Chapter 7

Common Challenges and Lessons Learned

The case studies in this volume show how civil society and security actors in diverse contexts work together towards human security. They show that local ownership in the security sector can be achieved, when civil society and security actors change discriminatory or hostile attitudes, set up regular consultation mechanisms, develop and implement joint programs, and work to institutionalise their joint efforts to prevent and address violence. Some common patterns and themes emerge from the case studies providing insights into how peacebuilding organisations address the challenges they encounter on the ground. Returning to the key concepts outlined in Chapter 1, this chapter draws out the challenges and lessons learned identified in the case studies.

Tools for Changing Attitudes

All case studies show that attitudes matter when it comes to improving relations between civil society and security actors. The peacebuilding organisations cited in this report work to transform existing adversarial stereotypes into new attitudes based on mutual understanding and trust. This requires changing mind-sets on the individual level but also among the larger public. Some of the tools that the organisations cited in this report use in order to change perceptions on these diverse levels are the following:

Humanizing Across the Civil-Military-Police Divide

On the individual level, trainers and facilitators reinforce the need for civil society to recognise the necessity of including military and police personnel as key stakeholders for human security, and for security forces to be respectful of civil society. Many organisations cited in this report note the importance of civil society affirming human rights standards, but also their need to model respectful listening even when security personnel shared difficult stories of what they have experienced and what they have done. They provide active listening techniques, communication and negotiation skills to enable their participants to build a human rapport and constructively engage with individuals from the other group.

Translating Language and Terminology

Security forces and civil society are not speaking the same language, both between and among sectors and organisations. Peacebuilding organisations are very attentive to the difference in terminology, the words and terms civil society and security sector individuals use to talk about security problems. They provide definitions and translations to clarify the meaning of terms and expressions to either group. In order to effectively translate between the two sectors, many civil society organisations first had to take the time to learn and understand security terminology for themselves. For example, Alliance for Peacebuilding staff attended military conferences and read military publications in order to learn about military interests and terminology. This enabled the development of training materials to compare and contrast peacebuilding with counterinsurgency and stabilisation. This time investment on learning military terminology, military structures and military strategy was difficult to fund, as there was not an immediate “outcome” or “output” to report to donors. Donors interested in fostering local ownership of security should invest more in capacity building for civil society on security issues.
Making Information Accessible
Changing attitudes and challenging stereotypes requires engaging people with simple, but compelling forms of communication. Peacebuilding organisations use art, radio, comic books or interactive training methods. Organisations such as Search for Common Ground are pioneers in producing innovative media such as illustrated flip-books in local languages and interactive participatory theatre shows that make difficult subjects accessible to local and low-literacy audiences. Peacebuilding organisations also make a conscious effort to avoid the overly technical language and the focus on international processes and legal treaties that is common in traditional civil society advocacy.

Working with “Champions of Change”
In most of the case studies, innovative security sector-civil society projects began because there were a few “champions of change” both in the security sector and in civil society that built trusting relationship and began to work together. Local ownership of security is initiated and legitimised by individual “champions” within civil society and the security sector – individuals who believe in the validity and usefulness of joint training or programmes and who have the capacity to foster broader changes.

For example, in the Philippines, when Brigadier General Raymundo Ferrer was still a Colonel, he participated in a training course at the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute and then made a decision to help organise training courses for other military officers and personnel. Key civil society leaders built a trusting relationship with Ferrer and began working with civil society groups to change their hostile attitudes toward the military. The Philippines case studies presented in both the Chapter 2 on Capacity Building as well as Chapter 5 on National Level Local Ownership illustrate the significant contributions these “champions” on all sides make to improving the state-society relationship and human security.

Partners for Democratic Change and Search for Common Ground also found that the work of “champions” was more effective than their own, because these champions were able to draw in other local “champions” from civil society, government ministries, and uniformed security services to engage in regional forums to discuss obstacles and opportunities for improving human security.

