Linkages between Climate Change and Challenges in Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace in the Sahel: Informal Summary. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/20181220_joint_meeting_of_the_economic_and_social_council_-_finalrev.pdf, p.4.
[76] PBC (22 March 2022), Meeting on Climate-Related Peace and Development Challenges in the Sahel: Chair's Summary. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/20221111_g5_sahel_-_pbc_written_advice_-_approved.pdf, p.4.
[77] PBC (9 December 2021), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on Sierra Leone. Chair's Summary. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/211209_pbc_chairs_summary_sierra_leone_mtg.pdf, p. 3.
[78] PBC (26 October 2022), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on South-Sudan Building Peace through Institutions and Governance in South Sudan. Chair's Summary. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/20221026_pbc_meeting_on_south_sudan_chairs_summary_clean.pdf, para. 10.

Member States highlighted that sub-national violence driven by multiple factors, including extreme weather events also related to climate change, continues to directly impact peace and security and exacerbate the humanitarian situation, driving up the number of people experiencing acute food insecurity and needing humanitarian assistance[79]. In follow-up, similar language is reflected in the PBC's written advice to the UNSC on the Secretary General's report on the situation on South Sudan[80].

- ***The Gambia***: In 2020, the PBC Member States recognised that the COVID-19 pandemic risked reversing investments made in priority areas of the Government's peacebuilding agenda, including climate change-induced tensions[81], and acknowledged the support provided by the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) to address these priority areas.[82]

- ***The Gulf of Guinea***: In its 2022 written submission to the UNSC, the PBC outlined the threats of climate change hazards in the Gulf of Guinea, including 'rising sea levels, increasing temperatures, and environmental threats are detrimental to coastal communities, significantly reducing fishing stocks and agricultural activities and decimating the livelihoods and social fabric of coastal communities' and underlined 'the importance of investing in climate mitigation, adaptation, and environmental protection measures within coastal communities to reduce the adverse effects of climate change and environmental degradation'.[83] The PBC also noted the need to address the political, socio-economic and environmental root causes of conflict and acknowledged the effects of climate change on maritime insecurity in the region[84]. The PBC encouraged 'substantial investment in innovative climate-smart adaptation, including sustainable economic empowerment and alternative livelihood programs, and mitigation options, including increasing awareness of climatic change'[85].

- ***Timor Leste:*** The PBC Member States recognised the challenges and opportunities facing Timor-Leste, including [in] addressing the adverse effects of climate change[86]. The opportunities include the efforts to manag[e] natural resources and natural disasters, as well as enhanc[e] resilience to the impacts of climate change, and expressed their

[79] PBC (6-9 December 2022), Visit of the PBC Delegation to South Sudan: Report. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/2023_01_24_visit_of_the_pbc_delegation_to_south_sudan_6-9_december.pdf, para. 19; *see also*, PBC (31 January 2023), Ambassadorial-level meeting on South-Sudan Building Peace in Communities through Local Governance and Community Reconciliation in South Sudan. Chair's Summary. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/230131_pbc_meeting_on_south_sudan_chairs_summary_final.pdf.

[80] PBC (6 March 2023), Written submission to the UNSC on the UNSG's report on the situation on South Sudan. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/2023_03_01_pbc_written_advice_on_unmiss_mandate_renewal_-_approved.pdf, p. 1, para. 2.

[81] PBC (15 June 2020), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on The Gambia: Chair's Summary. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_of_pbc_meeting_on_the_gambia_15_june_2020_-_final_002.pdf, p. 2.

[82] PBC (28 October 2019), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on The Gambia: Chair's Summary. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/pbc-gambia-chairs-summary-ambassadorial-level-meeting-28-october-2019, p. 3; PBC (16 June 2020), Press Release on impact of COVID-19 in The Gambia. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc-gmb-press_statement-meeting_-_final.pdf, p.2.

[83] PBC (18 November 2022), Written submission to the UNSC on Piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_written_advice_to_security_council_on_piracy_in_the_gulf_of_guinea_-_approved.pdf, p. 2.

[84] PBC (19 May 2023), Ambassadorial-level meeting on Strengthening Peacebuilding and the Implementation of the Regional Maritime Security Framework in the Gulf of Guinea. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_on_the_pbc_meeting_on_the_gulf_of_guinea_5_june.pdf, p. 4.

[85] PBC (18 November 2022), Written submission to the UNSC on Piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_written_advice_to_security_council_on_piracy_in_the_gulf_of_guinea_-_approved.pdf, p. 4.

[86] PBC (26 September 2022), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on Sharing Experiences, Good Practices and Lessons Learned in the Context of South-South and Triangular Cooperation. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_timor-leste_chairs_summary_final.pdf, paras. 5, 12.

commitment to support in mobilising coherent and coordinated international support for Timor-Leste to address its remaining challenges and meet its peacebuilding priorities, through the PBC platform[87].

**Thematic PBC Discussions:**

During the thematic discussions, the PBC has also discussed climate change:

- ***Women, Peace and Security (WPS)***: There is a growing recognition within the PBC of the nexus between WPS and climate-related security risks. The PBC Member States recognise that, as climate change hazards can exacerbate existing fragility and risks, it is crucial to understand how these hazards affect groups of people differently, especially groups who have been historically marginalised, such as women and children[88]. Specifically, in 2019, the PBC Chair raised that the effects of climate change would be most dramatically felt by those living in extreme poverty, the majority of whom are female, and this is then at odds with the fact that only a very small percentage of development aid is provided to women-led environmental program[89]. The PBC discussions also referred to the ways in which challenges related to climate change 'complicate' women-led peacebuilding work[90]. In its 2021 advice to the UNSC on WPS, the PBC recommended that the UNSC 'support[s] the efforts of women's peace outreach activities, including in the Sahel region, which has recently been further complicated due to challenges related to climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic'[91]. Later in 2022, the PBC recognised the threat that climate change poses to the security of women and girls and the implementation of the WPS agenda in Central Asia, and highlighted the opportunities that women's organisations present at the regional, national and grassroot level for integrated climate responses[92]. The PBC Member States specifically welcomed the role played by regional women networks, such as the Central Asian Women Leaders' Caucus and encouraged multistakeholder collaboration[93]. During the 2022 discussion on the Pacific, the PBC Member States

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[87] PBC (26 September 2022), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on Sharing Experiences, Good Practices and Lessons Learned in the Context of South-South and Triangular Cooperation. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_timor-leste_chairs_summary_final.pdf, paras. 5, 12.

