Chapter 6
National Level Platforms for Local Ownership

Earlier chapters in this volume illustrate the creative and inspiring work to improve local ownership of security through capacity building, community-police dialogues, gender mainstreaming in security, and peacebuilding approaches to DDR. This chapter explores national-level case studies of efforts to improve local ownership and human security. The case studies generally fit into three categories, with some efforts indicating more robust levels of local ownership than others.

National Security Dialogues
Similar to police-community dialogues, national dialogues on security provide an opportunity for civil society and the security sector to listen and learn from each other. Together, they identify threats to human security and strategies for response. In Guinea, Yemen and Libya, for example, such national dialogues provided a platform for improving understanding of security challenges and building a vision for possible responses. National security dialogues may be transitory and not integrated into the national SSR/D process. Yet they begin the process of viewing security as a public good; an issue that requires multi-stakeholder dialogue including civil society. National security dialogues do increase local ownership because they provide civil society an opportunity to express their voice.

National Peace Councils
National peace councils offer a more robust model for national level local ownership. They are permanent institutional platforms for joint assessment and early warning of conflict and joint planning and implementation for responding to conflict. For example, the National Peace Councils in Ghana, also known as a ‘National Infrastructures for Peace,’ provide joint training for civil society and security sector at the local, regional and national level. They also provide an early warning mechanism, in which civil society and the security sector jointly analyse early warning signs and then mobilise others for preventive action. In the peace councils, civil society and security actors decide together which joint set of local, regional and national efforts is needed to reconcile between groups in conflict. The National Peace Council in Kenya is another example of a peace infrastructure that has also successfully stopped the escalation of election-related violence.

Joint Institutional Oversight
When security actors and civil society engage in joint oversight, they jointly monitor and evaluate the performance of the security sector. In Burundi, civil society representatives have a permanent seat on the national defence review that oversees the SSR/D process. In Guatemala for example, the UN brokered peace plan enshrines accountability mechanisms for civil society to provide oversight to all areas of the security sector, including intelligence, military, police, criminal justice and national security policy formulation. In the Philippines, a civil society oversight platform allows civil society to meet monthly with security sector at the national and regional level to participate in the national security review process. In these cases, civil society actors identify security challenges, formulate joint strategies and monitor and evaluate the performance of the security sector. This permanent institutional engagement between civil society and security sectors is the ultimate guarantee of local ownership and an accountable, democratic state response to improving human security.
The Burundian SSR/D process is unique for several reasons. The Arusha Accord’s attention to the ethnic balance of the Burundi security forces in the years following the civil war may have displaced needed attention to security governance, as evidenced by renewed fighting and frequent accusations against the police of human rights abuses. As part of the SSR/D process, the Burundian Defence Review included three pillars to assess the military, police, and the crosscutting theme of security sector governance. Unlike most train and equip-type SSR/D efforts, this programme gave more attention to local governance and the process of how local institutions earned public legitimacy through open, transparent, and inclusive processes. The military pillar, for example, included a UN Peacebuilding Fund project in strengthening military ethics and discipline through a “moralisation” training for the military to improve the morality and behaviour of security personnel that could then improve the civil-military relationship. The overall purpose of the Defence Review was to identify diverse stakeholder’s security needs and perceptions through a participatory security assessment process. The process emphasised the diverse roles and the “matrix of responsibilities” of different stakeholders.

The “security governance pillar” focused on national ownership of the Defence Review process. The review assessed parliamentary roles and responsibilities for overseeing the security sector, to ensure it represented citizen’s interests. It also provided space and funding for civil society consultation, participation and oversight in security governance.

When the Defence Review began, tensions were high between civil society, the government, and the security sector, especially the police. In 2009, a civil society leader fighting government corruption was assassinated. The Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Intelligence denounced and threatened civil society, requiring all CSOs to obtain permission to hold public meetings and de-registering the main Burundian CSO network, the Forum for Strengthening the Civil Society (FORSC), until pressured to reverse the decision. Early in the program, military leaders and some Parliamentarians objected to having civilians involved in discussing security and strongly opposed civil society oversight or monitoring of the security sector. Through the Defence Review process, multi-stakeholder security dialogue led by skilled facilitators, built trust and appreciation that diverse civil society stakeholders held legitimate roles and responsibilities in security sector governance.

The Defence Review set up a Governance Advisory Group and chose two Burundian civil society organisations with experience on peace and security issues Conflict Alert and Prevention Centre (CENAP) and the Centre des Femmes pour la Paix/Women’s Centre for Peace (CFP/WPC) to participate. The Governance Advisory Group played a variety of roles, from guidance and advice on programme activities, to evaluating the impact of activities, coordinating and overseeing the security governance in the entire SSD program.

The challenge:
The Arusha Peace Accord attempted to address past security threats by emphasizing a strong multi-ethnic police and military, but overlooked the need to foster broader local ownership and oversight of the security sector.

Theory of change:
If Burundian stakeholders engage in and feel ownership of an inclusive dialogue process, they will together develop solutions to overcome obstacles to peace.
As part of its role in the Defence Review, CENAP structured wide public consultation to support the SSR/D process. With experience in conflict assessment and early warning, CENAP already had a positive track record on security issues. CENAP collected views of what was needed to create long-term peace from a representative sample of the Burundian population through focus groups, interviews, audio-visual sessions, and national forums. CENAP facilitated consultations with diverse local civil society organisations, women, youth, refugees, religious leaders, students, media, political parties and demobilised soldiers, CENAP organised dialogue groups in both rural and urban areas as well as national task forces on four identified challenges: illegal circulation of weapons; poverty and unemployment; attitudes during elections; and transitional justice and reconciliation. The consultations with diverse segments of Burundi society documented that people of different regions, classes and ethnic identities had different security challenges.

