Operationalising the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda in Somalia

Progress towards a Federalisation Agenda as a foundation for peace

Somalia

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Operationalising of Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda in SOMALIA: Progress towards a Federalisation Agenda as a Foundation of Peace

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Analysis and peer review
Ahmed Abdinasir Mohamed; Rufaa Sheikh Ahmed; Aisha Hassan; Cynthia Brain

Editors
Marina Kumskova and Johanna Hilbert

Lay-out
De Zaak P.

Abbreviations

AfDB	African Development Bank
AFP	UN Agencies, funds, and programmes
AMISOM	African- Union Mission in Somalia
CCA	Common Country Analysis
CEWARN	IGAD's Conflict Early Warning Mechanism
CEWERU	Somalia Conflict Early Warning Response Unit
DCO	UN Development Coordination Office
DPPA	UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FMS	Federal Member States of Somalia
DSRSG/HC/RC	Deputy Special Representative/ Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFI	International Financial Institutions
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
MPF	World Bank's Multi-Partner Fund
MPTF	Somalia Multi-Partner Trust Fund
NDP-9	Somalia's 2020-2024 Ninth National Development Plan
ODA	UN Official Development Assistance
PBC	UN Peacebuilding Commission
PBF	UN Peacebuilding Fund
PSG	Regional Peer Support Group
RMU	Risk Management Unit
SDRF	Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility
SIF	Somali Infrastructure Fund
SOYDEN	Somalia Youth and Development Network
SRSG	UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UN	United Nations
UNCG	UN Communications Group
UNCT	UN Country Team
UNDAF	UN Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNSC	UN Security Council
UNSOM	UN Integrated Mission in Somalia
UNSOS	UN Support Office for AMISOM
WPS	UN Women, Peace, and Security Agenda
YPS	UN Youth, Peace, and Security Agenda

Executive Summary

Somalia today is a highly fragile state. Although there are some strong examples of promising actions towards advancing peacebuilding and sustaining peace, deep-rooted and persistent challenges to peace remain. The federalisation agenda, inclusive locally led peace processes, and renewed financial incentives have been welcome developments. However, the trajectory has been reportedly downwards since 2017, stemming from shrinking civic space, capture of parliament, lacking rule of law and deepening war economy, coupled with persistent insecurity, existing culture of clannism, and widespread inequality. Achieving an enabling environment for peacebuilding and sustaining peace is only possible if the federalisation agenda succeeds and a political consensus in the country is reached *not only* between the government and its member states, *but also* with other interested parties, including civil society.

In order to strengthen the implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda in Somalia, this report provides the following recommendations:

Leadership, accountability, and capacity of the UN in Somalia

Designing **a clear peacebuilding vision, theory of change, and related roadmap** with measurable indicators to strategically coordinate all peacebuilding activities, including activities conducted by non-UN partners, and realise peacebuilding priorities is the key for strengthening leadership, supporting coordination, ensuring partnerships, and making a case for stronger donor support. The strategy needs to be developed under the supervision of one lead. In the short term, the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) can fulfil the coordinating function; however, there should be a forward-looking strategy to ensure that the Office of the Deputy Special Representative/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator will be able to fulfil this function following the UNSOM transition. To support the development of a dedicated peacebuilding strategy, the UN leadership should consider focusing its efforts on:

- Reviewing activities under the current UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (Cooperation Framework) to strengthen **the focus on conflict sensitivity and conflict prevention** and develop adequate tools and capacities to ensure the operationalisation of conflict analysis and conflict prevention action.
- Creating dedicated spaces within existing coordination platforms for **regular, informal, and inclusive multi-stakeholder reflection and learning** to capture and document ideas, including unspoken rationales, challenges, and insights to continuously adjust peacebuilding action in response to the realities.
- Strengthening **peacebuilding and conflict analysis capacities at the senior level** within the Resident Coordinator Offices (RCO) to bring the political and development pillars of the UN together in pursuit of the prevention of violent conflict. Conflict advisors should also be deployed during planning and assessment phases of humanitarian and development action.
- Improving **the UN accountability for peacebuilding action** by ensuring that the UN leadership and staff have capacities for effective conflict and context analysis and ability to translate the analysis into system-wide planning and programming, reviewed regularly against delivery timelines, key performance

indicators, or seamless end-to-end workflows.

- Encouraging the continuation of **the UN structural and management reforms,** particularly to reduce bureaucracy and boost inter-agency collaboration, including by engaging with the Development Coordination Office to establish a Somalia collaboration team to allow resident coordinators to establish a single collaborative network of support arrangements.
- Prioritising and strengthening **long-term programming that contributes to peacebuilding,** including reconciliation processes, transitional justice, trauma healing and establishment of economic incentives for peace, and localised conflict resolution mechanisms and processes. Closer engagement with civil society can be an avenue to establish community infrastructures to quickly respond and effectively maintain peace using a bottom-up process, in addition to navigating formal channels.
- Improving **agility and adaptive capacities** by improving the accessibility of the UN for local partners; supporting early warning systems and other infrastructures of peace at all levels; strengthening inclusive national capacity-building efforts, including for civil society; and advancing the diversity of UN leadership, including by prioritising hiring Somali experts for senior positions and empowering national staff within programme structures, including in decentralised locations.
- Strengthening **conflict and context analysis** through inclusive conflict prevention and crisis response mechanisms equipped with a system of community monitors and with comprehensive indicators to measure peace, development, and humanitarian risks that are rooted in local realities, and supported by adequate forecasting methods and informing a comprehensive Common Country Analysis (CCA) or other internal data collection mechanism.
- Continuing **the implementation of gender and youth strategies** to enable systematic integration of gender analysis and diverse participation in programme planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation across various UN entities in Somalia, leveraging the expertise of the Gender Theme Group and Youth Advisory Board.

The relatively decentralised positioning of the UN across the country is a welcome development; however, more needs to be done to **empower Somali staff within the UN programming structure.** This is especially important in decentralised locations, as they have the ability to communicate directly with locals and could provide increased insight into and national ownership of UN efforts at the local level.

The UNSOM should develop a clear exit strategy that focuses on retaining adequate capacity within the RCO for political analysis, dialogue, and convening power to plan, and implementation of multi-stakeholder processes and engagement with a wide range of partners.

The international community should enhance **the international political will to strengthen the UN position vis-à-vis the Somali government** to better operationalise efforts to build and sustain peace. One such avenue could be for the Security Council to explicitly mandate the development of a peacebuilding strategy in Somalia, a similar strategy that has been applied in Sudan. The Peacebuilding Commission should also engage with the Somali government to spearhead a follow-up meeting, following the re-eligibility confirmation in 2020.

Donors should take a clear position **not to support peacebuilding programs that are not working.** In this, donors should prioritise current programmes that are creating impact on the ground, without regard for UN agency 'traditional focus' and specific relationships, allowing new and more innovative programs to roll out. The UN Headquarters (UNHQ), in this, should better equip the UN field presences with the resources and support needed, including through the implementation of the UN mobility policy.

Operational and policy coherence

The operationalisation of the development-humanitarian-peacebuilding nexus (the Triple Nexus) requires adequate programming, coordination, and conflict analysis shared across the UN System in support for *integrated responses* to the complex and multidimensional challenges faced by Somalia. This requires:

- Strengthening **joint programmes where relevant** by capitalising on existing good practises, with roles and responsibilities of each partner clearly defined, based on an analysis of the comparative advantages of each partner, and adequate capacity to implement among participating organisations. Also, joint programming could be more successful if a majority of the staff working within the UN agencies were primarily focused on the outcomes of the joint programmes rather than their personal or organisational goals.
- Advancing **an area-based approach** to engage at the level of the federal states by creating platforms that bring together a range of actors, including peacebuilding experts, to implement collective responses.

Beyond programming, an effective operationalisation of the Triple Nexus requires **strong coordination within the UN System.** This requires the UN to first strengthen its capacity as a facilitator and a coordinator, *before* implementing peacebuilding programming. Existing coordination mechanisms need to be fully operationalised. Further, while a *peacebuilding coordination mechanism* is required to bring together peacebuilding activities, all **existing coordination mechanisms need to be optimised** to understand their added value and potential overlap.

The role of the implementer should be filled primarily by national and local actors, with relevant capacities supported by the UN actors. In this, the UN should

bolster efforts to strengthen the engagement with Federal Member States (FMS) and the community actors, beyond the current focus on the engagement with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), through the provision of conflict-sensitive guidance, tools, and capacity-building opportunities and creating spaces for and encouraging the meaningful participation of diverse women and youth civil society actors in all aspects of peacebuilding, including the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements and transitional justice processes, among others.

Partnerships for peacebuilding

Partnerships require ongoing coordination and effort to reach consensus about common concepts, operational policies, and tools that facilitate cooperation, especially when it comes to the peacebuilding realm. For the UN to fulfil its role as a facilitator and coordination, additional efforts are required to:

- Sign MOUs to further **avoid conceptual or practical misunderstanding and confusion about roles** and develop joint strategies with diverse partners around specific peace- building and conflict prevention objectives. The UN Cooperation Framework Steering Committee can fulfil this function.
- **Specify the role of regional partners in the Cooperation Framework** to amplify gaps and overlaps in relevant peacebuilding and conflict prevention activities. The new African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) could continue organising capacity-building sessions and peacebuilding dialogues at the community level.
- Strengthen engagement with the World Bank to implement some of the recommendations from **the UN-World Bank Pathways for Peace** report relevant for the current context in Somalia.
- Systematise the engagement of relevant partners in the UN's activities by inviting the World Bank, the African Union (AU), and civil society, among other partners, where relevant, to **join working groups and other coordination efforts.**
- Provide **an effective platform for dialogue and consensus building** in situations where there is a breach of trust between the government and external partners.

Specific attention needs to be paid to **strengthening relationships with diverse civil society members,** as the partnership with civil society currently lacks depth and institutionalisation. For this, the UN in Somalia should consider:
- Conducting **an assessment of the existing partnerships** to understand root causes of engagement fatigue and increased lack of incentives for civil society to engage with the UN.
- Establishing a **systematic and institutionalised community engagement strategy** with civil society focal points available in all UN entities in Somalia, with Terms of Reference specifying their responsibility for systematic engagement with civil society. A good

practice of the Humanitarian Country Team, where civil society, including local groups, are an integral part of the Group's work, should be replicated in peacebuilding settings.
- Ensuring that **consultative processes are inclusive and practical and start early on** in the processes of strategic and programmatic development with relevant feedback loops and follow-up, drawing on the UN System-Wide Community Engagement Guidelines on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace.
- Supporting **the revival and strengthening of the previously active Somalia Conflict Early Warning Unit** (CEWERU) in partnership with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the donor community.

There is currently no mechanism to coordinate among various stakeholders. Many participants called this a critical step towards consolidated action on peacebuilding. This could include conversations about strengthening peace committees and district councils, relaunching an early warning mechanism, avoiding duplication, and overall encouraging learning and exchange. The coordination role can be taken by the RCO, given its central positioning.

Financing for peacebuilding

In addition to the limited financing available for peacebuilding efforts, the smaller funding streams result from *the lack of alignment among donors on what constitutes peacebuilding*. This is further exacerbated by *the lack of a dedicated peacebuilding window among many donors* where peacebuilding is often considered to be a subset of other policy objectives. Having **a dedicated peacebuilding strategy** will help donors align around a strategic portfolio that promotes integrated, coordinated, and flexible peacebuilding action in Somalia over a long period of time.

This strategic portfolio can be then connected to development and humanitarian activities in line with the Cooperation Framework in the process of **regular and comprehensive donor coordination** that allows all partners to maximise synergies, minimise potential duplication, and ensure policy coherence. This requires:
- Ensuring that the UN effectively fulfils its role **as a coordinator and facilitator between the donor community and other partners** before taking on the role of an implementer. This would minimise potential competition with the FGS, FMS, and civil society and support adequate capacity building of diverse national stakeholders, while capitalising on the role of the UN at the country level.
- **Operationalising the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility** and engaging existing donors in the SDRF's processes, while allowing opportunities for remote coordination and/or positive engagement of bilateral and multilateral donors who do not have offices in Somalia. This will enable the SDRF to support the implementation of the Cooperation Framework and the 2020–2024 Ninth National

Development Plan (NDP-9), thereby complementing rather than substituting agency-specific funding and improving overall coherence.

- **Establishing an optimised peacebuilding donor group** (in addition to humanitarian and development donor groups, by optimising the relationships between the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) donor group and the Friends of Reconciliation) chaired by the RCO to ensure more clarity on specific allocations towards peacebuilding. This group should consist of representatives of other donor groups to ensure complementarity and coherence.

As much as availability and coordination are crucial for the quantity of financing for peacebuilding, **the quality of financing** – long-term, context-specific, and flexible, among other factors – should be given particular consideration by donors. This requires:

- Bilateral donors should consider **directly funding through pooled fund mechanisms** and instituting additional mechanisms tightly linked to conflict and context analysis and planning that support their strategic priorities, while addressing the gaps in the implementation of the Cooperation Framework, including supporting local peacebuilding work.
- Bilateral donors should consider **removing earmarking** from their contributions to enable additional flexibility in resource management. This could help ensure that local realities are reflected in the development of relevant projects for increased impact.
- The donor community, including the pooled funds and bilateral donors, should adapt **a vulnerability criterion** for allocation of trust funds and **a flexible funding window** to further advance flexibility.
- The donor community should further explore the good practice of **unconditional cash transfers,** especially to women-headed households.
- The donor community should consider **engaging with diverse national partners** in the development of grant schemes to ensure that they – as implementers – can produce meaningful impact on the ground through these grants.
- The donor community should **decentralise the management of the funds** through nationally situated and adequately staffed mechanisms.
- All peacebuilding partners should have **an assessment system** to enable best value for money. Where the upgrade of capacities may produce minimal results on peacebuilding, these resources can be reallocated towards actions that bring important results at the community level.

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1. Introduction and background

This section provides an overview of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda, briefly summarising the four shifts called for by the UN Secretary-General in the 2018 Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace and outlining a framework for our analysis of the implementation of peacebuilding and sustaining peace in Somalia.

1.1 The UN Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda

The United Nations, having been established in the wake of two world wars, serves an overall purpose of supporting its Member States in preventing and resolving armed conflicts in a peaceful manner, and achieving lasting peace.[1] **Peacebuilding** as such has always been a central component of the UN's work.

Peacebuilding has gained renewed traction since the early 2000s, when the world was confronted with growing numbers of civilians being killed and injured in conflict, and millions of people being displaced and lacking basic safety and security as a result of armed conflict. Acknowledging that armed conflict and violence are increasingly complex, dynamic, and protracted, the 2015 review of the UN's peacebuilding architecture[2] set out a new framework of 'sustaining peace' in order to strengthen the UN System in such a way that it can better serve its Member States in their efforts to prevent armed conflict and lasting peace.

