Operationalising the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda in Mozambique

Making a case for peacebuilding leadership

Mozambique

GPPAC
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Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

ADIN   Agency for Integrated Development of the North
CCA   Common Country Analyses
CEWERS   Conflict early warning and early response systems
DaO   UN Delivering as One Approach
DDR   Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
ERDIN   Strategy for Resilience and Integrated Development for the North
FRELIMO   Front of the Liberation of Mozambique
IDPs   Internally displaced persons
IFI   International Financial Institutions
JP   Joint Programmes
JSC   UN Joint Steering Committee
OCHA   UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PDA   UN Peace and Development Advisor
PQG   the Government of Mozambique's Five-Year Programme 2015–2019
PRA   Prevention and Resilience Allocation
RC   UN Resident Coordinators
RCO   UN Resident Coordinator Offices
RENAMO   Mozambican National Resistance
RPBA   Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessments
SADC   Southern African Development Community
UN   United Nations
UNCT   UN Country Teams
UNDAF   UN Development Assistance Framework
UNFPA   UN Population Fund
UNODC   UN Office of Drugs and Crimes
UNOPS   UN Office for Project Services
UNSDCF   UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
WB   World Bank
WPS   Women, Peace and Security

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Executive Summary

The UN has been supporting peacebuilding in Mozambique since the country's independence through a strong and continuous partnership with the government. The aim of this study has been to provide an initial assessment of the progress and impact of **the implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda in Mozambique** across the four shifts called for by the UN Secretary-General in his 2018 report on peacebuilding and sustaining peace: leadership, accountability and capacity; operational and policy coherence; partnerships; and financing.

The main findings of this assessment are as follows:

Leadership, accountability, and capacity of the UN in Mozambique:

The new UNSDCF developed by the current UN leadership provides a strong avenue to capitalise on the implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda, while ensuring that the UN's action is rooted in national priorities. To guarantee the adequate implementation of the framework, however, there is a critical need to address the gaps in leadership and capacities on peacebuilding within the UNCT in Mozambique. In this report, we advance **four key points of attention** to improve the current situation:

- **Streamlining work and clarifying leadership roles and responsibilities in relation to the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda.** The role of the PDA should be further amplified to coordinate peacebuilding efforts as it already features a combination of peacebuilding expertise and capacities to foster coordination within the UN system. As such, this position could not depend on external budget of the UNDP-DPPA Joint Programme and should be funded out of the UNCT's core budget. This will help to address the confusion that predominantly external stakeholders seem to experience in relation to the positions of the RC, the UNDP Resident Representative, the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy, and the PDA – and their roles in leading and/or supporting the implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda.
- **Supporting the continuity of staff and stronger leadership, seeking to decrease the turnover rates and to improve the authority and visibility of those in leadership roles.** For this, it is on the one hand important to ensure strategic and operational follow-up to the capacity assessments that are conducted in light of the new UNSDCF process, and on the other hand to better understand factors that influence the rotation of staff so that they can be addressed to create an enabling environment for long-term engagement of experts who fulfil their roles and responsibilities.
- **Increasing peacebuilding-specific expertise of staff members,** in order to provide adequate knowledge and capacities in a country prone to resurgences in violence and instability. One concrete step in this direction could be the appointment of a peacebuilding expert or conflict-sensitivity advisor, in addition to the PDA, to the RCO, as well as ensuring that dedicated peacebuilding expertise is available in all relevant UN AFPs that have peacebuilding objectives set forth in their respective strategies.
- **Ensuring that the broader civil society is included in accountability** dialogues between the UN and the Government of Mozambique, further strengthening their meaningful participation in the discussions of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda in the country.

Operational and policy coherence:

The report **highlighted evidence of added value of the UN in short-term emergency response,** with widespread appreciation for its efforts to address humanitarian needs in Mozambique. However, more often than not **distinctive peacebuilding components and conflict analysis are insufficient**, resulting in policies and programming that overlook the patterns of violence and instability that have characterised Mozambique over the last decades. Recent developments and the 2022 UNDSCF offer **reasons for cautious optimism**, although it is too early to assess their practical consequences. In this report, we have put forward the following comments and recommendations:

- **There is a need to combine short- and long-term planning** – even during times of emergencies – and ensure preventive reasoning and a conflict sensitivity lens applied to all of the work of the UN

in Mozambique. This forward-looking perspective should also stretch to a higher political involvement of the UN in relation to peacebuilding efforts.

- Identifying peacebuilding as one of the key strategic priorities for UN engagement in Mozambique under the new UNSDCF will be key for progressing on the implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda in the country. This provides an important opportunity to promote a peacebuilding and sustaining peace narrative across the entire UN system in Mozambique. However, there is a **need to further develop the corresponding output indicators** and to **ensure that peacebuilding programming addresses the root causes of violence and instability rather than its consequences.** This should include strengthening the capacity of communities to prevent conflict; manage the negative effects of violence; and support processes that address political, social, and economic causes of conflict.
- Another step would be to **ensure that the peacebuilding and sustaining peace components are made clear in the other strategic priority areas** in the UNDSCF, by underlining the importance of ensuring conflict sensitivity in all of the UN work in the country.
- The **new annual JWPs** could be key for better collaboration and coordination between UN agencies and partners. However, the UNSDCF does not make clear how the alignment between these JWPs is ensured. This is something that needs to be explored further, which also provides an opportunity to monitor how peacebuilding and sustaining peace components are incorporated into the various JWPs.
- Finally, **there needs to be a continuation of the efforts to increase accessibility of the UN in the satellite offices** to address the presumption of centralisation of the UN presence in areas that are often the most affected by crises in the country. This is in part linked to the need to further strengthen the capacity of government institutions at the local level, and the need to foster local participation and representation in ways that contribute to providing a 'social stability dividend'. It is however also linked to the need to improve the UN's flexibility and capacity to respond effectively across the country. The recent creation of the new posts of Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator based in Cabo Delgado and UN SRA within the RCO, outposted in Pemba, are good steps in this regard.

Partnerships for peacebuilding:

The success of peacebuilding efforts requires the meaningful participation of all relevant actors. The partnership between the UN and the Government of Mozambique has been defined as 'strong and continuous', but also as sensitive and not straightforward. The peacebuilding environment is highly politicised, and the UN's peacebuilding activities are in part limited by its partnership with the government. In this context, recent emergencies have led the government to show more openness to external partners and to cooperation – and this should be capitalised upon. This is clear when looking

at the establishment of ADIN, which seeks to promote multi-sectoral actions with a view to ensuring the socioeconomic development of the northern provinces of Niassa, Cabo Delgado, and Nampula. Indeed, ADIN has recently concluded a new Strategy for Resilience and Integrated Development for the North, which leverages partnerships with the African Development Bank, the EU, and the UN – acknowledging the relevance of international and regional actors to the development work in Mozambique. Despite its recent progress in relationships with the government the UN should:

- **Acknowledge the hurdles created by inadequacies within the government**, such as the effect of corruption, the hidden debt scandal, the lack of presence in rural regions, and the deficient approaches to the northern insurgency. In the spirit of partnership, criticism can be constructive, and it could create the foundation for a more transparent relationship that builds trust between all stakeholders. The UN should continue recognising the good practices of the government, but also offer support to overcome existing deficiencies that should be clarified.
- Strengthen its effort to **support the peacebuilding capacities of the government** by incorporating global agendas, including on peacebuilding and sustaining peace, into continuous policy dialogues and by conducting trainings and sharing resources with relevant national institutions.
- Provide **a platform for partners to support critical peacebuilding needs**. Having one inclusive platform that gives voices to local civil society organisations while providing a space for dialogue between them, international partners, and the government could be fundamental to rebuilding trust between peacebuilding stakeholders. The UN would embrace the **role of a convener** in what could be a foundational infrastructure that creates an enabling environment for local peacebuilding and avoids the ad hoc approach that has so far failed to strengthen relationships between different actors. Solutions found through these dialogues could align international, national, and local priorities and pave the way for more effective and sustainable peacebuilding initiatives.

While there is evidence of UN agencies working with local civil society in peace-related activities, there is **room for improvement in the degree and quality of community engagement**. To this end, we suggest a few options:

- **The UN should develop an institutionalised community engagement strategy**. This will entail undertaking a comprehensive stakeholder mapping exercise in order to better familiarise itself with the local CSOs' environment. Once the actors are identified, the joint activities that could be undertaken should include capacity building and joint dialogues on conflict sensitivity, conflict analysis, and a do no harm approach. On the basis of this, it

can be determined where civil society can provide meaningful contribution (i.e., in the CCA processes, monitoring of UNSDCF, among others) and where the UN could provide adequate support (i.e., the development of a Mozambique-specific national early warning system). The strategy should also include clarity on the opportunities for civil society to receive financial, technical, and capacity support.

- Aligned with the previous point, **the UN should promote informal and inclusive multi-stakeholder reflection and learning spaces** within existing coordination platforms, in order to capture and document ideas, including unspoken rationales, challenges, and insights based on the past peace processes, existing research on root causes, and lessons learned from the implementation of the UNSDCF.
- The UN could **increase its support to civil society organisations engaged in conflict early warning and early response activities**. In turn, this would benefit the preventive nature of its work.

Financing for peacebuilding

While the UN is continuously seen as a critical partner to the international donors engaging in Mozambique, the **resources allocated to peacebuilding projects and activities have consistently been insufficient and require better quality**. This also has affected local peacebuilding organisations that suffer from inadequate financial support, with funds too often ending up in Maputo-based organisations and being earmarked to health and education, forgoing a peacebuilding component. The following recommendations would contribute to a paradigm shift:

- **Funds should be earmarked to require peacebuilding components in all sorts of development work**. This would also increase the predictability of financing for peacebuilding and sustaining peace, facilitating consistent follow-ups, ensuring accountability, and allowing for potential adaptations of ongoing programmes.
- **Creating a platform for donor dialogue on peacebuilding is required**. Possibly hosted by the RC, such a space could be an opportunity for donors interested in peacebuilding to come together around a peacebuilding strategy and/or better understand and engage with the peacebuilding components of the UNSDCF. It would also create an opportunity to jointly reflect upon what constitutes peacebuilding and peacebuilding priorities in the context of Mozambique, not only to avoid money shifting away from peacebuilding towards development and humanitarian programming, but also to allow for the strengthening of the conflict sensitivity of the wider portfolio of aid programming.
- It is important to **ensure that peacebuilding resources are accessible to local organisations**. With new opportunities arising from the crises, the **newly committed funds should be more flexible and reduce some burdens on the partners**. In particular,

the fiscal and reporting requirements threshold should be lowered in relation to local civil society organisations and non-traditional partners, who are often overstretched in their capacities. The example of the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives, where they invested small amounts in short-term grants to local partners, should be explored further.

- It is critical that **the UN supports donors in identifying the right partners on the ground** to improve their capacities to engage and become valuable partners to advance the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda.

In sum, the challenges to peacebuilding and sustaining peace in Mozambique are manifold. However, **the current state of affairs offers a window of opportunity**. The recent emergencies exposed the dire need to include long-term planning at the centre of development activities in the country. Promoting social cohesion and addressing root causes of conflict is now ever so critical. It is time to **leverage the openings for cooperation and collaboration that have been presented**, and the UN should embrace the pivotal role of convener and promote the engagement of international and regional actors, as well as the meaningful participation of local civil society organisations. The language of the new UNDSCF offers hope: it encompasses 'promoting peace and greater social cohesion through more inclusive, participatory and accountable governance and institutions for people to enjoy their human rights and access an equitable and fair justice system'. **It is time to translate hope into optimism through effective action**.

1. Introduction and background

This section provides an overview of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda, briefly summarising the four shifts called for by the UN Secretary-General in the 2018 Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace and outlining a framework for our analysis of the implementation of peacebuilding and sustaining peace in Mozambique.

1.1 The UN Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda

The United Nations, having been established in the wake of two world wars, serves an overall purpose of supporting its Member States in preventing and resolving armed conflicts in a peaceful manner, and achieving lasting peace.[1] **Peacebuilding** as such has always been a central component of the UN's work. Peacebuilding has gained renewed traction since the early 2000s, when the world was confronted with growing numbers of civilians being killed and injured in conflict, and millions of people being displaced

and lacking basic safety and security as a result of armed conflict. Acknowledging that armed conflict and violence are increasingly complex, dynamic, and protracted, the 2015 review of the UN's peacebuilding architecture[2] set out a new framework of 'sustaining peace' in order to strengthen the UN System in such a way that it can better serve its Member States in their efforts to prevent armed conflict and lasting peace.

The concept of **sustaining peace** was formally adopted by the Member States in the 2016 dual General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions (A/70/262[3] and S/RES/2282[4]) and translated in the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda. This agenda sets out four shifts required to strengthen the UN's ability to better support peacebuilding efforts.[5]

The basic premise of the agenda is that its implementation requires a whole-of-system approach that incorporates all three pillars of the UN System – human rights, peace and security, and development – to come to a more holistic, long-term, multidimensional approach for preventing armed conflict, mitigating its impact when it does occur, and supporting governments and their citizens in achieving lasting peace.[6] In order for the UN to work along the lines of a whole-of-system approach, the UN Secretary-General has underlined that shifts are required in **operational and policy coherence** to strengthen support to peacebuilding and sustaining peace.[7]

The Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda is a long-term vision that requires institutions, norms, attitudes, and capacities to continuously adapt in response to the context changes at the country level. In order for the UN to deliver on this, the Secretary-General has emphasised that a shift is also required in terms of the UN **leadership, accountability, and capacity** in supporting peacebuilding and sustaining peace.[8]

The agenda is a shared task and responsibility that needs to be fulfilled by national peacebuilding stakeholders in an inclusive manner and with the support of the UN and the donor community. In order

1   United Nations, *United Nations Charter,* Accessible at: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter.
2   United Nations "The Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations peacebuilding Architecture", 29 June 2015,
     Accessible at: https://www.un.org/pga/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2015/07/300615_The-Challenge-of-Sustaining-Peace.pdf.
3   United Nations, "Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, on 27 April 2016 (A/70/262)", 12 May 2016,
     Accessible at: https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_70_262.pdf.
4   United Nations, "Resolution 2282 (2016) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7680th meeting, on 27 April 2016",
     Accessible at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2282.pdf.
5   These shifts tie the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda closely to other on-going UN-system wide processes, including the operationalization of the UN Reforms and prevention agenda. *See for instance*, "The Vision of the UN Peace and Security Pillar", 2019,
     Accessible at: https://reform.un.org/sites/reform.un.org/files/vision_of_the_un_peace_and_security_pillar.pdf.
6   ODI, Metcalfe-Hough, McKechnie, and Pantuliano, "Delivering the UN "sustaining peace" agenda: Four areas for action by Member States", September 2017, Accessible at: https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/11750.pdf.
7   United Nations, "The 2018 Secretary-General's Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (A/72/707)", 18 January 2018,
     Accessible at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/report-secretary-general-peacebuilding-and-sustaining-peace.
8   Ibid.

for the UN to deliver on this final element of the agenda, the Secretary-General has underlined that shifts are required in terms of **partnerships and financing** for peacebuilding and sustaining peace.[9]

1.2 Implementing the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda

While the general principles of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda are clear enough, there is no simple step-by-step guide on what it means to implement the agenda in practice. Implementation comes down to system changes that are highly dependent on contextual factors, capacities and resources available, and political agendas, among other factors. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify some key action points per shift as identified by the UN Secretary-General.