Research documented that most security threats did not have a military solution, highlighting the roles and responsibilities of other stakeholders.

The CFP/WPC supported consultation with women and girls, include female ex-combatants to ensure the public consultation was gender sensitive and included advocacy for women’s rights and the involvement of Burundian women in the peace and reconciliation process, particularly in light of UN resolution 1325’s mandate for women’s involvement in peace processes. CFP and CENAP also contributed in mobilisation of civil society, including those of women and youth, to get understand security sector reform and on their role in supporting peace consolidation.

An example illustrates how civil society participated in SSR. Military and police units began hosting "open days" where the public could visit non-sensitive sites to dialogue with and improve relationships and understanding. On one military open day, civil society representatives from human rights and women’s organisations worked together with military officers to evaluate different military units as they demonstrated how they would protect a village from a rebel attack in an “ethics competition.” The participating military units with the highest rating won a prize and public recognition. This exercise marked a new milestone in Burundian civil society oversight of the security sector.
Guatemala: Toward a Democratic Security Policy
By Ana Glenda Táger and Bernardo Arévalo de León

The Guatemalan Peace Accords signed in 1996 brought an end to 36 years of internal armed conflict between a repressive and authoritarian state and leftist guerrillas with more than 250,000 victims, 63 massacres and other crimes against humanity. As part of the peace process, Government and insurgency representatives reached an official Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Military on a Democratic Society that detailed the need to transform the security sector institutions adapting it to the new roles required in a democratic era. But implementation of the agreement faltered: a resistant military, a distracted government, a polarized atmosphere and an un-informed public combined to allow the continuation of the conceptual and operational frameworks of counterinsurgency that represented a latent threat to peace and democratization.

The Peace Accords dealt not only with the end of the armed confrontation and its effects in society, but addressed a wide range of social and economic issues – from women’s rights to socio-economic policy - effectively becoming an agenda for social reform. The Part Agreement on the Strengthening of Civil Society and the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society (AFPC, for its Spanish acronym) went beyond the usual disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration agenda to deal with issues of military reform and de-militarization of society. It was not so much about the end of armed struggle as about the advent of democracy in Guatemalan society. It dealt not so much with the necessary redefinition of military functions as a result of the end of armed conflict and the disappearance of the subversive military threat to the state, as with the need to ensure the development of a military institution that responds to the security needs of a democratic political community. In this regard, it built upon the Central American Democratic Security Framework Treaty that had been signed by the Presidents of the Central American countries in 1995 with the explicit intention to eradicate the authoritarian regional security structures and concepts inherited from the Cold War.

The POLSEDE (Toward a Security Policy for Democracy) initiative was launched in 1999 by two local civil society organisations, the local chapter of an academic network of research centres called the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO), and the Guatemalan Institute for Development and Peace (IGEDEP), with the support of the War-Torn Societies Project (WSP International) – currently known as Interpeace and UNDP. The research-and-dialogue process brought all the concerned parties in state and society around a collective effort to further the goal of military conversion and promoting democratization in the spirit of the peace accords. The programme gathered relevant government agencies including the military, civil society organisations and academic institutions in a process that lasted over 3 years, holding more than 200 meetings in 6 technical working groups and a high-level Plenary, and organizing ad-hoc events such as public conferences and workshops.

The War-Torn Societies Project had developed a method of participatory action research to enable a diverse and polarized community of actors in state and society to engage in an inclusive evidence-based analysis and
decision-making process. The research and dialogue process provided a neutral space making it safe for people to participate across socio-political divides, working upon the principle of consensus. The combined dialogue and research methods ensured the development of policy recommendations that were both technically sound and politically legitimate. The intention was to facilitate the adoption of collaborative attitudes by undertaking the dialogue as an academic exercise instead of relying on adversarial ‘negotiation’ formats. The ‘evidence based’ nature of the process would prevent actors from engaging on discussions based upon pre-defined, often ideologically anchored notions of what the problems and the solutions were, allowing time for the establishment of sound, evidence-based parameters for the discussion. The consensus rule would reduce concerns that the exercise could be politically manipulated in favour of one side or other and eased resistance to participation from hardliners by guaranteeing they would not be ‘ambushed’ by numbers.

A critical issue was the identification of the motivational factors that would enable such a varied group of actors, often polarised about the issues, to converge around a common effort. Government authorities expressed their support for the initiative, clearly identifying the value of consensus-based policies in such a polarised subject, and specifically, the potential contribution to the implementation of lagging AFPC commitments. Civil society organisations expressed their interest in a space that would allow them to interact with civilian and military actors in government, on a topic hitherto monopolised by security institutions and key for democratisation. Although some recalcitrant military elements expressed reservations about the opening of military conversion and other SSR/D issues to civil society organisations, as an institution the Military -interested in legitimizing itself in a new political context- expressed its willingness to join a research-based effort that stood apart from the adversarial dynamics that had characterised civil-military relations. Clarity about own and others’ motivations and transparency about the process rules and procedures enabled participants to progressively develop the trust and the shared knowledge necessary for the development of far-reaching consensus-based recommendations.

The project issued twelve documents with a range of specific recommendations that were integrated into a conceptual framework document on civil military relations, and four concrete legal and institutional reform proposals: of the national security system, of the intelligence services, and of the military functions. Beyond these concrete results, the project instilled in participant’s attitudes and skills that have enabled them to pursue cooperative engagement between state and society and strengthened civil society capacities for engagement still in evidence, long after the project ended.