[88] ECOSOC & PBC (3 December 2019), Joint Meeting on the Impact of Cross-border Transhumance on Sustainable Peace and Development in West Africa and the Sahel. Available at:
https://www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/files/en/2019doc/Summary_PBC-ECOSOC-joint-meeting.pdf, p. 20; PBC (22 March 2022), Meeting on Climate-Related Peace and Development Challenges in the Sahel: Chair's Summary. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/20221111_g5_sahel_-_pbc_written_advice_-_approved.pdf, p.4; PBC (20 April 2022), Press Statement: Peacebuilding Priorities in the Lake Chad Basin. Available at:
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2022-04-22/note-correspondents-peacebuilding-commission-press-statement-peacebuilding-priorities-the-lake-chad-basin, para. 11; PBC (31 May 2022), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on the Impact of Climate Change on Peacebuilding in the Pacific Islands. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_of_pbc_meeting_on_the_pacific_islands_.pdf, para. 2; PBC (28 November 2022), Fifth Annual informal consultative meeting between the AU's Peace and Security Council and the PBC. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary-_annual_informal_consultative_meeting_between_the_aupsc_and_unpbc_final.pdf, paras. 8, 11, 13, 14.

[89] ECOSOC & PBC (3 December 2019), Joint Meeting: The Impact of Cross-border Transhumance on Sustainable Peace and Development in West Africa and the Sahel. Available at:
https://www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/files/en/2019doc/Summary_PBC-ECOSOC-joint-meeting.pdf, p. 20.

[90] PBC (13 October 2021), Virtual Meeting on Women, Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace 'Enhancing the Leading Role of Women in Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Efforts'. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chair_summary_wps_meeting_13_october.pdf, para. 5.

[91] PBC (20 October 2021), Advice to the UNSC on Women, Peace and Security. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_advice_on_wps_.pdf, p.3.

[92] PBC (11 November 2022), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on Women Leadership for Women, Peace and Security agenda and the role of women in the context of climate change in Central Asia. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/20221111_chairs_summary_wps_in_central_asia_clean.pdf, para. 12.

[93] PBC (11 November 2022), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on Women Leadership for Women, Peace and Security agenda and the role of women in the context of climate change in Central Asia. Available at:

similarly stressed the need for inclusive approaches to peacebuilding and underscored the need to support and engage with local actors, including women who are disproportionately affected by climate change[94].

- **_Youth, Peace, and Security (YPS):_** The PBC Member States recognise disproportionate effects that climate-related security risks can have on youth, as well as the fact that youth have been at the forefront of climate, peace, and security action and should be valued and meaningfully included in all future climate and security policy and programming[95]. During the 2022 PBC meeting on YPS, the PBC Member States acknowledged that young people continue to face multidimensional challenges and barriers which are exacerbated by climate change and called for more action in support of national-level action plans for YPS, accessible funding for youth-led peacebuilding, and institutionalisation of the YPS agenda[96]. Similar language was brought up in the 2022 discussion on the situation in the Pacific[97].

- **_Community Engagement_**_:_ The PBC Member States recognised the value of community engagement in supporting action on addressing the interlinkage between climate, peace and security. During the 2022 discussion on the Pacific, the PBC Member States stressed the need for tailored solutions developed by local communities[98].  During the 2023 PBC's Ambassadorial-level meeting on the situation of indigenous peoples, Peace and Reconciliation in Canada, Colombia and Norway[99], Member States encouraged continued learning from indigenous peoples on all issues, especially those concerning climate change, environmental protection, and resources.

## CONCLUSIONS AND KEY TAKEAWAYS:

The need for a global response to the threat of climate change is clearly articulated by most Member States ([Glasgow Climate Pact](), para. 50). While most Member States generally agree that [UNFCCC]() is 'the primary international, intergovernmental forum for negotiating the global response to climate change' ([A/RES/70/1](), OP31; [S/RES/2677](), PP24; [E/RES/2022/10](), PP13), they also underscore the importance of taking into consideration, as appropriate, the security implications of the adverse effects of climate change and other ecological changes and natural disasters in relevant action ([A/RES/70/206](), PP9; [S/RES/2423](), OP68). While the reports of the IPCC demonstrate a limited connection between climate change and fragility[100], many Member States recommend additional research and modelling on whether and how climate change interlinks with fragility and conflict. This would allow all Member States to promote common

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https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/20221111_chairs_summary_wps_in_central _asia_clean.pdf, para. 12.
[94] PBC (31 May 2022), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on the Impact of Climate Change on Peacebuilding in the Pacific Islands. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_of_pbc_meeting_on_the_pa cific_islands_.pdf, para. 8.
[95] PBC (10 May 2022), Ambassadorial-level Meeting on Youth Peace and Security (YPS): Chair Summary. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_of_pbc_meeting_on_the_pa cific_islands_.pdf, para. 3.
[96] PBC (10 May 2022), Ambassadorial-level Meeting on Youth Peace and Security (YPS): Chair Summary. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_of_pbc_meeting_on_the_pa cific_islands_.pdf, para. 10.
[97] PBC (31 May 2022), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on the Impact of Climate Change on Peacebuilding in the Pacific Islands. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_of_pbc_meeting_on_the_pa cific_islands_.pdf, para. 8.
[98] PBC (31 May 2022), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on the Impact of Climate Change on Peacebuilding in the Pacific Islands. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_of_pbc_meeting_on_the_pa cific_islands_.pdf, para. 8.
[99]PBC (19 June 2023), Ambassadorial-level meeting on Indigenous Peoples, Peace, and Reconciliation in Canada, Columbia and Norway. Available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_canada_colombia_norway_ -_indigenous_peoples_19_june_2023_final.pdf
[100] Supra, note 16.

understanding about the most effective ways of addressing the impact of climate change on peace and security, including human security.