The concept of **sustaining peace** was formally adopted by the Member States in the 2016 dual General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions (A/70/262[3] and S/RES/2282[4]) and translated in the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda. This agenda sets out four shifts required to strengthen the UN's ability to better support peacebuilding efforts.[5]

The basic premise of the agenda is that its implementation requires a whole-of-system approach that incorporates all three pillars of the UN System – human rights, peace and security, and development – to come to a more holistic, long-term, multidimensional approach for preventing armed conflict, mitigating its impact when it does occur, and supporting governments and their citizens in achieving lasting peace.[6] In order for the UN to work along the lines of a whole-of-system approach, the UN Secretary-General has underlined that shifts are required in **operational and policy coherence** to strengthen support to peacebuilding and sustaining peace.[7]

The Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda is a long-term vision that requires institutions, norms, attitudes, and capacities to continuously adapt in response to the context changes at the country level. In order for the UN to deliver on this, the Secretary-General has emphasised that a shift is also required in terms of the **UN leadership, accountability, and capacity** in supporting peacebuilding and sustaining peace.[8]

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1   United Nations, *United Nations Charter,* Accessible at: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter.
2   United Nations "The Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations peacebuilding Architecture", 29 June 2015, Accessible at: https://www.un.org/pga/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2015/07/300615_The-Challenge-of-Sustaining-Peace.pdf.
3   United Nations, "Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, on 27 April 2016 (A/70/262)", 12 May 2016,
      Accessible at: https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_70_262.pdf.
4   United Nations, "Resolution 2282 (2016) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7680th meeting, on 27 April 2016",
      Accessible at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2282.pdf.
5   These shifts tie the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda closely to other on-going UN-system wide processes, including the operationalization of the UN Reforms and prevention agenda. *See for instance*, "The Vision of the UN Peace and Security Pillar", 2019,
      Accessible at: https://reform.un.org/sites/reform.un.org/files/vision_of_the_un_peace_and_security_pillar.pdf.
6   ODI, Metcalfe-Hough, McKechnie, and Pantuliano, "Delivering the UN "sustaining peace" agenda: Four areas for action by Member States", September 2017, Accessible at: https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/11750.pdf.
7   United Nations, "The 2018 Secretary-General's Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (A/72/707)", 18 January 2018,
      Accessible at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/report-secretary-general-peacebuilding-and-sustaining-peace
8   Ibid.

The agenda is a shared task and responsibility that needs to be fulfilled by national peacebuilding stakeholders in an inclusive manner and with the support of the UN and the donor community. In order for the UN to deliver on this final element of the agenda, the Secretary-General has underlined that shifts are required in terms of **partnerships and financing** for peacebuilding and sustaining peace.[9]

1.2 Implementing the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda

While the general principles of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda are clear enough, there is no simple step-by-step guide on what it means to implement the agenda in practice. Implementation comes down to system changes that are highly dependent on contextual factors, capacities and resources available, and political agendas, among other factors. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify some key action points per shift as identified by the UN Secretary-General.

The required shifts in UN <u>leadership, accountability and capacity</u> in supporting peacebuilding and sustaining peace are in part driven by the ongoing processes of repositioning **the RCO** and strengthening **the UN Country Teams (UNCT)** within the UN System and ensuring **collaborative leadership** in the context of transition. The adjustments that are being made to the RC System allow for the UN leadership at the country level to strengthen the linkages between the policy/political and the programming/operational roles of the UN. Acknowledging that support to peacebuilding and sustaining peace is inevitably influenced by political settings means that UN peacebuilding activities have to be accompanied by engagement from UN leadership in high-level and political dialogues. The focus on strengthening the capacities of the RCO and the UNCT to support peacebuilding and sustaining peace is amongst others operationalised by **bringing in relevant advisors and surge capacities** (e.g., peace and development advisors and gender advisors); creating **dedicated positions for civil society engagement** (civil society liaisons) and forming work groups inclusive of civil society; the provision of **training in conflict/context analysis;** strengthening the ability to adapt programming to rapidly changing contexts by conducting **regular assessments and evaluation with a focus on learning** rather than accountability; and ensuring **sufficient spread of UN locations and offices** across the country, to counter a centre-periphery bias.

Shifts in **operational and policy coherence** to strengthen support to peacebuilding and sustaining peace are

driven by the UN Secretary-General's ambition to decrease fragmentation of efforts and strengthen coherence, both at the strategic and operational level. A key element in this regard is the ambition to work from **a coherent and overarching country strategy** that ensures that a peacebuilding component is applied across **the Triple Nexus.** The strategy should bring the policy/political and the programming/operational role of the UN in-country together to support peacebuilding activities that are aligned with priorities identified by national peacebuilding stakeholders (government and civil society, specifically including women and youth). Such a coherent strategy (most often captured in the Cooperation Framework – or its predecessor the UN Development Assistance Framework) should be built on a joint understanding of the key issues to address. For this, **CCAs** should be conducted, which should include an analysis of the **main drivers of conflict and instability** in fragile and conflict-affected settings. A key element in strengthening operational coherence is to ensure that the UNCT is working from **a joint understanding of the capacities available** (and required) to work on peacebuilding. This requires the conduct of a capacity assessment, on the basis of which a **clear division of labour** within the UNCT is agreed upon, which takes into account the complementarities in terms of how various UN entities can best support national stakeholders in their peacebuilding processes – and which capacities are required to do so.

Shifts in partnerships for peacebuilding and sustaining peace in part are related to the ongoing processes to strengthen the complementarity between UN peacebuilding efforts and those of **regional organisations and international financial institutions** (especially the World Bank) by engaging regularly in joint analysis, planning, and information sharing – in addition to working in direct collaboration. They also relate to the requirement for the UN to develop **participatory systematic and institutionalised approaches** that involve civil society and local communities, including **community-engagement strategies** in consultation with national and local stakeholders, particularly youth and women's groups.

The required shifts in <u>financing</u> for peacebuilding and sustaining peace finally relate to the call of the UN Secretary-General to ensure that UN peacebuilding efforts have **adequate, predictable, and sustained financing**, including through the use of innovative financing mechanisms and pooled funds. As much as possible, the resources available for peacebuilding action are unearmarked and provided for a longer term to ensure that support is **responsive, flexible, and predictable.** In addition, in line with the acknowledgment that sustainable peace requires

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9   Ibid.

meaningful engagement of local stakeholders[10], the UN should engage in **authentic partnerships with local peacebuilders** (i.e., move beyond an extractive relationship by treating them as partners rather than implementers). The UN should also support civil society with simple and user-friendly grant application templates and selection/reporting criteria.

1.3 Monitoring progress on implementing the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda

The UN System currently monitors progress on the implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda via the Secretary-General's reports on peacebuilding and sustaining peace.[11] These reports provide an overarching picture of where the UN stands in the process, and reflect to a certain extent on progress achieved on the outputs of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda. From the Secretary-General's 2020 Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (A/74/976–S/2020/773[12]), it is reported that "of the 42 recommendations, 35 are in various stages of implementation, 3 have been completed and 4 related to financing are pending". Currently, monitoring systems for the UN Reforms are also being created (A/75/202[13]; A/72/684[14]).

While the action on the global indicators is a positive development that needs to be maintained, there is **less clarity about the progress made in implementing the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda at the country level** – and about the impact of implementing this agenda on advancing country-level peacebuilding processes and objectives. The 2 July 2020 Peacebuilding Commission Chair's letter speaks to this gap and encourages the UN to measure the success of peacebuilding and sustaining peace 'in terms of impact rather than outputs'.[15] Overall, the lack of adequate analysis of the implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda at the country level creates a gap in knowledge about the extent to which it makes a difference to those experiencing conflict and the ways

the implementation can be strengthened in line with shifting national priorities.

This brings us to the **rationale of this study:** Based on the premise of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda, it is assumed that if UN actors continuously work to respond to the four shifts called for by the UN Secretary-General, and if the donor community adequately supports these efforts through quality and quantity of financing, peace could be sustained long-term at the country level. In order to assess the effectiveness of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda, our analysis looks at the progress of the implementation and impact of the agenda at the country level.

1.4 Research objective and approach

This research project is a first attempt to fill the knowledge gap mentioned above by providing an **initial assessment of the progress and impact of the implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda** in Somalia.[16]

The overarching objective of the research is **to support more impactful peacebuilding and sustaining peace efforts at the country level.** This can be broken down into two sub-objectives:

1. to assess how UN actors at the country level have worked to implement the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda and, in this process, how their efforts have contributed to advancing country-level peacebuilding processes and objectives;

2. to engage with national and global stakeholders to formulate ways in which UN actors, in collaboration with the donor community, can strengthen the implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda at the country level so as to advance national peacebuilding processes and objectives.

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10   *See for instance* the 2020 dual UN Resolutions on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (A/RES/75/201–S/RES/2558) that recognize local peacebuilders as critical partners in peacebuilding; and the 2020 UNSG Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (A/74/976–S/2020/773) which states that peace is more sustainable when peacebuilding efforts are locally owned, led and implemented.

11   *For further information see* United Nations, "The 2018 Secretary-General's Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (A/72/707)", 18 January 2018, Accessible at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/report-secretary-general-peacebuilding-and-sustaining-peace; United Nations, "The 2019 Report of the Secretary General on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace", 30 May 2019, Accessible at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/a_73_890_e.pdf; and United Nations, "The 2020 Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding and sustaining peace", 30 July 2020, Accessible at: https://undocs.org/S/2020/773.

12   United Nations, "The 2020 Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding and sustaining peace", 30 July 2020, Accessible at: https://undocs.org/S/2020/773.

13   Ibid.

14   United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on repositioning the United Nations development system to deliver on the 2030 Agenda", 21 December 2017, Accessible at: https://undocs.org/A/72/684

15   United Nations, "Letter dated 2 July 2020 from the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council (A/74/935)", 7 July 2020, Accessible at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/a_74_935-2009035e_1.pdf.

16   This country case study is part of a wider project, containing three case studies (Somalia, Sudan and Mozambique), on the basis of which one synthesis policy note has been produced.

On the basis of insights gathered through a process of desk research, key informant interviews, and focus group discussions with key stakeholders within the UN System, the donor community, the national government, and the local peacebuilding community, this case study explores the progress made in the implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda in Somalia – as well as some of the initial effects of the implementation thus far.

This report first presents a brief overview of the peacebuilding context in Somalia, briefly summarising the current state of affairs in the country, and highlighting key achievements and outstanding challenges in terms of peacebuilding and sustaining peace (section 2). Then, the report provides an initial assessment of the progress made in terms of implementing the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda in Somalia by reflecting on the required shifts as identified by the Secretary-General (leadership, accountability, and capacity – section 3; operational and policy coherence – section 4; partnerships – section 5; and financing – section 6). For each of these sections, the report first presents a brief descriptive overview of the key structures, frameworks, and instruments in place relevant for the required shift, followed by an analysis of how these have contributed to the UN's ability to implement the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda in Somalia.

On the basis of that, the study provides practical recommendations for the UN and the donor community working on peacebuilding and sustaining peace in Somalia on how to further the implementation of the agenda, feeding into a broader process of drawing lessons to inform the policy discourse behind peacebuilding and sustaining peace (section 7).

2. Background: Peacebuilding in Somalia

This section provides an overview of the peacebuilding context in Somalia, briefly summarising the history of peacebuilding and the current state of affairs in the country, and highlighting key achievements and outstanding challenges towards the operationalisation of peacebuilding and sustaining peace at the country level.

Today's **Somalia is the most fragile when it comes to state-building,** following several decades of civil conflict, the rise of violent extremism, and subsequent weak governance systems. Since the outbreak of civil war in 1988, Somalia has experienced almost persistent conflict. The central government collapsed, most of the critical infrastructure was destroyed, a million refugees fled, and a devastating famine hit the country.[17] Somalis describe the period between December 1991 and March 1992 with the term *burbur* (catastrophe). In early 1992, UN diplomatic engagement began to support the negotiation of a ceasefire.[18] Shortly thereafter, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti initiated the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference (the **Mbagathi Peace Agreement**) that kickstarted the formation of the nominal government, known as the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) until 2012.[19] The federative structure, with the FGS and six FMS, replaced the TFG in 2012 with the adoption of a draft constitution.[20] The main political role of the FGS is to complete the federalism process, finalise the constitutional review, and prepare and conduct democratic elections every four years. **The trajectory has however been reportedly downwards since 2017** when the new government was elected,[21] resulting in shrinking civic space, capture of parliament, limitations on the rule of law, and a deepening war economy. **The COVID-19 pandemic** added further complexity to peacebuilding efforts in Somalia and has left a mark, despite efforts to institute fiscal measures aimed at increasing the health sector budget.[22]

Together, the above processes have implications on the legitimacy of the ongoing elections and overall deterioration in areas of governance and economic sector.[23] **The current election impasse** has further weakened peacebuilding efforts and shifted attention away from crucial stabilisation, reconciliation, and development activity priorities. Although Somalia's leaders agreed to complete the elections by 25 February 2022, still more than 30 per cent of the seats were yet to be completed by that date and another deadline of 15 March 2022 was set.[24] The US government has recently announced visa restrictions on Somali leaders and individuals who they said had 'obstructed the democratic process' after yet another delay in the elections. Insecurity incidents have also threatened the elections in a number of towns, including Barawe and

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17   Ken Menkhaus, *Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project: Somalia Case Study,* February 2018, accessed at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/766049/Somalia_case_study.pdf

18   Mark Bradbury and Sally Healy, *Endless war a brief history of the Somali conflict* (February 2010), Accessible at: https://www.c-r.org/accord/somalia/endless-war-brief-history-somali-conflict.

19   Ken Menkhaus, *Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project: Somalia Case Study* February 2018; Inclusive Peace & Transition Initiative, ''Women's role in Somalia's National Reconciliation Conference: 2002-2004'', n.d., Accessible at: https://www.inclusivepeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/infographic-women-somalia-2002-2004-en.pdf.

20   UN News, *UN officials welcome 'historic' approval of new constitution for Somalia,* August 2012, Accessible at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/08/416812-un-officials-welcome-historic-approval-new-constitution-somalia.

21   For instance, elite capture of politics have influenced the elections, along early negative trajectories, as FMS presidents handpicked and nominated their favourite candidates and redistricting nominations from other possible nominations. Crisis Group, 'Could Somalia Be the Next Afghanistan?', 22 September 2021, Accessible at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/could-somalia-be-next-afghanistan.

22   See more at: SaferWorld, "Now and the Future: Gender Equality, Peace and Security in a COVID-19 World-Somalia", January 2021, Accessible at: https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1335-now-and-the-future-gender-equality-peace-and-security-in-a-covid-19-world-somalia-.
      The pandemic has increased cases of sexual and gender-based violence and augmented tensions between citizens and security forces, particularly due to the spread of misinformation. At the moment of writing, the socio-economic impact of COVID-19, including in job creation and economic stability, continues to permeate communities, especially outside urban areas.

23   Derived from the interviews conducted for this project.

24   Derived from interviews conducted for this project.

Beletweyne.[25] In Mogadishu, the past few weeks have seen Al-Shabbab attacking several police stations and security checkpoints, raising concerns about election security as the country prepares for the long-delayed presidential election.

Main peacebuilding gains:

There are several indicators that Somalia can make solid steps towards political stabilisation, statebuilding, and sustaining peace.[26] First, *the establishment of the federal government* is a milestone towards overcoming deep-rooted political and inter-clan tensions and social division. Federalism can promote peace by decentralising power and proving a political solution for diverse people living throughout various areas of the country.[27] The federal government developed and works to implement NDP-9[28] to reduce insecurities, improve access to justice, strengthen institutions, and ensure inclusive politics.[29] Further, a notable change towards stabilisation in *public financial management and debt relief* has been taking place.[30] In 2020, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank's International Development Association determined that Somalia had taken the necessary steps to receive debt relief under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative,[31] providing incentives for donors to increase their financial support, including for peacebuilding action.[32] Lastly, there have been examples of successful *locally led and locally owned peace processes.* For instance, the 2017 Galkayo Peace Agreement[33] was a community-driven peace process under the oversight of the FGS that resulted in a strong local ownership used to initiate the process to rebuild social relations and forge inter-clan agreements.[34] It has also been

pointed out that clannism has positive aspects, as it prevents Somalia from erupting into conflict. Combined, these developments give Somalis hope for sustaining peace across the country and reassure external partners, including the donor community, of the value of continuous support for peacebuilding in Somalia.