“Champions” are risk-takers and face potential isolation from their peers, which may put their peacebuilding initiatives at risk. Since champions are ready to reach out across long-lasting divides between civil society and the security sector, they may face scepticism and even hostility from those on their own side. “Champions” may be questioned or rejected by others in their organisation, while also not fully accepted by people on the other side of the divide. A military representative or police officer who meets with a civil society leader from a university or NGO may be accused of meeting with the enemy; and vice versa. A civil society leader who chooses to engage with the security sector may face resistance and opposition from his constituencies because he is seen as taking sides with those who engage in civilian abuses. If attitudes towards “champions” become too polarised and divided, their initiatives will lack credibility and legitimacy among the wider population they represent. It is important to monitor how others in a similar role perceive “champions” and provide champions with adequate support so that they can build consensus within their own camps.

Tapping into Local Capacities
Donors and governments often underestimate local capacities to contribute to security. After several decades of training and higher education in the field of peacebuilding, civil society peacebuilding capacities are often more robust than those found in government, regional or international organisations. While donors lament the lack of local ownership, civil society equally laments that governments, security forces, and donors overlook or underestimate their abilities. The case studies in this report showcase the significant potential of local CSOs to act as
effective intermediaries between the security sector and the populations they represent. Donors and governments need to tap into this potential to better coordinate and root their work at the local level. For example, in Kenya and Ghana, extensive collaboration and coordination are possible precisely because there is full awareness of existing local capacities for supporting early warning and early intervention to stop violence. Identifying, mapping and connecting with local capacities are the most effective ways to achieve local ownership in the security sector and design human security responses that address local needs.

Protecting Civil Society’s Legitimacy
Many of the case studies show that civil society actors can be effective partners for security due to their legitimacy among local communities. The DDR projects are good examples of how civil society organisations can use their unique position to provide incentives to former combatants and communities to participate in DDR programs. Given their strong local networks and thorough understanding of the local context, local CSOs are able to draw in excluded groups and increase the legitimacy of official security efforts among the population at large. In Mozambique, CMC and FOMICRES were able to support Operation Rachel, as well as carry on the UN’s role in DDR, while still maintaining a relatively impartial role. This allowed the TAE to gain access to local communities and maintain trust. They were also able to reach out to groups such as women or youths who have been traditionally neglected in DDR programs. Former child soldiers, female combatants or soldier’s wives have seen as much disruptions in their lives as the “men with guns” who are the traditional key target group of DDR programs. Local youth and women’s organisation are able to engage with such groups, who suffer from particular stigmatisation after the war, and help transform their lives. No other stakeholder would have been able to gain access to all of these groups.

The legitimacy of civil society organisations among society at large depends on the public perception of their independence from government and their political impartiality. Since civil society organisations usually work in autonomy of political factions and cater to the needs of multiple groups, they are able to access and gain trust among large parts of the local population.

But this broad trust is difficult to maintain when engaging in partnerships with the security sector. In Palestine, the Philippines and Fiji, other civil society leaders criticised and mistrusted civil society groups that launched peacebuilding initiatives because they perceived their work with the police and military as a betrayal to the values of human rights. Sometimes, they also accused the civil society groups as spies working for the government. Given the history of human rights abuses in some countries, some civil society groups doubted the sincerity of military and/or police units adopting human security strategies. Further dialogue was necessary among civil society to discuss the ethics and purpose of building relationships with the military and police to address security challenges.

Donors and governments may also undermine the legitimacy of local CSOs when they engage in activities or adopt behaviour that put CSO’s independence at risk. For example, security forces should consult with their CSO partners before publishing information about a dialogue or joint programme or when making unannounced visits to programming sites.