A number of dialogues processes grew out of the project. The Project in Support of a Citizen Security Policy (POLSEC), was set up under the initiative of the participants in POLSEDE in response to an explicit request by the Government to transfer the analytical framework and dialogue mechanisms that were used in the project to the wider debate about public security such as initiatives in civil intelligence, criminal investigation and community-level security; The Guatemala Network for Democratic Security brought together military officers and civilians in a “security community” anchored in the new paradigm of democratic security that continued dialogue across the state-society divide. An Advisory Council on Security, created in the AFPC as a space for civil society participation in policy formulation, was finally established after Government and civil society reached agreement on the terms under which it would function. Over a dozen universities, think tanks and NGOs participated in a follow up projected called FOSS (Strengthening of Civil Society Organisations Specialised

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**The challenge:**
The security sector protected elite interests and undermined human security.

**Theory of change:**
As part of a peace process and wider effort at democratization, civil society worked with the security sector to reorient it toward “democratic security.”

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in Security) that carried out research on different aspects of the new security agenda, from civil society engagement in community security strategies to the development of democratic controls over the state’s security apparatus, that continues to function to this day. The National Congress signed an agreement with FOSS that turned its participant organisations into technical advisors of congressional committees working on security sector legislation. The result has been an empowered civil society, which has been playing important roles in the security sector policy making through technical advice, advocacy and lobbying.

This project did contribute toward progress and acted as a confidence building mechanism. It strengthened understanding on the technical issues at stake and improved research and policy capacities across the state-society divide; and a network of civilian and military actors with the skills and self-confidence necessary to continue in constructive interaction. Guatemala still has many security challenges linked to emerging security threats and forms of violence, and the process of democratizing the security legal and institutional frameworks continues. But it now has an empowered civil society that is living up to the challenge and engaging the state in constructive interaction around these issues.

The Philippines: The “Bantay Bayanihan” Forum
Written with Myla Leguro and Musa Sanguila

Building on a decade of capacity building training programmes and joint programming for the military and civil society in the Philippines, a new initiative creates a permanent forum for civil society-military-police coordination and civil society oversight of the security sector. Launched in 2011, the Bantay Bayanihan forum institutionalised the goodwill that began with the 2010 formulation of the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) that included strong participation from civil society groups.

Bantay Bayanihan, known as the “BB,” engages the security sector in critical and constructive collaboration towards peace and security sector reform. The network serves as an independent oversight body in the implementation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ Internal Peace and Security Plan. It provides dialogue spaces for various stakeholders to come together and work towards addressing peace and security issues at the local and national levels.

The BB is a “Whole of Nation Approach” involving many diverse stakeholders. But the BB is also localised, enabling the general public at the local level to communicate directly with local security forces and local government. The map here highlights the locations of BB platforms across the Philippines. The network has grown to 15 clusters with a nationwide reach. It includes 150 civil society organisations – including human rights, religious, environmental, academic, and labour groups - together with civilian government units, leaders from the Department of National Defence, Department of Interior and Local Government, Philippine National Police, Armed Forces of the Philippines, National Security Council, and the Cabinet Cluster on Justice, Peace, and Security also participate in BB events and meetings. The BB’s National Secretariat is the Security Reform Initiative (SRI).

According to the BB’s website, “The universal message of Bantay Bayanihan is about working together towards winning the peace. By sharing the gains and duties of laying the groundwork for conflict resolution and community development, it creates a
space for conflict survivors to be empowered in creating their future. At the same time, it brings government closer to its constituents, offering a human perspective of security issues rather than its traditional institutional stance.” BB aims for dialogue partners to jointly implement the IPSP to ensure and advance human rights, international humanitarian law, rule of law, accountability, civilian engagement and democratisation of the armed forces. Specifically, BB includes the following tasks:

- Serving as a venue or direct channel to raise issues regarding the IPSP-Bayanihan, including peace and security concerns of local communities
- Conducting and validating periodic evaluations of IPSP-Bayanihan
- Providing recommendations to the Chief of Staff (national level) and Commanding General (unified command/ division/ brigade level) on IPSP-Bayanihan
- Generating concise policy recommendations on security reforms together with peace and conflict dynamics, to be submitted and presented to respective peace and order councils (local executive) and sanggunian (local legislative), all the way to national-level Cabinet security cluster (executive) and Congress (legislative)
- Promoting Bantay Bayanihan to other potential partner stakeholders
- Institutionalizing the active partnership of government and civil society

In addition to smaller meetings where civil society representatives meet with security sector leaders, the BB also holds public forums to broaden discussion about Peace and Order Councils, Normalisation, and CAFGUs (Citizen Auxiliary Force Geographical Units). Bantay Bayanihan also produces policy reform papers to reflect the views of both civil society and relevant government agencies.

The BB emerges from decades of tense relationships between communities and security forces. At first, civil society suggested that they call the BB a “multisectoral advisory committee.” Then the name shifted to the “Bayanihan Partners Forum” but some parts of civil society objecting, noting it was too early to call each other “partners.” Some military officers were unsure about allowing civil society representatives to hear intelligence reports, such as the details of operations, from casualties to how many shells were fired. A civil society member shared that with the IPSP approach guiding the military’s activities, there was a significant change in dealing with such cases: “Military now plays a vital role as protector of the civilians. This lessened human rights violations because the military has learned that they have to connect with the community. Before, they were hard to get or they were very sensitive and defensive especially when we brought cases of rape [against soldiers] to the [meeting] sessions.” Trust
continues to grow, as security forces recognise the value of hearing civil society’s different perspectives and analysis on security threats.