The required shifts in UN leadership, accountability and capacity in supporting peacebuilding and sustaining peace are in part driven by the ongoing processes of repositioning **the RCO** and strengthening **the UN Country Teams (UNCT)** within the UN System and ensuring **collaborative leadership** in the context of transition. The adjustments that are being made to the RC System allow for the UN leadership at the country level to strengthen the linkages between the policy/political and the programming/operational roles of the UN. Acknowledging that support to peacebuilding and sustaining peace is inevitably influenced by political settings means that UN peacebuilding activities have to be accompanied by engagement from UN leadership in high-level and political dialogues. The focus on strengthening the capacities of the RCO and the UNCT to support peacebuilding and sustaining peace is amongst others operationalised by **bringing in relevant advisors and surge capacities** (e.g., peace and development advisors and gender advisors); creating **dedicated positions for civil society engagement** (civil society liaisons) and forming work groups inclusive of civil society; the provision of **training in conflict/context analysis**; strengthening the ability to adapt programming to rapidly changing contexts by conducting **regular assessments and evaluation with a focus on learning** rather than accountability; and ensuring **sufficient spread of UN locations and offices** across the country, to counter a centre-periphery bias. Shifts in **operational and policy coherence** to strengthen support to peacebuilding and sustaining peace are driven by the UN Secretary-General's ambition to decrease fragmentation of efforts and strengthen coherence, both at the strategic and operational level. A key element in this regard is the ambition to work

from **a coherent and overarching country strategy** that ensures that a peacebuilding component is applied across **the Triple Nexus**. The strategy should bring the policy/political and the programming/operational role of the UN in-country together to support peacebuilding activities that are aligned with priorities identified by national peacebuilding stakeholders (government and civil society, specifically including women and youth). Such a coherent strategy (most often captured in the Cooperation Framework – or its predecessor the UN Development Assistance Framework) should be built on a joint understanding of the key issues to address. For this, **CCAs** should be conducted, which should include an analysis of the **main drivers of conflict and instability** in fragile and conflict-affected settings. A key element in strengthening operational coherence is to ensure that the UNCT is working from **a joint understanding of the capacities available** (and required) to work on peacebuilding. This requires the conduct of a capacity assessment, on the basis of which a **clear division of labour** within the UNCT is agreed upon, which takes into account the complementarities in terms of how various UN entities can best support national stakeholders in their peacebuilding processes – and which capacities are required to do so.

Shifts in partnerships for peacebuilding and sustaining peace in part are related to the ongoing processes to strengthen the complementarity between UN peacebuilding efforts and those of **regional organisations and international financial institutions** (especially the World Bank) by engaging regularly in **joint analysis, planning, and information sharing** – in addition to working in direct collaboration. They also relate to the requirement for the UN to develop **participatory systematic and institutionalised approaches** that involve civil society and local communities, including **community-engagement strategies** in consultation with national and local stakeholders, particularly youth and women's groups. The required shifts in financing for peacebuilding and sustaining peace finally relate to the call of the UN Secretary-General to ensure that UN peacebuilding efforts have **adequate, predictable, and sustained financing**, including through the use of innovative financing mechanisms and pooled funds. As much as possible, the resources available for peacebuilding action are unearmarked and provided for a longer term to ensure that support is **responsive, flexible, and predictable**. In addition, in line with the acknowledgment that sustainable peace requires meaningful engagement of local stakeholders[10], the UN should engage in **authentic partnerships with local peacebuilders** (i.e., move beyond an extractive relationship by treating them as partners rather

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9   Ibid.
10   See for instance the 2020 dual UN Resolutions on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (A/RES/75/201–S/RES/2558) that recognize local peacebuilders as critical partners in peacebuilding; and the 2020 UNSG Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (A/74/976–S/2020/773) which states that peace is more sustainable when peacebuilding efforts are locally owned, led and implemented.

than implementers). The UN should also support civil society with simple and user-friendly grant application templates and selection/reporting criteria.

1.3. Monitoring progress on implementing the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda

The UN System currently monitors progress on the implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda via the Secretary-General's reports on peacebuilding and sustaining peace.[11] These reports provide an overarching picture of where the UN stands in the process, and reflect to a certain extent on progress achieved on the outputs of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda. From the Secretary-General's 2020 Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (A/74/976-S/2020/773[12]), it is reported that "of the 42 recommendations, 35 are in various stages of implementation, 3 have been completed and 4 related to financing are pending". Currently, monitoring systems for the UN Reforms are also being created (A/75/202[13]; A/72/684[14]).

While the action on the global indicators is a positive development that needs to be maintained, there is **less clarity about the progress made in implementing the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda at the country level** – and about the impact of implementing this agenda on advancing country-level peacebuilding processes and objectives. The 2 July 2020 Peacebuilding Commission Chair's letter speaks to this gap and encourages the UN to measure the success of peacebuilding and sustaining peace 'in terms of impact rather than outputs'.[15] Overall, the lack of adequate analysis of the implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda at the country level creates a gap in knowledge about the extent to which it makes a difference to those experiencing conflict and the ways the implementation can be strengthened in line with shifting national priorities.
This brings us to the **rationale of this study**: Based on the premise of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace

Agenda, it is assumed that if UN actors continuously work to respond to the four shifts called for by the UN Secretary-General, and if the donor community adequately supports these efforts through quality and quantity of financing, peace could be sustained long-term at the country level. In order to assess the effectiveness of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda, our analysis looks at the progress of the implementation and impact of the agenda at the country level.

1.4. Research objective and approach

This research project is a first attempt to fill the knowledge gap mentioned above by providing an **initial assessment of the progress and impact of the implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda** in Mozambique.[16]

The overarching objective of the research is **to support more impactful peacebuilding and sustaining peace efforts at the country level**. This can be broken down into two sub-objectives:

1. to assess how UN actors at the country level have worked to implement the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda and, in this process, how their efforts have contributed to advancing country-level peacebuilding processes and objectives;
2. to engage with national and global stakeholders to formulate ways in which UN actors, in collaboration with the donor community, can strengthen the implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda at the country level so as to advance national peacebuilding processes and objectives.

On the basis of insights gathered through a process of desk research, key informant interviews, and focus group discussions with key stakeholders within the UN System, the donor community, the national government, and the local peacebuilding community, this case study explores the progress made in the implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda in

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11   For further information see United Nations, "The 2018 Secretary-General's Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (A/72/707)", 18 January 2018, Accessible at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/report-secretary-general-peacebuilding-and-sustaining-peace; United Nations, "The 2019 Report of the Secretary General on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace", 30 May 2019, Accessible at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/a_73_890_e.pdf; and United Nations, "The 2020 Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding and sustaining peace", 30 July 2020, Accessible at: https://undocs.org/S/2020/773.
12   United Nations, "The 2020 Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding and sustaining peace", 30 July 2020, Accessible at: https://undocs.org/S/2020/773.
13   Ibid.
14   United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on repositioning the United Nations development system to deliver on the 2030 Agenda", 21 December 2017, Accessible at: https://undocs.org/A/72/684.
15   United Nations, "Letter dated 2 July 2020 from the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council (A/74/935)", 7 July 2020, Accessible at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/a_74_935-2009035e_1.pdf.
16   This country case study is part of a wider project, containing three case studies (Somalia, Sudan and Mozambique), on the basis of which one synthesis policy note has been produced. The countries were selected based on the following criteria: 1) GPPAC members' expertise in the global peacebuilding and sustaining peace agenda; 2) the existence of established relationships of GPPAC members with the national governments, regional organisations, UN field presences and the donor community; and 3) the existence of locally led early warning data collection practices and experience with developing monitoring and evaluation for national peacebuilding frameworks.

Mozambique – as well as some of the initial effects of the implementation thus far.

This report first presents a brief overview of the peacebuilding context in Mozambique, briefly summarising the current state of affairs in the country, and highlighting key achievements and outstanding challenges in terms of peacebuilding and sustaining peace (section 2). Then, the report provides an initial assessment of the progress made in terms of implementing the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda in Mozambique by reflecting on the required shifts as identified by the Secretary-General (leadership, accountability, and capacity – section 3; operational and policy coherence – section 4; partnerships – section 5; and financing – section 6). For each of these sections, the report first presents a brief descriptive overview of the key structures, frameworks, and instruments in place relevant for the required shift, followed by an analysis of how these have contributed to the UN's ability to implement the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda in Mozambique.

On the basis of that, the study provides practical recommendations for the UN and the donor community working on peacebuilding and sustaining peace in Mozambique on how to further the implementation of the agenda, feeding into a broader process of drawing lessons to inform the policy discourse behind peacebuilding and sustaining peace (section 7).

2. Background: Peacebuilding in Mozambique

This section provides an overview of the peacebuilding context in Mozambique, briefly summarising the history of peacebuilding and the current state of affairs in the country, and highlighting key achievements and outstanding challenges towards the operationalisation of peacebuilding and sustaining peace at the country level.

Mozambique has been affected by violence for decades. In 1975, a decade-long war culminated in the country's independence from Portugal.[17] Later, a civil war between the Front of the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) ravaged the country until the signing of the 1992 Rome General Peace Accords.[18] With a strong focus on disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR), the implementation of the accords did not encompass substantial efforts to build infrastructures for peace, which are required for a sustainable and violence-free environment. This, among other factors, likely contributed to the resurgence of internal armed violence between the same actors in 2013,[19] which eventually led to the 2019 Maputo Accord for Peace and National Reconciliation.[20] Yet, peace remains a fragile reality in Mozambique.

The history of violent tensions has had **severe consequences for the development of the country and the well-being of its citizens**. Once seen as an example of post-conflict success, growing at an average of 7 per cent per year between 2002 and 2015, Mozambique has since suffered from an ongoing economy downturn, peaking at negative growth of -1.2 per cent in 2020 in part due to the various humanitarian crises that affected the country as well as issues with low commodity prices and the revelation of a large hidden debt in undisclosed commercial loans.[21] Perhaps unsurprisingly, the country has been in constant decline in the Global Peace Index[22] and the Global Terrorism Index.[23] Similarly, the country was ranked 181th out of 189 countries in the latest Humanitarian Development Index, with marginal improvements over the last decade.[24] Its poverty levels remain extremely high and are 'largely unchanged since 2003 at approximately 54 per cent'.[25] In 2020, Mozambique was the second most

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17   Institute for Security Studies, 'Planning for peace Lessons from Mozambique's peacebuilding process', June 2016, Accessible at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Planning%20for%20peace_%20Lessons%20from%20Mozambique%E2%80%99s%20peacebuilding%20process.pdf.

18   Peace Agreements, 'General Peace Agreement for Mozambique: Rome, 4 1992'. Accessible at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/392.

19   *Note that* the lack of transparency of the Mozambican electoral processes is one of the most discussed factors. For example see CODESRIA, Bussotti, 'Peace and Democracy in Mozambique: An Endless Transition', 2021, Accessible at: https://codesria.org/IMG/pdf/1._peace_and_democracy_in_mozambique_proof.pdf

20   Maputo Accord, 'Maputo Accord for Peace and National Recognition', 6 August 2019, Accessible at: https://maputoaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Maputo-Accord-for-Peace-and-National-Reconciliation.pdf. Further note that a previous attempt to cease hostilities occurred in 2014, when a treaty was signed. However, 'one the very same day the truce was signed, an attack occurred'. *For further information see* Deutsche Welle, Krippahl, 'Peace in Mozambique: Third time lucky?', 5 August 2020, Accessible at: https://www.dw.com/en/peace-in-mozambique-third-time-lucky/a-54444504.

21   Which in turn contributed to the depreciation of the currency and soaring inflation. *For further information see* World Bank, GDP Growth (annual %)", Accessible at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=MZ.%20See%20also%202021%20UNDAF%20Evaluation%20pp.%201-2; *See also* UN Mozambique, 'UN Mozambique 2017–2021 UNDAF Evaluation Final Report', 23 March 2021, p. 1-2, Accessible at: https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/download/19225. Please further note that the debt-to-GDP ratio of Mozambique was sitting at 128.5% in 2020.

22   From ranking 46th in 2010 to 103rd in 2021 out of 163 countries. *For further information see* Institute for Economics and Peace, 'Global Peace Index 2021: Measuring Peace in a Complex World', June 2021, Accessible at: https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/GPI-2021-web-1.pdf.

23   *Further note* that the Global Terrorism Index considered Mozambique the 15th country most impacted by terrorism in 2020. For further information see Institute for Economics and Peace, 'Global Peace Index 2021: Measuring Peace in a Complex World', June 2021, Accessible at: https://visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/GTI-2020-web-1.pdf.

24   UNDP, *Human Development Index (HDI)*, Accessible at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi.

25   United Nations, 'United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2017–2020', January 2016, p. 2, Accessible at: https://sites.unicef.org/about/execboard/files/Mozambique-UNDAF_2017-2020_Eng.pdf. *Note that* the UNDAF saw a downward trend, falling from 60% in 2002-2003, with some increases in access to basic services. *For further information see* UN Mozambique, 'UN Mozambique 2017–2021 UNDAF Evaluation Final Report', 23 March 2021, p. vi, Accessible at: https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/detail/19225.

worsened country in the Fragile States Index, which assesses states' vulnerability to conflict or collapse.[26] In addition, the country has been plagued by corruption[27] and has been characterised as an authoritarian regime.[28] **Socioeconomic vulnerability and violence are intertwined**,[29] and there are thus multiple factors that have contributed to, and may continue to cause, social upheaval in Mozambique.