Formulating and adhering to an “engagement policy” can be a good way of protecting the legitimacy of civil society organisations. The “engagement policy” serves to define conditions and principles under which a CSO is willing to work with security actors. In Fiji, the Pacific Center for Peacebuilding’s engagement policy prescribed to never meet one-by-one with the security sector. They always took along another member of their organisation to witness any meetings with security forces. This ensured some transparency and accountability within civil society and helped to build trust and understanding of the intentions of the programs. CIVIC and CDA, two US-based NGOs, also have developed a policy for their work with any armed groups. CSOs may often decide to publish their “engagement policy” to maintain acceptance among their
constituencies. In the Philippines, for example, trainers publicised their engagement policy to help the public understand the principles of their engagement with the police and military.

In order to maintain their legitimacy, CSOs need to be transparent about their motives and principles when working with security actors and security actors must commit to respecting CSOs’ engagement policies.

Including New Stakeholders
A common pattern among all of the case studies is the need to broaden the number and type of stakeholders involved in an effort to improve human security. The community policing case studies illustrate the inclusion of youth, women, and diverse representatives from civil society as well as security providers such as police, private security forces, representatives of local and central government, and donors to build a common vision of human security at the community level.

Likewise, many peacebuilding organisations adopt all-encompassing approaches to promote gender-sensitive approaches to security. They simultaneously build alliances with diverse stakeholders from government, business, civil society and local communities, work at the international, national, and local level and push change in political, institutional and cultural domains. Projects such as the Gender-Responsive Policing Project in Pakistan or the Improving Access to Justice for Women in Nepal have shown that working at multiple levels at the same time can reinforce the new ideas that gender projects introduce.

The Dilemmas of Gender-Inclusion
In all of the community policing case studies, women and girls have been identified as key participants of community-based policing initiative. This is because women and girls are especially vulnerable to experiencing violence, but also because they have a well-documented ability as connectors (or dividers) on the local level. Including them gives voice to victims and enables them to become agents of change.

However, there can be two unintended side effects when focusing exclusively on drawing in women. First, participation in community-based policing projects might expose women and girls to acts of retaliation, if other community members contest the role they aspire to play in the community. The women’s ethnic or religious background might exacerbate this risk depending on the stage and the intensity of the conflict. Second, while including women is important, the continuous participation of men and boys is necessary as well. Especially in contexts where gender-based violence against women is prevalent, male community members, who may often be the perpetrators, can play a key role in preventing attacks. The case study “Preventing Youth Violence in Kenya” shows how peacebuilding approaches could support boys to develop meaningful non-violent social identities and to contribute to larger human security goals. But men may also be victims of sexual violence and in need of assistance and they may also need support in order to adapt to a new society where women play a more outspoken role. According to some NGOs, the identity crisis of Congolese men “has, at times, been exacerbated by aid agencies’ almost exclusive focus on women.” In each context, it is important to evaluate the risks and benefits of a specific programme on local women and men and adapt the programme to meet the need of all gender groups.

Reach Out to Religious Leaders
In some contexts, religious leaders can increase the legitimacy of a community-based program. In Afghanistan for example, stakeholders believed the democratic policing programme was acceptable because, unlike other police reforms, it kept with Islamic traditions and included a religious teacher in all training programs. The presence of the religious leaders emphasised that the purpose of the programme - learning to listen and respond to local people’s needs - was politically neutral and culturally acceptable. Religious leaders also know the security needs of
their religious communities well and can give important insights into how to better protect them.

**Join Forces with the Private Sector**

Some of these cases show that businesses, be they local or international, play an important role in improving human security in communities. They may often be stakeholders in local conflicts such as shown in the case studies on Tanzania or Nepal. Private companies that are willing to advance the human security agenda can use their clout to effectively engage with police and government actors. Peacebuilders increasingly work with businesses as partners for change.