In the region of Lanao del Norte, the BB’s work building civil society collaboration outreach from a small, interfaith NGO known as Pakigdait with the Filipino military. Pakigdait conducts interfaith dialogue between Muslim and Christian leaders and aims to help communities address conflict and bring needed changes without violence. Like most of his community, Musa Sanguila of Pakigdait had experienced abuse from military personnel. Growing up as an ethnic Moro, he had been rounded up by the military police and from that experience of repression and humiliation he became a Moro activist. In August 2008 the army blocked all food supplies to the local municipality. Pakigait requested for passage to bring in relief goods. The army refused for fear that they are also providing for the insurgents. But now, because of the BB dialogue, trust between civil society and the military is increasing because of the BB engagement.

His colleague Abel Jose Moya was captured and tortured in the 1980s for his role in the New People’s Army. Sanguila and Moya had a change of heart. With a desire to promote a “culture of peace,” Sanguila and his colleagues began regularly visiting military camps to teach soldiers how to speak the local Maranao language and to relate better to local communities. The AFP twice awarded Pakigdait as an “outstanding NGO” for its bridge building work between civil society and the military. 67 Now Musa Sanguila sits on the BB oversight committee. Sanguila observed that “Everyone is wounded” in both civil society and in security forces. Speaking as a representative of civil society, Sanguila states “It is important we talk to each other. We always tell them that we are here not to criticise but to be constructive on how we can push for peace and development together. We are here to help.”
Ghana: A National Infrastructure for Peace

Like other states, a modern state system coexists with tribal chiefs without formal political authority. Neither the state nor traditional leaders were able to stop violent conflicts in northern Ghana in the 1980s and 1990s. Riots broke out after the 2002 slaying of one region’s traditional King of Dagbon and many of his elders. The regional government established the Northern Region Peace Advocacy Council (NRPAC) as a mediation mechanism to deal with the issues of trust among traditional factions.

With the success of the NRPAC, the government decided to explore the possibility of extending the peace council concept to the rest of the country. NGOs such as the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) have worked with local communities to train tribal and village leaders in mediation and conflict transformation skills since the mid-1990s. These local peace committees have prevented violence when tensions began over stolen property, inter-tribal conflicts or disputes over land.

With support from the UN Development Programme, as well as regional organisations of the African Union and ECOWAS, Ghanaians convened a range of consultations with the military, police, Parliament, and civil society at local, regional and national level. The Ghanaian Ministry of Interior launched the National Architecture for Peace in May 2006. The goal of this programme was to design an early warning and response system at national, regional, and district levels that could facilitate coordination among government, military, police and civil society. The National Architecture for Peace mandated joint dialogue, problem solving, and promotion of reconciliation initiatives.

The National Peace Council Act of 2011 established a national infrastructure for peace that consisted of a National Peace Committee, regional and district peace councils and as an innovative element, Government-affiliated Executive Secretaries and Peace Promotion Officers on the regional and district level.

National Peace Council (NPC) is a platform for consultation and cooperation between the government, security forces, traditional chiefs, business leaders, religious leaders and other representatives from civil society with the aim of “promoting reconciliation, tolerance, trust and confidence building, mediation and dialogue.” The NPC coordinates early warning and response including the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts. It provides mediation and mediation support and emphasises indigenous solutions to conflicts. It build capacities of the society to peacefully manage and transform conflict and promotes understanding about the values of reconciliation, tolerance, confidence building, mediation and dialogue as responses to conflict.

The NPC is independent. It has a Board, consisting of thirteen eminent persons appointed by the President in consultation with the Council of State. Eight members are representatives from religious bodies. The NPC’s independence from government strengthens its public legitimacy and acceptance by traditional leaders.

The national platform connected Regional and District Peace Councils. In some regions, already existing Regional Peace Advisory Councils merged with regional security structures. Each Regional Peace Council has their own staff of professional Peace Promotion Officers, trained by WANEP, the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding, to do public education, monitor conflict, and facilitate dialogue and mediation. Peace Promotion Officers nominated by regional governments, act as coordinators to facilitate early warning and response. Executive Secretaries
of the National Peace Council with experience in conflict resolution and peace building operate in each region and district. The Ministry of Interior has a Peacebuilding Support Unit to coordinate the collaboration of government agencies with the infrastructure for peace components and provides technical and administrative support.

Together, the national, regional and district peace councils form an early warning network to alert to the potential for violent conflict as well as an early response network to prevent conflict from escalating. The National Peace Council hosts a website that monitors conflict in different regions of the country and provides a 'conflict map' of key divisive issues. Ghana’s local peace committees are the first resort if conflicts break out at the local level. If tensions escalate, regional peace teams are sent in to mediate and facilitate communication to address underlying grievances. If these efforts cannot stop the threat of violence, regional teams call upon national level diplomats and parliamentarians to get involved. The Ghanaian military intervenes only as a last resort, when they then have the legitimacy and support from other leaders who consent to military action. The international community touted this as an example of atrocity prevention, illustrating the type of infrastructure needed for the prevention element in the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).

In 2007, when community groups in the suburbs of Tamale, the capital of the Northern Region of Ghana, had clashed over the construction of a water pipeline, the Northern Region Peace Advisory Council successfully intervened to stop the violence and mediate a settlement. Local Peace Councils use mediation to address conflicts over land, religion, social and political issues.

The NPC sponsors peace education activities. For example, on one occasion one hundred youth from all the regions in the country were trained to become Peace Advocates within their communities. The NPC also sponsors capacity building programmes for the three main political parties to strengthen their capacities to manage diversity and conflicting political, religious, economic, tribal and land interests.