Outstanding peacebuilding challenges:

Despite the achievements, Somalia is faced with numerous multidimensional challenges that can alter gains achieved. A federalism process has not been effective. *The political fragmentation* – rooted in clan dynamics, corruption, elite capture of resources, and disincentives for compromise – is the major contributor to the instability within the country.[35] The tensions between the FGS and FMS[36] continue to exacerbate social divisions. The international assistance system mobilises resources through the FGS, thus creating a 'winner-takes-most' political system that is essentially weak. *Clan affiliation and clan identity* are key to accessing resources, as the competition over resources among clans exacerbates grievances and advances inter-clan tensions.[37] This builds on *widespread economic, social, and cultural inequalities* throughout the country. For example, Somali women are continuously subjected to harmful gender norms that affect their access to education, resulting in only 27 per cent of female-headed households receiving some formal education compared to 41 per cent of their male counterparts.[38] *Land ownership* is another primary driver of conflict caused by the uncertainty surrounding land rights and the lack of equity in land use and access, especially by women, returned refugees, internally displaced persons, and minority

25 It is reported that, in Beletweyne, a suicide bomber blew himself up in a restaurant killing 13 people and injuring 18 others before the start of elections.

26 The decentralisation of power and the division between federal and state governments enables federalism to address challenges of coexistence and rivalries, including between various influential clans.

27 IDEA International, "Why Federalism", 27 August 2020, Accessible at: https://www.idea.int/news-media/media/why-federalism

28 Federal Government of Somalia, The Ministry of Planning, Investment, and Economic Development, *Somalia's National Development Plan 2020-2024*, 2020, p. 110-111, Accessible at: https://mop.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/NDP-9-2020-2024.pdf;
    Note that based on research and evidence, there is no clear evidence on how the National Development Plan was carried out in the first two years of its implementation.

29 Ibid, p. 109-10.

30 Federal Government of Somalia, The Ministry of Planning, Investment, and Economic Development, *Somalia's National Development Plan 2020-2024,* 2020, Accessible at: https://mop.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/NDP-9-2020-2024.pdf.

31 IMF, "Press Release No. 20/104: Somalia to Receive Debt Relief Under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative", 25 March 2020, Accessible at: https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/03/25/pr20104-somalia-somalia-to-receive-debt-relief-under-the-enhanced-hipc-initiative.

32 Federal Government of Somalia, The Ministry of Planning, Investment, and Economic Development, *Somalia's National Action Plan 2020-2024,* 2020, p. 119, Accessible at: https://mop.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/NDP-9-2020-2024.pdf.

33 Derived from the interviews conducted for this project.

34 London School of Economics, "Finding Peace in Somalia: the Galkayo "Local" Peace Agreement", 4 November 2020, Accessible at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/107142/1/CRP_finding_peace_in_somalia.pdf.

35 Federal Government of Somalia, The Ministry of Planning, Investment, and Economic Development, *Somalia's National Development Plan 2020-2024,* 2020, p. 132, Accessible at: https://mop.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/NDP-9-2020-2024.pdf.

36 International Peace Institute, "SRSG Swan: 2020 Can Be the "Year of Delivery" for Somalia", 25 February 2020, Accessible at: https://www.ipinst.org/2020/02/srsg-swan-on-somalia#8.

37 Federal Government of Somalia, The Ministry of Planning, Investment, and Economic Development, Somalia's National Action Plan 2020-2024, 2020, Accessible at: https://mop.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/NDP-9-2020-2024.pdf.

38 Care International, "Women and Girls in Somalia Continue to Be the Most Affected by the Humanitarian Crises", 29 September 2021, Accessible at: https://www.care-international.org/news/press-releases/women-and-girls-in-somalia-continue-to-be-the-most-affected-by-the-humanitarian-crises.

clans.[39] Further, the insurgent group, Al-Shabaab, poses an ongoing security threat in the south-central region, resulting in recurring humanitarian shocks, widespread violence, large-scale displacement, and sexual and gender-based violence.[40] The situation is complicated by Al-Shabaab's ability to maintain local support[41] due to the widespread perception of the government being securitised and the lack of accountability for armed forces.[42] This highly complex political and security situation further challenges the opportunities of gaining national consensus around the path to state-building. Moreover, *the effects of climate change* pose additional threats to the already fragile situation and contribute to local grievances and community tensions.[43] For example, growing levels of drought induce herder–farmer conflicts, where settled communities and livestock herders compete over the same resources.[44] Despite the successful Galkayo peace process, *very few cases of inclusive and locally driven peace processes* exist, while the participation of non-Somali actors in peace processes is growing. This leads to mistrust of the population for peace processes and a lack of sustainability of peace agreements. Finally, *the mechanisms for addressing people's grievances* are traditionally missing in peace processes in Somalia. Coupled with a distrust for formal justice mechanisms, the situation requires institutionalising transitional justice to alleviate deeply rooted grievances and facilitate the possibilities for peace and reconciliation.

Moving forward:

There is some foundation and progress in advancing peacebuilding and sustaining peace in Somalia, including locally led peace processes, financial incentives, and the federalisation agenda; however, the deep-rooted challenges to peace need to be reflected on and better integrated into dedicated national and multilateral strategies. The persistent security challenges, lack of transitional justice and rule of law, existing elite capture and war economy, challenges of climate and security, various forms of inequality, as well as land disputes, need to be addressed through a political consensus. Achieving an enabling environment for peacebuilding and sustaining peace is only possible if the federalisation agenda succeeds and a political consensus in the country is reached not only between the government and its member states, but also with other interested parties, including civil society. In this, the UN in-country should support building inclusive and accountable institutions and national conflict prevention and peacebuilding capacities, as well as facilitate meaningful platforms for multi-stakeholder analysis and exchange. It is also important that multilateral partners, including the UN Member States and the donor community, ensure meaningful support for the UN System in their support for the inclusive national peacebuilding priorities. This will not only enable the journey towards sustaining peace but also also capitalise on Somalia's state-building priorities rooted in conflict prevention and strong governance.

39   Shuraako, Burman, Bowden, and Gole, "Land Tenure in Somaia: Potential Foundations for Security and Prosperity", February 2014, Accessible at: https://shuraako.org/sites/default/files/documents/Land%20Tenure%20in%20Somalia%20A%20Potential%20Foundation%20for%20Security%20and%20Prosperity.pdf.

40   Centre for Strategic and International Studies, "Examining Extremism: Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen (al Shabaab)", 23 September 2021, Accessible at: https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-harakat-al-shabaab-al-mujahideen-al-shabaab.

41   During the initial outbreak of COVID-19, Al-Shabaab was able to carry on local support, especially in areas where the government has limited reach. Further, the Al-Shabaab mobile courts were described as an effective arbitration mechanism that is free of clan influence. Derived from the interviews conducted for this project.

42   For instance, passing Al Shabbab check points is noted to be a less traumatising experience for the citizens, where people are just expected to "pay and go." At the government checkpoints, citizens report sexual and gender based violence occurring at government checkpoints. Derived from the interviews conducted for this project.

43   ACCORD, ''The Impact of Climate Change on Peace and Security in Somalia: Implications for AMISOM'', 24 February 2021, Accessible at: https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/the-impact-of-climate-change-on-peace-and-security-in-somalia-implications-for-amisom/.

44   SIPRI, Eklöw and Krampe, "Climate- Related Security Risks and Peacebuilding in Somalia", October 2019, Accessible at: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/sipripp53_2.pdf.

3.
Leadership, accountability, and capacity of the UN in Somalia

This section reflects on the capacities available within the United Nations in-country leadership to support the implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda in such a way that country-level peacebuilding priorities and objectives can be advanced, including in the context of fragility and emerging crises.

The UN leadership structure in Somalia is complex. In 2013, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2093[45] establishing *an integrated UN Assistance Mission in Somalia*. Under its mandate, UNSOM provides technical advice and capacity-building for peacebuilding and reconciliation processes in Somalia,[46] promotes shared priorities among all UN actors at the country level, and 'gives the Somali administration "a single door to knock on"'.[47] In addition to UNSOM, the UN presence in Somalia includes a variety of UN agencies, funds, and programmes (AFPs)[48] brought together under an umbrella of the UNCT, UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), as well as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).[49]

In this integrated structure, the UN country presence is supported by *four key leadership positions:*

At the time of writing, James Christopher Swan[50] holds the position of UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and is responsible for the broad oversight of all UN operations in the country. The UN Deputy Special Representative, Anita Kiki Gbeho,[51] oversees the work of the political, human rights, electoral, and rule of law and security components of UNSOM. In this, UNSOM leads on the political track of UN engagements. Specifically, it promotes an enabling environment for the effective delivery of international assistance. This includes providing policy advice to the FGS related to building national institutions and practises that enable peace- and state-building, supporting the FGS in the coordination of international actors, and providing technical and financial assistance to the country's political and socioeconomic recovery.[52] Special attention is currently paid to supporting the elections and conducting a constitutional review.

Further, the head of UNSOS, known as the Assistant Secretary-General– Lisa Filipetto[53] – provides technical, administrative, and logistic support to AMISOM, Somalia Security Forces, and UNSOM, as well as directly facilitates statebuilding and reconciliation efforts. In this, UNSOS is recognised as a 'strategic enabler'.[54]

Lastly, Adam Abdelmoula,[55] the Deputy Special Representative/Resident Coordinator/ Humanitarian Coordinator (DSRSG/RC/HC), coordinates the operational and technical component of the UN presence and supports better integration of all UN activities.[56] The RCO does not only possess technical expertise in advancing key peace- and state-building

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45 United Nations, 'Resolution 2093 (2013) adopted by the Security Council on 6 March 2013 S/RES/2093', Accessible at: https://unsos.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s-res-2093-2013_0.pdf.
46 United Nations, 'Resolution 2592 (2021)', 30 August 2020, p. 4, para 6 (d), Accessible at: https://undocs.org/S/RES/2592(2021).
47 The New Humanitarian, 'The UN's Integrated Mission in Somalia', 10 May 2013, Accessible at: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2013/05/10/un-s-integrated-mission-somalia.
48 UN Somalia, *UN Entities in Somalia,* Accessible at: https://somalia.un.org/en/about/un-entities-in-country.
49 AMISOM is mandated to assist the Somali security forces to provide security for the political process at all levels as well as stabilisation, reconciliation and peace building in Somalia. *For further information see* United Nations, "Resolution 2568 (2021)", 12 March 2021, Accessible at: https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2568(2021).
50 *For further information on James Swan SRSG see* United Nations Somalia, *Our Team*, Accessible at: https://somalia.un.org/en/about/our-team.
51 UN Secretary General, *Anita Kiki Bgaho: Deputy Special Representative*, Accessible at: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/profiles/anita-gbeho-0.
52 *See* UNSOM, *Donor Coordination*, Accessible at: https://unsom.unmissions.org/donor-coordination.
53 *For further information on Lisa Filipetto see* UN, *UNSOS Leadership,* Accessible at: https://unsos.unmissions.org/leadership.
54 *For further information on UNSOS see* UN, *UNSOS Mandate,* Accessible at: https://unsos.unmissions.org/unsos-mandate.
55 *For further information on Adam Abdelmoula see* United Nations Somalia, Our Team, Accessible at: https://somalia.un.org/en/about/our-team.
56 UNSOM, *Leadership*, Accessible at: https://unsom.unmissions.org/leadership.

processes,[57] but also often exercises the political mandate to mediate challenges and conflicts between parties[58] as they arise. The triple-hatted position of DSRSG/RC/HC responds to the call of the UN Secretary-General to integrate development, humanitarian, and peacebuilding agendas across the UN System.[59] Such a position presents the RCO as a leader in advancing cross-sectoral and multidisciplinary approaches to advance peace- and state-building in Somalia.

The UN leadership is supported by relevant advisors and experts. The group of experts on issues relevant to peacebuilding includes several positions at UNSOM, including peacebuilding and conflict analysis officer, several political affairs officers in the Political and Mediation Group, human rights and protection advisers, and an adviser on Youth, Peace and Security, as well as a coordinator and monitoring and evaluation specialist for the UN Peacebuilding Fund, a P/CVE adviser, and a climate and security adviser in the Integrated Office. To guarantee widespread impact of its activities on sustaining peace and development, the UN leadership relies on the support of a *risk management unit* (RMU).[60] The RMU aims to build the UN's capacity to mitigate risks by delivering workshops and advises the UN on risk management approaches.[61]

Conflict and context analysis are mostly developed within the UN System. The *Common Country Analysis (CCA)* provides key data for conflict and context analysis of the drivers of conflict and instability. This data enables the UNCT to be flexible when handling various crises and ensures its continued relevance.[62] In addition to the CCA, donors and other international partners reported relying on the analysis published by UN AFPs to inform their own strategies and programming.[63] Attempts to facilitate localised data collection and analysis have previously been made. Although outside the UN System, a good example of strengthened conflict analysis is the Somalia Youth Development Network and IGAD for the CEWERU partnership. As the national coordination structure of IGAD's Conflict Early Warning Mechanism (CEWARN), CEWERU collects early warning

data through district peace committees which receive data from diverse community actors who represent clans within several districts in Somalia.[64] However, such a mechanism for localised data collection is currently not functional due to the lack of political support and financial backing. When in operation, this mechanism produced critical analysis, including around political processes, but was perceived to be too sensitive and, therefore, was not used. The UN could provide political support and support fundraising efforts to enhance and functionalise such mechanism initiatives.

The UN field presence is relatively decentralised. The UN has office presence in at least 12 cities and towns in Somalia.[65] The UN has satellite offices in major towns such as Baidoa, Beledweyne, Hargeisa, and Garowe; the offices of UN entities (with both national and international staff) also exist in Berbera, Bossaso, Dhobley, Dhusamareb, Doolow, Galkayo, and Kismayo.[66] In all locations, the UN field presence operates from closed compounds with strict security protocols and guidelines.[67] While such precautions are necessary, the compounds are guarded by security companies that are sometimes owned by the actors who contribute to fragility.

There is some remarkable progress, as well as substantial gaps in the UN leadership on peacebuilding in Somalia. Across its complex leadership architecture, the UN presence in Somalia has demonstrated significant progress in supporting peacebuilding and sustaining peace. The lack of a dedicated and inclusive peacebuilding strategy and limited peacebuilding capacities within the UN, however, hamper further incorporation of peacebuilding priorities across the UN's integrated approach in Somalia.
Successful peacebuilding action requires long-term relationships that build trust. The Cooperation Framework not only recognises the importance of trust-building to advance sustainable peace, but also highlights the transparency of partnerships created. Some UN actors, such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP), have extensive experience on

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57 The UN system brings extensive knowledge and expertise on the many peacebuilding challenges facing Somalia. In addition to in-country capacities, the UN presence in Somalia can leverage regional and global expertise and best practices in peacebuilding. *See* United Nations, "Somalia Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework", June 2021, p. 50, Accessible at: https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/UNSDCF-Somalia-2021-2025.pdf.