**Avoid Biases and Hardening Lines**

Some of the case studies illustrate that men, women and youth who are already very outspoken and engaged in other community or peace initiatives may be the first to be willing to meet with security forces. In contrast, those community members who feel more critical of or even hostile to such projects or who may also sense existing prejudices against their involvement may be reluctant to participate. This can lead to biases within the mechanisms that are set up to administer the exchange between the community and the police. In some cases, the working group or committee can appear as pro-police and siding with a particular side of the conflict. More radical constituents might be contesting their work from the outside. Peacebuilding organisations make an effort to reach out as much as possible to those who are still afraid or reluctant to make their voices heard in order to avoid the hardening of conflict lines and increase the legitimacy of common initiatives for human security goals.

**Dealing with Spoilers**

Broadening ownership also means dealing effectively with individuals or groups that may want to obstruct projects that change existing security approaches. In some countries, key leaders of justice and security sector institutions perpetuate and silently tolerate exclusion of or violence against particular gender communities. For example, in Nepal, International Alert worked with government representatives who were almost exclusively men of a certain age and member of the Brahmin cast. Lobbying for gender-sensitive reforms among these elites is challenging and requires political finesse and diplomatic skill.

One way to circumvent spoilers is to focus on the younger generation who tends to be more open to notions of gender equality, although less institutionally powerful. In Pakistan for example, GIZ started to involve more mid-level members of the police since they were more open to change than the senior management they had been dealing with. SFSC in the DRC moved in the opposite direction. They realised that trying to teach soldiers to behave respectfully against civilians while their own unit commanders were openly involved in abuses was not as effective. They decided to reach higher levels of leadership in the military rather than working as broadly as possible. To increase pressure on spoilers, peacebuilding actors move around in institutions building links where most useful.

**Identifying Security Sector Interests**

In many of the case studies, the authors and programme designers highlighted the need for civil society to better understand the interests of the security sector. This enables building common ground, which will facilitate effective collaboration. For example, in the Philippines, the Armed Forces expressed an interest in finding new ways of thinking about preventing violence. Their interest in peacebuilding made it possible for civil society to provide them with an overview of peacebuilding skills such as negotiation and mediation, which could be used by AFP forces to address local conflicts and prevent violence. The military and police involved in the training did not consider these skills as degrading their level of combat preparedness. On the contrary, they viewed them as enhancing the capabilities of the military, police, and paramilitary forces for peacebuilding.84

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In their effort to mitigate harm to civilians, the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) recognised the need to understand security forces’ strategic interests. They often recognise that harming civilians results in further attacks on them and more support for opposition groups. Security forces may have their own legal, strategic and ethical reasons for wanting to mitigate civilian harm. Once CIVIC had recognised this interest, it no longer had to simply advocate for ending violence from a human rights point of view, but could make case for preventing and mitigating of civilian harm that corresponded to the security forces’ strategic interests. This made CIVIC’s work more convincing and enabled the organisation to build relationships, dialogue and jointly solve problems with security forces.

Identifying and recognizing the interests of security actors requires CSOs to question their underlying presumptions and listen carefully. Successful programming depends on the ability of CSOs and security actors to build common ground.

**Training Delivery**

**“Engaged Learning”**

Trainers universally found the need to develop interactive, scenario-based training that could be delivered in the short blocks of time available. In some of the case studies, civil society trainers were given only 1-2 hours with 300 soldiers in the room to provide an introduction to a peacebuilding topic, which makes it challenging to find the right approach. Training also needs to be culturally appropriate and sensitive to education levels, including widespread illiteracy in some countries.

Role-playing and active games, contests, and competitions between groups seemed to work especially well to motivate lively participation. Real life scenarios based on the context where participants worked were uncomfortable. Scenarios based on an imaginary context that was distinct enough from the local context to provide a degree of distance, while similar enough in the challenges to allow participants to engage with the exercise in a context that felt more “safe.” Visual aids such as hand outs and PowerPoint presentation should contain mostly visual representations of the ideas and not just words. Audio-visual materials such as short film clips were also useful to help all of the trainees have a common experience upon which they could jointly reflect on the concepts of peacebuilding.