Main peacebuilding gains: All of the factors outlined above in and of themselves would mean that the Mozambican context is challenging for the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda. Yet, over the years, some peacebuilding gains have been achieved – for example, the absence of violence was a pre-condition to the years of economic growth. More recently, the Government of Mozambique has reportedly become more active and open to partnerships with a view to engaging in sustained **reconstruction processes in its most fragile areas**.[30] One concrete example of this is the recent creation of the Agency for Integrated Development of the North (ADIN). The agency seeks to be a credible catalyst that contributes to the economic and social growth of the northern region, striving for inclusive, harmonious, and sustainable development through the strengthening of inter-institutional coordination between government parties, the private sector, international cooperation partners, civil society, and local communities.[31]

Outstanding peacebuilding challenges: In the wake of **poor governance**, **ongoing or recent security-specific contexts** have been curbing the effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts across the development-humanitarian-peace nexus (the Triple Nexus) in Mozambique. First, there is the destabilising insurgency against the local government and population in northern Mozambique, perpetrated by the non-state armed group recognised as Ahlu Sunnah Waj-Jama (known locally as Al-Shabaab, affiliated with the Islamic State).[32] The turmoil started in 2017 and continued to rise until it peaked in 2021, with around 3,000 reported deaths, half of which were civilians, and over 850,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs).[33] In Cabo Delgado, reports of sexual violence, forced recruitment, and alleged killings continue to sow terror and disproportionately affect women and youth.[34] The latter are particularly relevant in Mozambique, a country with over half of its population under 18 years old.[35] Second, central Mozambique was the stage for multiple violent attacks perpetrated by a splinter group of RENAMO, the self-titled Military Junta, as a consequence of internal leadership disputes and demands to be recognised as stakeholders in the 2019 Maputo Accord.[36]

In addition, as acknowledged by the UN, Mozambique is one of the countries most affected by **climate-related hazards**.[37] Climate hazards are correlated with displacement and food insecurity, which in turn are connected with armed conflict, as identified in the UN Security Council resolution 2417 (2018).[38] The cyclones Idai and Kenneth overwhelmed an already fragile

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26 After ranking 80th in 2006, Mozambique is now considered the 22nd most fragile state in the world. *For further information see* FFP Fragile States Index, *Country Dashboard: Mozambique,* Accessible at: https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/.

27 The country is ranked 149th out of 180 countries in the Corruption Perception Index, which ranks countries and territories by their perceived levels of public sector corruption. *For further information see* Transparency International, *2020 Corruption Perceptions Index: Mozambique,* Accessible at: https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/nzl.

28 The country currently sits at 122nd out of 167 countries, according to the Economist's Democracy Index. *For further information see* Economist Intelligence Unit, *Democracy Index 2020,* Accessible at: https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2020/#mktoForm_anchor.

29 *For further information see* Council of Europe, *Socio-economic Violence,* Accessible at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/gender-matters/socio-economic-violence; and IOM, 'Socioeconomic Vulnerabilities as a Factor in Long-term Risk of Radicalization: Prevention Potential of Local Communities and Official Assistance in Central Asian Countries', 2020, Accessible at: https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/socioeconomic-vulnerabilities-as-a-factor-in-long-term-risk-of-radicalization.pdf.

30 *Further note that* the report uses a mix of data sources to inform the analysis and the recommendations for moving forward include a comprehensive desk review, a survey, multiple interviews and a couple of roundtable discussions with relevant stakeholders.

31 *For further information see* ADIN, *Quem Somos,* Accessible at: https://adin.gov.mz/en/quem-somos/.

32 *Note that* despite some uncertainties regarding the perpetrators and their objectives, both their connection to international violent extremist groups and their aims to benefit from the illicit economic activity occurring in the province are widely acknowledged.

33 *For example see* UNICEF, 'Mozambique', 2020, Accessible at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2022-HAC-Mozambique.pdf; *and* PLAN International, 'Conflict in Northern Mozambique- Realities of Children and Adolescent Girls', June 2021, Accessible at: https://plan-international. org/conflict-and-children-northern-mozambique#download-options.

34 United Nations, 'Mozambique: Violence continues in Cabo Delgado, as agencies respond to growing needs', 11 June 2021, Accessible at: https://news. un.org/en/story/2021/06/1093872.

35 UNICEF, *Adolescent & social norms situation in Mozambique,* Accessible at: https://www.unicef.org/mozambique/en/adolescent-social-norms.

36 *Note that* although less severe than in Cabo Delgado, there were also deaths resulting from these attacks. *For further information see* UN Mozambique, 'United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2017-2020: 2019 Progress Report', May 2020, p. 11, Accessible at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-abidjan/---ilo-lusaka/documents/publication/wcms_746772.pdf.

37 United Nations, 'United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2017-2020', January 2016, p. 17, Accessible at: https://sites.unicef.org/about/execboard/files/Mozambique-UNDAF_2017-2020_Eng.pdf. *Note that* indeed, Mozambique was at the top of the 2019 Global Climate Risk Index, which analyses the extent to which countries have been affected by impacts of weather-related loss events. *For further information see* Germanwatch, Eckstein, Künzel, and Schäfer, 'Global Climate Risk Index 2021: Who Suffers Most from Extreme Weather Events? Weather-Related Loss Events in 2019 and 2000-2019', January 2021, Accessible at: https://germanwatch.org/sites/germanwatch.org/files/Global%20Climate%20Risk%20Index%202021_1.pdf.

38 UN, 'Resolution 2417 (2018) Adopted by the Security Council at its 8267th meeting, on 24 May 2018', p. 3, Accessible at: https://undocs.org/S/RES/2417(2018).

rural Mozambique in 2019, causing severe damage; an extraordinary number of IDPs;[39] and a surge in famine, poverty, and gender-based violence. Between the two, an estimated 1.95 million people were affected and US $3 billion dollars in infrastructure were lost.[40] If the context was dire, it became worse with the outbreak and spread of **the COVID-19 pandemic**, with its known impact on public health. As reported during interviews, the pandemic was correlated with the suspension of many jobs, which in turn led to increased banditry, both organised and non-organised, and social cohesion has been depleted due to stiff competition over scarce resources.

Alas, there is **broad-based disenfranchisement and exclusion** among the citizens in Mozambique. Many young people exist in a 'socioeconomic status of "waithood" and are excluded from political voice and opportunities to earn an income, to have an education, for social mobility and self-improvement, and to have a voice in politics'.[41] This is a dangerous recipe that makes the youth more amenable to using violence to achieve their ends – and thus underlines the relevance of targeting the youth and including them in programmes and activities that aim to foster social cohesion. Further, women's role in society 'remains relatively marginal' and women have 'lower access to education, skills development opportunities and employment than men'.[42] Furthermore, gender-based violence incidents and forced marriages increase during conflict, with women as the prime victims – with a shocking one-third of Mozambican women aged 15–49 having reportedly experienced physical violence.[43]

Moving forward:

Building on peacebuilding gains and recognising the wide range of needs in the country, the UN has been supporting Mozambique in multiple areas since its independence[44] through a 'strong and continuous partnership'[45] with the government. This 45+ year period provides substantive lessons for the years ahead. Understanding the successes and failures of the DDR-focused peace processes is key in this regard. There is a need to better comprehend, analyse, and integrate root causes of violence and instability into peacebuilding action, as well as to combine short- and long-term planning that echoes the interconnected nature of peace, development, and humanitarian work. This would pave the way to the strengthening of inclusive peacebuilding capacities, reconciliation efforts, functioning national institutions, multi-stakeholder coordination, and operational and policy coherence – all of which require adequate and flexible funding. The UN can leverage its long-lasting relationship with the government to pivot itself as a convener among a plethora of (at times disengaged) stakeholders in the country and bring them together around common peacebuilding objectives. There is thus room for further support by the UN, and these are the areas that will be explored throughout this report, where we will be looking into the UN's most recent action in Mozambique, with a focus on implementing the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda.

39   *Note that t*hose in situations of which fragility is evident, with IDPs often lacking means of subsistence and becoming targets of various types of violence.

40   World Bank, 'The World Bank Mozambique: Cyclone Idai & Kenneth Emergency Recovery and Resilience Project (P171040)', 8 September 2019, Accessible at: https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/727131568020768626/pdf/Project-Information-Document-Mozambique-Cyclone-Idai-Kenneth-Emergency-Recovery-and-Resilience-Project-P171040.pdf.

41   World Bank, 'The World Bank Northern Mozambique Rural Resilience Project (P174635): Project Information Document (PID)', 16 November 2020, p. 6, Accessible at: https://clubofmozambique.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Concept-Project-Information-Document-PID-Northern-Mozambique-Rural-Resilience-Project-P174635.pdf.

42   Ibid.

43   World Bank, 'The World Bank Mozambique: Northern Crisis Recovery Project (NCRP) (P176157): Project Information Document', 12 March 2021, p. 5, Accessible at: https://ewsdata.rightsindevelopment.org/files/documents/57/WB-P176157.pdf.

44   The now discontinued UN peacekeeping force UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) focused on verifying the implementation of the military aspects of the Accords and overseeing the electoral process and launched a humanitarian assistance programme to help the millions of people displaced by the civil war to resettle in their communities. *For more information see* UN, *Mozambique- ONUMOZ Background*. Accessible at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/onumozS.htm. *And* Peace Agreements, 'General Peace Agreement for Mozambique: Rome, 4 1992'. Accessible at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/392.

45   United Nations, 'United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2017–2020', January 2016, p. 2, Accessible at: https://sites.unicef.org/about/execboard/files/Mozambique-UNDAF_2017-2020_Eng.pdf.

3. Leadership, accountability, and capacity of the UN in Mozambique

This section reflects on the capacities available within the United Nations in-country leadership to support the implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda in such a way that country-level peacebuilding priorities and objectives can be advanced, including in the context of fragility and emerging crises

The UN leadership in Mozambique lies first and foremost in the hands of the **Resident Coordinator** (RC) – the highest ranked representative of the UN Development System at the country level (who also serves as a humanitarian coordinator). The RCs, who are '**double-hatted as humanitarian coordinators**', ensure system-wide accountability on the ground for the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF).[46] In Mozambique, the position is occupied by Myrta Kaulard, who assumed duties on 1 July 2019. Her role is pivotal for the implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda, as the RC is 'responsible for coordinating development strategies that are risk informed and help to build peaceful and inclusive societies'.[47] The development of the UNSDCF has been a part of an inclusive process, with the participation of civil society. Together with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, the RC co-chairs the Joint Steering Committee that coordinates the implementation of the UNDAF/UNSDCF and ensures alignment with national, regional, and international development processes, mechanisms, and goals.[48] The RC leads the UN Country Team (UNCT), which provides the overall strategic oversight and guidance for the entire UNDAF/UNSDCF and conducts and updates the common country analysis (CCA), the basis for developing the strategic frameworks.[49] The CCA is a key instrument in identifying the main drivers of conflict and instability, and as such a key instrument in implementing the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda.

It has been **challenging to ensure the stability of the RC position in Mozambique**. Delays in the appointment of the RC and relatively quick turnover in the position – the previous RC was in the position for less than two years – undermine the effectiveness of the UN system as envisioned by the UN Secretary-General, curbing continuity and preventing the development of an empowered and impartial leadership at the country level.[50] Indeed, coordination efforts and the implementation of the UNDAF/UNSDCF were affected by the fact that the RC position was vacant for around nine months before Myrta Kaulard was appointed. During this period, an interim coordinator was selected; however, this 'was not enough to secure all decision-making and coordination needs and, at the same time, this provisional situation did not allow making changes to the ongoing UNDAF budget or orientation,

46   United Nations, 'The Report of the Secretary-General on repositioning the United Nations development system to deliver on the 2030 Agenda', 17 December 2017, p. 12, Accessible at: https://undocs.org/A/72/684. *Note that* the UNCT includes the heads of the UN agencies working in Mozambique. To operationalize the peace and security pillar envisioned by the UN Secretary-General's reforms, the UNDAF, also known recently as the UNSDCF, is positioned as 'the single most important United Nations country planning instrument'.

47   United Nations, 'The 2018 Secretary-General's Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (A/72/707)', p. 7 para 24, Accessible at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/sg_report_on_peacebuilding_and_sustaining_peace.as_issued.a-72-707-s-2018-43.e.pdf.

48   *Note that* the Joint Steering Committee is composed of high-level representatives of the Government and UN Heads of Agency. *For further information see* United Nations, 'United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2017-2020', January 2016, p. 17, Accessible at: https://sites.unicef.org/about/execboard/files/Mozambique-UNDAF_2017-2020_Eng.pdf. *See also* UN Mozambique, '2022-2026 UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for Mozambique', 2021, p. 88.

49   UN Mozambique, '2022-2026 UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for Mozambique', 2021, p. 88.

50   *For further information see* United Nations, 'The 2018 Secretary-General's Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (A/72/707)', p. 8-9 para 29 and 32, Accessible at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/sg_report_on_peacebuilding_and_sustaining_peace.as_issued.a-72-707-s-2018-43.e.pdf.

as this requires diplomacy and negotiations with the government'.[51-]

In July 2019 Mirko Manzoni became the **Secretary-General's Personal Envoy for Mozambique** in order to provide good offices and assist in the implementation of the Maputo Peace and National Reconciliation Agreement signed on 6 August 2019. The Personal Envoy also facilitated dialogue between the government and RENAMO, as well as with the breakaway Military Junta after the splintering among RENAMO, and was 'able to respond to opportunities' related to DDR.[52] This has provided UN leadership with an opportunity to engage in constructive dialogue related to addressing fragility risks, and ensuring that DDR processes continue to progress.

Another relevant peacebuilding-related role is the Peace and Development Advisor (PDA). The PDAs support RCs and UNCTs in efforts to coordinate across the political and development pillars of the UN in pursuit of the prevention of violent conflict.[53] The current PDA in Mozambique, Laura Lima, is well known among peacebuilding stakeholders in Mozambique. She started in her role in 2018, a time when there was no RC and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) did not have a Resident Representative – a challenge in terms of leadership and guidance for peace and sustaining peace work. Since then, issues around the presidential elections, the disasters associated with the hurricanes, and the 2019 Peace Agreement have been central concerns in her role.