58 Ibid, p. 51.

59 United Nations, "Peacebuilding and sustaining peace: Report of the Secretary General", 18 January 2018, p. 9 para 32, Accessible at: https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/72/707.

60 United Nations Somalia, "Risk Management Unit: Risk Management Unit at a Glance", 19 January 2020, Accessible at: https://somalia.un.org/sites/default/files/2020-01/RMU.PDF.

61 Ibid. *Also*, during the interviews conducted for this project, the RMU's assessment of the fiduciary risks and training in risk assessment and management was cited as especially 'useful'.

62 United Nations, "Somalia Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework", June 2021, p. 53-54, Accessible at: https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/UNSDCF-Somalia-2021-2025.pdf.

63 Derived from the interviews conducted for this project.

64 *For further information see* Inter- Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)- CEWARN, "CEWARN- IGAD's Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism", Accessible at: https://www.cewarn.org/index.php.

65 Derived from the interviews conducted for this report.

66 Derived from the interviews conducted for this report.

67 Derived from the interviews conducted for this report.

conflict analysis and prevention in Somalia. This earned UNDP the reputation of being a platform, convenor, and trusted partner by the national government, other UN actors, and donors. This recognition stems from the establishment of strong partnerships at the local, national, and regional levels. Thus, the reflection on what makes the UN a strong partner and leader is needed to continue to capitalise on the UN's added value at the country level.

Sustaining political engagement beyond UNSOM is critical. At the moment, the mission leads on the political function at the integrated mission, as the RCO is expected to fill more operational development and humanitarian responsibilities. However, UNSOM should be a mission that transitions over time with a clear exit strategy from the outset. Some interviewees suggested that the absence of a clear exit strategy will most likely lead UNSOM to be present in the country for many, many years to come. Given the temporary role, there should be no space for a decline in political engagement of the UN. As such, some suggested that the UNSOM should focus on retaining adequate capacity within the RCO for political analysis, dialogue, and convening power to plan and implement multi-stakeholder processes and engagement with a wide range of partners. Doing so has the potential to safeguard enablers of conflict prevention and sustainable peace in Somalia.

Peacebuilding capacities need to be enhanced. Peacebuilding efforts in Somalia have been affected by modest political influence and limited coordination. Two of the four strategic priorities in the Cooperation Framework explicitly aim to advance peacebuilding by strengthening inclusive politics and reconciliation[68] and delivering improved security and rule of law for citizens.[69] Many of the peacebuilding experts are not at senior level. In addition, capacities to conduct conflict and context analysis and meaningfully translate analysis into more conflict-sensitive programming are currently loosely established within the integrated mission in Somalia. At the same time, there is neither a dedicated peacebuilding strategy nor a dedicated actor to coordinate peacebuilding engagement at the operational level and support critical conflict prevention capacities.

Continuity of staff and accountability for senior leadership needs to be improved. The lack of peacebuilding expertise is exacerbated by a high turnover of staff, jeopardising stable working relationships. Conversely, some senior UN actors hold the same positions for over eight years with no accountability for the delivery of results due to protective personal relationships among colleagues within the UN System, without commitment to the overall objectives of the institutions they serve. Moreover, the current UN policies do not contain enough incentives for the staff to move. The staffing patterns have been described as an ineffective and stagnant way of working because they limits the creativity, innovation, and alternative thinking required to adjust to contemporary challenges.[70]

There is a need for stronger accountability for peacebuilding results. Beyond staff accountability, the general accountability systems for the delivery of peacebuilding results in Somalia are lacking. The Cooperation Framework does not mention specific indicators of progress beyond assigning specific reporting focal points to each indicator. For example, UNSOM and UNDP are responsible for reporting on the 'number of conflicts resolved through established community-led, grass-roots conflict resolution mechanisms' under indicator 1.3.b. Similarly, the same actors are expected to report on the 'increased trust in formal justice institutions' under indicator 2.1.a. These are, however, not attached to clear and measurable indicators and a related roadmap. Further, the lack of accountability systems can be explained by the difficulty in measuring the impact of political work, as well as some aspects of operational activities.[71] This difficulty is because providing advice and coordinating political processes produce minimal immediate impact, especially in a situation where the results depend on actors outside of the UN's control. However, the lack of immediate results in many peacebuilding activities can be compensated by the commitment to long-term reflection processes to better inform the continuous UN engagement in Somalia.

International support for the UN in-country presences is weak. UN regional actors have provided targeted and reflective support, including in the drafting of the Cooperation Framework. Both the Development Coordination Office Africa and the Regional Peer

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68 This includes ensuring that human rights and equality are codified in agreed federal and state constitutions, supporting the development of community inclusive conflict resolution mechanisms, and building the capacity of civil society to provide support and independent oversight for Somali institutions. *See* United Nations, 'Somalia Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework', June 2021, p. 29 -32, Accessible at: https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/UNSDCF-Somalia-2021-2025.pdf.

69 This includes supporting the establishment of community-oriented security services at federal and state level to ensure human security. *See* United Nations, 'Somalia Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework', June 2021, p. 34, Accessible at: https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/UNSDCF-Somalia-2021-2025.pdf.

70 Derived from the interviews conducted for this project.

71 Derived from the interviews conducted for this project.

Support Group[72] have been critical parts of the Cooperation Framework development process. Further, after several years of silence, Somalia re-engaged with the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in 2020, resulting in the PBC committing to continue exercising its convening capacity and relationships with the PBF and mobilising international support for the country's peacebuilding priorities.[73] However, the second proposed PBC meeting remains pending. At the same time, the UN Security Council resolutions on Somalia continue to highlight the good practice of the Somalia Senior Leadership Coordination Forum as a platform for collaboration based on the needs and availability of its leaders. This raises concerns about the process of reflection shifting towards the action of the Security Council in support of Somalia peace- and state-building goals. As the council explicitly mandated the development of a peacebuilding strategy in Sudan, a similar strategy could be applied to the situation in Somalia. Additionally, the Global Focal Point for the Rule of Law Programme has been cited to be a positive initiative, but its activities at the country level are hard to trace.

Regular reflection and learning are required to support the continuity of peacebuilding actions. Positive steps have been taken to facilitate reflection at strategic moments. For instance, the final evaluation of the 2017–2020 Strategic Framework provides actionable strategic and programmatic recommendations for strengthening the UN's support for Somalia's national development priorities under NDP-9, including through the Cooperation Framework.[74] These recommendations have been partially integrated into the updated Framework. The establishment of a peacebuilding strategy is one such recommendation that has been missed out. Moreover, the lack of meaningful reflection at UNSOM and AMISOM prevails, leading to their mandates and strategies largely not changing, failing to reflect the changes in the situation on the ground.[75]

Effective peacebuilding necessitates agility and adaptive capacities for a meaningful impact. Some

resources suggest that the UN in Somalia was able to adequately adapt to the changed reality of the COVID-19 pandemic. This understanding is supported by the previous Strategic Framework which enabled an organised, nationwide, multisectoral response by and through the FGS.[76] While the immediate COVID-19 response plan was primarily humanitarian in nature, the broader Somalia Country Preparedness and Response Plan[77] included a socioeconomic component. This plan was not included in the framework; however, it was made possible by the present capacities with the UN field presence.[78] Despite these efforts, it was cited that the UN peacebuilding actors in Somalia are perceived to be much stronger in stable contexts, where the goals and priorities have been identified in advance. This rests on the fact that the UN has strong planning and implementation capacity in Somalia.[79]

There are several reasons for the limited agility and adaptive capacities with the UN in Somalia. Despite the ongoing implementation of the UN Reforms aimed partially at limiting bureaucracy within the UN System, the UN continues to be a 'giant bureaucracy'. The UN processes in Somalia have been described as 'too slow' and 'cumbersome' to adapt to changing peacebuilding contexts. Further, limited engagement at the state and local levels has a significant impact on the UN's agility and adaptive capacities, as UN personnel are unable to meet with these experts. For instance, entering the UN compound requires security clearance, a cumbersome and frustrating process that limits the perception of equal partnerships. The UN staff also infrequently leaves the compound because of the stringent security guidelines.[80] These protocols limit the UN's mobility and civil society access to its partners. Lastly, the majority of the UN staff does not speak local languages and is therefore unreachable to some local experts.

Conflict and context analysis is required for adequate programming. At the time of writing, a deep and contextual understanding of peacebuilding is not comprehensive. The CCA presents a solid database of information and analysis to enable the UN System in

72   United Nations, "UN Development Coordination Office Regional Office for Africa: Annual Results Report 2020-2021", July 2021, p. 18, Accessible at: https://unsdg.un.org/resources/un-development-coordination-office-regional-office-africa-annual-results-report-2020-2021.

73   United Nations, "Press Statement of the Peacebuilding Commission on peacebuilding in Somalia", 4 December 2020, Accessible at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_press_statement_on_somalia_approved.pdf.

74   UN Somalia, "The 2017-2020 UN Strategic Framework: Final Evaluation Summary," 2021.

75   *For further information on UNSOM see* United Nations, "Resolution 2102 (2013), 2 May 2013, Accessible at: https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2102(2013); and United Nations, "Resolution 2592 (2021)", 30 August 202, Accessible at: https://undocs.org/S/RES/2592(2021). *For further information on AMISON see* United Nations, "Resolution 2372 (2017), 30 August 2017, Accessible at: https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2372(2017); and United Nations, "Resolution 2568 (2021)", 12 March 2021, Accessible at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2568.pdf.

76   UN Somalia, "The 2017-2020 UN Strategic Framework: Final Evaluation Summary," 2021.

77   United Nations, "Somalia Country Preparedness and Response Plan (CPRP) COVID- 19: UN and partners' support towards the immediate humanitarian and socio-economic consequences of COVID-19", August 2020, Accessible at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CPRP%20Final%20Subow%2C%2026%20April%20%281%29.pdf.

78   UN Somalia, "The 2017-2020 UN Strategic Framework: Final Evaluation Summary," 2021. p. 7.

79   Derived from the interviews conducted for this report.

80   During the interviews, it was reported that, under normal operational pre-COVID conditions, most programme staff left the compound at least once a week, including travel to field locations. However, this is not enough time to dedicate to meaningfully engage, and civil society cannot access the UN as well.

Somalia and its partners to meet the multidimensional challenges in a comprehensive and integrated manner, while remaining sensitive to the conflict and the changing situation on the ground.[81] It is intended to be independent and impartial[82]; however, it is also a public document. As a result, it paints a fairly broad and general picture to avoid touching upon possibly sensitive issues in the context of post-conflict settings. Yet, it is precisely these sensitive issues that need to be addressed to advance sustainable peace. Therefore, the CAA cannot unfold its full potential for joint effective action. Political and financial support by the UN could be directed towards ensuring IGAD's Somalia Conflict Early Warning Unit and relevant community mechanisms have the capacity to effectively collect early warning data from district peace committees on various Somali populations to promote the conflict and context analysis required.

Peacebuilding requires a long-term approach.
The sustainability of peacebuilding efforts is at risk due to the lack of long-term approaches to building incentives for peace beyond a political track. Frequently, peacebuilding efforts are centred on cessation of hostilities and mediation. However, long-term reconciliation, transitional justice, trauma healing, and establishing economic incentives for peace are not prioritised. Such an approach is perceived as an unsustainable practice that needs to be overcome to enable the progressive transfer of responsibility to local development actors while gradually downscaling the UN's overall footprint.[83] Conversely, there are positive examples of increasing long-term peacebuilding efforts. The role of women in decision-making is slowly starting to gain momentum with the development of Somalia's National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (WPS).[84] One way UNDP is supporting long-term peacebuilding activities is by using a community-based reconciliation and trauma healing approach implemented by the Somalia Youth and Development Network,[85] as well as social and economic integration of individuals and youth at risk of participating in violence.[86] However, long-term projects are challenged by political realities and have seen minimal impact[87] at both the FGS and FMS levels. This can be explained by the fact that capacity-building is a two-way street that requires an enabling environment for such an activity. In the context of a political impasse, institutional reforms and building infrastructures for peace can be a hard process. Closer engagement with civil society can be

an avenue to establish community infrastructures to quickly respond and effectively maintain peace using a bottom-up process.

Moving forward:

Through many years of working on conflict analysis and prevention in Somalia, the UN earned a reputation of being a platform, convenor, and trusted partner for the national government, UN actors, and donors. The latest Cooperation Framework continues a trend of increased representativeness and clarity on the division of roles and responsibilities. At the same time, a dedicated peacebuilding strategy and capacities to further integration of peacebuilding priorities across the UN's integrated approach in Somalia are still lacking, especially without adequate conflict/context analysis and accountability mechanisms. As such, designing a clear peacebuilding strategy, strengthening conflict/context analysis, and facilitating regular informal and inclusive multi-stakeholder reflection and learning are critical to meaningfully operationalise peacebuilding and sustain peace in Somalia. The UN Security Council could have mandated such a strategy as it has done in Sudan; however, at the moment, critical international support for the UN leadership is missing.

81   Ibid, p. 7.
82   United Nations, "Somalia Common Country Analysis", 25 September 2020, p. 68, Accessible at: https://somalia.un.org/en/91993-un-common-country-analysis-somalia-2020.
83   UN Somalia, "The 2017-2020 UN Strategic Framework: Final Evaluation Summary," 2021.
84   UN Women has just recently established programming, before other agencies picked up the implementation of the Women Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda. However, there is no stand-alone policy on gender.
85   *For further information see* SOYDEN, *Activities,* Accessible at: https://soyden.net/services/.
86   UNDP "Independent Country Programme Evaluation –Somalia Report", 2020, Accessible at: http://web.undp.org/evaluation/evaluations/adr/somalia.shtml.
87   UN Somalia, "The 2017-2020 UN Strategic Framework: Final Evaluation Summary," 2021.

4. Operational and policy coherence to strengthen support to peacebuilding and sustaining peace

This section looks at the extent to which in-country UN actors have succeeded in coordinating their peacebuilding efforts across the relevant UN pillars (i.e., peacekeeping, peacebuilding, development, and humanitarian) in order to support the implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda in such a way that country-level peacebuilding priorities and objectives can be advanced.

The UN operates under an integrated strategic framework. Leadership and action of the UN System operating in Somalia is guided by *an integrated strategic framework*,[88] also known as the 2021–2025 UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (the Cooperation Framework).[89] It guides the entire programme cycle from planning to implementation, monitoring, reporting, and evaluation of the collective UN support.[90] The implementation of the Cooperation Framework is guided by *a Joint Government-UN Cooperation Framework Steering Committee* composed of high-level federal government and UN representatives, as well as development partners and minority group representatives.[91] The *UN Programme Management Team*, consisting of senior staff across agencies, funds, programmes, and UNSOM, provides strategic advice and guidance on UN system-wide programmatic issues. *The Cooperation Framework Results Groups*, consisting of the representatives of all UN entities present on the ground, are primarily responsible for the technical-level operationalisation of the Cooperation Framework.[92] The UN's various thematic working groups, including on gender, youth, and durable solutions, ensure the perspectives and needs of marginalised groups inform the implementation of the Cooperation Framework.[93]

The Cooperation Framework is anchored in the Triple Nexus 'with a central focus on addressing the underlying causes of recurrent human-made and environmentally driven crises that undermine the resilience of Somali institutions, communities, and individuals, particularly those most vulnerable and marginalised'.[94] This is a clear sign of increased commitment to integrated conflict sensitivity across the UN's work. Previously, the UN in Somalia mainly provided humanitarian assistance. However, the results of humanitarian efforts have not sufficiently contributed to resilience.[95] For example, the lack of investment into flood control infrastructure beyond humanitarian response to the challenge of climate change has doubled the amount of support needed. This shift towards peacebuilding and development priorities demonstrates the realisation that relying on humanitarian assistance alone is an unsustainable approach to address the root causes of conflict in Somalia.[96]

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88   The previous 2017-2020 Strategic Framework also served as a combined UN Development Assistance Framework and Integrated Strategic Framework.