- **UN development actors** reference the following main priorities[101] in relation to the interlinkages between climate and security:
    - Strengthened *mitigation of and adaptation to climate change* as an 'immediate and urgent priority' (i.e., A/RES/70/205, OP1; E/RES/2019/14, OP23; A/RES/74/4, para. 11), including through 'technology transfer to and capacity-building in developing countries' (i.e., A/RES/72/132, OP64; E/HLS/2022/1, para. 103, Glasgow Climate Pact, para. 40).
    - (When addressing *human security problems*, including food and water insecurity,) the comprehensive action to both 'address the adverse effects of climate change on food[/water] security, as well as the root causes of food[/water] insecurity' (i.e., A/RES/70/223, PP16; A/RES/71/245, PP20; A/RES/72/238, PP29).
    - Multi-hazard *early warning systems, climate-resilient early action, and increased response preparedness* (i.e., E/HLS/2017/1, para. 7; E/RES/2019/14, OP23; A/RES/74/115, OP9; E/RES/2022/10, OP28; A/RES/76/128, OP9; A/RES/77/29, OP10), based on 'the whole-of-government, whole-of-society and coordinated approach' (E/HLS/2022/1, para. 16), including through exposure and vulnerability mapping, new technologies and communication protocols (E/RES/2022/10, OP28), while integrating 'local and indigenous knowledge and solutions' (E/CN.6/2022/L.7, para. 62(z)(aa)), 'address[ing] systematic observation gaps, in order to improve understanding of climate change, climate-related risks and tipping points, and adaptation limits' (Decision 22/CP.27, para. 3), and 'strengthening the systematic, impartial and timely collection and sharing of data disaggregated by sex, age and disability and evidence-based policy and operational responses at all levels' (i.e., A/RES/72/132, OP14; A/RES/74/115, OP15; A/RES/75/118, OP9; A/RES/76/128, OP15; A/RES/77/29, OP16). Relevant stakeholders are encouraged to respond to the call by the Secretary General for 'the UN action plan to ensure that every person on Earth is protected by early warning systems within five years' (A/RES77/282, PP13).
    - 'Minimising and addressing *loss and damage* associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to its effects' (Glasgow Climate Pact, para. 63), including by financing the loss and damage fund created by COP27 (Decisions 2.CP.27 and 2.CMA.4, OP2 and OP3), supporting the Santiago Network for Loss and Damage in 'its mandated role in catalysing technical assistance for the implementation of the relevant approaches at the local, national and regional level (Decision 1.CP.27, OP28), and 'acknowledg[ing] the important role of a broad range of stakeholders at the local, national and regional level, including indigenous peoples and local communities, in averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage' (Glasgow Climate Pact, para. 62).
    - 'Context-specific and effective *disaster risk reduction [DRR], disaster risk management and local and national resilience building* strategies based on [multidimensional and comprehensive] risk assessments that integrate disaster, climate risks and conflicts'[102], as well as 'mainstream[ing] [DRR measures] in the implementation of other relevant policy areas, such as for sustainable development, poverty eradication, climate change mitigation and adaptation' (i.e., The Sendai Framework, para. 26(e); E/HLS/2017/1, para. 7; E/RES/2019/14,

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[101] Note that the list of mechanisms is incomplete. Each resolution and other agreed documents are to be further reviewed to identify solutions relevant for each specific context.
[102] Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (2019), Co–chair Summary of the The sixth session of the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction. Available at:
https://www.unisdr.org/conference/2019/globalplatform/assets/pdf/58809_chairsummary.pdf, para. 6.

OP23; E/HLS/2022, para. 23), and humanitarian action (A/RES/72/132, OP64; A/RES/73/139, OP20; A/RES/77/289, para. 39(g); A/RES/77/285, PP11). Disaster risk assessment, policies, programmes and communication should ensure 'the use of traditional, Indigenous and local knowledge and practices to complement scientific knowledge' and 'involve practices such as raising public awareness and investing in academic and professional training, advocacy campaigns, social media and community mobilisation' (A/RES/77/289, OP20).

- Incorporation of 'climate-related vulnerability [and risk management] *into national development plans* and strategies for eradicating poverty and reducing inequality and for social protection systems' (i.e., E/RES/2018/05, OP32; A/RES/72/132, OP64) and 'support for and strengthening national and, as appropriate, local preparedness and response capacities, and to build resilience, taking into account the differing needs of women, girls, boys and men of all ages' (i.e., A/RES/71/128, OP17; A/RES/72/132, OP18). Consequently, the UN is requested to 'adopt and mainstream a climate- and environment-responsive approach into their programmes, [...] cooperation frameworks, or equivalent planning frameworks, and their policy advice to programme countries, in accordance with national development policies, plans, priorities and needs' (A/RES/75/233, OP29).

- 'Mobilise[d] [long-term] *climate finance* from all sources, including multilateral development banks, other financial institutions and the private sector, to reach the level needed to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement, including 'achieving a balance between adaptation and mitigation' (E/HLS/2022/1, para. 112(a)) significantly increasing support for developing countries, beyond USD 100 billion per year' (i.e., E/HLS/2022/1, paras. 84, 103; Glasgow Climate Pact, para. 40), and 'exploring innovative approaches and instruments for mobilising finance from private sources', with an emphasis on the importance of transparency in the implementation of their pledges' (E/HLS/2022/1, paras. 10, 105).