There is some **confusion among external stakeholders regarding the leadership roles within the UN**. The distinction between the role of the RC and that of the UNDP Resident Representative remains unclear to various stakeholders that participated in interviews or discussions for this report. Further, the Personal Envoy was still seen by many as the Swiss Ambassador, a role he occupied in the past. The full scope of his mandate is also unclear, especially when it comes to a variety of political functions the UN is expected to fulfil. In addition, the person that stakeholders referred to as the peacebuilding focal point was recurrently the PDA – even though that is not a UN leadership position. In addition to the confusion regarding leadership, there is also **limited peacebuilding expertise in the UN Mozambique**, despite increased efforts to support peacebuilding capacities. The UN does have the mandate to think peace in the long term, as reported y an interviewee, but there needs to be stronger support beyond a PDA and a Personal Envoy, with dedicated peacebuilding advisors to the RC and the UNCT, as well as in all relevant UN agencies, funds, and programmes (AFPs) that have peacebuilding objectives set forth in their respective strategies. Currently, the staff within the RC Office (RCO) does not include a dedicated peacebuilding expert, besides the PDA.[54]

In terms of accountability, the UN positions itself as being **accountable to the people of Mozambique** through its partnership with the Government of Mozambique, as well as with the broader society, including civil society, academia, the private sector, and development partners. In the new UNSDCF, the UN commits itself to contribute to a vision for the country where all people equitably participate in, and benefit from, sustainable development in a peaceful and resilient Mozambican society, underpinned by gender equality.[55] The UNSDCF serves as a core accountability tool between the UNCT and the host government, and among UNCT members for collectively delivering development results.[56] One key aspect will be to ensure that the perspectives of the broader society are included in the accountability dialogues, as reportedly meaningful inclusion of civil society is currently lacking in monitoring and evaluation.[57]

Finally, despite the facts that the **UN field presence in Mozambique is relatively balanced**,[58] it is still perceived by other stakeholders as centred around the capital Maputo. The RCO is showing efforts to continue strengthening the UN presence across the country. Within the context of the UN Reform and through the UNDAF/UNSDCF process, a mapping of the capacities of UN entities was conducted, providing a picture of the overlaps and gaps in the UN system, with or

51 UN Mozambique, 'UN Mozambique 2017-2021 UNDAF Evaluation Final Report', 23 March 2021, p. 35–36, Accessible at: https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/detail/19225.

52 United Nations DPPA, 'Annual Report 2020: Giving Peace a Chance', 8 September 2021, p. 18, Accessible at: https://dppa.un.org/sites/default/files/6146_unny_annual_report_31_300.pdf.

53 *For further information see* United Nations, 'The 2018 Secretary-General's Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (A/72/707)', p. 10 para 36, Accessible at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/sg_report_on_peacebuilding_and_sustaining_peace.as_issued.a-72-707-s-2018-43.e.pdf; *and* UN DCO, 'Report of the Chair of the UNSDG on the Development Coordination Office' May 2021, p. 15, Accessible at: https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/UNDCO-Report-2021-rev.pdf.

54 United Nations, *Mozambique*, Accessible at: https://unsdg.un.org/un-in-action/mozambique.

55 UN Mozambique, '2022-2026 UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for Mozambique', 2021, p. 6.

56 Ibid, p. 12.

57 *Note that* it was suggested that the National Human Rights Commission could potentially play the role of championing the inclusion of civil society given the linkage between peacebuilding and human rights that is created with the new strategic UNSDCF priority area on 'peacebuilding, human rights and inclusive governance'. *For further information see* UN Mozambique, '2022-2026 UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for Mozambique', 2021, p. 44. *Also,* it should be noted that the Commissioner is appointed by the President of the Republic, which could hinder their perceived neutrality.

58 The UN RC Office has shared information that attests to the fact that the UN has conducted various activities through their offices across the country.

without physical presence in Mozambique, allowing for more strategic and coordinated interventions in the future. Additionally, the RC has recently created the post of Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator based in Cabo Delgado, and has mobilised resources to create a post of UN Senior Regional Advisor (SRA) within the RCO, outposted in Pemba, to ensure a well-coordinated recovery, resilience, development, peacebuilding engagement in full complementarity with the humanitarian effort. The changes are supposed to ensure sound dialogue and support to local authorities, a strong UN contribution to recovery and development coordination platforms, and complementarity among various efforts across the Triple Nexus.[59] The impact of these new positions remains to be seen, but the RCO is showing efforts to balance the UN presence across the country.

Moving forward:

The new UNSDCF developed by the current UN leadership provides a strong avenue to capitalise on the implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda, while ensuring that the UN action is rooted in national priorities. To guarantee the adequate implementation of the UNSDCF, however, there is a critical need to address the gaps in leadership and peacebuilding capacities within the UNCT in Mozambique. Potential steps can be broken down into three priority areas. The first is **streamlining work and clarifying leadership roles and responsibilities both internally and externally**. During the roundtable discussions organised by GPPAC, relevant stakeholders indicated that the UN is perceived as having a 'fragmented approach' and dealing with coordination challenges.

The second priority area is **supporting continuity of staff and stronger accountable leadership**. Staff turnover rates are compromising the work of the UN in Mozambique. Without appropriate allocation of human and financial resources, the successful implementation of projects can be compromised.[60] The UNCT should focus on finding more solutions to ensure continuity of staff members as well as strengthen the capacity of the existing ones. In relation to leadership, lack of continuity can compromise the consolidation of relationships with the government as well as hinder firm leadership. Delays in appointing an RC further risk undermining his/her authority and visibility in-country.

The third priority area is **increasing peacebuilding-specific expertise**. In other countries that show lower levels of violence and fragility, the UN has more staff specialised in peacebuilding.[61] Alas, in Mozambique, with fewer resources and recurrent incidences of violent conflict, effective peacebuilding becomes far-fetched. One avenue for increasing peacebuilding expertise is engaging with local and national peacebuilding experts beyond limited consultancies and adopting systematic forms of partnership.

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59   UNFPA, 'Comments on the UNFPA Draft Country Programme Document for Mozambique: First Regular Session 2022', Accessible at: https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/board-documents/UNFPA%20draft%20CPDs%20-%20Comments%20%26%20Response%20-%20Mozambique%20CPD%20-%20FINAL%20-%2010Dec21.pdf.

60   *For example* the UNDAF Progress Report 2020, highlighted that the UNCT's deficiencies in resources, efficiency and support has been hindering the achievement of anticipated results.

61   *For example* in Liberia, which has *two* PDAs and a political coordinator, that while it was still found that the RCO 'needs more staff and capacity to be effective … [as the current situation is] not enough to coordinate and support the implementation of programming in the country while also building the preventive capacities of national actors'. *See* IPI, 'Sustaining Peace in Liberia: New Reforms, New Opportunities?', May 2019, p. 19, Accessible at: https://gppac.net/files/2019-05/1905_Sustaining-Peace-in-Liberia.pdf.

4. Operational and policy coherence to strengthen support to peacebuilding and sustaining peace

This section looks at the extent to which in-country UN actors have succeeded in coordinating their peacebuilding efforts across the relevant UN pillars (i.e., peacekeeping, peacebuilding, development, and humanitarian) in order to support the implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda in such a way that country-level peacebuilding priorities and objectives can be advanced

The Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda inspired a **reform in the *modus operandi* of the UN**. To operationalise the model envisioned by the Secretary-General, the UNDAF – and subsequently the UNSDCF – was positioned as 'the single most important United Nations country planning instrument in support of the 2030 Agenda'.[62] It builds on **integrated context analysis** developed by the UN in cooperation and dialogue with other relevant actors, notably the government, and aims to connect different actors based on their comparative advantages and ensure a solid basis for the programming of all UN activities on the ground. The main analysis in this report will be based on the **2017-2021 UNDAF**.[63] A **new UNSDCF is in place from 2022 onwards**, and will be referred to where relevant. However, as a recent document the analysis will be limited to its content, as its practical consequences remain to be seen.[64] These documents offer the **overall framework** that combines the efforts of all the agencies active in the country in order to provide 'coherent, effective and efficient support to address key development challenges' while complementing 'the considerable support of bilateral and other multilateral partners'.[65]

Peacebuilding programming:

The UNDAF/UNDSCF are **developed in collaboration with the government**, through strategic meetings at the highest level, as well as consultations with representatives of CSOs, the private sector, and international development partners.[66] The UNDAF sought to align with both the Sustainable Development Goals (2030 Agenda) and with government priorities, addressed in its Five-Year Programme 2015-2019 (PQG – the Portuguese acronym for *Plano Quinquenal do Governo*). The framework is organised around **four result areas**: prosperity, people, planet, and peace. Within these result areas the UNDAF defines 10 outcomes to which the UN in Mozambique should contribute.[67] While peace was one of the four results areas around which the UNDAF was developed, **peace is only mentioned in outcome 8, focused on governance**.

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62 United Nations, 'The Report of the Secretary-General on repositioning the United Nations development system to deliver on the 2030 Agenda', 17 December 2017, p. 12, Accessible at: https://undocs.org/A/72/684.

63 *Note that* in Mozambique, the latest UNDAF was supposed to cover the period from 2017 to 2020, but was extended for another year due to the unexpected challenges related to "various unprecedented events" such as the humanitarian crises related to the devastation of the 2019 cyclones. *For further information see* UN Mozambique, 'UN Mozambique 2017-2021 UNDAF Evaluation Final Report', 23 March 2021, Accessible at: https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/detail/19225.

64 *Note that* the start of a new Cooperation Framework cycle was January 1st 2022. *For further information see* United Nations Sustainable Development Group, 'United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (CF) Implementation', 4 October 2021, Accessible at: https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-10/Final_UNSDCF%20Implementation%20-Table-04102021_0.pdf.

65 *Note that* the UNDAF/UNSDCF represent 'exclusively the entirety of the UN's activities in Mozambique ... and is therefore the UN's One Programme for Mozambique'. *For further information see* United Nations, 'United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2017-2020', January 2016, p. 1, Accessible at: https://sites.unicef.org/about/execboard/files/Mozambique-UNDAF_2017-2020_Eng.pdf. *Also note that* following the Delivering as One (DaO) approach, the UN's presence in Mozambique is guided by one programme, one leader, one budgetary framework and fund, and one management system.

66 Ibid. *And* UN Mozambique, '2022-2026 UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for Mozambique', 2021, p.6.

67 *Note that* the outcomes are: (i) Food Security and Nutrition, (ii) Economic Transformation, (iii) Education, (iv) Gender, (v) Social Protection, (vi) Health, (vii) Youth, (viii) Governance, (ix) Natural Resources and (x) Resilience. Under each outcome there were different outputs – 37 in total – that encapsulate the expected contribution of the UN agencies to each outcome.

Outcome 8 is explained in the document as 'all people benefit[ing] from democratic and transparent institutions and systems that guarantee *peace consolidation*, human rights and equitable services'.[68] If we delve deeper into the outputs associated with this outcome, only output 8.1. continues to explore peace: "actors and mechanisms that promote a culture of peace and dialogue strengthened." The other outcomes are not directly linked to conflict or instability, even though they in fact address some of the key drivers in Mozambique (e.g., food security and economic transformation). However, an explicit conflict sensitivity lens does not seem to have been applied to these outcomes. Overall, this seems **very little for a country which has alternated between periods of war and peace**, including the resurgence of low-intensity armed conflict between RENAMO and FRELIMO in the period 2013-2016 – a situation which others have considered a 'reality check, revealing the dangers of a flawed democratisation process'.[69]

The new **UNSDCF provides a better starting point for implementing the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda** in comparison to the former UNDAF. The central vision of the strategy is for the UN to contribute to a country where 'all people equitably participate in, and benefit from, sustainable development in a *peaceful and resilient* Mozambican society, underpinned by gender equality'.[70] **'Peacebuilding, human rights and inclusive governance' is one of the four priority areas** that form the central components of the framework.[71] As such, the UNSDCF provides an opportunity for the UN and the government to engage in a continuous dialogue on peacebuilding and sustaining peace. The document unpacks the priority area as follows: 'This area aims to contribute to Mozambique's priorities to strengthen democracy and national unity, promote good governance and decentralisation, and enhance international cooperation with special attention to women and youth, people with disabilities, the most vulnerable and marginalised. It encompasses promoting peace and greater social cohesion through more inclusive, participatory and accountable governance and institutions for people to enjoy their human rights and access an equitable and fair justice system'.[72]

It remains to be seen how this priority area is put into practice. The so-called Strategic Priority Groups – co-

led by representatives of government institutions and heads of UN agencies, and responsible for UNSDCF implementation, monitoring progress, and reporting on their strategic priority area – will be developing joint working plans (JWPs) identifying the joint UN contribution to the foreseen results, including through joint programming and joint resource mobilisation.[73] For now, the indicators listed in the results framework for the 'peacebuilding, human rights and inclusive governance' strategic priority area are mostly focused on strengthening the position and security of women and girls, in what seems like a missed opportunity to include references to some of the key drivers of conflict in Mozambique (e.g., political and economic exclusion of youth; corruption and misappropriation of income related to natural resources; etc.). The same applies to the other three priority areas, which are all relevant for sustaining peace – but are not presented as such when looking at the accompanying results frameworks, nor linked to conflict or instability. Similar to the UNDAF, **the UNSDCF misses an opportunity here to apply a conflict sensitivity lens to all of its development programming in Mozambique.**

Focused **reflective and learning processes** that inform action are critical to ensure sustainability of peacebuilding action in Mozambique. Lessons learned from UNDAF must be taken into account to increase conflict sensitivity of relevant action and capitalise on effective conflict prevention action. **The scarce focus on peacebuilding in the UNDAF is reported to have undermined the preventive efforts of the UN in Mozambique**. Various actors perceive the peacebuilding work of the UN to be reactive and ad hoc, based on projects with a prevailing focus on emergency responses and lacking a forward-looking vision that ensures sustainability. In addition, one interviewee also mentioned that the existing research on the root causes of the conflict is 'narrow and not sufficiently in-depth'. Another partner has suggested that 'commissioned research rarely results in meaningful policy or programmatic change'. Indeed, **the relapse from previous peace agreements should have better informed the framing of the UN work in Mozambique**. One key challenge is that Mozambicans are continuously trapped in ineffective DDR programmes. Both the 1992 Rome General Peace Accords and the 2019 Maputo Accord for Peace and

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68   United Nations, 'United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2017-2020', January 2016, p. 12, Accessible at: https://sites.unicef.org/about/execboard/files/Mozambique-UNDAF_2017-2020_Eng.pdf.
69   ISS, Faleg, 'Conflict Prevention in Mozambique: Can there be peace after the storm', April 2019, p. 1, Accessible at: https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief%205%20Mozambique_0.pdf.
70   UN Mozambique, '2022-2026 UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework For Mozambique', 2021. p. 40.
71   Ibid, p. 44. Note that the other strategic priority areas are: human development; economic diversification and sustainable livelihoods; and climate resilience and sustainable use of natural resources.
72   Ibid.
73   Ibid, p. 88-89.