89   United Nations, "Somalia Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework", June 2021, Accessible at: https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/UNSDCF-Somalia-2021-2025.pdf.

90   United Nations, "Somalia Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework", June 2021, p. 49, Accessible at: https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/UNSDCF-Somalia-2021-2025.pdf.

91   Derived from the interviews conducted for this report.

92   United Nations, "Somalia Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework", June 2021, p. 55, Accessible at: https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/UNSDCF-Somalia-2021-2025.pdf.

93   United Nations, "Somalia Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework", June 2021, p. 55, Accessible at: https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/UNSDCF-Somalia-2021-2025.pdf.

94   Ibid, p. 50

95   UN Somalia, "The 2017-2020 UN Strategic Framework: Final Evaluation Summary," 2021.

96   Derived from the interviews conducted for this project.

Inclusion is a critical element of the UN's work. An updated gender strategy is also in development, after an earlier one expired in 2021.[97] Somalia is the first UN presence in the world to have adopted a youth strategy that guides mainstreaming youth into peacebuilding activities.[98] Youth focal points are present in every UN AFP and regularly coordinate on Youth, Peace and Security.[99] In this, a youth interagency working group ensures interagency coordination on youth-related issues. The Youth Advisory Board – established in 2019 and consisting of 18 Somali, nine males and nine females – serves to strengthen the UN's youth engagement and participation in political processes and peacebuilding initiatives in Somalia.[100] However, there is limited clarity about what activities particularly contribute to the peacebuilding element of the theory of change.

The peacebuilding component of the Cooperation Framework is embedded in both the theory of change and specific strategic priorities.[101] However, relevant activities are spread across strategic priorities without any clarity of what concrete actions are. For example, activities implemented range from the strengthening and decentralisation of the federal system to supporting dispute resolution and reconciliation processes (strategic priority 1) to inclusive peacebuilding, reconciliation, and political engagement (strategic priority 4). This approach allows peacebuilding activities to remain decentralised without clear conflict prevention, mediation, and reconciliation objectives. Thus, the centralisation of activities is needed in Somalia as the Triple Nexus requires peacebuilding components across UN activities.

The key role of the UN at the country level is to facilitate and coordinate activities across the Triple Nexus in support of national priorities. The UN in Somalia has a long history of inter-agency coordination that emerged prior to the UN Reforms. However, there is no dedicated country-level collaboration with a person serving as the focal point that would support inter-agency collaboration in Somalia. The UN liaises with international donor partners through

their respective humanitarian and development coordination structures. One example is the *Senior Leadership Coordination Forum* – consisting of UNSOM, UNSOS, and AMISOM. This forum should hold monthly meetings but realistically meets on a primarily ad hoc basis based on senior leadership availability and the existence of 'burning issues'. Together with the federal government and international representatives, the UN also established *a high-level Triple Nexus Steering Committee* that is yet to be operationalised and will support the development of working groups dedicated to strategic issues, such as combating corruption, the environment, and durable solutions. Further, to enhance inter-agency cooperation and policy coherence, the UN created the *UN Communications Group (UNCG)* in Somalia. The UNCG functions to ensure the activities associated with the framework align with the FGS' and FMS' priorities; spread awareness of the identified FGS-UN joint strategic priorities; highlight good practises and lessons learned; collect impact achievements from various stakeholders; and systematically increase accountability, transparency, and visibility of resources.

The UN constantly seeks to broaden its joint programming. The UN's efforts to avoid fragmentation and strengthen coherence manifest in a variety of joint analysis programming and coordination processes, guided by the Cooperation Framework. Moreover, human rights-based approaches, gender equality and women's empowerment, environmental sustainability, capacity building, and results-based management are mainstreamed in Cooperation Framework objectives[102] and build a foundation for strengthened coordination and joint programming. Joint programming has brought various UN actors together in the pursuit of achieving the same goal. For instance, the UN Joint Programme on Local Governance brings together five UN agencies under the objective to 'boost economic development and make communities stronger in the face of conflict'. The programme resulted in broadened citizen participation in decision-making, including by the creation of spaces like district development forums.[103] The joint programme on Women, Peace and Protection (WPP) led by UN Women, UNDP, and UNSOM[104] is

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97   Derived from the interviews conducted for this project.

98   United Nations, "Somalia Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework", June 2021, p. 27, Accessible at: https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/UNSDCF-Somalia-2021-2025.pdf .

99   Derived from the interviews conducted for this report.

100 United Nations, "United Nations Community Engagement Guidelines on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace", August 2020, Accessible at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/un-community-engagement-guidelines-peacebuilding-and-sustaining-peace-0.

101 If the UN ensures continuity in ongoing stabilisation, de-radicalisation, and peacebuilding efforts through improved engagement at the community level, including with women and youth, are advanced, then security and rule of law institutions will be more efficient, transparent, and accountable, and will increasingly engage with, and be responsive to, the needs of Somalis, particularly the most marginalised and vulnerable. United Nations, "Somalia Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework", June 2021, p. 31, Accessible at: https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/UNSDCF-Somalia-2021-2025.pdf.

102 United Nations, "Somalia Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework", June 2021, p. 48, Accessible at: https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/UNSDCF-Somalia-2021-2025.pdf.

103 UNDP Somalia, Joint UN Programme on Local Governance (JPLG), Accessible at: https://www.so.undp.org/content/somalia/en/home/projects/un-joint-programme-on-local-governance-and-decentralized-service.html.

104 UN Somalia, "UN and Somali Government launch a New Joint Programme to Empower Women," 5 December 2021, Accessible at: https://somalia.un.org/en/161706-un-and-somali-government-launch-new-joint-programme-empower-women#:~:text=A%20two%2Dyear%20US%24%206.2,in%20Mogadishu%20on%2030%20November.&text=This%20programme%20will%20support%20women's,Sustainable%20Development%20Goals%20(SDGs).

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another good example of combining UNDP's extensive women's empowerment experiences and protection in specific contexts in Somalia and UN Women's recently acquired strong gender expertise.[105] Working jointly together, UNDP and UN Women, among other partners, can strengthen each other's country-specific and gender capacities. However, some of the joint programmes met criticism for an increased focus of the respective partners on their organisation's priorities, poor management, and the lack of fulfilment of their respective roles, especially in the political realm.

The Cooperation Framework supports inclusive national peacebuilding priorities. The Cooperation Framework mirrors the strategic priorities of the NDP-9 to 'ensure alignment, continuity, complementarity, coherence, and coordination' between the UN and the national government.[106] Diverse *national and international constituencies* such as representatives from the FGS, the FMS, academic, labour, industry and financial organisations and civil society, contributed to the development of the Cooperation Framework. Further, there are a number of mechanisms that support the coordination between the UN and the government. One primary mechanism used is the platform for the coordination of donor support – *the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF)*[107] – which includes working groups within its steering committee organised around the NDP-9 pillars. Similarly in 2020, the national government established *a Peacebuilding Coordination Unit*, in partnership with the UN, to coordinate peacebuilding activities in the country, including CEWARN. While the unit is not operational to date, it is a promising initiative as no other peacebuilding coordination structures are known to exist at the time of drafting this research.[108] Another platform is the *Somalia Partnership Forum*[109] which brings together the UN and national government leadership. Despite this, these platforms are not fully operationalised in part due to the FGS' focus on political processes and the federalisation agenda. In many ways, limited operationalisation of such platforms rest in complex relationships between the government and the UN in-country.

There is very limited UN engagement at the local and FMS levels. This can be explained through a number of factors. First, despite good examples of the top UN staff

engagement in conflict prevention efforts in Puntland and Somaliland around the disputed Tukaraq region[110], satellite offices are not sufficiently staffed and have limited peacebuilding engagement. Second, the focus of the UN work on Track 1 diplomacy efforts further separates the UN from the realities at the local level. Lastly, the federalisation agenda is the current key priority in the UN's interaction with national partners, neglecting state-level engagement.

There is notable progress in operational and policy coherence but gaps remain. In its role as a strategic partner and supporter of the national government, the UN in Somalia manages a relatively coordinated and integrated response to the country's multidimensional challenges across the Triple Nexus.[111] To further strengthen its coordination and coherence, the UN needs to ensure more adaptive programming and guarantee coordination within the UN System and with diverse national stakeholders.

There should be strong support for further developing joint programming in Somalia, but only where it benefits strategic priorities. Both the Final Evaluation of the Strategic Framework and the Cooperation Framework proclaim the UN in Somalia will continue to focus on joint programming to incentivise collective action and system-wide coherence. This approach aims to reduce transaction costs; maximise impact; and increase government participation in programme design, implementation, and evaluation. However, it is important to note that joint programming is not always appropriate, especially when partners have different goals or want to implement short-term small-scale projects. Reportedly, mostly mid- or long-term large projects are best suited for joint programming, as they have the potential to be continuously updated throughout the programme timeline to reflect current realities and major reviews, such as annual reviews. Area-based approaches is one way of doing joint programming to achieve cross-sectoral coordination and longer term programming at the state and local levels.

The role of the UN as an implementer needs to be further understood. While the role of the UN as a coordinator and facilitator of activities across the Triple Nexus was recognised by interviewees, the

105   Derived from the interviews conducted for this project.
106   United Nations, 'Somalia Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework', June 2021, p. 55, Accessible at: https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/UNSDCF-Somalia-2021-2025.pdf.
107   Federal Government of Somalia, ''Aid Flows in Somalia'', April 2020, p.11, Accessible at: https://somalia.un.org/sites/default/files/2020-05/Aid%20Flows%20in%20Somalia%20-%202020.pdf.
108   United Nations, 'Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Somalia', 10 August 2021, p. 7 para 37, Accessible at: https://www.undocs.org/en/S/2021/723.
109   United Nations Somalia, 'Joint Statement from International Partners on the Need for Ongoing Dialogue Among Somali Leaders', 15 December 2020, Accessible at: https://somalia.un.org/en/105283-joint-statement-international-partners-need-ongoing-dialogue-among-somali-leaders.
110   United Nations Somalia, 'On visit to Hargeisa, UN envoy highlights of cooperation and world body's broad support', 9 January 2020, Accessible at: https://somalia.un.org/index.php/en/32990-visit-hargeisa-un-envoy-highlights-benefits-cooperation-and-world-bodys-broad-support.
111   United Nations, "Somalia Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework", June 2021, p. 51, Accessible at: https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/Somalia-UNSDCF-2021-2025.pdf.

question remains to what extent the UN should be an implementing partner. Various UN entities often allocate their internal capacities to implement the organization's strategic priorities as outlined in the Cooperation Framework. This focus, however, tends to raise competition among agencies for funding and limit national implementation capacities. There are a number of joint programmes, including the WPP,[112] where the government is an equal partner. Such an approach needs to be prioritised to ensure that programming contributes to capacity building and inclusive national ownership.

Coordination within the UN and with the national government should be meaningfully operationalised, beyond its existence on paper and ad hoc nature. The engagement of the UNCT and UNSOM with the broader network of UN AFPs remains scarcely present in the country, despite the existence of various coordination mechanisms.[113] As a result, there is very limited exchange of information and data among UN agencies. Similarly, the ad hoc nature of coordination mechanisms stems from the plethora of existing coordination mechanisms, requiring time and effort by relevant partners to attend, without appropriate consideration of their value or impact.

While the UN fulfils its mandate and works closely with the national government in supporting national peacebuilding priorities, it is also limited by it. For example, as the Cooperation Framework mirrors the national priorities of the NDP-9, the framework limits the UN's ability to analyse various root causes of conflict, including the lack of inclusive and locally driven peace processes and political consensus. This does not necessarily effectively leverage the UN's unique mandate with its capacity and expertise as a global institution. There is also a certain degree of reluctance to challenge the FGS in the face of the existing complex political issues.[114] This limits the UN's ability to respond to local realities in a flexible, adaptive, and complementary manner and hinders effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

The UN in Somalia should further its engagement at the FMS and community levels. A welcome aspiration is the Cooperation Framework's emphasis on supporting the establishment of community conflict resolution platforms, as well as on the development of synergies between national and grass-roots initiatives.[115]

Reportedly, representatives of civil society, government, and communities have expressed the need for increased UN presence at the local level and increased visibility of effective peacebuilding interventions. Moreover, community structures such as local Guurti committees, women peace committees, elders and religious leaders, community action forums, and district peace and safety committees operate with significant legitimacy and could support UN conflict analysis efforts. Without access to the FMS and communities, UN actors will continue to lack access to impactful community structures and legitimacy within remote and non-centrally located areas.

Moving forward:

The UN is indispensable as a facilitator and coordinator of activities across the Triple Nexus in Somalia. It is seen as an actor capable of bridging protracted substantive differences between the FGS and FMS with regards to the federalisation agenda, as well as in supporting national peace- and state-building priorities more broadly. However, in order to continue growing into this role, the UN should resolve the limitations connected to the internal coordination and work to further deepen its partnership with national stakeholders, including the FMS and the communities. This requires operationalisation of existing coordination mechanisms, deepening conflict and context analysis that can further ensure that joint or individual programming contributes to impactful action on peacebuilding and sustaining peace.

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112   Funded through the Peacebuilding Fund and the Somalia Multi Partner Trust Fund, WPP partners with the Federal Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development (MoWHRD), and implemented by UN Women, the United Nations UND, and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). For further information see United Nations Somalia, 'UN and Somali Government launch a New Joint Programme To Empower Women', 5 December 2021, Accessible at: https://somalia.un.org/en/161706-un-and-somali-government-launch-new-joint-programme-empower-women.

113   Derived from the interviews conducted for this project.

114   Derived from the interviews conducted for this project.

115   United Nations, "Somalia Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework", June 2021, p. 27, Accessible at: https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/UNSDCF-Somalia-2021-2025.pdf.

5. Partnerships for peacebuilding and sustaining peace

This section looks at how the UN coordinates with relevant stakeholders outside of the UN System in terms of implementing the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda, and what impact these partnerships have on advancing country-level peacebuilding processes and objectives.

The UN recognises the diversity of the peacebuilding, development, and humanitarian partners that engage in Somalia. As such, the UN works with and is willing to engage with a broad ecosystem of partners, including regional organisations, the donor community, and civil society, based on their complementary capacities and respective mandates. These partnerships enable *joint analysis, programming, and information sharing* for overall coherence among aid actors, *significant financial flows* towards peacebuilding, and i*mpactful implementation* at the country level.