- '*The enhanced cooperation of and concerted action by Member States with youth* in order to address [challenges posed by climate change]', including by 'promot[ing] youth participation in climate action and to consider youth perspectives in decision-making processes on climate change' (i.e., A/RES/70/127, OP17; A/RES/72/146, OP18; A/RES/74/121, OP22; A/RES/76/137, OP26).

- Support for '*economic development and human well-being*, with a focus on affordable and equitable access for all, enhancing interconnectivity and achieving access to energy, and improving access to financial services, as well as promoting decent work in the rural economy, improving access to quality education, promoting quality health-care services, including through the acceleration of the transition towards equitable access to universal health coverage, providing affordable and secure housing for people in vulnerable situations, advancing gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls, expanding social protection coverage, climate change mitigation and adaptation and combating inequality within and between countries and social exclusion, especially of the furthest behind' (i.e., A/RES/74/234, OP8; A/RES/75/230, OP9; A/RES/76/218, OP9; A/RES/77/179, OP9).

- *Full and meaningful participation of diverse women* in 'the design, implementation, follow-up and evaluation of policies and activities related to conflict prevention, the mitigation of post-conflict situations, peace mediation, the impacts of climate change and emergencies, including natural disasters, humanitarian assistance, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction' (i.e., A/RES/70/132, OP2(d); A/RES/71/228, OP12; A/RES/72/148, OP2(d); A/RES/72/234, OP35; A/RES/74/126, OP2(g); A/RES/76/140, OP2(g); A/RES/77/193, OP5(u)), to ensure that the needs and priorities of diverse women and girls are 'systematically addressed' and that they can 'effectively contribute' to the

development and adoption of 'strategies to decrease women's and girls' vulnerability to environmental factors, including gender-responsive strategies on mitigation and adaptation to climate change', support for 'the resilience and adaptive capacities of women and girls to respond to the adverse effects of climate change, through, inter alia, the promotion of their health and well-being, as well as access to sustainable livelihoods, and the provision of adequate resources' (i.e., A/RES/70/132, OPs2(v), 7; A/RES/72/148, OP2(aa), A/RES/72/148, OP7). Further, the provision of 'adequate resources towards achieving the full and equal participation of women in decision-making at all levels on environmental issues' is requested (A/RES/70/205, OP13).

- '*Localisation of climate action*, including support for local governments and building resilient communities, is extremely important because they understand local needs and are on the front line of climate change adaptation action, and disaster risk reduction, response and recovery' (A/RES/76/258, OP211).

- **UN peace and security actors** reference the following main priorities in relation to the interlinkages between climate and security include:
    - **Through the work of the PBC:**
        - Continued *attention to the adverse effects of climate change on peacebuilding efforts at the country level*[103], including its effects on maritime insecurity[104], including through increased efforts to strengthen consideration of climate change and climate-related security risks in UN joint analysis, risk assessment, and strategic planning efforts[105].
        - Consistently building *stronger synergies between the PBC and other intergovernmental bodies* (i.e., the UNSC, ECOSOC, HRC, etc.)[106] to bring attention to interlinked development and peace challenges triggered by climate change effects.
        - The development of a PBC workplan that *strengthens its advisory role* (A/77/720-S/2023/86, Annex (4)(II)), including specifically based on the PBC's access to contextual information' on 'possible security implications of climate change.
        - Promotion of and request for action on the following climate, peace and security priorities highlighted by the PBC Member States:
            - Support and substantial investment in *'more ambitious' adaptation*, including sustainable economic empowerment and alternative livelihood programs, *and mitigation options*, including increasing awareness of climatic change[107].

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[103] PBC (March 2023), Report of the Chair of the Liberia Configuration's consultations with International Financial Institutions. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/report_of_the_chair_of_the_liberia_configuration_of_the_pbc_consultations_with_ifis_march_2023.final_.pdf, p. 3, 5; PBC (31 May 2022), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on the Impact of Climate Change on Peacebuilding in the Pacific Islands: Chair's Summary, Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_of_pbc_meeting_on_the_pacific_islands_.pdf, paras. 3, 4.

[104] PBC (19 May 2023), Ambassadorial-level meeting on Strengthening Peacebuilding and the Implementation of the Regional Maritime Security Framework in the Gulf of Guinea: Chair's Summary, Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_on_the_pbc_meeting_on_the_gulf_of_guinea_5_june.pdf, p. 4.

[105] PBC (2020), Virtual Consultation on the 2020 Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture: 'Institution Building and System-Wide Engagement for Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace': Chair's Summary. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_of_pbc_consultations_on_institution_building_and_system-wide_support_22_may_to_2_june_2020_-_final.pdf, para. 9.

[106] PBC (13 Nov. 2018), ECOSOC-PBC Joint Meeting on Linkages between Climate Change and the Challenges of Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace in the Sahel. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_chair_remarks_at_the_joint_pbc-ecosoc_meeting_13_nov_-_final.pdf, pp. 4-5.

[107] PBC (28 Nov. 2022), Fifth Annual informal consultative meeting between the AU's Peace and Security Council and the PBC. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary-_annual_informal_consultative_meeting_between_the_aupsc_and_unpbc_final.pdf, paras. 8, 11, 13, 14; PBC (31 Oct. 2022),

- Building upon *the key sources of resilience*, including the strong customary institutions surrounding land and kinship, building local community capacity in climate change mitigation and adaptation[108], and calling for the support for local knowledge and tailored solutions developed by local communities[109].
- *Gender- and youth-responsive approaches* in climate-related peacebuilding[110] and *meaningful participation and inclusion* of *diverse civil society actors*, including women and youth, and community engagement in climate and security policy and programming[111].
- Increased investment into and support of *early warning and prevention systems*[112], including through utilising existing efforts to collect climate data, incorporating climate related indicators in the nationally owned peacebuilding efforts[113], and strengthening institutions to identify, examine and monitor climate security risks, as well as to develop scalable solutions[114].

Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on the Great Lakes Region, Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_-_pbc_meeting_on_the_great_lakes_region.pdf, para. 7; PBC (7 June 2017), Informal Meeting on the Solomon Islands. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_solomon_islands_chairs_summary_-_final.pdf, p. 3; PBC (28 July 2020), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on theImpact of COVID-19 on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace in the Pacific Islands: Chair's Summary. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/28072020._pbc_meeting_on_the_pacific_-_chairs_summary._final.pdf, para. 4; PBC (31 May 2022), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on the Impact of Climate Change on Peacebuilding in the Pacific Islands. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_of_pbc_meeting_on_the_pacific_islands_.pdf, paras. 3, 4, 8; PBC (16 Dec. 2019), A letter to the UNSC on the UNOWAS Mandate Review. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/12.12.19_letter_of_the_chair_of_the_pbc_to_the_sc_on_the_unowas_mandate_renewal_-_approved.pdf, p.1; a joint meeting with ECOSOC on the linkages between Climate Change and Challenges in Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace in the Sahe (p. 4); PBC (22 Mar. 2022), Meeting on Climate-Related Peace and Development Challenges in the Sahel: Chair's Summary. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/20221111_g5_sahel_-_pbc_written_advice_-_approved.pdf, p.4; ECOSOC & PBC (13 Nov. 2018), Joint Meeting on the Linkages between Climate Change and Challenges in Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace in the Sahel: Informal Summary. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/20181220_joint_meeting_of_the_economic_and_social_council_-_finalrev.pdf, p. 3; PBC (18 Nov. 2022), Written submission to the UNSC on Piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_written_advice_to_security_council_on_piracy_in_the_gulf_of_guinea_-_approved.pdf, p. 4.

[108] Supra, note 114.

[109] PBC (31 May 2022), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on the Impact of Climate Change on Peacebuilding in the Pacific Islands: Chair's Summary. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_of_pbc_meeting_on_the_pacific_islands_.pdf, para. 8.

[110] Supra, note 114.

[111] PBC (22 Mar. 2022), Meeting on Climate-Related Peace and Development Challenges in the Sahel: Chair's Summary. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/20221111_g5_sahel_-_pbc_written_advice_-_approved.pdf, p.4; PBC (9 Dec. 2021), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on Sierra Leone. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/211209_pbc_chairs_summary_sierra_leone_mtg.pdf, p. 3; PBC (31 May 2022), Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on the Impact of Climate Change on Peacebuilding in the Pacific Islands. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_of_pbc_meeting_on_the_pacific_islands_.pdf, para. 8; ECOSOC & PBC (28 June 2017), Joint Meeting on the Situation in the Sahel: Informal Summary. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/ecosoc-pbc-joint-meeting-summary._28_june_2017.pdf, p. 2; PBC Annual Session (2018), Peacebuilding and sustaining peace in the Sahel region. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/concept_note_pbc_annual_session_sahel_draft_6_november_2018.pdf, p. 2; PBC Annual Session (2018), Peacebuilding and sustaining peace in the Sahel region. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/concept_note_pbc_annual_session_sahel_draft_6_november_2018.pdf, p. 2.

[112] Supra, note 114.

[113] PBC (30 Jan. 2023), The Peacebuilding Commission Ambassadorial-Level Meeting on Peacebuilding in the New Agenda for Peace: Chair's summary, Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/230130_chairs_summary_pbc_new_agenda_for_peace_final_0.pdf, para. 4.

[114] Supra, note 114.

- *Strengthened and accountable institutions*,[115] including those responsible for resource management.
- **Through the work of the UNSC,**
    - Promotion of and request for action on the following climate, peace and security priorities highlighted by the UNSC documents and UNSC Member States:
        - Request for the Secretary General to ensure that his *reporting to the UNSC contains 'contextual information' on 'possible security implications of climate change*, when such issues are drivers of conflict, represent a challenge to the implementation of Council mandates or endanger the process of consolidation of peace' (S/PRST/2011/15, para. 8). Such reporting is to be based on 'integrated, evidence-based and data-driven analysis, [and] strategic assessments' (i.e., S/RES/2429, OP47; S/RES/2677, OP32).
        - Request for the Secretary General to conduct *a strategic review regarding the scope of existing mandates and its activities*, further 'invit[ing] the Secretary General to present to the UNSC its recommendations as well as his observations on these recommendations, including on potential areas of improvement or new or refocused priorities, including on [...] effects of climate change on security' (S/PRST/2019/7, para. 5).
        - '*Comprehensive risk assessments*', '*long-term risk management strategies relating to climate change impacts', and 'regional and national dialogues,* and request for the UN, based on [these] risk assessments, to support stabilisation and build resilience', as well as 'strengthening capacities to mitigate risks' (i.e., S/RES/2567, PP26; S/RES/2568, PP15; S/RES/2576, PP8; S/RES/2576, OP4(b)(iv)); S/RES/2631, OP2(b)(iv)). This includes by providing gender-sensitive risk assessments on the adverse effects of climate change' (S/RES/2625, OP3(b)(i)); S/RES/2677, OP3(b)(i)).
        - *Risk assessment of environmental damage in fragile humanitarian situations*, and 'systematic integration' of 'climate and environmental issues 'into the planning of interventions by armed and security forces, while conducting humanitarian relief operations after natural disasters or during peacekeeping operations' (S/2020/929, p. 21).
        - *Partnership between the UN, regional and sub-regional organisations* in addressing [pressures related to climate] 'in a coordinated and holistic manner' (S/PRST/2018/16, para. 15; S/PRST/2019/7, para. 20).
        - F*ull, equal and meaningful participation of young people* who 'play a unique role in strengthening the national, local and community-based capacities in conflict and post-conflict situations to prepare for and respond to increasingly frequent and severe weather events and natural disasters' (S/RES/2535, OP10).
        - *Women's full, equal and meaningful inclusion and participation* in (S/RES/2493, OP3) in developing strategies to address climate change and its implications on peace and security, while, simultaneously, 'increase[ing] attention to women, peace and security as a cross-cutting subject in all relevant thematic [and

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[115] Supra, note 114.

country-specific] areas of work on [the UNSC] agenda' ([S/RES/2242](), PP13).