National Reconciliation relied heavily on DDR efforts,[74] but failed to effectively reintegrate combatants in society – despite some successes, including through the UN's support.[75] In particular, these DDR efforts failed to ensure **an effective socio-economic integration of ex-combatants, which is a key driver of resurgence of violence in central Mozambique**: In a roundtable, one participant mentioned that 'they are professionals of violence and now have nothing to sustain them, so what would you expect?'. Another one added that 'peacebuilding action has failed because it has not properly addressed the historical marginalisation and grievances in Mozambique in the past'.

There is a challenge of **projecting a realistic picture of Mozambique** in the UNDAF/UNSDCF. In fact, the UNDAF appears to have been overly optimistic. It is widely acknowledged that Mozambique suffered from poor governance and that there was a legitimacy deficit, especially in rural areas. The country was known to face issues with disenfranchisement, exclusion, poverty, unemployment, and marginalisation, disproportionately affecting youth and women. Alas, although recognising that there are 'underlying political and social tensions' that result in 'sporadic outbreaks of violence and unrest', the UNDAF characterised Mozambique's political system as 'largely effective for almost two decades'.[76] Compared to the UNDAF, **the UNSDCF is more outspoken about ongoing conflict and stability risks in Mozambique**. The situation in Cabo Delgado, for example, is listed throughout the strategy as an area of concern, and the risk assessment provided refers to a number of key drivers of conflict: 'Failure to carry out development projects to create more jobs and self-employment, especially for young people and women, effective inclusion, participation and human and economic development would foster instability'.[77]

Further, while there is evidence of the UN's added value with regards to issues such as gender equality[78] and with programmes targeting the youth and capacity building, **distinctive peacebuilding components and stronger conflict analysis are perceived to be insufficient**. Unsurprisingly, UNDAF progress reports[79] barely mention achievements and actions in areas where peacebuilding should be at the forefront of the Triple Nexus (a situation that is expected to change with the implementation of the new UNSDCF). Nonetheless, the UN saw progress and achievements in a few areas and activities, namely in line with UNSCR 1325 – 'significant progress was made in 2019 towards [the] achievement of an enabling environment for sustainable implementation of Women Peace and Security (WPS) commitments in Mozambique'.[80]

Indeed, there is a **perceived lack of clarity of the UN's peacebuilding work among external stakeholders**. The UN's strategies were deemed unclear by partners, who mentioned that at times they have had difficulties adjusting to them. The absence of a noticeable peacebuilding narrative and activities such as dialogue and reconciliation efforts could undermine future social cohesion in an already fragile society. As one participant mentioned during a roundtable discussion, '[P]eople are losing focus about what peacebuilding is…. [With the UN] it is brought amidst human rights or development initiatives, or ultimately food distribution'. The perception that the UN '**distributes food instead of peace**' risks damaging the prospects for long-lasting peace in Mozambique.

One agency that was singled-out in the context of peacebuilding discussions was the **International Organisation for Migration (IOM)**, perceived by some as 'the only organisation who is really implementing

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74 *Note that* the now discontinued UN peacekeeping force ONUMOZ (UN Operation in Mozambique, which lasted from December 1992 until December 1994), was established to help implement the 1992 Rome General Peace Accords. The mission's mandate focused on verifying the implementation of the military aspects of the Accords and overseeing the electoral process. In addition, ONUMOZ launched a humanitarian assistance programme to help the millions of people displaced by the civil war to resettle in their communities. In practice, emphasis was placed on the implementation of the DDR processes that formed a central component of the Peace Accords.

75 *Note that* the Multi Year Appeal (MYA), UNDPPA's primary extra-budgetary instrument, contributed to the demobilisation of 1,490 combatants out of a total of 5,221 in seven out of 16 RENAMO bases located throughout the country. In total, six bases have been fully closed. Former combatants have returned home to transition to civilian life in their communities, with the help of local leaders. Funds were also used to disarm and demobilise 40 female combatants (of an estimated total of 247) in a safe and inclusive manner. In 2021, some 3,700 remaining former combatants were expected to go through the DDR process. The Personal Envoy has emphasised, however, that he would like to see the full social and economic reintegration of all to the long-term sustainability of the process as it would embed peace and support national reconciliation. *For further information see* United Nations DPPA, 'Annual Report 2020: Giving Peace a Chance', 8 September 2021, p. 18, Accessible at: https://dppa.un.org/sites/default/files/6146_unny_annual_report_31_300.pdf.

76 United Nations, "United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2017-2020", January 2016, p. 2-3, Accessible at: https://sites.unicef.org/about/execboard/files/Mozambique-UNDAF_2017-2020_Eng.pdf.

77 UN Mozambique, '2022-2026 UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for Mozambique', 2021, p. 97.

78 UN Mozambique, 'United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2017-2020: 2019 Progress Report', May 2020, p. 78, Accessible at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-abidjan/---ilo-lusaka/documents/publication/wcms_746772.pdf. *Note that* these include the engagement of 'over 200 men at the community level on the role of men towards increased participation of women in conflict resolution and peace building and consolidation at the community level' or the support to the establishment of the National Civil Society Platform on WPS. *Also,* the UN saw progress and achievements in a few areas and activities, namely in line with UNSCR 1325 – 'significant progress was made in 2019 towards [the] achievement of an enabling environment for sustainable implementation of Women Peace and Security (WPS) commitments in Mozambique'. Derived from interviews conducted for this project.

79 UN Mozambique, 'UN Mozambique 2017-2021 UNDAF Evaluation Final Report', 23 March 2021, p. 48, Accessible at: https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/detail/19225.

80 Ibid.

peacebuilding work'. By looking at the IOM Country Strategy Report (2021–2023) one can find a **clear example of strategic peacebuilding action**. It foresees a specific peacebuilding programme that aims to strengthen the capacity of communities to prevent conflict, manage the negative effects of violence, and support processes that address its root causes. This programme emphasises the relevance of community-level action, reconciliation, and the value of having a peace discourse spearheading an integrated response that recognises the relevance of socioeconomic elements to sustainable peace. This could be used in the future as a good practice to build upon in order to emphasise the importance of peacebuilding even during emergency action. The stabilisation work of the **UNDP** was also acknowledged by partners, as well as its efforts in engaging local communities in harder-to-reach areas.[81]

Adaptability and agility:

The work in Mozambique during the 2017–2021 period was extremely challenging for all international and national peacebuilding stakeholders due to unexpected events. The trifecta of natural disasters (the cyclones), armed violence (in Cabo Delgado and in Central Mozambique), and the outbreak of a global pandemic had obvious impact on the work of the UN. According to the UNDAF Progress Report of 2019, these phenomena led to the '**reprogramming of many activities**', while 'the combination of localised violence with social and economic exclusion, and humanitarian needs poses considerable governance challenges and severely disturbs social cohesion in the region'.[82]

Interviews, discussions, and project documentation all attest to the fact that **no one was prepared for the scale and intensity of the combined events** that affected Mozambique. While unpreparedness in relation to COVID-19 was obvious and universal, more and better work could have been done to prepare for scenarios of disaster – natural or man-made. On the one hand, in Cabo Delgado, there was not enough effort to build the infrastructures for peace that are required for a sustainable and violence-free environment and there continues to be a clear need for more community engagement, work which could be supported by the UN. On the other hand, the UNDAF Progress Report of 2019 explains that the cyclones presented 'new and unexpected challenges and landscape for work'.

While this is true, it has also been acknowledged that Mozambique is especially prone to natural disasters. As a result, **the importance of anticipating main risks and trends in developing the frameworks is clear,** with an explicit allocation of resources to emergencies and crises. The new UNSDCF takes this into account by including these risks and challenges in its strategy right from the beginning, and subsequently aiming to address them in the strategic priority areas – 'climate resilience and sustainable use of natural resources' and 'peacebuilding, human rights and inclusive governance'.

The magnitude of immediate needs associated with the multiple crises experienced by Mozambique in recent years explain the **focus on short-term emergency response**. As the World Food Programme Representative and Country Director for Mozambique has noted, the situation became a 'humanitarian catastrophe beyond epic proportions…[and thus] our priority is saving lives and making sure emergency assistance reaches those who need it most'.[83] Agencies were forced to reorient staff and resources to support the humanitarian response, and there has been **widespread appreciation for the UN's efforts to address humanitarian needs in Mozambique**. Both internal documents and interviews confirm this understanding. The UNDAF evaluation concluded that 'direct impact in emergency work is highly recognised by partners' and that the UN was 'able to adapt to quick changes and still perform and manage additional resources provided for the emergencies (but not budgeted in the UNDAF)'.[84] In interviews, the UN's capacity for adaptation was praised and linked to the fact that it combines expertise in multiple areas. Indeed, **the One UN approach was visible** e.g., when tackling the needs of displaced people in northern Mozambique, with the examples of the World Food Programme providing food in general and UNICEF providing specific nutrient-dense food for health care for children.[85]

Despite these achievements, **there is room for improvement**. We follow the conclusions of the UNDAF Progress Report of 2020 which states that 'the combination of emergency work with a continued focus on UN's strategic areas is desired; [b]oth short and long-term impact activities need to be prepared for the next UNSDCF'.[86] There is a need to **combine short- and long-term thinking, even in emergency action**: Multi-sectoral responses in emergency response programmes should include components of dialogue and reconciliation and promote multi-cluster action that

81   Ibid, p. 43.
82   UN Mozambique, 'United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2017–2020: 2019 Progress Report', May 2020, p. 9, 11,
      Accessible at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-abidjan/---ilo-lusaka/documents/publication/wcms_746772.pdf.
83   United Nations, 'Humanitarian catastrophe in northern Mozambique 'beyond epic proportions', 8 April 2021,
      Accessible at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/04/1089362.
84   Ibid.
85   UN Mozambique, 'United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2017–2020: 2019 Progress Report', May 2020,
      Accessible at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-abidjan/---ilo-lusaka/documents/publication/wcms_746772.pdf.
86   UN Mozambique, 'United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2017–2020: 2020 Progress Report', November 2021.

goes beyond a one-year horizon.[87] The new UNSDCF takes this into account by underlining the synergies between the four new strategic priority areas, as well underlining that 'the UNSDCF complements and connects with UN strategic response frameworks that primarily speak to the other dimensions of the HDP Nexus and the Prevention Agenda, as well as response to the COVID-19 pandemic'.[88] Reference is made here to the Mozambique Humanitarian Response Plan, the UN Multi-Sector Response Plan to COVID-19, the Government's Resilience Strategy for the Integrated Development of the North, and the UN Comprehensive Strategy for the North.[89] This latter strategy is stated to include relevant parts of the UNSDCF and provides 'whole-of-UN support to addressing the root causes of the complex crisis in the provinces Cabo Delgado, Nampula and Niassa in support to the Government's efforts'.[90] The research team has not been able to review this strategy, but in principle it should provide a good starting point for combining short- and long-term thinking in emergency action.

Joint analysis and programming:

Multi-sectoral responses are related to the **internal coordination** within the UN. Under the UNDAF, the UNCT prepared joint programmes that involved multiple agencies and formed groups to address specific programmes. The **joint work** was seen as 'crucial in areas that demand multiple and varied competences and specialties'.[91] However, it is often unclear 'whether joint activities fall into official programmes or not, and therefore how they align to government priorities'.[92] Under the new UNSDCF, **UN agencies in collaboration with partners will develop, monitor, and report on annual** JWPs. These JWPs are meant to 'help to translate outcomes into concrete, measurable and time-bound outputs that provide clear linkages to enable the attribution of the UN contribution to national priorities'.[93] For each of the new strategic priorities a UNSDCF Strategic Priority Group has been established which will be in charge of preparing the JWP on an annual basis (also taking into account the annual review of the CCA), and all UNCT members – regardless of their physical presence – will be involved in the preparation of JWPs for the strategic priorities they contribute to.[94] The UNSDCF does not make clear how the alignment

between these JWPs is ensured, despite the fact that each JWP contributes to one of the four outcomes in the UNSDCF. Although partners recognise the improvements in the joint work of the UN, its agencies are at times seen as 'working for different objectives and in some cases even as competing among themselves'.[95]

In addition, **the urban-rural divide** is an adverse Mozambican reality and it also impacts the work of the UN, which is perceived to be too Maputo-focused, further hindering the engagement with local partners. There is an overall perception that the UN focuses its work in the capital and a few other urban centres around the country. Understanding the regional dynamics of Mozambique and how some areas such as Cabo Delgado are particularly affected by different crises is crucial to ensuring maximum complementarity between the various UN entities active in Mozambique – particularly from the perspective of peacebuilding and sustaining peace.

Moving forward:

In terms of strengthening the extent to which in-country UN actors succeed in coordinating their peacebuilding efforts across the relevant UN pillars (i.e., peacebuilding, development, and humanitarian), there are a number of relevant observations to make. **Joint programming can be explored further** in order to decisively move away from an agency-driven approach and truly commit to the UN Delivering as One Approach. The most successful partnerships between agencies to carry out joint activities are regulated by signed memorandums of understanding that clearly state the roles and responsibilities of each agency within a project. There is a need to always have an effective mechanism for coordination and partnership and the joint programme design process needs to be more coherent to ensure that the whole programme is more than the sum of the parts contributed by individual agencies. It will be interesting to see how the new JWPs are going to strengthen joint action in practice.

In addition, it is advisable **to continue the process of decentralisation of the UN presence in Mozambique.** This would also allow communities to benefit from stronger support in hard-to-reach areas where other

87   *Note that* the inter-cluster complementarity is foreseen in OCHA's Mozambique Humanitarian Response Plan for 2021.
88   UN Mozambique, '2022-2026 UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for Mozambique', 2021, p. 75.
89   Ibid, p. 75- 77.
90   Ibid, p. 77.
91   UN Mozambique, 'UN Mozambique 2017-2021 UNDAF Evaluation Final Report', 23 March 2021, p. 41, Accessible at: https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/detail/19225.
92   Ibid. *For instance*, the work led by UNAIDS in the area of HIV-AIDS is, in itself, a joint programme that mobilises all agencies, although there is no structured multi-agency programming in the area within the UNDAF.
93   UN Mozambique, '2022-2026 UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for Mozambique', 2021, p. 86.
94   Ibid.
95   UN Mozambique, 'UN Mozambique 2017-2021 UNDAF Evaluation Final Report', 23 March 2021, p. 43, Accessible at: https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/detail/19225.

entities, including the government, are known to have negligible presence. The capacity of government institutions at the local level should be developed, and local participation and representation fostered in ways that contribute to providing a 'social stability dividend'.[96] The recent creation of the new posts of Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator based in Cabo Delgado and UN SRA within the RCO, outposted in Pemba, are **good steps in this regard**.