For example, Search for Common Ground’s training programme to address sexual and gender-based violence learned the importance of disseminating curriculum tools such as comic books in local languages to soldiers to make the lessons immediately accessible. When developing a curriculum, it is important to identify not only the “what” of the curriculum but also the “how” – the practicalities of how soldiers will talk with and engage civilians.

**Mixed Ranks**

Training military personnel of the same rank was easier than mixing senior and lower level officers and enlisted personnel. Trainings that included both enlisted personnel and officers created difficult dynamics. Enlisted personnel did not feel free to participate. They simply agreed with what their officers told them or said in the trainings. Lower-ranking enlisted personnel fear contradicting higher-ranking officers because of potential penalties for sharing secret information or saying something wrong. They expressed frustration at discrimination because of their education level. It may be easier for senior officers to learn the material if the trainer is reporting what has been taught to field level rather than teaching the same material to senior officers. This can both protect the dignity of senior officers as well as allow them to review and refresh their memory on the topics that they may or may not have been exposed to earlier in their careers.

**Location of Training**

For joint trainings between civil society, military and/or police, a non-military or non-police environment, where security personnel could wear civilian clothes, seemed to be beneficial. It
was easier to create a non-hierarchical exchange of opinions and learning in trainings that took place, especially if there were either senior and low-ranking officers or enlisted personnel.\textsuperscript{87} Trainers should help trainees feel safe by creating a safe place in the training room through ground rules and confidentiality that creates a sense of confidence and trust allowing trainees to share with each other. The co-training environment - with both civilians (mostly from universities and NGOS) and military and police personnel - at the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute (MPI) was a good venue for dialogue, exchange, networking and training between military and civil society. This co-training environment allowed people to get to know one another, exchange contact information, build trust, and to have a common language and set of concepts in peacebuilding that allowed them to solve security problems together. In some of the case studies, university settings provided a more neutral setting, as they are seen as less hostile to the military and police. Religious organisation may also provide a setting where civil society and the security sector can meet together.

**Scale and Institutionalisation**

Inadequate resources to address the scale of security challenges are a common pattern across the case studies. Many of the programmes described in these case studies never reached a critical mass of people to create conditions for addressing the security challenges. When gender-sensitive training happens in one unit or branch of the military, but not others, it is not likely to make a systemic impact. When a community-based policing approach happens in one community, but not in neighbouring ones, the programme may illustrate decreased levels of violence at the local but not national level. Institutional change requires decades, not months or years. Projects that last only six months to a year are unlikely to make lasting changes. A common challenge across some of the case studies was the lack of donor funding available for “decade thinking” or country or region-wide programs.

National dialogues and platforms to enable local ownership build trust and confidence between the civil society and security sector. They identify security threats and generate innovative ideas for improving human security. But they are not a panacea to fix all security problems. Almost every case study in this volume faces daunting, on-going security challenges despite the good work to foster local ownership of security. In some cases, such as Yemen, Burundi, and Libya, the contributions of multi-stakeholder security dialogues are pale in comparison to the magnitude of the problems. The drivers of violence in these countries outpace the levels of resilience generated by improving civil society-military-police relations. Some of the case studies reflect on the challenge of meeting the scale of the problem, and the steps that can be taken to institutional new ways of thinking about security.

**Institutionalisation of Training**

There are multiple levels of institutionalisation required. First, there is a need to institutionalise any training curriculum in military and police schoolhouses that do professional military education. Second, the key concepts and ideas need to be included in military and security doctrine. Third, operational “just in time” training for security forces is needed before they are deployed. And finally there is the need to integrate any curriculum into ”steady-state” training exercises that occur without the same urgency.

In the DRC, for example, the scale of the need for training and intervention was vast. SFCG realised early on that rather than working broadly with as many officers as possible they needed to employ a strategy to reach higher levels of leadership in the military. So, they started to train more senior-level army members who were then able to train their own staff. This increased organisational buy-in.