The UN-World Bank Partnership

The World Bank characterises its partnership with the UN in Somalia as 'strong' and focused on the Triple Nexus, particularly in the areas of security sector and resilience programming.[116] Based on its complementary role, the World Bank contributes to the UN's efforts in Somalia across two priority areas: (1) strengthening institutions to deliver services and (2) restoring economic resilience and opportunities.[117] *Both priority areas have significant peacebuilding functions* as they support the core government agencies to remedy the gaps in institutional capacity, build the capacity of municipalities in urban resilience, improve the business environment, and lower the barriers to entry,[118] which are mobilising factors for Al-Shabaab and an incentive to join clan militia. These activities also build a reassuring ground for other donors to scale up investments. Further, the World Bank's activities invite the private sector to engage and support broader economic development in the country. As such, the World Bank's activities enable the UN to achieve results related to the strategic priorities outlined in the Cooperation Framework. While the World Bank's mandate aims to work directly with the government, the World Bank extends service contracts to UN agencies where national capacity is lacking.[119] Given the fragile situation in Somalia, the World Bank maintains its sustained engagement by formulating alternative strategies for engagement, including in partnership with the UN actors, avoiding unnecessary withdrawals of activities and funding, which can further exacerbate fragility.[120]

While the UN-World Bank partnership is ongoing, it remains to be meaningfully operationalised in support of Somalia's peacebuilding priorities. The division of labour between the UN and the World Bank seems to be clear as the World Bank supports most of the objectives under strategic priorities 2, 3, and 4 of

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116   World Bank Group, "Country Partnership Framework for the Federal Republic of Somalia for the Period FY 19-22", 29 August 2018, Accessible at: https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/941361537906125793/pdf/SOMALIA-CPF-08312018.pdf.

117   World Bank, *Somalia Overview,* Accessible at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/somalia/overview#2.

118   Ibid.

119   World Bank-financed Somalia Shock Responsive Safety Net for Human Capital Project (SNHCP) that provides cash transfers to targeted poor and vulnerable households, establishing the key building blocks of a national shock-responsive safety net system, is being executed in partnership with WFP and UNICEF to support implementation of the cash transfer system. *For further information see* World Bank Group and United Nations, "2020 UN-WB Partnership Monitoring Report: United Nations – World Bank Partnership in Crisis-Affected Situations", 2021, Accessible at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/United-Nations-World-Bank-Partnership-in-Crisis-Affected-Situations-2020-UN-WB-Partnership-Monitoring-Report.pdf.

120   In this, the World Bank is not a political actor but provides development support specifically to the government. The World Bank falls under "turn-around allocation" (same in Sudan). It is not per se peacebuilding funding; however, it opens space for dialogue on how to best use development resources in a way that provides support to people at the end (even though it does not fund civil society).

the Cooperation Framework.[121] However, there are instances of programmatic repetition caused by an overlap in the respective mandates, especially in the development realm. Coordination also remains very low. Moreover, the World Bank is uniquely positioned to support national peacebuilding and conflict prevention capacities in the spirit of recommendations from the UN–World Bank *Pathways for Peace* report. However, there is limited action on conflict prevention in Somalia. Signing of an MOU could be one way to avoid further overlap in strategies around specific peacebuilding and conflict prevention objectives.

Regional and Sub-Regional Organisations

The Cooperation Framework recognises the need for closer regional cooperation and is informed by the Secretary-General's Comprehensive Prevention Strategy for the Horn of Africa.[122] In partnership with the UN, the AU, the EU and IGAD work to support the situation in Somalia.[123] The AU primarily supports peacebuilding efforts (i.e., security sector reform and stabilisation) through AMISOM – currently transitioning into the ATMIS.[124] Within its mandate, AMISOM conducted trainings and organised peacebuilding dialogues at the community level, focusing on conflict dynamics, conflict resolution mechanisms, the psychology of peace, managing intra-state conflict, negotiations in peace processes, the role of media in peacebuilding, transformation, and reconciliation.[125] Such dialogues supported communities in producing priorities and plans of action on peace and security for local consideration. ATMIS is expected to retain some of AMISOM's functions; however, it is unclear whether peacebuilding dialogues will be part of this mandate. Further, IGAD and the EU collaborate with the UN to monitor the situation in Somalia[126] and provide political accompaniment, raising awareness on developments in Somalia.[127]

Despite the recognition of the importance of regional cooperation, **the UN engagement with regional actors in Somalia has been ad hoc and limited**. The Cooperation Framework does not mention specific partnerships with regional actors beyond AMISOM, which is mandated by the UN Security Council until the end of March 2022 at the earliest.[128] The reason lies primarily in the fact that the Somali government and the AU have deteriorated as a result of the political impasse in the country that took place as the dialogue about the future of AMISOM was underway.[129] In February this year, officials from the AU, FGS, and international partners have adopted key documents providing a roadmap for establishing a new mission to replace the current AMISOM.[130] The adoption marked conclusions of discussions between the Technical Teams from the AU and the FGS to agree on a framework for a new mission that will eventually hand over security responsibilities to the Somali security forces. In this, the UN plays a critical role given that the elections are currently underway to bring the national government and the AU actors involved in Somalia together to rebuild consensus around shared peacebuilding concerns and activities to better leverage each organisation's complementary capacities. As a key donor to the AMISOM soldiers, the EU should also provide political support for the dialogue to move forward.

Partnership with Civil Society and Community Engagement

The UN in Somalia has a long-standing commitment to engage with civil society. Within the RCO, there is a Civil Society Liaison Officer who, together with gender and youth advisors, works exclusively with civil society. Furthermore, the UN works with existing coalitions and networks, such as the *Civil Society Peacebuilding Working Group* and the *NGO Consortium*, as well as local communities that support peace. For instance, the UN hosted online and in-person consultative

121   United Nations, "Somalia Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework", June 2021, Accessible at: https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/UNSDCF-Somalia-2021-2025.pdf.

122   Ibid, p. 50.

123   United Nations, "Joint Communique on the Situation in Somalia (AU, EU, IGAD, and UN)", 10 April 2021, Accessible at: https://amisom-au.org/2021/04/joint-communique-on-the-situation-in-somalia-au-eu-igad-and-un/.

124   IPI, Williams, "Lessons for "Partnership Peacekeeping" from African Union Mission in Somalia", 30 October 2019, Accessible at: https://www.ipinst.org/2019/10/lessons-partnership-peacekeeping-amisom; African Union, African Union, Federal Government of Somalia, international partners conclude discussions on new AU mission, 9 February 2022, https://amisom-au.org/2022/02/african-union-federal-government-of-somalia-international-partners-conclude-discussions-on-new-au-mission/.

125   AMISOM, "Resident of Mogadishu and Surrounding Areas Meet for Peacebuilding Dialogue", 12 June 2021, Accessible at: https://amisom-au.org/2021/06/residents-of-mogadishu-and-surrounding-areas-meet-for-peacebuilding-dialogue/.

126   International Labour Organisation, 'UN Agencies and IGAD Secretariat launch a regional initiative to address migration and climate change in East Africa', 25 May 2021, Accessible at: https://www.ilo.org/global/docs/WCMS_794443/lang--en/index.htm; and UNDP Somalia, 'EU – UN – IGAD Cross Border Project to accelerate 2019 cooperation between Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia borders', 21 January 2019, Accessible at: https://www.so.undp.org/content/somalia/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2018/12/eu-_-un-_-igad-cross-border-project-to-accelerate-2019-cooperati.html.

127   Inter- Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 'Joint Communique on the Situation in Somalia (AU, EU, IGAD, and UN)', 20 May 2021, Accessible at: https://igad.int/programs/66-somalia.

128   United Nations, 'Resolution 2614 (2021) Adopted by the Security Council at its 8939th meeting, on 21 December 2021', Accessible at: https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2614(2021).

129   International Crisis Group, 'Reforming the AU Mission in Somalia', 15 November 2021, Accessible at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/b176-reforming-the-au-mission%20%282%29.pdf.

130   AMISOM, 'African Union, Federal Government of Somalia, international partners conclude discussions on new AU mission', 9 Feb 2022 https://amisom-au.org/2022/02/african-union-federal-government-of-somalia-international-partners-conclude-discussions-on-new-au-mission/

processes with civil society members when developing the Cooperation Framework.[131] Civil society, including local groups, are an integral part of the Humanitarian Country Team.[132] Similarly, when Somalia was undergoing a re-eligibility review to receive PBF funding in 2020, UNSOM held an inclusionary civil society actor consultation process and provided a platform for the general public to provide inputs and define priorities.[133] As part of the WPP, UN Women and UNSOM, together with the national partners, work to engage with the clan elders, religious leaders, women leaders, and civil society groups at both the national and grassroot levels and establish a Civil Society Reference Group for Somalia as an institutional mechanism to harness civil society expertise.[134] In terms of protection of civic space, UNSOM is working to advocate for civil society involvement in the selection of parliamentary member delegates. There however remains a high risk of lead capture that makes civil society work reliant on certain clans. The more vulnerable individuals will not be the ones to facilitate the program to be implemented. Such partnerships with civil society in Somalia are critical because the government does not control all the territories in Somalia. It is within these territories that local organisations provide essential services traditionally provided by the government, through the local Guurti committee and women peace committees.[135]

The partnerships between the UN and civil society are not always easy. First, the presence of civil society within the UN coordination structures is limited. The *Peacebuilding Working Group,* consisting of civil society from INGOs, national organisations, and grassroots groups, exists as a strong counterpart to the government to engage with a great diversity of experiences. This working group can meaningfully inform Somalia's CCA update and become a meaningful partner to implement the Cooperation Framework. However, it does not have a formal channel of systematic engagement with the UN and is reportedly by itself inactive in engagement with the UN. Second, no *systematic and institutionalised community engagement strategy* exists in Somalia. Consultative processes are widespread but repetitive with the same actors answering the same questions, without meaningful depth of the discussions, follow-up, or feedback loop.

Lastly, there is lack of *representation in current efforts of community engagement.* Most of the consulted partners are based in the capital of Mogadishu, limiting the engagement of community actors from remote areas. Even the CEWERU – reported as a good practice of early warning and conflict prevention – has been inactive in recent years.

Moving forward:

The UN engagement in Somalia with a broad ecosystem of partners, including regional organisations, the donor community, and civil society is based on their complementary capacities and respective mandates. This engagement is welcome as it enables joint analysis, programming and information sharing, improved financial support, and impactful implementation at the country level. However, improvements could be made regarding partnership operationalisation, such as creating an authentic partnership assessment mechanism. Further, all partners need to reach consensus about common concepts, operational policies, and tools that facilitate cooperation, especially in terms of peacebuilding. Diverse partners also could be included, where relevant and within their respective mandates, in the UN's planning processes to ensure alignment and address any operationalisation gaps in the Cooperation Framework and partners' respective strategies. One way to bring diverse actors together could be the creation of a multi-stakeholder coordination platform under the RCO to strengthen infrastructures for peace, avoid duplication, and overall encourage learning and exchange.

131 United Nations, 'Somalia Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework', June 2021, p. 74–75, Accessible at: https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/UNSDCF-Somalia-2021-2025.pdf.
132 Derived from the interviews conducted for this project.
133 Derived from the interviews conducted for this project.
134 https://drive.google.com/drive/u/2/folders/1__ogRkGDAV_J2A5AGpsxp--_0hdYHNeB. The Dhusamareb III elections agreement specified that a combination of traditional elders, civil society representatives and regional state leaders would choose delegates, but this was not clarified in subsequent agreements. *For further information see* Somali Dialogue Platform and Somali Public Agenda, 'Brief No. 10: Protecting stability and inclusivity in Somalia's indirect election process', December 2020, p. 2, Accessible at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Protecting%20stability%20and%20inclusivity%20in%20Somalia%27s%20indirect%20election%20process%20-%20Somali%20Dialogue%20Platform%20%282020%29_0.pdf.
135 Interpeace and Centre for Research and Dialogue, 'A Force for Change: Promoting the Roles of Civil Society and the Private Sector in Peacebuilding and Reconciliation in South-Central Somalia', 2008, Accessible at: https://gsdrc.org/document-library/a-force-for-change-promoting-the-roles-of-civil-society-and-the-private-sector-in-peace-building-and-reconciliation-in-south-central-somalia/.

6. Financing for peacebuilding

This section examines various funding systems in place to finance the UN's implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda at the country level, assessing whether or not these systems provide funding of quality and quantity – in an adequate, predictable, and sustainable manner – and how the amount of funding available impacts the UN's ability to advance country-level peacebuilding processes and objectives.

In 2020, Somalia received $2 billion in official development assistance (ODA).[136] As of June 2021, donors reported $685 million in development aid, a 35 per cent decrease from the high of $1 billion reported for the previous year.[137] Given the absence of government structures and reliance on humanitarian structures for service delivery, humanitarian assistance has been the largest component of ODA, representing 51 per cent of total ODA from 2009 to 2018; in 2018, 47 per cent of ODA was humanitarian assistance.[138]

There is limited clarity on the availability of resources spent on peacebuilding. This lack of clarity is connected to the lack of agreement among donors on what constitutes peacebuilding. Dedicated funding streams for peacebuilding tend to be considerably smaller and more ad hoc than established systems of humanitarian and development funding. In many institutional contexts, peacebuilding is also less established as a separate policy domain in its own right and is often viewed through either a development or a foreign/security policy lens. Reportedly, many donors and UN partners referred to peacebuilding differently. Their definition of peacebuilding included activities ranging from addressing unemployment to supporting the federalisation agenda.

Somalia's peacebuilding initiatives are funded through various mechanisms, including pooled funds and direct funding from multilateral entities, bilateral donors, intermediary organisations, international financial institutions, and the private sector.[139]

There are two key *pooled funds* supporting peacebuilding in Somalia. First, the Peacebuilding Fund was first launched in Somalia in 2009.[140] Between 2009 and 2019, the PBF supported projects implemented by 15 UN entities in partnership with the FGS, FMS, and civil society.[141] In July 2020, Somalia's eligibility request for the PBF was renewed.[142] Some of the most significant PBF peacebuilding activity contributions in Somalia include the mitigation of inter-clan disputes, support for mediation and dialogue, and increased support for increased community engagement. The PBF has a history as a key enabler for the UN to invest in joint programming linked to recovery, stabilisation, local governance, and peacebuilding.[143] To address harmful gender norms, the PBF committed to using at least 50 per cent of its allocated funding in Somalia for the promotion of gender equality and women's empowerment.[144] The second pooled fund is the Somalia Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) established in 2014.

136 UN Somalia, 'Aid Flows in Somalia 2021', 1 June 2021, Accessible at: https://somalia.un.org/en/160002-aid-flows-somalia-2021

137 Ibid.

138 Devinit, Dalrymple, Thomas and Hanssen, 'Supporting Longer Term Development in Crisis at the Nexus: Lessons from Somalia Report', February 2021, p. 27, Accessible at: https://devinit.org/documents/903/Supporting_longer_term_development_in_crises_at_the_nexus_Lessons_from_Somalia.pdf.

139 While most of the resources are distributed through the UN and NGOs, the private sector is perceived by some donors to be more responsive to their needs. *For further information see* UN Somalia, 'The 2017-2020 UN Strategic Framework: Final Evaluation Summary', 2021.

140 United Nations Peacekeeping and the Konterra Group, 'Evaluation of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) Project Portfolio In Somalia Evaluation Report', 27 December 2019, Accessible at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/somalia-pbf-portfolio-evaluation-final.

141 Ibid.

142 United Nations, 'UN Peacebuilding Commission Holds First Meeting on Somalia Since 2015', 2 December 2020, Accessible at: https://somalia.un.org/en/103532-un-peacebuilding-commission-holds-first-meeting-somalia-2015.

143 IOM, 'Operationalizing the Humanitarian- Development- and Peace Nexus: Lessons from Columbia, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, and Turkey', 2019, p. 13, Accessible at: https://publications.iom.int/fr/system/files/pdf/operationalizing_hdpn.pdf.

144 United Nations, 'Ambassadorial- Level Meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission on Somalia: Chair's Summary', 2 December 2020, Accessible at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/ambassadorial-level_meeting_of_the_peacebuilding_commission_on_somalia.pdf.