Furthermore, **having a specific peacebuilding outcome with corresponding output indicators in the new UNSDCF** will be key for progressing on implementing the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda. This is the first step to promote the visibility of a peacebuilding and sustaining peace narrative across the entire work of the UN in the country. A next step would be to ensure that the peacebuilding and sustaining peace components are also made clear in the other strategic priority areas in the UNDSCF, by underlining the importance of ensuring conflict sensitivity in all of the UN work in the country.

There is also a **need to develop the combination of short- and long-term planning in areas particularly affected by humanitarian crises**. The new JWPs provide an opportunity for this. Ideally, this should be accompanied by a specific budget and toolbox for emergencies that ensures efficient financial disbursements and capacity in case of the outbreak of conflict or disaster. Here, one could think of a pool of mediators that can be called upon on short notice, or a small-grants facility to respond to critical community needs coming out of the CCA and early warning assessments. These short-term activities would have to be linked to longer-term peacebuilding activities like building infrastructures for peace: supporting community structures and building networks. Accounting for violent or natural shocks in advance will facilitate an integrated response. The UNDSCF should also be taken as an opportunity to ensure higher political involvement of the UN in relation to peacebuilding efforts, given the conflict-related issues affecting the country. Ideally this goes beyond the UN leadership in the country, but also more actively engages UN leadership at headquarters level.

Finally, **the UNDSCF needs to be more flexible to absorb changes on the ground** as they arise. The new UNSDCF, being outcome-based with a limited number of priorities, in principle allows for more programmatic flexibility and is expected to enhance the UN's ability to respond accordingly to the evolving context and risks. The RC and the UNCT will 'work together to identify, evaluate and address emerging issues and anticipate any significant changes in developmental and financial circumstances that may require adjustments'.[97] An important tool in this regard will be the CCA, which will be updated at least once a year 'to identify actual or anticipated shifts in the national development landscape. It will provide an updated public analysis by the UN to stakeholders and help the UN identify possibly course corrections needed in the UNSDCF and its Theory of Change'.[98] Hence, this will be an important component to monitor progress in the implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda. At the moment, the CCA that was conducted to feed into the development of the UNSDCF is not publicly available, and hence has not been reviewed by the research team.

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96 UN Mozambique, 'UN Mozambique 2017-2021 UNDAF Evaluation Final Report', 23 March 2021, p. 43, Accessible at: https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/detail/19225.
97 UN Mozambique, '2022-2026 UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for Mozambique', 2021, p. 101.
98 Ibid., p. 101- 102.

5. Partnerships for peacebuilding and sustaining peace

This section looks at how the UN coordinates with relevant stakeholders outside of the UN System in terms of implementing the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda, and what impact these partnerships have on advancing country-level peacebuilding processes and objectives.

The success of peacebuilding is correlated with the degree of localisation and ownership of the activities and solutions it envisions. The main actor responsible for spearheading policy and peacebuilding efforts is the national government, and the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda relies on principles of shared responsibility between relevant actors. There are **good practises of collaboration that should be continued and improved** in the implementation of the new UNSDCF.

These include UN agencies participating in working groups together with national partners as a way of improving coherence and alignment of development work in the country or the bolstering of thematic task groups to consider the best ways of addressing given issues. In the CCA process, training sessions and consultations with multiple partners – from the inter-agency Joint Support Group to academia, civil society organisations, the private sector, and the government – are key to informing the UNSDCF's reasoning.[99]

Partnership with the national government:

Indeed, the UNDAF defines the partnership between the UN and the Government of Mozambique as '**strong and continuous**'.[100] Yet, throughout the consultations the relationships with the Government of Mozambique have also been defined as **sensitive and not straightforward**. The peacebuilding environment was criticised for being 'highly politicised' and peace-related decision-making accused of being too centralised in both the government and the capital Maputo.[101] Often the result of the UN inaction lies in the difficulties of getting government consent to provide critical support. Political divergences at the municipal level are also said to trump advances in peacebuilding work. International donors also alluded to difficulties when working with the government.

The recent emergencies have led the government to **show more openness to external partners**. The establishment of ADIN in 2020 demonstrates the government's recognition of the need for partnerships to rebuild the regions of the country most affected by the cyclones and violence. ADIN is a coordinating body that seeks to promote multi-actor and multi-sectoral actions with a view to ensuring the socioeconomic development of the northern provinces of Niassa, Cabo Delgado, and Nampula.[102] Examples of work that has been done by ADIN include the dissemination of their strategy and the familiarisation of communities with it, the sponsoring of youth academic programmes and dialogues regarding joining armed terrorist groups,[103] and the support and assistance of IDPs.[104] In addition, ADIN has already kickstarted its engagement with international stakeholders, as attested by the Northern

99   UN Mozambique, 'United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2017-2020: 2019 Progress Report', May 2020, Accessible at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-abidjan/---ilo-lusaka/documents/publication/wcms_746772.pdf.

100 United Nations, 'United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2017-2020', January 2016, p. 2, Accessible at: https://sites.unicef.org/about/execboard/files/Mozambique-UNDAF_2017-2020_Eng.pdf.

101 Derived from interviews conducted for this project.

102 *For further information on the mandate see* ADIN, *Quem Somos,* Accessible at: https://adin.gov.mz/quem-somos/.

103 Club of Mozambique, 'Watch: Government mobilises US$764 million for ADIN to develop northern Mozambique', 31 August 202, Accessible at: https://clubofmozambique.com/news/watch-government-mobilises-us764-million-for-adin-to-develop-northern-mozambique-170230/; *and* Club of Mozambique, 'Mozambique: ADIN delivers 600 agricultural production kits to displaced families in Cabo Delgado', 6 December 2021, Accessible at: https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-adin-delivers-600-agricultural-production-kits-to-displaced-families-in-cabo-delgado-206170/.

104 Club of Mozambique, 'Mozambique: ADIN delivers 600 agricultural production kits to displaced families in Cabo Delgado', 6 December 2021, Accessible at: https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-adin-delivers-600-agricultural-production-kits-to-displaced-families-in-cabo-delgado-206170/.

Mozambique Rural Resilience Project, supported by the WB,[105] or by its collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the UN Office for Project Services in a crisis recovery project in northern Mozambique.[106] An interviewee also highlighted that the UNDP is collaborating with ADIN in building public infrastructures in northern Mozambique, following a stabilisation approach previously used in Iraq and Cameroon.[107]

While various actors acknowledged the relevance of the creation of this public institution and its potential to bridge the coordination deficits in the country, the gap between its mandate and what it has achieved so far was also highlighted. ADIN was said to be **slow in getting things done** – for instance, and as an anecdote, it was only late in 2021 that the agency got its own office space. ADIN's work has also been curbed by changes in its leadership. According to an interviewee, this 'halted the drive' of a Peacebuilding Coordination Group at the provincial level (Cabo Delgado), composed of organisations that were already developing activities in the area, which was at a very early stage of creation and whose future is now uncertain.

Partnership with civil society:

Peacebuilding is not – and should not – remain an exclusive task of the UN and the national governments, as civil society should be involved at all phases, from design and implementation to monitoring and evaluating the results of activities.[108] There is some evidence of some UN agencies working with local civil society in peace-related activities, but the examples given were of **limited types of engagement and primarily located within a few agencies** – notably the IOM and the UNDP. There are also examples in UN documents, such as the work with civil society organisations through Sala da Paz, a platform created to 'observe elections and promote [a] peaceful environment'.[109]

Yet, various actors mentioned that the UN is operating

at 'too high of a level' and **needs to strengthen its meaningful engagement** with civil society organisations, especially actors working at the local level. The UN is **seen to be too dependent on the government**. The distance between the UN and local organisations is particularly noticeable in harder-to-reach areas of Northern Mozambique where the mistrust towards the Government also has a toll on the UN efforts. During a roundtable dialogue organised as part of this project, one participant stated that 'the UN needs to work with the Government, but people don't trust the Government because it is not connected [with communities in the North], and that is a breaking point [for collaboration]'. Civil society representatives mentioned a 'very hostile environment' for work, where at times the civil society space can be curtailed due to absent party membership.[110] Some interviewees highlighted that there is a number of efforts by the Government and the UN to engage with civil society, but convening and engaging in one-off dialogues does not entail the level of strong and operational partnerships envisioned by the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda.

Through the consultations for this report, there were some examples of **local and national peacebuilding work of civil society organisations** on their own that could be built on. As an example, the Centre for Democracy and Development mentioned their focus on 'preventing violent extremism, inclusive dialogue, and overall human rights' as well as their efforts to finalise a 'Manual on Social Cohesion' for faith-based organisations to facilitate the integration of IDPs with host communities. Furthermore, there are a number of established national peacebuilding networks and community structures that aim to advance peace at the local level and support the national government and the UN in advancing national peacebuilding priorities. GPPAC, through its member in Mozambique – PROPAZ – has a vast network of peace builders that operates in five provinces, which serves as the foundation for the Mozambique conflict early warning system that facilitates incident and situation reports through its trained CSO field officers. Their 5 provincial field reporters are based in Cabo Delgado,

105 World Bank, *Northern Mozambique Rural Resilience Project,* Accessible at: https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P174635. *Note that* the project is implemented by the Ministries of Agriculture and Rural Development (MADER), Environment and Land (MTA), and Oceans, Inland Waters and Fisheries (MIMAIP) through FNDS, BioFund and ProAzul, in close coordination with ADIN.

106 UNOPS, 'Supporting Crisis Recovery in Northern Mozambique', 29 September 2021, Accessible at: https://www.unops.org/news-and-stories/news/supporting-crisis-recovery-in-northern-mozambique.

107 *Note that* activities were said to include road rehabilitation, (re)building schools and health facilities, providing capacity strengthening for government actors to manage and deliver programs directly to communities, providing immediate livelihood support and ensuring income-generating activities to grant people minimum conditions for an income, and implementing social cohesion activities for host communities and IDPs.

108 *Note that* the UN Security Council Resolution 2558 (2020) recognizes local peacebuilders and civil society as meaningful peacebuilding stakeholders. *For further information see* UN, 'Resolution 2558 Adopted by the Security Council on 21 December 2020 (S/RES/2558)', Accessible at: https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2558(2020).

109 UN Mozambique, 'United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2017-2020: 2019 Progress Report', May 2020, p. 79, Accessible at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-abidjan/---ilo-lusaka/documents/publication/wcms_746772.pdf.

110 *Note that* as the Government was said to 'embody FRELIMO'. *Also,* the 2019 UNDAF Progress Report mentions the 'retrenchment of civic space in the country'. *For further information see* UN Mozambique, 'United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2017-2020: 2019 Progress Report', May 2020, p. 79, Accessible at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-abidjan/---ilo-lusaka/documents/publication/wcms_746772.pdf; *and* United Nations, 'United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2017-2020', January 2016, p. 78, Accessible at: https://sites.unicef.org/about/execboard/files/Mozambique-UNDAF_2017-2020_Eng.pdf.

Nampula, Zambezia, Sofala, and Maputo. These are the sort of initiatives that could be better supported by the UN's systematic and institutionalised community engagement, building on the already existing local initiatives, and providing them with funding, training and technical support.

Partnership with international financial institutions:

International and regional actors also contribute (bilaterally and in partnership with the UN) to a more or less effective sustaining peace agenda in Mozambique. A key actor in Mozambique is the **WB**, with whom the UN was said to work in coordination to advance complementarity. In particular, the UN can tap into areas that the WB has no mandate to engage in, such as mediation and supporting dialogue for peace. The WB's work in Mozambique has multiple focus areas, one of them being 'enhancing sustainability and resilience'.[111] In April 2021, the WB approved Mozambique's eligibility to the Prevention and Resilience Allocation, 'unlocking $700 million in funding to prevent the further escalation of conflict and build resilience in Mozambique'.[112] The WB also supports ADIN and is behind recent large-scale projects – the Crisis Recovery Project and its Rural Resilience Project.[113-114] The **EU** is also conducting peacebuilding efforts in Mozambique, including social cohesion work through partnerships with civil society organisations such as the Aga Khan Foundation. However, as mentioned by interviewees, due to the recent kick-off of the most relevant initiatives, it is too early to evaluate their impact. Overall, it is clear that the new UNSDCF, with its more outspoken focus on peace and stability, provides a strong opportunity for the UN to engage in more strategic dialogues with the international and regional partners to explore complementarity and coherence of approaches.

One important process in this regard is the **Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment (RPBA)**, an approach that builds on collective efforts of the UN, the WB, and the EU that could contribute to better understanding and tackling underlying drivers of conflict and tension. In practice, some progress has already been achieved. A new **Strategy for Resilience and Integrated Development for the North (ERDIN)** was recently concluded and followed evidence provided by an RPBA that was recently carried out by the UN, the EU, the WB, and the African Development Bank with the Government of Mozambique.[115] The document explains the needs and the activities required to rebuild and restore socioeconomic life quality in the most affected areas of the country and is structured around three pillars: support to peacebuilding, security, social cohesion; strengthening the social contract; economic recovery and resilience. The UN Population Fund was 'one of several UN agencies' that has contributed to the UNCT's efforts to align the UN's interventions with ERDIN and ensure a coordinated response. This included a mapping exercise of UN capacities to contribute to ERDIN 'which has provided an overview of potential overlaps and gaps in the UN engagement in the North, and thereby guiding better coordination and distribution of roles and responsibilities'.[116] At the time of writing, however, ERDIN **had not yet been approved by the government**. Its practical implications and the reflections based on the RPBA process remain to be seen.

Partnerships with regional organisations:

Recognising the spillover effects of conflict, **regional peacebuilding support is fundamental**. Regional pressure was applied towards increasing international troop deployments and training missions to bring security to the Cabo Delgado region, leading to the arrival of Rwandan and **Southern African Development**

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111 World Bank, *Mozambique Overview: Development news, research, data,*
Accessible at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mozambique/overview#3.