Even though Ghana is West Africa’s most stable democracy, chieftaincy-related conflicts and the discovery of oil led sparked political tensions leading up to the 2008 elections. The National Peace Council (NPC) played a major role in ensuring peaceful elections in 2008 by enabling interparty dialogue, helping to establish a code of conduct for political parties and their candidates, promoting voter education and public value in peaceful elections. When tension broke out in the streets after the media announced initial election results that only 50,000 votes separated the winner and the loser, the NPC helped to arrange for both candidates to go on television to ask their supporters to go home, to reject the use of violence, and to support a smooth transfer of power through discreet meetings with stakeholders that defused considerable tension.

**Kenya: A National Peace Council**

The roots of Kenya’s electoral violence are deep. Following colonialism, the British favoured some tribes with political positions and ownership of large tracts of land. Other tribal groups, punished by the British for their rebellion and insurgency against British authority, continue to perceive a system of injustice. Every election is an opportunity to either affirm or challenge post-colonial tribal dominance.

Kenya has a robust civil society highly trained in conflict prevention. Teams of civil society Kenyan peacebuilding experts have been mediating conflicts in other African countries since the 1980s. With several dozen Kenyans with higher degrees in conflict transformation and peacebuilding, multiple institutions and initiatives are always underway to prevent violence and foster a just peace.
For example, since the mid-1990s, the Kenyan National Council of Churches mobilises clergy from across the country at every election to preach against the use of violence and put up public billboards condemning electoral violence. Other Kenyan NGOs, in partnership with UNDP, have trained Peace Teams as immediate responders to deescalate public violence. Still other Kenyan NGOs use mobile phone networks and social media to enable the public to quickly report outbreaks of violence to security authorities and civilian peace team responders.

In 1995, the Wajir Peace and Development Committee, developed by Somali women’s groups, became a model for imagining a whole of society approach to human security in Kenya. This Wajir District Peace Committee had brought peace to one Kenyan district near the border with Somalia by mediating between elders of different clans while working with representatives of formal authority. The Kenyan government’s District Commissioner who was chairperson led the Peace and Development Committee. The Committee also included Members of Parliament, the heads of all government departments, military and police, representatives of the various peace groups, religious leaders, and Kenyan NGO. The Committee representatives planned and designed the Committee’s activities. The Peace and Development Committee held broad consultations in twelve regional “Stakeholders Validation Workshops” between the government and non-state actors, involving all relevant ministries, including the military and police, academia, development partners, regional organisations, CSOs, women, youth groups, communities, private sector and local authorities.

To build on Wajir District Peace Committee’s successes in reducing violence, in 2001 the Kenyan government established a National Steering Committee (NSC) on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management. The Office of the President, through the NSC, embarked on a process towards the development of a national policy on peacebuilding and conflict management in 2004.

Kenya’s 2007 electoral violence was a test for these prevention efforts. Once violence began, some warned of the potential for mass atrocities, mirroring those that had taken place in Rwanda. As pockets of severe violence between tribes supporting competing political candidates mounted, the Kenyan infrastructure of local peace committees, mobile phone reporting, trained local peace teams, religious leadership, and responses from the Kenyan military and police complemented by UN and African Union diplomacy created a “whole of society” response that was able to quell the violence. Yet still 1,500 people were killed and an additional 300,000 displaced during the elections. Kenyans determined that more needed to be done to prevent violence.

After the establishment of the 2008 National Accord and
Reconciliation Act, the government decided to create District Peace Committees in all of Kenya’s districts given the wide consensus among researchers and observers that the peace committees have successful reduced violence and enabled dialogue to address conflicts, especially in the pastoralist areas. The Kenyan government also set up four commissions to address the causes and consequences of electoral violence. The Office of the President published the National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management, including the lessons learned from the Post-Election Violence of 2008, at the end of 2011. However, the efforts to address the root causes of Kenyan’s grievances had not been addressed by 2013.

In preparation for another round of potential electoral violence in 2013, a variety of Kenyan organisations mobilised to prevent violence again. The Uwiano platform brought together the government’s National Cohesion and Integration Commission with the National Steering Committee on Conflict Management, the UN Development Programme and Peace-Net, a civil society network of more than 500 Kenyan NGOs. Uwiano set up an extensive campaign via media and mobile phone texting to provide citizens with a way of providing early warning signs or reporting violence and to match requests for help with appropriate response mechanisms including civilian rapid response teams as a first resort and to the military and police as a last resort.71 The Uwiano Platform prevented over a hundred incidents of potential violence in the volatile Rift Valley region alone.

The underlying tensions between tribal groups in Kenya still exist and may even be increasing over time.72 While prevention efforts successfully convinced people to reject violence as a method for obtaining justice in the short term, the broader grievances regarding land distribution and political power still fuel anger. The international community, actively waging a counterterrorism campaign in east Africa with the help of the current Kenyan government, has shied away from pressing for deeper political and land reforms needed to address the drivers of conflict. The International Criminal Court trials, while attempting to provide a sense of justice, may actually become the trigger for future violence if the ICC trials favour one tribe or another.

**West Africa: Early Warning and Early Response**

The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) is a civil society-based peacebuilding network operating across West Africa. WANEP collaborates on peace and security programme with the Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS) and the African Union. Its multi-stakeholder approach recognises the need to focus at the policy level as well as community peacebuilding. WANEP is the civil society partner of ECOWAS in the operationalisation of the ECOWAS Early Response Network (ECOWARN). WANEP has trained ECOWAS staff in early warning and conflict assessment, negotiation, mediation and dialogue skills as well as community engagement and civil-military coordination.

WANEP founded and now runs the West African Early Warning and Early Response Network (WARN) as one of its conflict prevention mechanisms. It aims to improve human security in West Africa by monitoring and reporting socio-political situations that could degenerate into violent and destructive conflicts. WARN informs policy makers on options for response on one hand and WANEP’s response strategies on the other hand. The WARN programme of WANEP is the forerunner of the ECOWARN.