The MPFT serves as the primary vehicle for supporting the joint programmes of the UN, including those dedicated specifically to peacebuilding purposes.[145] All programmes in its portfolio are required to integrate gender aspects during design and implementation, including monitoring of gender markers as part of results frameworks.[146] At the same time, the MPTF in Somalia is currently undergoing reforms, including rebranding as the Somalia Joint Fund.
The fund's new investment and resource mobilisation strategy and revised Terms of References are expected to be approved in March 2022. The donors continue to remain cautious about the processes within the fund. Neither one of these two funds applies a youth marker to their spendings.

There are a number of *non-UN pooled funds* providing meaningful support to peacebuilding in Somalia. For instance, *the Somalia Stability Fund (SSF)* is a multi-donor instrument, active since 2013. The Somalia Stability Fund aims for a peaceful, secure, and stable Somalia through support to stabilisation, conflict prevention, and peace- and state-building.[147] This fund has been characterised as an agile, flexible, and context-driven pooled fund that results from the commitment of all donors who join the fund to accept required priority shifts and broad trajectories. The good practice of the Somalia Stability Fund is also a strong focus on co-creation, where donors are involved in the design of the project but also provide political accompaniment at the end of the project. Further, interviewees referenced less frequently the *African Development Bank's Multi-Partner Somalia Infrastructure Fund* (AfDB's SIF) as a meaningful and direct peacebuilding support fund due to the Fund has mostly addressed enabling factors for peacebuilding such as infrastructure and governance.

Operationalised in 2016, the AfDB's SIF supports and accelerates Somalia's inclusive and sustainable economic recovery and peace- and state-building, with a focus on infrastructure rehabilitation and development.[148] Established in 2014, the *World Bank Multi-Partner Fund* (MPF)[149] has been a catalyst for building and strengthening government institutions and enabled harmonisation of policy dialogue.[150] Currently, the MPF seems to be undergoing a review to respond to its need for greater capacity to respond dynamically and flexibly to the fragile operating context.[151] This has negatively affected relations with stakeholders and proactive engagement with the government-led aid architecture, leading to the further weakening of the fund's potential and undermining stakeholder confidence in its capacity to deliver. Similarly, diminished donor confidence has led to increased earmarked contributions, which now stand at 99 per cent of the overall amount. This has fundamentally undermined the very concept of this pooled fund.

Bilateral funding through donor countries provides additional support for peacebuilding activities through countries' embassies and offices in-country or in the region.[152] Between 2009 and 2018, the US provided the most ODA donor contributions to Somalia, by allocating $2.3 billion over the 10-year period, followed by EU institutions ($1.7 billion) and the UK ($1.7 billion). Other donors providing large amounts of ODA were Germany ($628.9 million), Sweden ($585.1 million), Norway ($448.9 million), and Turkey ($430.3 million).[153] Further, the cited donors often support the pooled funds, including non-UN pooled funds. For example, Sweden, the EU, and Denmark are the largest donors to the MPTF, while equally supporting the PBF and the Somalia Stability Fund. On the other hand, some of these donors prefer to work by directly funding the UN and civil society.

Various bilateral and multilateral donors have established ways to advance **donor coordination**. The Secretary-General's 2018 Report on Peacebuilding and

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145   Donor contributions to the UN MPTF dropped from US$91.1 million in 2018 to US$75.5 million in 2019, before a further decrease to US$72.6 million in 2020; *see* UNDP, *Somalia Multi Window Trust Fund Factsheet*, 2021, Accessible at: https://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/4SO00.

146   United Nations Somalia, 'Somalia Multi- Partner Trust Fund January- December 2020', 31 March 2021, Accessible at: https://mptf.undp.org/document/download/26967.

147   The major donors for SSF are Denmark, the European Union, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom. *For further information see* Somalia Stability Fund, *Donors and Structure,* Accessible at: https://stabilityfund.so/donors-and-structure/.

148   African Development Bank Group, *Multi- Partner Somalia Infrastructure Fund,* Accessible at: https://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/multi-partner-somalia-infrastructure-fund-sif.

149   United Nations Somalia, 'Somalia UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund', 2021, Accessible at: https://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/4SO00.

150   World Bank Group, 'The Multi- Partner Fund Progress Report July- December 2019', 2020, p. 40, Accessible at: https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/880541585577866905-0010022020/original/MPFProgressReportJulDec2019.pdf.

151   Ibid, p. 61.

152   Some of these donors work to directly fund civil society and work with them to develop proposals through the principle of co-creation rather than as a matter of implementation of donor priorities (i.e., Sweden). The donors also work to provide political spaces to their donees, including through the work of the Somalia Stability Fund. Despite substantial impact on the support for local communities, infrastructure and institution-building, the donors of course gain some political influence from their engagement. Derived from the interviews conducted for this study.

153   Devinit, Dalrymple, Thomas and Hanssen, 'Supporting Longer Term Development in Crisis at the Nexus: Lessons from Somalia Report', February 2021, p. 30, Accessible at: https://devinit.org/documents/903/Supporting_longer_term_development_in_crises_at_the_nexus_Lessons_from_Somalia.pdf.

Sustaining Peace recognised the SDRF[154] as a good practice of establishing a joint combined governance structure and addressing disconnected financial avenues in country contexts for the implementation of national priorities.[155] The SDRF provides a common governance framework for the MPTF, MPF, and AfDB's SIF to pool donor contributions.[156] The SDRF serves as a forum for dialogue between the FGS, FMS, and international partners. Additionally, *UNSOM convenes various donors* to support greater alignment among the aid actors around key issues of concern across the Triple Nexus. The *RMU* also helps define common approaches through the UN Risk Working Group and the Multi-Party Risk Working Group and discussions with aid agencies in Somalia. The *PBF Donor Group* has been in existence since 2018; however, it is largely limited to the PBF's work. *The Friends of Reconciliation* is another platform that exists to discuss peacebuilding matters. There are also *humanitarian and development donor groups* that occasionally hold joint meetings. However, some donor coordination platforms are not operational, and the flow of information between the platforms is limited. In many ways, donors have to coordinate and engage bilaterally. The lack of coordination makes it difficult for cross-cutting knowledge sharing and lessons learned on initiatives and plans discussed across platforms.

The situation in Somalia provides strong ground for innovative means of supporting peacebuilding activities. Given Somalia's newly gained heavily indebted poor country status and debt relief qualification, it is likely alternative funds will also be channelled to Somalia. This can prompt more *international financial institutions* to engage in the country. A successful innovative funding mechanism that should be capitalised on is *cash transfers.* They have been primarily used by humanitarian actors such as UNDP and UN-Habitat and yielded strong results, especially when unconditional cash transfers are made to women-headed households.[157] In Kismayo, UN-Habitat partnered with the Swedish International Development Agency to provide $210 over a course of three months to 250 households. This was successful in providing immediate financial relief to the most economically vulnerable families in

the city.[158] Women were easily accepted as cash transfer beneficiaries due to their traditional role of managing household spending.[159] Together, these allocations helped to prevent communal violence and mitigate rising mistrust in political affairs.

While donors remain attentive and supportive of peacebuilding efforts in Somalia, there is a significant gap and lack of clarity surrounding financing for peacebuilding.[160] Therefore, it is important to ensure that available funding is of significant quantity – meaning the amount – and quality – meaning flexible, sustainable, and efficient.

Having a peacebuilding strategy will help donors align around a strategic portfolio. The UN should support donors' peacebuilding efforts through facilitation and coordination, rather than acting as an implementer. At the time of writing, the funding for peacebuilding activities in Somalia constitutes a collection of separate projects falling under the Cooperation Framework or framed as supportive of the NDP-9 implementation. Naturally, many peacebuilding programmes are well intended, impactful, and needs-focused. However, there seems to be limited understanding on how peacebuilding activities leverage off each other without running the risk of duplicating efforts. This is largely connected to the absence of a dedicated peacebuilding strategy, which would help donors to coordinate their contributions and address duplication and gaps in the required support. Another reason for limited knowledge of ongoing peacebuilding efforts is that bilateral and multilateral donors are often driven by their own strategies and priorities. Nevertheless, they do take into consideration the existing analysis through the CCA, Cooperation Framework, NDP-9, and civil society analysis. Lastly, it was cited that donors are beginning to shift and channel funds through bilateral aid programmes to national government and civil society, as opposed to the UN pooled funds. Their goal is to enable greater control of budgetary spending, reduce levels of bureaucracy, and ensure more impactful action leading to programming implementation and increasing resources allocated at the country level.

154 UNSOM, 'Prime Minister Shirdon Launches Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility', 29 October 2013, Accessible at: https://unsom.unmissions.org/prime-minister-shirdon-launches-somalia-development-and-reconstruction-facility. *Also see* United Nations, 'Peacebuilding and sustaining peace: Report of the Secretary General', 18 January 2018, Accessible at: https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/72/707.

155 United Nations, 'Peacebuilding and sustaining peace: Report of the Secretary General', 18 January 2018, Accessible at: https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/72/707.

156 World Bank Group, Honig and Cramer, 'Strengthening Somalia's Systems Smartly: A Country Systems Risk Benefit Analysis', December 2017, Accessible at: https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/779801520341781240/pdf/123945-WP-PUBLIC-P164350-UseofCountrySystemsReport.pdf.

157 Derived from the interviews conducted for this project.

158 UN-Habitat, 'UN-Habitat and SIDA partner in cash transfer initiative to cushion Kismayo residents from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic', 14 April 2021, Accessible at: https://unhabitat.org/un-habitat-and-sida-partner-in-cash-transfer-initiative-to-cushion-kismayo-residents-from-the.

159 However, a study by the Humanitarian Practice Network cautioned that when the amount provided to women increased (ex. $300-$400), then community members would raise questions and cause resistance. For further information see Humanitarian Practice Network, Wasilkowska, Collins, and Schryer-Roy, 'Gender Impact Analysis: unconditional cash transfers in South Central Somalia', August 2013, Accessible at: https://odihpn.org/magazine/gender-impact-analysis-unconditional-cash-transfers-in-south-central-somalia/.

160 It is also a complex exercise to track money spent on peacebuilding in Somalia due to differing understanding of what defines peacebuilding and due to the fact some peacebuilding projects are covered from various development and even humanitarian portfolios and the donor community does not often have specific mechanisms to track funding allocated specifically to peacebuilding. Derived from the interviews conducted for this project.

The UN can take a greater role in supporting effective and efficient funding allocations. Annually, billions of dollars are reportedly spent on software programmes that are inaccessible by UN staff because of unstable internet connections. These large amounts poured into unusable software programmes, in contexts where the internet is unstable and often lacking, should be reallocated towards unconditional cash transfers or other activities that produce peace dividends.

Ensuring effective donor coordination should be the priority for peacebuilding partners in Somalia. Despite their limitations, joint meetings between the humanitarian and development donors groups constitute good practice regarding the operationalisation of the Triple Nexus. However, beyond these engagements, the donor coordination is limited. The Cooperation Framework suggests that 'strong collaboration with donors is required to maximise synergies, minimise potential duplication, and ensure policy coherence',[161] signalling that, in the nine years since the establishment of the SDRF, its current system of coordination does not work. While the SDRF could have been an avenue to address the challenge of donor coordination, only 20 per cent of ODA goes towards the Facility.[162] Currently, the SDRF is not fully functional and operates when circumstances favour a meeting. Similarly, the SDRF Steering Committee has not met for about two years.[163] The donor community also bilaterally supports implementing partners, requiring further coordination and mapping of financial flows. Further, peacebuilding allocations are not considered within the current political landscape. In this, it is important to note that coordination can be a very time-consuming exercise. Therefore, the more coordination spaces exist, the less effective they become. Thus, there is a strong need to decide who brings efforts together and how, and build on each other's work. Since the World Bank, Sweden, and other donors are not present in Somalia, it is extremely valuable to ensure inclusive and regular coordination, without ad hoc meetings, among the donors, including those based outside the country. *Donors should ensure context-specific approaches to peacebuilding beyond over-reliance on global agendas.* By relying on global policies and shaping the way local peacebuilding actors operate, donors can harmfully impact prospects for peace at the country level. For example, some approaches to women's empowerment have endangered women due to the negative attitudes within communities to the 'Westernised' ways of women's empowerment. The same applies to the means of addressing Al-Shabaab, as the perception of the

global community's response could further legitimise and maintain local support. As such, national and local peacebuilding experts should have an opportunity to obtain peacebuilding funding and shape the strategy and approaches behind the proposals. Further decentralising the management of these funds through nationally situated and staffed mechanisms could likely enable greater alignment to local needs, understanding of the context, flexibility, and cost effectiveness.[164]

Competition for funds among the UN agencies should be minimised. To some extent, pooled financing mechanisms compete with agency-specific fundraising efforts. This is in addition to the UN country-based AFP offices that receive funding through the headquarters of their respective entities. The ongoing fundraising efforts by separate entities leads to a competition over funding and a lack of inter-agency cooperation, joint analysis, and sharing of information. As shown by the experience in Somalia, the UN System seems competitively better positioned when aligned together around pooled instruments, rather than acting individually. Representing a theory of change, the Cooperation Framework articulates the causal linkages and actions required by all partners to achieve transformative results. The SDRF, or another coordination mechanism, should enable various financial streams to address critical gaps in the implementation of the Cooperation Framework. Doing so would thereby complement, rather than substitute, agency-specific funding and improve overall coherence.

Peacebuilding goals are long-term; so should be the case for peacebuilding financing. Currently, the maximum length of a peacebuilding project is 18 months or less. The Life and Peace Institute's Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative project showed how 18 months of funding does not allow effective implementation and real impact.[165] Given the realities faced by donors, ensuring long-term funding is difficult. However, the short span of funding is complemented by the diverse nature of funding available for peacebuilding from the same source. The partners in Somalia, including the UN, reported they regularly change their strategy in line with donor priorities. They tend to change every 3 to 4 years with the adoption of the cabinet in the donor country. This short time span for funding and changing donor priorities prevents long-term plans for sustaining peace in Somalia. There needs to be a more consolidated and coordinated effort to address the structural causes of fragility while supporting immediate crisis responses

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161 Ibid.
162 United Nations, 'Somalia Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework', June 2021, p. 42, Accessible at: https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/Somalia-UNSDCF-2021-2025.pdf.
163 Derived from the interviews conducted for this project.
164 Devinit, Dalrymple, Thomas and Hanssen, 'Supporting Longer Term Development in Crisis at the Nexus: Lessons from Somalia Report', February 2021, p. 61, Accessible at: https://devinit.org/documents/903/Supporting_longer_term_development_in_crises_at_the_nexus_Lessons_from_Somalia.pdf.
165 LPI and SPL, 'Peace Financing Case Study: lessons from the first UN Peace Building Fund- Civil Society partnership in Somalia', September 2021, p. 2.

to various shocks faced by Somalia. This could be achieved by further supporting the available pooled fund mechanisms and instituting additional mechanisms tightly linked to development analysis and planning to cover the gap in support for local peacebuilding work. Compared to individual projects from individual institutions which support incremental change, well-designed pooled funds can promote integrated cross-cutting initiatives over a long period of time.