- Request for the inclusion of climate change and conflict analysis as a cross-cutting theme in UN briefings to the Council and the participation UNSC meetings on specific contexts to share their experiences regarding the implications of climate change in their work on the ground, including briefers from affected countries to draw on the impacts of and risks associated with climate change on peace and security in their contexts[116].
- Closer engagement of the UNSC with the Informal Expert Group on Climate and Security, the Group of Friends on Climate and Security and the UN Climate Security Mechanism ([S/PV.9345](), pp. 2, 3, 7, 16, 17).
- Promotion of 'the necessity of *reducing the overall environmental footprint of relevant special political missions* and, where mandated, identifying climate-related risks' ([A/RES/77/127](), PP18).
- The *deployment of dedicated capacity on climate, peace and security* (such as the climate, peace and security advisors) in field missions, to anticipate and address the linkages between climate change, peace and security and thus strengthen missions' abilities to implement the given mandates ([S/PV.9345](), p. 3).
- The appointment by the Secretary General of *a special representative for climate, peace and security* who could strengthen coordination between the relevant UN entities in order to improve its ability to address climate-related security risks ([S/PV.9345](), pp. 6, 40).

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[116] Member States' Joint Statement (2023), Joint Pledges: Climate, Peace and Security. Available at:
https://www.aplusforpeace.ch/joint-pledges-climate-peace-and-security.

## ANNEX 1: References to the interlinkages between climate change and peace and security in selected UN documents:

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**The UN Secretary General:**

*The 2022 Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace* (A/76/668–S/2022/66) suggests that 'climate-related security risks have become a reality for millions of people who are struggling to cope with resource scarcity, food insecurity and loss of livelihoods, especially affecting women', and that 'climate change can have a multiplier effect, exacerbating vulnerabilities, tensions and inequalities and destabilising social, political, economic and demographic dynamics at the local, national and regional levels' (para. 6). The Secretary General also projects that 'competition for natural resources compounded by climate change [...] are set to increase further as, by mid-century, more than 4 billion people will be living in water-stressed regions' (para. 21).

*The 2023 'A New Agenda for Peace' policy brief* highlights that climate change impacts pose an 'existential threat to some island states', 'exacerbate the risks of instability, in particular in situations already affected by conflict', and 'create new, unanticipated areas of contestation, leading to new or resurgent disputes related to territorial and maritime claims' (p.6). In this view, climate change affects not only the development work but also 'human rights and our shared peacebuilding objectives' (pp.6-7).

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**The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC):**

The IPCC suggests that 'climate change can indirectly increase risks of violent conflicts by amplifying well-documented drivers of these conflicts such as poverty and economic shocks' in 'resource-dependent livelihoods'[117]. The IPCC highlights that 'non-climatic factors are the dominant drivers of existing intrastate violent conflicts, [and] in some contexts extreme weather and climate events have had a small, adverse impact on their length, severity or frequency' and that 'impacts of weather and climate extremes, particularly drought, by increasing vulnerability will increasingly affect violent intrastate conflict'[118]. According to the IPCC, 'the largest adverse impacts [have been] observed in many locations and/or communities in Africa, Asia, Central and South America, LDCs, Small Islands and the Arctic, and globally for Indigenous Peoples, small-scale food producers and low-income households'[119].

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**The UN Peacebuilding Architecture Reviews:**

*The 2015 Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (*A/69/968–S/2015/490) suggested that disputes over land and water can be 'structural drivers of conflict' (para. 16), and 'population growth and environmental degradation are adding new complexities to the global security milieu' (para. 17).

*The Group of Independent Eminent Persons for the 2020 Peacebuilding Architecture Review* (A/74/944–S/2020/678) considered 'the urgent challenge of climate change' as a threat to 'the well-being of all peoples and our planet' (Annex II para. 1). The group recognised that the three pillars are compatible and complementary and therefore the concerns about the 'securitisation of development' are not pertinent, but rather 'the needs and priorities of people affected by conflict, low human development, climate change, refugee flows, internal displacement and humanitarian spillovers of conflict [should be integrated] into peace processes and peacebuilding efforts, to ensure moving towards durable solutions for all' (Annex II para. 5).

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**The UN-World Bank's 'Pathways for Peace' Report:**

The Pathways for Peace report also noted that 'violent conflicts [...] are increasingly linked to global challenges such as climate change' (p. xi) and clarified that '[while] by itself, climate change does not cause violent conflict[;] it does create major stress, especially in fragile situations where governments have limited means to help their populations adapt' (p. xxi). The report further stressed that 'risks associated with climate change can combine with and exacerbate risks of violence through factors such as food insecurity, economic shocks, and migration' (p. xxi).

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[117] IPCC (2014), Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report. Available at: https://archive.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf, pp. 71-73.

[118] IPCC (2022), Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report. Available at: https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6/wg2/IPCC_AR6_WGII_FullReport.pdf, p. 11

[119] IPCC (2023), A Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Sixth Assessment Report. Available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_SYR_SPM.pdf, p. 5.

## ANNEX 2: Documented evidence for the need to address climate-related security risks at the country level:

Local peacebuilders from Mozambique, Uganda, and Zimbabwe conducted localised climate-security risk assessments[120] in their communities and identified different examples of how climate change and security are interlinked in their local contexts:

- Uganda, Kaabong district in Karamoja sub-region:
    - Droughts increase competition over scarce resources resulting in armed fights among pastoral communities.
    - Droughts lead to the movement of people into Kaabong, creating further pressure on existing limited resources.
    - Shifts in wildlife animal migratory routes and water availability destroy crops, worsen animal attacks, and contribute to food insecurity.