ECOWARN’s regional focus has led to a complementary National Early Warning System (NEWS). NEWS is setting up community-based conflict monitoring systems with local monitors to produce conflict and peace assessment reports, early warning reports, and policy briefs which are widely disseminated to CSOs, governments, intergovernmental bodies, partners, and

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**The challenge:**

Violence in one part of the region can spill over to violence in other parts.

**Theory of change:**

Create local, national, and regional capacity for early warning and immediate response from skilled mediators and peace teams.
UN agencies. WANEP’s 15 national country-based networks developed and validated their indicators to ensure effective culturally sensitive conflict monitoring. Building on the success of Ghana’s National Peace Council which established a civilian first resort to preventing and responding to violent conflict, WANEP is working to building a national architecture for peace that builds a coordination system between security forces, governments and civil society to prevent and respond to conflict.73

The WANEP partnership with the Kofi Anan Peacekeeping Training Center in Ghana and WANEP’s West African Peacebuilding Institute (WAPI) offer opportunities for WANEP staff to provide training to West African security forces from ECOWAS and the African Union, in addition to its training for civil society organisations and state institutions. WANEP trains new security officers to “know” human security, and what their role in achieving this is. WAPI offers a specific training for the security sector, where people in the army and police may attend WAPI through scholarships. The courses aim to discuss what conflict is and what causes it; security sector participants come to see how civilians view conflict and the role of security services.

**Senegal: The Armée-Nation as Indigenous Model for Peace**

*Written with Teresa Crawford, Hugh O’Donnell and Partners West Africa*

In 2009, Partners West Africa (PartnersGlobal Affiliate based in Dakar, Senegal), made an innovative move in its work on human security when it hired Colonel Birame Diop, a colonel in the Senegalese Air Force and scholar and practitioner in the field of security in West Africa. Seconded by the Ministry of Armed Forces to Partners, Colonel Diop first served as the Director for Partners Africa Institute for Security Sector Transformation. During his three years with Partners Colonel Diop served as a bridge across the civil-military divide by hosting seminars on the role of military in society, as well as how the military and civilian populations in West Africa can cooperate.

As Director of the African Institute for Security Sector Transformation (AISST) Colonel Diop addressed the lack of integration of security sector actors (military, police, border patrol and intelligence services) into civilian authority structures and systems (legislative, executive and judiciary) in West Africa. AISST began with an initiative to capture the best practices and strategies for strong civil-military relations in West Africa.

Working in collaboration with AISST, the results of the initiative produced the report *Senegal’s Armée-Nation: Lessons Learned from an Indigenous Model for Building Peace, Stability and Effective Civil-Military Relations in West Africa.*74 Recognizing the profound challenges of development, and its relationship to security, Senegal’s armed forces play key roles in supporting the development of the country – from health to education to vital infrastructure development. Senegal’s top military leadership credits the military’s good relationships with the population and its roles in development as responsible for Senegal’s relative peace and stability compared to its neighbours. AISST

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**The challenge:**
The army had a history of violent relations with the public.

**Theory of change:**
Bring the security sector together with civil society to jointly develop a new model for civil-military relations.
convenes civil-military dialogues across Africa to highlight the potential positive models of security forces contributing to human security.

AISST facilitates local ownership of security through joint programmes between civil society and the security sector to improve human security. For example, following an order from then President Wade in 2010, senior leadership in the military issued a directive to increase women’s leadership within security forces. Although they had made modest progress, women remained largely in “desk” functions and did not hold frontline leadership positions. The Minister for the Armed Forces asked Colonel Diop to design a programme to aid the successful integration of women. Building upon his unique connections with civil society and working from the Partners platform he recommended drawing on the resources of civil society.

Partners West Africa worked with the Alliance for Migration, Leadership and Development (AMLD), and the Senegalese Ministry for Women, Family, Social Development and Women's Entrepreneurship on gender mainstreaming in the Senegalese armed forces. Building upon the deep research already conducted with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) Partners convened a multi-sector platform to study the challenge. They convened focus groups of current and past service members to generate deeper understanding. The interviews and research were followed by a 5-day workshop on gender mainstreaming in October 2010. The workshop convened members of the armed forces with a responsibility and interest in mainstreaming gender with Senegalese experts in gender and security reform. A select group of regional and international experts discussed and outlined the opportunities and challenges facing the armed forces in developing policies, allocating resources and creating structures that support gender mainstreaming.

This workshop was followed by a presentation of over 60 recommendations to the Ministry of Armed Forces to harmonise current policies with international instruments and existing Senegalese legislation. These recommendations formed the foundation of a series of reforms the Ministry undertook. In 2011, representatives gathered from each of the branches of the Senegalese security sector to share lessons learned and best practices in human security.
Guinea’s Defence and Security Forces (DSF) are respected for their role in the independence movement. However, beginning in the early 1980s, the DSF rooted itself deeply within Guinea’s authoritarian political structures. With growing political power came a cycle of military coups, widespread corruption, impunity, violence, and human rights abuses, including the massacre of 150 pro-democracy protestors in a soccer stadium in the country’s capital in 2009. This prompted domestic and international demands that Guinea’s security sector be reformed. While the 2010 election provided an opportunity for reform and comprehensive SSR/D efforts were launched, civilians outside of government were largely left out of the process.