Flexibility of funding should be a key feature of donor support in a fragile setting. During the COVID-19 pandemic, funding was often withdrawn due to the inability to determine if the programming available would have a meaningful impact or if the donor community should invest in other avenues to achieve peace in Somalia. However, some donors did show flexibility as a result of COVID-19; signalling more flexibility is possible. Currently, a majority of funds in Somalia are earmarked due to the lack of donor trust in the complex political environment. With only 2 per cent of the funds earmarked in 2020, the MPTF aimed to provide the means for donors to provide unearmarked, multi-annual and flexible funding towards the implementation of the peace- and state-building goals in Somalia.[166] To enable trust funds to provide funding flexibility, there is a need to protect the funds from earmarking in alignment with the donor's own political ambitions. In this, a vulnerability criterion for allocation of trust funds could be agreed on, and a flexible funding window could be created within the trust funds.

Moving forward:

Dedicated funding streams for peacebuilding in Somalia are considerably smaller and more ad hoc than established systems of humanitarian and development funding. In addition to the limited financing available for peacebuilding efforts, the smaller funding streams result from the lack of alignment among donors on what constitutes peacebuilding and the lack of a dedicated peacebuilding window among many donors.

Therefore, having a dedicated peacebuilding strategy will help donors align around a strategic portfolio that promotes integrated, coordinated, and flexible peacebuilding action in Somalia over a long period of time. This strategic portfolio can then be connected to development and humanitarian activities in line with the Cooperation Framework in the process of regular and comprehensive donor coordination that allows all partners to maximise synergies, minimise potential duplication, and ensure policy coherence.

Further, as much as availability and coordination, the quality of financing – long-term, context-specific, and flexible, among other factors – should be given particular consideration by donors. By relying on global policies and shaping the way local peacebuilding actors operate, donors can harmfully impact the prospects for peace at the country level. Peacebuilding goals are long-term and require substantial flexibility in fragile contexts. Peacebuilding financing should be responsive to these realities.

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166   United Nations Somalia, 'Somalia Multi- Partner Trust Fund January- December 2020', 31 March 2021, Accessible at: https://mptf.undp.org/document/download/26967.

7. Conclusions and recom- mendations

In order to build on the progress achieved towards sustaining peace and address existing root causes of conflict and instability in Somalia, this report provides a series of recommendations for the UN and the donor community across the four shifts called on by the UN Secretary-General in the 2018 Secretary-General's Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (A/72/707):

Leadership, accountability and capacity of the UN in Somalia

Many years of working on conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Somalia, UN actors earned a reputation of being a platform, convenor and trusted partner for the national government, civil society and donors. The latest Cooperation Framework further capitalises on this role and supports an increased clarity on the division of roles and responsibilities among a complex UN structure. At the same time, the lack of a dedicated and joint peacebuilding strategy and expertise prevent further operationalisation of peacebuilding priorities to the UN's integrated approach in Somalia. As such, designing **a clear peacebuilding vision, theory of change, and related roadmap** with clear and measurable indicators to strategically coordinate all peacebuilding activities, including activities conducted by non-UN partners, and realise peacebuilding priorities is critical to meaningfully operationalise peacebuilding and sustaining peace in Somalia. In the short-term, UNSOM can fulfil the coordinating function; however, there should be a forward-looking strategy to ensure that RCO will be able to fulfil this function following the transition. To support the development of dedicated peacebuilding strategy, the UN leadership should consider focusing its efforts on:

- Reviewing activities under the current Cooperation Framework to strengthen **the focus on conflict sensitivity and conflict prevention** and develop adequate tools and capacities to ensure the operationalisation of conflict analysis and conflict prevention action.
- Creating dedicated spaces within existing coordination platforms for **regular, informal and inclusive multi-stakeholder reflection and learning** to capture and document ideas, including unspoken rationales, challenges and insights to continuously adjust peacebuilding action in response to the realities.
- Strengthening **peacebuilding and conflict analysis capacities at the senior level** within the RCO to bring the political and development pillars of the UN together in pursuit of the prevention of violent conflict. Conflict advisors should also be deployed during planning and assessment phases of humanitarian and development action.
- Improving **the UN accountability for peacebuilding action** by ensuring that the UN leadership and staff has capacities for effective conflict and context analysis and ability to translate the analysis into system-wide planning and programming, reviewed regularly against delivery timelines, key performance indicators or seamless end-to-end workflows. Donors should take a clear stance not to support programs that are not working. In this, donors should prioritise current programmes that are creating impact on the ground, without regard for UN agency 'traditional focus' and specific relationships, allowing new and innovative programs to roll-out. The UNHQ, in this, should better equip the UN field presences with resources and support needed, including through the implementation of the UN mobility policy.
- Encouraging **the continuation of the UN structural and management reforms**, particularly to reduce bureaucracy and boost inter-agency collaboration, including by engaging with the Development Coordination Office (DCO) to establish a Somalia collaboration team to allow resident coordinators to establish a single collaborative network of support arrangements.
- Prioritising and strengthening **long-term programming that contributes to peacebuilding,** including reconciliation processes, transitional justice, trauma healing and establishing economic incentives for peace, and localised conflict resolution mechanisms and processes. Closer engagement with civil society can be an avenue to establish community infrastructures to quickly respond and effectively maintain peace using a bottom-up process, in addition to navigating formal channels.
- Improving **agility and adaptive capacities** by improving the accessibility of the UN for local partners, supporting early warning systems and other infrastructures of peace at all levels, strengthening inclusive national capacity building efforts, including for civil society, and advancing the diversity of UN leadership, including by prioritising hiring Somali experts for senior positions and empowering national

staff within programme structures, including in decentralised locations.

- Strengthening **conflict and context analysis** through inclusive conflict prevention and crisis response mechanisms equipped with the system of community monitors and with comprehensive indicators to measure peace, development and humanitarian risks that are rooted in local realities, and supported by adequate forecasting methods and informing comprehensive Common Country Analysis (CCA) or another internal data collection mechanism.
- Continuing **the implementation of gender and youth strategies** to enable systematic integration of gender analysis and diverse participation in programme planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation across various UN entities in Somalia, leveraging the expertise of the Gender Theme Group and Youth Advisory Board.

Relatively decentralised positioning of the UN across the country is a welcoming development; however, more needs to be done to **empower Somali staff within the UN programming structure.** This is especially important in decentralised locations, as they have the ability to communicate directly with locals and could provide increased insight and national ownership to UN efforts at the local level.

The UNSOM should develop a clear exit strategy that focuses on retaining adequate capacity within the RC Office for political analysis, dialogue and convening power to plan, and implementation of multi-stakeholder processes and engagement with a wide range of partners.

The international community should enhance international political will to strengthen the UN position vis-a-vis the Somali government to better operationalise efforts to build and sustain peace. One such avenue could be for the Security Council to explicitly mandate the development of a peacebuilding strategy in Somalia, a similar strategy that has been applied in Sudan. The Peacebuilding Commission should also engage with the Somali government to spearhead a follow-up meeting, following the re-eligibility confirmation in 2020.

Operational and policy coherence

The Triple Nexus is critical for Somalia in its transition towards peace- and state-building. The operationalisation of the Nexus requires adequate programming, coordination and conflict analysis shared across the UN System in support for **integrated responses** to complex and multidimensional challenges faced by Somalia. This requires the DSRSG/RC/HC to fully exercise the authority over both conflict prevention and crisis response and maintain operational flexibility to operate in diverse local contexts. This requires:

- Strengthening **joint programmes where relevant** by capitalising on existing good practises, with

roles and responsibilities of each partner clearly defined, based on an analysis of the comparative advantages of each partner, and adequate capacity to implement among participating organisations. Also, joint programming could be more successful if majority of staff working within the UN agencies would be primarily focused on the outcomes of the joint programmes rather than their personal or their organisations goals.
- Advancing **an area-based approach** to engage at the level of federal states by creating platforms that bring together a range of actors, including peacebuilding experts, to implement collective responses.

Beyond programming, an effective operationalisation of the Triple Nexus requires **strong coordination within the UN system.** This requires the UN to first strengthen its capacity as a facilitator and a coordinator, before implementing peacebuilding programming. Existing coordination mechanisms need to be fully operationalised. Further, while a peacebuilding coordination mechanism is required to bring together peacebuilding activities, all existing coordination mechanisms need to be optimised to understand their added value and potential overlap.

The role of the implementer should be filled primarily by national and local actors, with relevant capacities supported by the UN actors. In this, the UN should bolster efforts to strengthen the engagement with FMS and the community actors, beyond the current focus on the engagement with FGS, through the provision of conflict-sensitive guidance, tools and capacity-building opportunities and creating spaces for and encouraging the meaningful participation of diverse women and youth civil society actors in all aspects of peacebuilding, including the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements and transitional justice processes, among others.

Partnerships for peacebuilding

The UN in Somalia works with **a broad ecosystem of partners,** including regional organisations, international financial institutions (IFIs) and civil society, based on their complementary capacities and respective mandates. Such an engagement enables *joint analysis, programming and information sharing,* improves *financial support,* and promotes *impactful action* at the country level. However, **partnerships require ongoing coordination and effort to reach consensus** about common concepts, operational policies and tools that facilitate cooperation, especially when it comes to the peacebuilding realm. For the UN to fulfil its role as a facilitator and coordination, additional efforts are required to:

- Sign of MOUs to further **avoid conceptual or practical misunderstanding and confusion about roles** and develop joint strategies with diverse partners around specific peace building and conflict prevention objectives. The UN Cooperation Framework Steering Committee can fulfil this function.

- **Specify the role of regional partners in the Cooperation Framework** to amplify gaps and overlaps in relevant peacebuilding and conflict prevention activities. The new African Union mission – ATMIS – could continue organising capacity building sessions and peacebuilding dialogues at the community level.
- Strengthen the engagement with World Bank to implement some of the recommendations from **the UN-World Bank Pathways for Peace** report relevant for the current context in Somalia.
- Systematise the engagement of relevant partners in the UN activities by inviting the World Bank, the African Union (AU) and civil society, among other partners, where relevant, to **join working groups and other coordination efforts.**
- Provide **an effective platform for dialogue and consensus building** in situation where there is a breach of trust between the government and external partners.

Specific attention needs to be paid to strengthening the relationships with diverse civil society as the partnership with civil society currently lacks depth and institutionalisation. For this, the UN in Somalia should consider:

- Conducting **an assessment of the existing partnerships** to understand root causes of engagement fatigue and increased lack of incentives for civil society to engage with the UN.
- Establishing **a systematic and institutionalised community engagement strategy** with civil society focal points available in all UN entities in Somalia, with ToR specifying their responsibility for systematic engagement with civil society. A good practice of the Humanitarian Country Team, where civil society, including local groups, are an integral part of the Group's work, should be replicated in peacebuilding settings.
- Ensuring that **consultative processes are inclusive and practical and start early on** in the processes of strategic and programmatic development with relevant feedback loops and follow-up, drawing on the UN System-Wide Community Engagement Guidelines on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace.
- Supporting the revival and strengthening of the previously active **early warning and early response mechanism** (CEWERU) in partnership with IGAD and the donor community.

There is currently no mechanism to coordinate among various stakeholders. Many participants called this to be a critical step towards a consolidated action on peacebuilding. This could include conversations about strengthening peace committees and district councils, re-launching an early warning mechanism, avoid duplication, and overall encourage learning and exchange. The coordination role can be taken by the RC Office, given its central positioning.

Financing for peacebuilding:

Dedicated funding streams for peacebuilding in Somalia are considerably small and more ad hoc than established systems of humanitarian and development funding. In addition to the limited financing available for peacebuilding efforts, the smaller funding streams result from *the lack of alignment among donors on what constitutes peacebuilding.* This is further exacerbated by *the lack of a dedicated peacebuilding window among many donors* where peacebuilding is often considered to be a subset of other policy objectives. Having a dedicated peacebuilding strategy will help donors align around a strategic portfolio that promotes integrated, coordinated and flexible peacebuilding action in Somalia over a long period of time. In the long-term, such an approach is more effective than artificially bringing together separate activities supported by diverse donors post-factum.

This strategic portfolio can be then connected to development and humanitarian activities in line with the Cooperation Framework in the process of **regular and comprehensive donor coordination** that allows all partners to maximise synergies, minimise potential duplication, and ensure policy coherence. To support the donor coordination, the following steps need to be undertaken:

- Ensure that the UN effectively fulfils its role **as a coordinator and facilitator between the donor community and other partners** before taking on the role of an implementer. This would minimise potential competition with the FGS, FMS, and civil society and support adequate capacity building of diverse national stakeholders, while capitalising on the role of the UN at the country level.
- **Operationalise the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF)** fully and engage existing donors groups, bilateral donors, IFIs and non-UN pooled funds in the SDRF processes, while allowing opportunities for remote coordination and/ or positive engagement of bilateral and multilateral donors who do not have offices in Somalia. This will enable the SDRF to support the implementation of the Cooperation Framework and NDP-9, thereby complementing rather than substituting agency-specific funding and improving overall coherence.
- (In addition to humanitarian and development donor groups) establish **an optimised peacebuilding donor group** (by optimising the relationships between the PBF donor group and the Friends of Reconciliation) chaired by the RC Office to ensure more clarity on specific allocations towards peacebuilding. This group should consist of representatives of other donor groups to ensure complementarity and coherence.

As much as availability and coordination are crucial for the quantity of financing for peacebuilding, **the quality of financing** – long-term, context-specific and flexible, among other factors – should be given particular consideration by the donors. By relying on global policies and shaping the way local peacebuilding

actors operate, donors can do more harm than good to the prospects for peace at the country level. Moreover, *peacebuilding goals are long-term and require substantial flexibility* in fragile contexts. Peacebuilding financing should be responsive to these realities. To support the quality financing, the following actions are required:

- Bilateral donors should consider **direct funding through pooled fund mechanisms** and instituting additional mechanisms tightly linked to conflict and context analysis and planning that support their strategic priorities, while addressing the gaps in the implementation of the Cooperation Framework, including to support local peacebuilding work.
- Bilateral donors should consider **removing earmarking** from their contributions to enable additional flexibility in resource management. This could help ensure that local realities are reflected in the development of relevant projects for increased impact.
- The donor community, including the pooled funds and bilateral donors, should adapt **a vulnerability criterion** for allocation of trust funds, and a flexible funding window to further advance flexibility.
- Further exploring the good practice of **unconditional cash transfers,** especially to women-headed households.
- The donor community should consider **engaging with diverse national partners** in the development of grant schemes to ensure that they – as implementers – can produce meaningful impact on the ground through these grants.
- The donor community should **decentralise the management of the funds** through nationally situated and adequately staffed mechanisms.
- All peacebuilding partners should have **an assessment system** to enable best value for money. Where the upgrade of capacities may produce minimal results on peacebuilding, these resources can be reallocated towards actions that bring important results at the community level.

Annexes: Relevant resources

Global Resources

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World Bank, United Nations, "Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict", 2018, Accessible at: https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/Pathways-for-peace_web.pdf.

Somalia-Specific Resources:

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United Nations Somalia, " UN Country Results Report: Somalia 2020", 12 April 2020, p. 6, Accessible at: https://somalia.un.org/en/124495-un-somalia-country-results-report-2020#:~:text=The%20UN%20Country%20Results%20Report,Framework%202017%E2%80%932020%20(UNSF)%3A.

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United Nations Somalia, "United Nations Multi-Partner Trust Fund: Mid-Year Report", 9 September 2021, Accessible at: https://somalia.un.org/en/143615-un-multi-partner-trust-fund-2021-mid-year-report.

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United Nations, "Somalia Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework", 25 June 2021 Accessible at: https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/UNSDCF-Somalia-2021-2025.pdf.

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