112 World Bank "World Bank Supports Victims of Conflict in Mozambique", 27 April 2021, Accessible at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/04/27/world-bank-supports-victims-of-conflict-in-mozambique. *Note that* in December 2021, the WB approved an additional $100 million grant from the International Development Association (IDA) to support the project 'Investing in Inclusive Human Capital Development' aiming to improve inclusive access to effective basic social services for the most vulnerable populations in Northern Mozambique. *For further information see* World Bank, 'World Bank Supports Urban Development in Northern Mozambique', 17 December 2021, Accessible at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/12/17/world-bank-supports-urban-development-in-northern-mozambique.

113 World Bank, *Northern Crisis Recovery Project,* Accessible at: https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P176157; *and* World Bank, *Northern Mozambique Rural Resilience Project,*
Accessible at: https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P174635.

114 *For further information on the* results of the World Bank's work in Mozambique with a focus on agriculture, infrastructure and resilience see World Bank, *Mozambique Overview: Development news, research, data,* Accessible at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mozambique/overview#3.

115 *For further information see* ADIN, 'The ERDIN Validation Process starts in the 3 Northern Provinces', October 9, 2021, Accessed at: https://adin.gov.mz/en/2021/10/09/inicia-o-processo-de-validacao-da-erdin-nas-3-provincias-do-norte/. *See also* Orfeu Lisboa, 'Mozambique defines a resilience strategy to for the North', October 29, 2021, Accessed at: https://www.rfi.fr/pt/mo%C3%A7ambique/20211029-mo%C3%A7ambique-define-estrat%C3%A9gia-de-resili%C3%AAncia-para-desenvolver-norte.

116 UNDPA, 'Comments on the UNFPA Draft Country Programme Document for Mozambique: First regular session 2022', Accessible at: https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/board-documents/UNFPA%20draft%20CPDs%20-%20Comments%20%26%20Response%20-%20Mozambique%20CPD%20-%20FINAL%20-%2010Dec21.pdf.

Community troops to support the fight against the Northern insurgency.[117] In addition to military presence, the Southern African Development Community also has a regional **early warning system** that is supposedly supported by national early warning centres, although little is known about its effectiveness. The UN could support CSOs engaged in conflict early warning and early response systems, such as PROPAZ. This could add value across the entire Mozambique national peacebuilding and sustaining peace architecture, through real-time conflict reports and updates, situation analysis, and policy advisory.

Moving forward:

There is a need for increased and improved engagement when reflecting on how the UN coordinates with relevant stakeholders outside of the UN system in terms of implementing the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda. As a starting point, UN should **embrace the localisation peacebuilding** has been experiencing and encourage the government to capitalise on such a trend. It points towards more deliberate efforts and engagement with local partners (including civil society) in order to develop joint contextualised solutions that better address root causes of conflict and are owned by those directly affected by it. Having one **inclusive peacebuilding platform** that gives voices to local civil society organisations while providing a space for dialogue between them, international partners, and the government could be fundamental to rebuild trust between peacebuilding stakeholders – especially given that communities in rural areas share a perception of being 'marginalised and exploited by the central government'.[118] The UN would embrace the role of a convener in what could be a foundational infrastructure that creates an enabling environment for local peacebuilding and avoids the ad hoc approach that has so far failed to strengthen relationships between different actors.[119]

Further, **the UN should undertake a comprehensive stakeholder mapping exercise**, with a view to enhancing familiarity with the local CSOs' environment as well as with the existing national peacebuilding capacities. A list of relevant actors should include traditional leaders and religious representatives, who could have an important role to play in the country. Pre-existing

community structures, including community courts, should also be explored.[120] In addition, activities that could be undertaken must include capacity-building, and interviewees suggested giving the UNDP a leading role in conflict sensitivity, conflict analysis, and do no harm training. However, the UN must not limit itself to community-based capacity-building activities. **Social cohesion** initiatives are also pivotal in Mozambique, especially given the fact that in various areas IDPs outnumber host community members. This can generate competition over resources and all sorts of identitarian tensions in the future. Working together to prevent this would be in complete alignment with the peacebuilding and sustaining peace agenda.

Finally, there needs to be a **clearer distinction between the UN and the government**. To avoid being seen as politically biased, the UN must disseminate messages across the country about its role and its work and it should not shy away from criticising the government when it needs to. While the work of the UN depends on cooperation frameworks, it should still acknowledge the hurdles created by corruption, the hidden debt scandal, the lack of presence in rural regions, or the deficient approaches to the northern insurgency. Criticism can also be constructive, and it could create the foundation for a more transparent relationship that builds trust between all stakeholders. Indeed, the latest annual report mentions the implementation of 423 programmes under the UNDAF – which would have not been successful without 'the leadership of the government institutions and the partners for their collaboration and advice. The UN should **continue recognising the good practises of the government, but also offer support to overcome existing deficiencies that should be openly discussed**.

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117 USIP, Sheehy, 'The Need to Build on Security Gains in Mozambique', 14 September 2021.
Accessible at: https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/09/need-build-security-gains-mozambique. *Further,* the military gains combatting Islamic-State affiliated forces in the North are relevant and acknowledged. While this is to be welcomed, partners and military strategists should discuss together how to move beyond the mere absence of violence (negative peace) and focus on the optimal means to promoting the attitudes, institutions and structures that create peaceful societies (positive peace).

118 Ibid., p. 3.

119 *For instance*, an interviewee mentioned a recent effort of IOM to establish a peacebuilding working group, which held some meetings but is without concrete outcomes yet. One of the reasons for its limited success was the fact that 'there is an urgent need to expand the scope of the working group to include more local-based organisations'.

120 *Note that* local and community-centric, this kind of initiative has been dormant due to the lack of funding.

6.
Financing for peacebuilding

This section examines various funding systems in place to finance the UN's implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda at the country level, assessing whether or not these systems provide funding of quality and quantity – in an adequate, predictable, and sustainable manner – and how the amount of funding available impacts the UN's ability to advance country-level peacebuilding processes and objectives.

In the decades that followed the Peace Agreement of 1992, **Mozambique managed to attract strong donor support for reconstruction and development.**[121] According to an interviewee, Mozambique was considered a 'star' within the post-conflict African countries due to an economic growth of 7 per cent per year between 2002 and 2015 – benefiting from large-scale foreign investment projects in the extractive

industries.[122] There was perceived political stability and peace was seen as a natural consequence of economic growth that would trickle down to everyone – a prediction that did not materialise, as **few benefited** from this novel prosperity. But because **peace was taken for granted**, there was a tendency to focus on short-term projects, rather than strategic thinking and a long-term perspective. Civil society representatives indicated that as soon as the situation in Mozambique appeared to stabilise, donors re-allocated their support for peacebuilding activities towards more traditional development activities. The funding for PROPAZ' early warning response work, for instance, was cut. By not sufficiently integrating a conflict-sensitivity perspective into development support, root causes of problems were not addressed. As one interviewee put it, partners were 'happy working on projects, without a national vision to it'.[123] As a consequence, as others have noted, the 'abundant donor supply allowed the Mozambican government to diversify its peace and development partners over time, but it was not enough to avoid conflict recurrence and the emergence of violent extremism'.[124]

In addition, in 2016 an undisclosed amount of $2.2 billion of **sovereign debt** was discovered and led to the withdrawal of contributions of various relevant actors, including the IMF, a sharp decrease in foreign investment (75 per cent), and overall economic turmoil that curtailed growth.[125] This 'hidden debt scandal' damaged the reputation of, and eroded the trust in, the Government of Mozambique. The UNDAF could not have anticipated the subsequent cuts from international donor support, even though it has reportedly responded effectively: The UN was still able to perform and manage additional resources provided for emergencies that occurred and were not budgeted in the UNDAF.[126-127] In fact, the UN continued to be called upon by major donors to implement activities, with development support channelled through **the UN system as an alternative to some of their national budget contributions**.[128]

Despite these continuous flows of predominantly humanitarian and development funding towards the UN system, **the UN's peacebuilding work in Mozambique**

121   United Nations, 'United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2017-2020', January 2016, p. 2,
        Accessible at: https://sites.unicef.org/about/execboard/files/Mozambique-UNDAF_2017-2020_Eng.pdf.
122   World Bank, *Northern Crisis Recovery Project,* Accessible at: https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P176157.
123   Derived from the interviews conducted for this project.
124   Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, Muto and Saraiva, 'Assessing Context-Specific Peacebuilding Approaches in Contemporary Armed Conflicts: From
        High-Level Mediation to Middle-Out Linkage in Syria and from Adaptive Mediation to Nationally-Owned Peacebuilding in Mozambique', 2020, p. 254,
        Accessible at: https://ipus.snu.ac.kr/eng/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2020/12/03_Ako-Muto-and-Rui-Saraiva.pdf.
125   World Bank, *Northern Crisis Recovery Project,* Accessible at: https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P176157.
126   UN Mozambique, 'UN Mozambique 2017-2021 UNDAF Evaluation Final Report', 23 March 2021, p. ix,
        Accessible at: https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/detail/19225.
127   UN Mozambique, 'United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2017-2020: 2019 Progress Report', May 2020, p. 11, Accessible at:
        https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-abidjan/---ilo-lusaka/documents/publication/wcms_746772.pdf.
128   *Note that* some crises had positive consequences, such as the opening of the UNFPA office in Beira or the opening of UNICEF's office in Cabo Delgado
        as a result of the cyclones in 2019. *For further information see* UN Mozambique, 'UN Mozambique 2017-2021 UNDAF Evaluation Final Report', 23 March
        2021, p. 37, Accessible at: https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/detail/19225.

has continuously been underfunded.[129] The original UNDAF programme planned resources allocated per each of its four results areas is clear: US $223M for prosperity, US $329M for people, US $105M for planet, and only $51M for peace. This situation is more puzzling when looking at the re-evaluation of resources as of 2019. **In a period where violence and conflict were already a major issue in the country, the resource allocation for peace decreased.**[130]

UNDAF Programme Planned Resources:

Result Area	Amount	Estimated Contributions	Funding Gap	% Gap
Prosperity	223,548,614	159,278,839	64,269,775	28.75%
People	329,648,821	215,001,263	114,647,558	34.78%
Peace	51,589,685	35,482,012	16,107,673	31.22%
Planet	105,172,544	69,457,644	35,714,900	33.96%
TOTAL USD	**709,959,664**	**479,219,758**	**230,739,906**	**32.50%**

UNDAF Re-Evaluated Resources as of 2019:

Result Area	Amount	Estimated Contributions	Funding Gap	% Gap
Prosperity	265,489,940	177,518,208	87,971,733	33.14%
People	331,241,156	213,589,890	117,651,266	35.52%
Peace	44,323,777	28,186,974	16,136,802	36.41%
Planet	63,216,338	48,571,596	14,644,742	23.17%
TOTAL USD	**704,271,211**	**467,866,668**	**236,404,543**	**33.57%**

The situation has not improved with the new UNSDCF. Strategic priority area 4, 'peacebuilding, human rights and inclusive governance' is the only priority area that is linked to peacebuilding Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 (next to SDGs 5 and 17) and it has the lowest budget of the four priority areas[131]:

Strategic Priority Area UNSDCF 2022–2026	Available resources	To be mobilised	Total budget	% of budget
1. Human development	$116,654,867	$597,534,797	$714,189.664	40%
2. Economic diversification and sustainable livelihoods	$216,473,447	$180,410,000	$396,883,447	22%
3. Climate resilience and sustainable use of natural resources	$208,978,407	$260,083,678	$469,062,085	27%
4. Peacebuilding, human rights, and inclusive governance	$29,236,209	$160,508,137	$189,744,346	11%
Total			**$1,769,879,542**	**100%**

In addition, looking at an **expenditure per SDG** graph from the latest annual report, one finds SDG16 is at the bottom of the list. In a country with a vast history of internal armed violence and tensions, the numbers do not add up.

UN Sustainable Development Goal Expenditures:

The lack of available resources for peacebuilding falls within a wider **need to increase the availability of donor funding in the country**. The 2021 UNDAF evaluation concluded that partners, in particular the government, considered that 'resources allocated to projects and activities were not sufficient in face of the enormous needs of the countries'.[132] This in turn undermines the capacity of the Government and the public administration to implement reforms and to design coherent, effective and sustainable policies.[133] As a result of limited availability of funding, the UN AFPs are 'forced' to compete with each other for funding, leading to a lack of information sharing and required coherence and coordination.

In addition, **donors rarely coordinate among themselves on peacebuilding**. There are several donor coordination mechanisms that exist, including sectoral working groups, the Coalition of the Wiling, and others. Donors commented that it is difficult to know who is doing what on peacebuilding, and suggested that circulating a compilation of peacebuilding activities (e.g., created by the UNCT) and joint media conferences between heads of various organisations (as happened once recently) could contribute to enhanced clarity. Similarly, while there are development and humanitarian platforms for donor dialogue, the absence of a peacebuilding-specific mechanism further hinders coordinated efforts. This might be one of the reasons for the lack of agreement between donors on what

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129 *Note that* the major donors for the peace result area in the UNDAF were the EU, Norway, Finland, the UK, United States, and Canada. *For further information see* UN Mozambique, 'UN Mozambique 2017–2021 UNDAF Evaluation Final Report', 23 March 2021, p. 3, Accessible at: https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/detail/19225.

130 Ibid, p. 12.

131 UN Mozambique, '2022–2026 UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for Mozambique', 2021, p. 106– 113.

132 UN Mozambique, 'UN Mozambique 2017–2021 UNDAF Evaluation Final Report', 23 March 2021, p. 24, Accessible at: https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/detail/19225.

133 UN Mozambique, 'United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2017–2020: 2019 Progress Report', May 2020, p. 11, Accessible at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-abidjan/---ilo-lusaka/documents/publication/wcms_746772.pdf.

constitutes peacebuilding and could help explain why peacebuilding is the most underfunded area under the new UNSDCF. In the period of abundance, donors were accused of mistaking peacebuilding for democracy, believing that election support was enough to ensure sustainable peace.

The challenges related to financing peacebuilding in Mozambique are not only driven by a lack of available funding, but also linked to the **quality of the available funding**. Local civil society organisations cited inadequate financial support and 'unrealistic timeframes' that hindered their ability to conduct follow-up action after successful activities. The already small amount of money allocated to peacebuilding in Mozambique does not tend to take into account the fast-paced changes in the conflict dynamics – major international donors are not adapting their funding cycles accordingly, making it harder to have impact. Heavy reporting requirements and a failure to meet financial compliance rules tend to lead to a reliance on working with bigger civil society organisations based in Maputo. However, as mentioned by an interviewee, in some cases 'only Northern-based organisations can do real peacebuilding work on the ground as they have much-needed local knowledge'. In this context, a good example comes from USAID Office of Transition Initiatives, which invested small amounts in short-term grants to local partners instead of multiple years of multimillion-dollar investments. This allowed them to fund actors who would not otherwise be eligible for funding, including through in-kind contributions. To increase the reach of their support, they have also invested in non-traditional partners by paying fees to get them registered as an actual organisation, avoiding the cost barrier of the registration itself and ensuring their eligibility for support.