**Institutionalizing Reward Structures**

Current reward structures within many military and police units do not reward soldiers or police officers for demonstrating skills in preventing violence, building peace, and fostering human security. For example, when Colonel Ferrer was promoted to Brigadier General in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, some within the security forces noted that working for peace
could help with their own promotions. There is a need to formalise the incentives for security actors to engage with civil society in order make local ownership more sustainable.

**Consortium Planning**

Training can be a gateway to enable diverse groups to build more synergy and foster linkages between different programmes and at different levels. To make the most of this possibility, a group of civil society and security sector institutions can approach donors as a consortium with a menu of mutually reinforcing training, coaching and programs. This will improve the potential of institutionalizing human security priorities to leverage the move from training as “technical” capacity toward pragmatic coordination in conflict assessment, protection of civilians, mediation, and collaborative decision-making.

**Working with the System**

In Pakistan’s Gender-Responsive Policing project, a number of important elements helped to build support for gender reform in policing. First, the project constituted a Steering Committee to get support for steering the entire process of planning and implementation. The project then conducted a Gender Audit to gather relevant data on gender and policing, and studied in detail all relevant laws and policies. At every step, the project sought formal approval for their activity plans, and coordinated with the main government institutions relevant to the project. Programme achievements, problems or changes in planning were shared with these government institutions and parliamentarians.

**Identifying Indicators for Local Ownership**

Local ownership of security requires changing attitudes, skills, and knowledge as well as improving the performance of institutions. Monitoring and evaluation of local ownership is critical. *We value what we measure.*

While skills and knowledge are relatively easy to assess, attitudes are more difficult to measure. One can easily test a perpetrator’s knowledge about legislation on gender-based violence. For example, one could survey how many soldiers in the DRC knew that rape was a crime and what punishment for rape conviction entailed. But the fact that the soldiers have knowledge of the legal definition and consequences of rape does not yet prove that their attitude towards women has become more respectful. How can you tell that people now think differently about gender-based violence than before? Or whether ex-combatants are reintegrated into their communities? Or whether the threat of violent extremism is lower than before?

Measuring changes in attitudes requires context-specific indicators developed in collaboration with local communities. Context-specific indicators measure specific factors that local people identify as causing mistrust between perpetrators and victims. Organisations such as SFCG have been extensively using these indicators to evaluate their programs. So, in the DRC where rape was often committed close to water sources, SFCG would ask civilian interviewees questions such as “Would you feel confident going to water sources if there are military vehicles in the area?” or they would ask soldiers questions such as “do you feel that to be a strong man you need to beat your own wife?” or “how would you interact with a civilian at a road block?” Since these perceptions evolve constantly, especially in situations where conflict is still on going, assessment has to happen almost on a continuous basis. Search for Common Ground monitored awareness and perceptions in the DRC through pre- and post-project surveys, baseline and evaluations at the 12, 18, and 24-month stages.

Here are some initial ideas of how to measure the changes that are necessary to achieve effective local ownership in the security sector and have civil society and security work together for human security. The indicators are grouped into attitudes, skills and knowledge, and institutional changes, although there may be some overlap.
Attitudes
- Stakeholders in both civil society and the security sector identify the value and need for coordination
- Security forces and communities perceive each other as partners not opponents
- Individuals and communities say they feel safer and are able to work, travel and live without fear of violence
- Security forces respond when approached by community members who express security concerns
- Communities credit police and local government for improvements
- Women and minority groups participate and say they feel represented
- People recognise that discriminatory attitudes may put particular gender groups at risk for gender-based violence
- Individuals at risk for gender-based violence have confidence that security sector institutions will treat them fairly
- Communities increasingly invest more of their own resources (time and money) into security projects

Skills and Knowledge
- Civil society and the security sector use communication, dialogue, negotiation, mediation and other conflict management and transformation skills
- All stakeholders can translate, compare and contrast different civil society and security sector terminology so as to bridge the different approaches
- All stakeholders identify gaps in their capacity. They are aware of their need to gain more knowledge of other stakeholder's and their interests.
- Civil society groups, especially women's and youth groups, have the capacity to help develop, implement and monitor security-related programs