- Zimbabwe, Gwanda district in Matabeleland South Province:
    - Prolonged and frequent droughts and unpredictable rain patterns lead to food insecurity due to decreased crop yields. Food insecurity further leads to violent cattle rustling to earn a living.
    - Droughts enable illicit artisanal mining and thus enhance social fragility.
    - Recurrent droughts drive communities to move their livestock to neighbouring communities' grasslands, leading to violence where pastoralist communities clash over grazing and water resources.
    - Droughts disturb the availability of highly expensive local delicacy food, the Mopane worm, which increases competition over the resource.
    - Infrastructures damaged during cyclones lead to community clashes over scarce water at collection points.

- Mozambique, Mecufi district in Cabo Delgado Province:
    - Tropical cyclones result in public health risks and social dissolution.
    - Drought contributes to food insecurity and increases competition over scarce resources and associated violence.
    - Limited availability of arable land leads to land disputes.

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[120] The project was guided by the Step-by-Step Guidance on how to document, assess, and address climate-related security risks at the local level, developed by GPPAC with technical and financial support of the UN Development Programme (UNDP).

## ANNEX 3: The Evolution of the Climate, Peace and Security Debate in the UNSC.

The UNSC's recognition of the interlinkages between climate risks and security can be traced back to **17 April 2007**, when the first-ever debate on the impact of climate change on peace and security was held under the Presidency of the United Kingdom. Then-British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett framed climate change not as a matter of narrow traditional (hard) security but as a matter of 'our collective security in a fragile and increasingly interdependent world' (S/PV.5663, p. 19).

In **July 2011**, an open debate on the 'Impact of Climate Change' under the 'maintenance of international peace and security' agenda item was initiated under the Presidency of Germany. The concept note highlighted that 'the Security Council had increasingly acknowledged that sustainable peace requires a comprehensive approach to security' (S/2011/408, para 3). A Presidential Statement adopted in the follow-up of the discussion noted 'possible security implications of climate change is important, when such issues are drivers of conflict, represent a challenge to the implementation of Council mandates or endanger the process of consolidation of peace' and requested 'the Secretary General to ensure that his reporting to the Council contains such contextual information' (S/PRST/2011/15, para. 9).

In **July 2018**, Sweden hosted an open debate on 'Understanding and Addressing Climate-Related Security Risks' under the 'maintenance of international peace and security' agenda item. Then-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Ms. Wallström stated that 'an enhanced understanding of climate-related security risks and how to address them in the UNSC should not, and will not, duplicate the responsibilities of the GA or other UN bodies' (S/PV.8307, p. 8). She suggested that, 'instead, it will ensure that all UN bodies deliver on their respective mandates to the best of their ability and that the system collectively delivers more than the sum of its parts' (S/PV.8307, p. 8).

Under the presidency of the Dominican Republic, an open debate took place in **January 2019** on the theme 'Addressing the Impacts of Climate-Related Disasters on International Peace and Security'. The concept note highlighted that extreme weather and climate-related disasters threaten international security in the Caribbean and beyond (S/2019/1, para. 6).

In **July 2020**, during its presidency, Germany hosted an open debate on 'Climate and Security' chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Heiko Maas. The debate aimed to 'define how best to provide the UNSC with a comprehensive and authoritative information basis on the security implications of the effects of climate change' and to understand what information, partnerships, and tools could best 'support the timely assessment of and response to climate-related security risks in order to prevent the escalation of conflict' (S/2020/725, para. 9).

In **September 2020**, Niger, as a President of the UNSC, hosted an open debate under the theme 'Humanitarian Effects of Environmental Degradation and Peace and Security'. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Niger, Kalla Ankourao, called for 'cooperation policies better adapted to [the challenge of climate change] that spare[s] no country and pose[s] a real threat to the peace and stability of States and the fate of future generations.' (S/2020/929, p. 9).

In **February 2021,** the United Kingdom hosted an open debate on 'Addressing Climate-Related Security Risks to International Peace and Security through Mitigation and Resilience-Building'. In a statement, Prime Minister Boris Johnson noted that 'our countries and our peoples will have to deal with the security impacts of climate change' and called upon the Security Council to 'show the kind of global leadership that is needed to protect the peace, security and stability of our nations, of our regions and of our world' (S/2021/198, p. 9).

In **September 2021**, an open debate on 'Climate and Security' under the 'maintenance of international peace and security' agenda item under the Presidency of Ireland took place. The objective of the debate was to 'deepen substantive awareness of how climate security risks are relevant to the work of the Security Council, and explore what tangible actions can be taken' and to 'illustrate how climate change is affecting peace and security and discuss practical actions the Security Council can take to address climate-related security risks' (S/2021/782, para. 1).

In **December 2021**, under the presidency of Niger, an open debate was held on the theme of 'Maintenance of international peace and security: Security in the context of terrorism and climate change'. The objective of the debate was to 'to engage the international community on ways to address the fight against terrorism and climate change and develop more effective strategies at the regional and global levels' ([S/2021/988](), p. 3).

In December **2021**, the Security Council met ([S/PV.8926]()) to adopt a draft resolution ([S/2021/990]()) co-sponsored by Niger and Ireland. The draft resolution proposed requesting the Secretary-General to integrate climate-related security risks as a central component into comprehensive conflict-prevention strategies of the UN, with a goal to contribute to the reduction of the risk of conflict relapse due to adverse effects of climate change. The draft resolution was co-sponsored by 113 Member States and supported by 12 Council Members, but was voted by Russia and thus rejected.

In **October 2022**, Gabon held a debate on the topic 'Threats to international peace and security: Climate and security in Africa'. The objective of the debate was to 'analyse the links between climate change and peace and security in Africa' and to 'explore ways to optimise the international community's support for Africa in order to minimise the impact of climate change on peace and security' ([S/2022/737](), p. 2).