Delays also plague the funding of peacebuilding action in Mozambique. According to interviewees, some UN Peacebuilding Fund projects have been waiting to be approved by the government for over two years. There is a need to break this stalemate, which requires more diplomatic efforts spearheaded by the RC.

Moving forward:

Despite the described state of affairs, **recent developments are opening new avenues for innovation**. According to different sources, a more receptive government is mobilising US $764M from multilateral partners to finance the activities of ADIN,[134] and the commitments from the WB to Mozambique – mentioned above – have been called a 'generational project'.[135] It is a moment to capitalise on. In order to strengthen the UN's ability to advance country-level peacebuilding processes and objectives, there is a need for additional quality and quantity of peacebuilding financing. Prevention is cost-effective and peacebuilding is less expensive when compared to humanitarian or stabilisation work.

There needs to be more advocacy on the side of the UN to **encourage donors to ensure that earmarked funding also goes to peacebuilding**. This goes hand-in-hand with the aforementioned need to combine short- and long-term thinking in the context of emergencies in Mozambique, and could contribute to assisting the government in 'avoiding donor fragmentation, duplication and short-termism which undermines the capacity of the Government and the public administration to implement reforms and to design coherent, effective and sustainable policies'.[136] Results would also improve if peacebuilding components required increased physical presence of agencies and civil society organisations on the ground, to add relevant contextual knowledge and increase the likelihood of local ownership. It is critical that the **UN supports donors in identifying the right partners on the ground**.

Finally, the UN could **coordinate and regularly convene a peacebuilding-specific platform for donor dialogue**, in order to increase synergies and improve overall collaboration and information sharing.

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134 ISS Pretoria, Cilliers, Louw-Vandran, Walker, Ewi, 'What would it take to stablise Cabo Delgado?', 21 May 2021, Accessible at: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/what-would-it-take-to-stabilise-cabo-delgado; *and* Club of Mozambique, 'Watch: Government mobilises US$764 million for ADIN to develop northern Mozambique', 31 August 2020, Accessible at: https://clubofmozambique.com/news/watch-government-mobilises-us764-million-for-adin-to-develop-northern-mozambique-170230/.
135 USIP, Sheehy, 'The Need to Build on Security Gains in Mozambique', 14 September 2021, Accessible at: https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/09/need-build-security-gains-mozambique.
136 UN Mozambique, 'United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2017-2020: 2019 Progress Report', May 2020, p. 11, Accessible at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-abidjan/---ilo-lusaka/documents/publication/wcms_746772.pdf.

7. Conclusions and recommendations

The aim of this study has been to provide an initial assessment of the progress and impact of the **implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda in Mozambique**. The analysis has been structured around the four shifts called for by the UN Secretary-General in his 2018 report on peacebuilding and sustaining peace: leadership, accountability and capacity; operational and policy coherence; partnerships; and financing. This section summarises the main findings of the analysis and provides a number of recommendations on how to improve UN efforts to implement the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda in Mozambique.

Leadership, accountability, and capacity of the UN in Mozambique:

The new UNSDCF developed by the current UN leadership provides a strong avenue to capitalise on the implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda, while ensuring that the UN's action is rooted in national priorities. To guarantee the adequate implementation of the framework, however, there is a critical need to address the gaps in leadership and capacities on peacebuilding within the UNCT in Mozambique. In this report, we advance **four key points of attention** to improve the current situation:

- **Streamlining work and clarifying leadership roles and responsibilities in relation to the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda**. The role of the PDA should be further amplified to coordinate peacebuilding efforts as it already features a combination of peacebuilding expertise and capacities to foster coordination within the UN system. As such, this position could not depend on external budget of the UNDP-DPPA Joint Programme and should be funded out of the UNCT's core budget. This will help to address the confusion that predominantly external stakeholders seem to experience in relation to the positions of the RC, the UNDP Resident Representative, the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy, and the PDA – and their roles in leading and/or supporting the implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda.

- **Supporting the continuity of staff and stronger leadership,** seeking to decrease the turnover rates and to improve the authority and visibility of those in leadership roles. For this, it is on the one hand important to ensure strategic and operational follow-up to the capacity assessments that are conducted in light of the new UNSDCF process, and on the other hand to better understand factors that influence the rotation of staff so that they can be addressed to create an enabling environment for long-term engagement of experts who fulfil their roles and responsibilities.

- **Increasing peacebuilding-specific expertise of staff members,** in order to provide adequate knowledge and capacities in a country prone to resurgences in violence and instability. One concrete step in this direction could be the appointment of a peacebuilding expert or conflict-sensitivity advisor, in addition to the PDA, to the RCO, as well as ensuring that dedicated peacebuilding expertise is available in all relevant UN AFPs that have peacebuilding objectives set forth in their respective strategies.

- **Ensuring that the broader civil society is included in accountability** dialogues between the UN and the Government of Mozambique, further strengthening their meaningful participation in the discussions of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda in the country.

Operational and policy coherence:

The report **highlighted evidence of added value of the UN in short-term emergency response,** with widespread appreciation for its efforts to address humanitarian needs in Mozambique. However, more often than not **distinctive peacebuilding components and conflict analysis are insufficient**, resulting in policies and programming that overlook the patterns of violence and instability that have characterised Mozambique over the last decades. Recent developments and the 2022 UNDSCF offer **reasons for cautious optimism**, although

it is too early to assess their practical consequences. In this report, we have put forward the following comments and recommendations:

- **There is a need to combine short- and long-term planning** – even during times of emergencies – and ensure preventive reasoning and a conflict sensitivity lens applied to all of the work of the UN in Mozambique. This forward-looking perspective should also stretch to a higher political involvement of the UN in relation to peacebuilding efforts.

- Identifying peacebuilding as one of the key strategic priorities for UN engagement in Mozambique under the new UNSDCF will be key for progressing on the implementation of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda in the country. This provides an important opportunity to promote a peacebuilding and sustaining peace narrative across the entire UN system in Mozambique. However, there is a **need to further develop the corresponding output indicators** and to **ensure that peacebuilding programming addresses the root causes of violence and instability rather than its consequences.** This should include strengthening the capacity of communities to prevent conflict; manage the negative effects of violence; and support processes that address political, social, and economic causes of conflict.

- Another step would be to **ensure that the peacebuilding and sustaining peace components are made clear in the other strategic priority areas** in the UNDSCF, by underlining the importance of ensuring conflict sensitivity in all of the UN work in the country.

- The **new annual JWPs** could be key for better collaboration and coordination between UN agencies and partners. However, the UNSDCF does not make clear how the alignment between these JWPs is ensured. This is something that needs to be explored further, which also provides an opportunity to monitor how peacebuilding and sustaining peace components are incorporated into the various JWPs.

- Finally, **there needs to be a continuation of the efforts to increase accessibility of the UN in the satellite offices** to address the presumption of centralisation of the UN presence in areas that are often the most affected by crises in the country. This is in part linked to the need to further strengthen the capacity of government institutions at the local level, and the need to foster local participation and representation in ways that contribute to providing a 'social stability dividend'. It is however also linked to the need to improve the UN's flexibility and capacity to respond effectively across the country. The recent creation of the new posts of Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator based in Cabo Delgado and UN SRA within the RCO, outposted in Pemba, are good steps in this regard.

Partnerships for peacebuilding:

The success of peacebuilding efforts requires the meaningful participation of all relevant actors. The partnership between the UN and the Government of Mozambique has been defined as 'strong and continuous', but also as sensitive and not straightforward. The peacebuilding environment is highly politicised, and the UN's peacebuilding activities are in part limited by its partnership with the government. In this context, recent emergencies have led the government to show more openness to external partners and to cooperation – and this should be capitalised upon. This is clear when looking at the **establishment of ADIN**, which seeks to promote multi-sectoral actions with a view to ensuring the socioeconomic development of the northern provinces of Niassa, Cabo Delgado, and Nampula. Indeed, ADIN has recently concluded a new Strategy for Resilience and Integrated Development for the North, which leverages partnerships with the African Development Bank, the EU, and the UN – acknowledging the **relevance of international and regional actors** to the development work in Mozambique. Despite its recent progress in **relationships with the government** the UN should:

- **Acknowledge the hurdles created by inadequacies within the government**, such as the effect of corruption, the hidden debt scandal, the lack of presence in rural regions, and the deficient approaches to the northern insurgency. In the spirit of partnership, criticism can be constructive, and it could create the foundation for a more transparent relationship that builds trust between all stakeholders. The UN should continue recognising the good practices of the government, but also offer support to overcome existing deficiencies that should be clarified.

- Strengthen its effort to **support the peacebuilding capacities of the government** by incorporating global agendas, including on peacebuilding and sustaining peace, into continuous policy dialogues and by conducting trainings and sharing resources with relevant national institutions.

- Provide **a platform for partners to support critical peacebuilding needs**. Having one inclusive platform that gives voices to local civil society organisations while providing a space for dialogue between them, international partners, and the government could be fundamental to rebuilding trust between peacebuilding stakeholders. The UN would embrace the **role of a convener** in what could be a foundational infrastructure that creates an enabling environment for local peacebuilding and avoids the ad hoc approach that has so far failed to strengthen relationships between different actors. Solutions found through these dialogues could align international, national, and local priorities and pave the way for more effective and sustainable peacebuilding initiatives.

While there is evidence of UN agencies working with local civil society in peace-related activities, there is **room for improvement in the degree and quality of community engagement**. To this end, we suggest a few options:

- **The UN should develop an institutionalised community engagement strategy**. This will entail undertaking a comprehensive stakeholder mapping exercise in order to better familiarise itself with the local CSOs' environment. Once the actors are identified, the joint activities that could be undertaken should include capacity building and joint dialogues on conflict sensitivity, conflict analysis, and a do no harm approach. On the basis of this, it can be determined where civil society can provide meaningful contribution (i.e., in the CCA processes, monitoring of UNSDCF, among others) and where the UN could provide adequate support (i.e., the development of a Mozambique-specific national early warning system). The strategy should also include clarity on the opportunities for civil society to receive financial, technical, and capacity support.

- Aligned with the previous point, **the UN should promote informal and inclusive multi-stakeholder reflection and learning spaces** within existing coordination platforms, in order to capture and document ideas, including unspoken rationales, challenges, and insights based on the past peace processes, existing research on root causes, and lessons learned from the implementation of the UNSDCF.

- The UN could **increase its support to civil society organisations engaged in conflict early warning and early response activities**. In turn, this would benefit the preventive nature of its work.

Financing for peacebuilding:

While the UN is continuously seen as a critical partner to the international donors engaging in Mozambique, the **resources allocated to peacebuilding projects and activities have consistently been insufficient and require better quality**. This also has affected local peacebuilding organisations that suffer from inadequate financial support, with funds too often ending up in Maputo-based organisations and being earmarked to health and education, forgoing a peacebuilding component. The following recommendations would contribute to a paradigm shift:

- **Funds should be earmarked to require peacebuilding components in all sorts of development work**. This would also increase the predictability of financing for peacebuilding and sustaining peace, facilitating consistent follow-ups, ensuring accountability, and allowing for potential adaptations of ongoing programmes.

- **Creating a platform for donor dialogue on peacebuilding is required**. Possibly hosted by the RC, such a space could be an opportunity for donors interested in peacebuilding to come together around a peacebuilding strategy and/or better understand and engage with the peacebuilding components of the UNSDCF. It would also create an opportunity to jointly reflect upon what constitutes peacebuilding and peacebuilding priorities in the context of Mozambique, not only to avoid money shifting away from peacebuilding towards development and humanitarian programming, but also to allow for the strengthening of the conflict sensitivity of the wider portfolio of aid programming.

- It is important to **ensure that peacebuilding resources are accessible to local organisations**. With new opportunities arising from the crises, the **newly committed funds should be more flexible and reduce some burdens on the partners**. In particular, the fiscal and reporting requirements threshold should be lowered in relation to local civil society organisations and non-traditional partners, who are often overstretched in their capacities. The example of the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives, where they invested small amounts in short-term grants to local partners, should be explored further.

- It is critical that **the UN supports donors in identifying the right partners on the ground** to improve their capacities to engage and become valuable partners to advance the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda.

In sum, the challenges to peacebuilding and sustaining peace in Mozambique are manifold. However, **the current state of affairs offers a window of opportunity**. The recent emergencies exposed the dire need to include long-term planning at the centre of development activities in the country. Promoting social cohesion and addressing root causes of conflict is now ever so critical. It is time to **leverage the openings for cooperation and collaboration that have been presented**, and the UN should embrace the pivotal role of convener and promote the engagement of international and regional actors, as well as the meaningful participation of local civil society organisations. The language of the new UNDSCF offers hope: it encompasses 'promoting peace and greater social cohesion through more inclusive, participatory and accountable governance and institutions for people to enjoy their human rights and access an equitable and fair justice system'. **It is time to translate hope into optimism through effective action**.

Annexes: Relevant resources

Global Resources:

Security Council Report, Resolutions on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/peacebuilding-including-the-pbc/.

United Nations, Identical letters dated 6 July 2020 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council (A/74/944-S/2020/678), 13 July 2020, Accessible at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/2009354e-2_1.pdf.

United Nations, Reports of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, Accessible at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/policy-issues-and-partnerships/policy/sg-reports.

United Nations, The key documents on the UN Reforms, https://reform.un.org/content/resources.

United Nations, 'The UN System-Wide Community Engagement Guidelines on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace', August 2020, Accessible at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/un-community-engagement-guidelines-peacebuilding-and-sustaining-peace-0.

World Bank, United Nations, 'Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict', 2018, Accessible at: https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/Pathways-for-peace_web.pdf.

Mozambique Specific Resources:

UN Mozambique, 'UN Mozambique 2017-2021 UNDAF Evaluation Final Report', 23 March 2021, Accessible at: https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/detail/19225.

UN Mozambique, 'United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2017-2020: 2019 Progress Report', May 2020, Accessible at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-abidjan/---ilo-lusaka/documents/publication/wcms_746772.pdf.

UN Mozambique, '2022-2026 UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for Mozambique', 2021.

World Bank, Northern Mozambique Rural Resilience Project, Accessible at: https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P174635.