Processes
- Mechanisms exist that enable the security sector and communities to have direct contact and engage in dialogue and consultation, joint implementation or joint institutional oversight when working to address challenges and find solutions to improve human security
- Mechanisms are inclusive, granting participation to all stakeholders
- Mechanisms exist at as many levels and in as many areas of security sector policy-making and programming as possible
- Mechanisms are integrated horizontally enabling participants to feed local security needs into the broader national security agenda and enabling local communities to participate in the implementation of national security goals

Institutional Changes
- Stakeholder institutions commit to long-term training on civil society and security sector engagement for all relevant stakeholders as part of broader institutional efforts to foster joint approaches to human security
- Security sector introduce code of conducts and reward-schemes to encourage community-oriented behaviour
- Security sector increases recruitment, retention and professionalisation of women - including in leadership roles
- Security sector puts in place anti-corruption and gender-sensitive policies and practices (e.g. female patrolling units, dedicated women's desks, counselling services for victims)
- Civil society develops engagement policies to encourage non-adversarial attitudes towards security actors among their staff

Concluding Remarks
The idea of "security" usually conjures up images of government, military and police heads meeting in secure locations to plan counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and policing in enemy-
centric operations. The case studies in this volume provide a new vision of security where men and women of all ages, ethnicities and religions build problem-solving relationships with police and military forces.

**Innovative Paths to Legitimate State-Society Relations**

Improving the state-society relationship is at the heart of all of the case studies described here. Local ownership of security, the most fundamental public good, is a prerequisite to democratizing and legitimizing the state-society relationship. The security sector and society find common ground when they work together toward sustainable human security. While some of the case studies took place in a formal security sector reform process, most of the case studies illustrate parallel pilot efforts of military, police and communities to train and work together to improve human security.

**The Utility of Peacebuilding Skills and Processes**

Local peacebuilding organisations use facilitation, negotiation and mediation skills and processes to bring the security sector into direct relationship with society in order to improve human security. The intellectual vision for each of the case studies here comes from groups trained to think creatively about conflict. Peacebuilding organisations recognise the potential for conflict between the security sector and civil society and try to bring the groups together in order to decrease it. They set up processes that enable the security sector to engage in dialogue and consultation, joint implementation or joint institutional oversight in order to create safe spaces for diverse stakeholders to meet each other, build relationships, and address security challenges together. This direct contact is especially important because civil society and security forces often have so little opportunity to meet each other and discuss their respective security interests. Improving human security requires increasing the contact between the stakeholders so that they can develop joint solutions. The case studies in this report illustrate stories of how local peacebuilding efforts turn lip service into real commitments to human security. They show that bringing people together is both possible and productive.

**The Road to Local Ownership**

Those who use words like “local ownership,” “capacity building,” and “civil society,” may certainly have good intentions, yet the meaning is often unclear. There is often an implementation gap between intent and impact. The conceptual framework and case studies in this volume illustrate ways to deepen and broaden local ownership by enabling the security sector to engage directly with local civil society.

Each of the case studies provides examples of how peacebuilding approaches can broaden the ownership of security programmes by including formerly excluded social groups. In many of the initiatives, local communities had no previous contact with security forces and engaged in communication and exchange for the first time. There seems to be a growing commitment among security and government actors to broaden local ownership and accept not only more but also more diverse inputs from the community into their local policing strategies.

However, in many contexts, direct contact and joint initiatives of civil society and security actors are still at the entry-level stages. The groups are often more willing to engage in joint training and ad hoc dialogues than jointly implementing security sector programmes or sharing institutional oversight of security sector policies and programmes. In many countries, there is still a trust deficit between the security sector and society, which prevents meaningful local ownership. The road ahead is long and challenging. The stories in this volume offer inspiration and hope that multi-stakeholder coordinated approaches to human security will become more frequent and more institutionalised.