In Guinea, Partners for Democratic Change and Partners West Africa, began work with the Committee Civilo Militaire (CCM) to conduct workshops to help Guinea undertake a national SSR/D process that considers the interests of civilian leadership and civil society. The Guinea Citizen Security Project (GCSP) began in 2011 and is endorsed by the Guinean Minister of Defence. Since its inception, the initiative has successfully brought civil society into the SSR/D process through education, engagement with Guinean security forces, articulation of issues at the local level, and identification of opportunities for civil and security sector collaboration. In parallel with the essential civilian engagement Partners, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), and the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), held a joint conference on the theme “Developing a Guinean National Security Policy.” The conference brought together members of Guinea’s ACSS community, as well as official representatives from the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Security, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the National Transition Council, and Guinean civil society organisations.

Since 2011, GCSP has been implemented in each of Guinea’s main regions. In the first year, it included Lower Guinea, Upper Guinea, and the Forest Region. The second year included the more contentious Medium Guinea. In 2014, GCSP replicated the dialogue in Boké and Kindia—cities within the strategically significant stretch along the coast of Lower Guinea. Community security forums provided a space for civil society and security forces to discuss what they considered their main security threats and what they perceived as the gaps in the SSR/D process. The outcomes of these forums were fed into the national dialogue to share security concerns with the national leadership and to identify where more emphasis and attention was needed in the reform process.

A number of outcomes emerged. The programme provided an “on-ramp” for citizen engagement and created new “software” - spaces for engagement to improve the quality of relationships between civil society and the armed forces. It brought together champions of change and provided them with both intellectual and moral support. Political will, the right people, and concrete actions accompanied by funds created an atmosphere where change was
acceptable. The programme in Guinea was small-scale and took place at the local level, but it resulted in increased transparency because citizens gained a better understanding of what SSR/D was and what national level actions were being undertaken. The current National Security Strategy better reflects the threats the population is facing, and the state is slowly moving back into ungoverned and un-serviced spaces.

As a complement to the formal SSR/D process, Partners is also leading a programme on policing reform with Partners West Africa, COGINTA and CECIDE. “Partners for Security in Guinea: Reforming the Police to Better Serve Citizens” aims to improve overall citizen security by strengthening the community-oriented services of the Guinea National Police (GNP) through institutionalised trainings and policies. Given a history of security forces using violent repression, victims rarely report crimes to the police. Underperforming security institutions negatively affect social trust, resilience and economic activity in the country. Partners is training a cadre of trainers at the National Police Training Academy on community policing, human rights, gender and sexual based violence and youth engagement. Partners is also supporting the establishment of Community Safety and Crime Prevention Councils (CSCPC) led by mayors in two communities in Conakry to bring together local leaders and community based organisations. These councils will act as fora to voice concerns, as platforms for civic education regarding the police roles and responsibilities and in the long-term.
In Yemen, state and non-state armed groups play roles in security and justice. Non-state armed groups known as "Popular Committees" are an indigenous movement whose mandate and function are rooted in and inspired by the tribal tradition of collective responsibility in which local men volunteer to maintain security in their communities. These groups have been instrumental in peace talks with both the Saudi-backed President and Ansar Allah (Houthi) opposition in control of large parts of northern Yemen. In contested states like Yemen, a multi-stakeholder dialogue including civil society, security forces, and security policymakers from the state, tribal and religious leadership is daunting. Yet there are examples of both regional and national multi-stakeholder dialogues in Yemen that offer potential lessons.

In the two restive governorates of Marib and Abyan, the Yemen office of Partners for Democratic Change (Partners Yemen) built on past work on governance and community reconciliation to support a "Justice and Security Dialogue" series in the two regions of Yemen beginning in 2013. The "Justice and Security Dialogue" model is a US Institute of Peace programme to improve trust between security actors and the communities they serve. Partners Yemen launched the dialogue series in the capital Sana’a with forty participants, including local and national government officials and members of the security forces, tribal and community leaders, members of civil society, and members of the judiciary. A conflict assessment process clarified that many participants shared the same analysis of the factors driving violence: a lack of education and employment for youth, underdevelopment and resource shortages, and an overall failure on the government’s part to protect human rights particularly in Marib where local people often oppose state law and favour tribal rule.

The dialogue participants asserted that security challenges were not amenable to military or police solutions. Rather, there was a need for greater education, job opportunities and development. Participants identified recommendations for addressing justice and security issues including the following:

- Develop a unified security action plan that engages security forces, local police and law enforcement, justice actors, Popular Committees, and citizens.
- Develop a strategy for reintegrating, dismissing, or otherwise engaging Popular Committees to lead to a state-led security provision.
- Develop cooperation strategies between communities (including Popular Committees) and security officials and between governorate officials and neighbouring governorates to respond to threats and causes of conflict.
- Protect electricity towers and oil pipelines by expanding electricity provision.
- Engage local tribes in protection responsibilities, ranging from protecting electricity towers and pipelines in their areas to protecting government institutions.
- Conduct a dialogue between security officials and citizens and find other mechanisms to build public trust and decrease tensions between citizens and security figures.
- Increase military and security checkpoints on main roads used by traffickers and criminals, and increase public awareness to reduce potential citizen-security force tensions or standoffs at these checkpoints.

While the original project design planned a series of large-scale dialogue conferences in each
governorate, Partners Yemen recognised that smaller, local dialogues emphasizing joint
problem solving and programming would be more effective. Partners Yemen helped local
officials from Marib and Abyan take the recommendations emerging from the dialogue to
national counterparts in government to seek resources and support for implementing these
strategies. In Abyan, local officials took over the role of convening these justice and security
dialogues, having been convinced of the benefits of joint analysis and problem solving. But in
Marib, where there was less support for the state and also fewer state services and presence,
the government was not able to help local officials. The justice and security dialogue in Marib
came to be a place where local stakeholders negotiated over the very concept of the state and its
relationship to tribal structures. In January 2014, Partners Yemen presented the security and
justice recommendations from the dialogue to the security director and local military
commander, who agreed to take on some of the recommendations. While there was less local
ownership of the dialogue process in Marib than in Abyan, the relationship building in Marib
was measurable. Evaluations of the dialogue process in both governorates were positive,
indicating participants felt it was a worthwhile process.