In **June 2023**, the UNSC open debate on climate change, peace and security was held under the Presidency of the United Arab Emirates to explore how the UNSC could support a 'collaborative and responsive approach to climate change and peace and security and how to target and tailor climate action to complement the Council's responsibility to maintain international peace and security' ([S/2023/408](), p. 2).

Other UNSC meetings on topics related to climate and security:
- **'Natural resources and conflict'** - held by **Belgium** in **June 2007** ([S/PV.5705]()). The open debate resulted in a Presidential Statement. While not addressing the issue of climate change directly, the Presidential Statement 'note[d] that, in specific armed conflict situations, the exploitation, trafficking, and illicit trade of natural resources have played a role in areas where they have contributed to the outbreak, escalation or continuation of armed conflict' and reminded the UNSC has 'taken measures on this issue, more specifically to prevent illegal exploitation of natural resources[...] and to encourage transparent and lawful management of natural resources, including the clarification of the responsibility of management of natural resources, and has established sanctions committees and groups and panels of experts to oversee the implementation of those measures' ([S/PRST/2007/22](), para. 5).
- '**New challenges to international peace and security and conflict prevention**' - held by **Portugal in November 2011** ([S/PV.6668]()). The briefing aimed to 'look, in a comprehensive manner, at a spectrum of recently identified challenges to international peace and security' and ' examine possibilities for devising a framework for a regular, comprehensive and systematic focus on these issues, including, when relevant, the interlinkage between them, through which new developments, reports of the Secretary General and briefings from relevant United Nations agencies and bodies could be channelled for concerted consideration' ([S/2011/698](), p. 3).
- **'Conflict Prevention and Natural Resources'** - held by the **United Kingdom in June 2013** ([S/PV.6982]()) Open Debate aimed to tackle 'the link between the transparent and effective management of extractive industries and conflict prevention and how the international community can support national governments to develop their institutional and legal capacity to better manage extractive industries' ([S/2013/334](), para. 10(a)).
- **'Peace and security challenges facing small island developing states'** - held by **New Zealand in July 2015** ([S/PV.7499]()). Open Debate provided an opportunity for small islands and developing states (SIDS) 'to highlight specific challenges and vulnerabilities that they face in maintaining peace and security.' ([S/2015/543](), p. 2).
- '**Challenges in the Sahel Region' -** held by **Spain and Egypt in May 2016** ([S/PV.7699]()). Briefing aimed at exploring avenues 'to address the crisis in the Sahel from a holistic point of view' ([S/PV.7699](), p. 12).
- **'Water, peace and security'** - held by **Senegal in November 2016** ([S/PV.7818]()). Open Debate aimed to understand 'how to encourage countries that are facing water-related issues to opt for cooperation in addressing their respective needs' and consider the role of the UNSC 'in preventing and managing water-related conflict situations.' ([S/2016/969](), p. 5).

- **'Preventive Diplomacy and Transboundary Waters'** - held by **Bolivia in June 2017** (S/PV.7959). Mr. Morales Ayma, President and Representative of Bolivia, highlighted that 'the water crisis is one of the greatest threats posed to life on the planet' and that 'the organs of the United Nations, on the basis of their respective mandates, must redouble their efforts so that together we can stymie that threat' (S/PV.7959, p. 4).
- **'Addressing complex challenges to international peace and security'** - held by **Japan in December 2017** (S/PV.8144). Open Debate aimed to 'discuss how the Council can better address today's complex contemporary threats to international peace and security in a holistic and comprehensive manner' (S/2017/1016, p. 4).
- **'The Role of Natural Resources as a Root Cause of Conflict'** - held by **Bolivia in October 2018** (S/PV.8372) - Briefing aimed to 'highlight how the control, exploitation and access to natural resources has been a catalyst for the outbreak, escalation and continuation of armed conflicts, unlawful invasions and the overthrow of Governments, causing humanitarian disasters and long-term consequences in the management of post-conflict scenarios.' (S/2018/901, para. 1).
- **'Contemporary drivers of conflict and instability and insecurity'** - held by **Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in November 2020** (S/2020/1090) The discussion focused on the security implications of climate change and COVID-19, among other factors (S/2020/1090, p. 12).
- **'Strengthening the fight against the financing of armed groups and terrorists through the illicit trafficking of natural resources'** - held by **Gabon in October 2022** (S/PV.9147) - Debate aimed to 'address the issue of the financing of armed groups and terrorists through the illicit trafficking of natural resources in Africa, a theme which has not been covered specifically in previous debates on conflict prevention and natural resources' (S/2022/728, p. 3).
- **'Sea-Level Rise: Implications for International Peace and Security'** – held by **Malta** in **February 2023** (S/PV.9260) - Open Debate aimed to 'explore ways in which the Security Council can address the risks to international peace and security posed by sea-level rise in the global security architecture and invest in preventive mechanisms' (S/2023/79, p. 3).

## ANNEX 4: Selected UN documents relevant to the interlinkages between climate and security:

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| **Global** |
| The 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change |
| The 2015 Paris Agreement |
| The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity |
| The 2018-2028 International Decade for Action 'Water for Sustainable Development' and its 2023 Midterm Review |
| The 2015–2030 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and its 2023 High-Level Midterm Review |
| The 2030 Agenda, the Sustainable Development Goals and the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda |
| Agreed conclusions adopted by the Commission on the Status of Women at its sixty-sixth session |
| Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review of Operational Activities for Development of the UN system |
| The 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants |
| The Glasgow Climate Pact |
| SIDS Accelerated Modalities of Action (SAMOA) Pathway |
| **Regional** |
| *Africa:* |
| The Agenda 2063 and the AU-UN Framework on the Implementation of Agenda |
| The 2022 Aswan Forum for Sustainable Peace and Development under the theme 'Africa in an era of cascading risks and climate vulnerability: pathways for a peaceful, resilient, and sustainable continent' |
| *Pacific:* |
| The 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent |
| The Boe Declaration on Regional Security and its Action Plan |