At the national level, the UN Resolution had mandated a National Dialogue Conference (NDC)
including the state government, tribal authorities, non-state armed groups, and civil society,
including representatives from women and youth groups. The National Dialogue process was
a core component of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-sponsored agreement—which paved
the way for former president Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down in exchange for immunity in
November 2011—and was designed to be an inclusive process addressing the myriad of
challenges facing the country. After multiple, hand-wringing delays, the 565-member body
completed more than ten months of painstaking work and agreed upon more than 1400 articles
laying out recommendations on the conflict in Saada, demands from Southern secessionists,
economic development, transitional justice, and expanding rights and freedoms. The Dialogue
broke down important cultural barriers—allowing youth to engage on equal footing with tribal
elders and introducing unprecedented acceptance of women’s participation in all facets of
government and public life. Dialogue participants were divided into nine themes in the
conference's agenda, including southern interests in secession, the capital Sa’ada, national
reconciliation, transitional justice, state building, good governance, rebuilding the army and
security forces, the status of special entities, rights and freedoms, and comprehensive,
integrated, and sustainable development.
As part of the Partner’s Yemen flagship project called LEAD – Local Engagement for Advocacy and Dialogue, Partner’s Yemen was very active in the NDC to help ensure that the working group meetings were done in an inclusive and participatory manner. In fact, one of the programme’s hallmarks of success was the respect and encouragement that Yemen’s policy-makers and National Dialogue members showed the LEAD team members and Partners Yemen staff. Such credibility gave the LEAD programme a unique opportunity to meet with and train certain members of each of the National Dialogue’s nine working groups and collectively determine a strategy for raising awareness of the Dialogue’s outcomes in rural regions. For instance, the head of the Rights and Freedoms Working Group, Ms. Arwa Othman, who would go on to become Yemen’s Minister of Culture, worked closely with the LEAD team to help community members better understand the output of her working group and the National Dialogue agreements, particularly as it pertains to constitutional rights and freedoms.

The National Dialogue Conference concluded in 2014. The National Dialogue Conference achieved many positive changes. It strengthened women’s political participation and took steps to combat violence against women. The Conference also strengthened the role of political parties and civil society, allowing them more equal representation with tribal representatives. While there was consensus on many issues, the interest in southern secession was a point of contention. During the NDC, there was political violence in many regions, mass protests in the south, and calls for violent rebellion by southern leaders. While the NDC was ultimately successful in terms of its process of inclusion and building relationships capable of joint problem solving, but unsuccessful in preventing war.

**Libya: Multi-stakeholder National Dialogue Preparatory Commission**

*Written with Najla Elmangoush*

Former Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi maintained control over security and justice institutions such as the police, army, and courts and limited their capacities. Gadhafi kept his hold over Libya by promoting tribal identities and promoting a culture of *bedouinisation* that included the use of traditional justice and informal security institutions. As Libya’s new post-revolution National Transitional Council (NTC) attempts to create new security and justice institutions, the country needs local and national peacebuilding processes to foster dialogue between diverse Libyan groups and to build a bridge between traditional and state-based approaches to security and justice.

Civil society is playing a number of roles to help facilitate dialogue between civilians and armed groups. In some cases, traditional civil society leaders mediate between different political factions and armed groups. For example, tribal leadership facilitated reconciliation between the post-revolutionary government of Libya and a militia that had seized four oil ports on the eastern coast. The government was not able to protect the oil ports, so a guard recruited his own militia, demanding local governance over the port’s security. Government representatives were not able to resolve the situation, as the militia refused to meet with them. At the government’s request, tribal leaders mediated between the government and the militia, and the militia eventually returned security control of the ports back to the government.⁸⁰

At the national level, modern civil society is also playing a role to convene a national dialogue about security, justice and related issues. The Libya National Dialogue Preparatory Commission⁸¹ set up a forum for diverse stakeholders to explore their perspectives on security and justice issues. Funded by the Libyan government and assisted by the UN Technical Assistance Team, the Commission affirmed its independence from government control and its desire to be inclusive so that all ethnic and tribal groups, armed groups, and men, women, youth and elders in communities could participate in the dialogue.
A commission of thirteen prominent civil society leaders without political affiliation or ties to any of the armed groups acted as unpaid volunteers to facilitate the National Dialogue between 2013 and 2014. An Advisory Team made up of seventy-five Libyans who represent the broadest possible cross-section of society provides a consultative body for the National Dialogue to identify opportunities for dialogue with diverse groups.

The Advisory Team also developed the criteria for selecting delegates to attend the government-run National Conference, where civil society had representation from the civil society-run National Dialogue. The dialogue had only a handful of rules. No one suspected or charged with serious crimes could participate. All participants had to agree in principle with some general form of a united Libya. No weapons were allowed into the dialogue space.

In Phase I of the National Dialogue, the preparatory commission created a series of participation and engagement events across the country to gather suggestions, comments and proposals to build consensus on broad themes of national unity, identity, values and vision. In Phase II, the National Dialogue discussed specific challenges: security, development and transitional justice. The National Dialogue aims to provide a place where diverse stakeholders can improve their relationships and understanding of each other. This is a necessary step to achieve a national consensus on a vision for how security, justice and other key elements of governance will evolve in Libya. The National Dialogue currently is on hold in 2015 as it supports high-level UN mediation to achieve a peace process.