Training has a number of functions related to local ownership in security. Training plays a role in capacity building for both civil society and security forces to enable basic understanding, shared terminology, and skills necessary to work together. While real reform and transformation of the security sector often takes 20 years, training is a shorter-term intervention with limited impact. Without sustained institutional support and change, and robust consultation and participation in designing human security-oriented strategies with civilians, training is unlikely to make an impact. In Burundi, training in conflict management and leadership for the security sector was pitched as a “slice of SSR” – it enables and supports broader SSR/D processes. But in practice, building capacity and trust through training first can set a foundation that led to institutional change.

Training also plays a role in building trust and relationships between civil society and security forces. Training often is a starting point, enabling dialogue, problem solving and more advanced levels of joint coordination for human security. Most of the case studies in this section of the report document how civil society is providing training to security forces to help them improve their community engagement strategies. However, in the section on Community Policing and DDR for example, civil society organisations provided training to community members to prepare them to dialogue and coordinate effectively with security forces.

For all the attention to the democratisation of security forces, protection of civilians and civic assistance, there are relatively few training courses for the military and police to learn about civil society or for civil society to understand and relate to the security sector. All stakeholders need a shared set of terminology, concepts, skills and abilities for civil society-military-police coordination to support human security. While the UN provides training for humanitarian civil-military coordination, this is only for humanitarian assistance. Formal, institutionalised training to enable civil-military-police coordination to support a broader approach to human security is still rare.

**Training for Security Sector**

Security sector training programmes are requesting training on a range of topics that relate to civil society or what some countries refer to as “the human aspects of military operations” including civil-military coordination, protection of civilians, negotiation, governance, trauma, civic assistance, conflict assessment, conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Some military training centres already offer training on some topics. But often there are no civilians involved in writing the materials, and the terms and definitions used often do not reflect the perspectives of civil society. Some police training centres have begun to include and expand training on community policing, problem-solving policing and restorative justice. But these approaches are not yet widely accepted.

Military and police community engagement strategies, where the security sector aims to build relationships with the community, requires capacity building to help the military and police understand civil society and their approaches to human security. Many military and police training programme focus mostly on the use of force against an “enemy” or “criminal” and their concept of who civilians are can often be negative or hostile. In some countries, security forces have been taught in trainings that civilians are inferior to military personnel. Security forces have even been encouraged to take anything they need from civilians with statements such as
“civilians are the field for the military to harvest.” Although training programmes may mention the necessity to protect civilians, they rarely teach the specific skills that are required to relate, communicate, and coordinate with civil society to support human security. So, any curriculum or training programme will need to provide these skills while also taking into account security sector views of civilians. If these latter are the source of mistrust, they must be transformed so that trust between the security sector and civilians can increase.

Training for Civil Society
In order for local people to participate in security-related analysis and problem solving, they must be able to understand the security sector’s roles and responsibilities. In some countries, civil society organisations attend educational conferences or workshops led by the military or police, to learn more about the security sector. Civil society educational programmes in universities and NGOs often teach peacebuilding and human security-related courses. But few have courses on understanding the military or police mandate and operational procedures, or learning how to use peacebuilding processes to improve communication and coordination between civil society and the security sector. Civil society requires more training and education to understand the mandate and capabilities of security forces, to understand how to leverage these capabilities where appropriate, and to communicate support requirements in a way that avoids unintended consequences such as increasing attacks against civilians. Training for civil society can also provide an idea of what “success” looks like in terms of democratic state-society relations and successful SSR/D.

Many civil society organisations are involved in providing training to security forces (see list of training topics here). While human security depends on fruitful civil-military-police understanding and coordination, a lack of opportunities for integrated, multi-stakeholder training and dialogue inhibits these goals. Integrated training between security policymakers, security forces, and civil society can help identify common ground in national security and human security perspectives and also help people recognise the areas where their approaches are different. This can allow cooperation in overlapping areas while appreciating the need for independence to protect the safety of civil society.

Joint Training for Civil Society and Security Sector
Currently, few opportunities for joint training for both civil society and the security sector exist. The military and police tend to think of security as their job alone. And civil society tends to distrust the military and police. The few that do exist tend to be run by civil society. Of the case studies documented in this report, joint training for the military, police and civil society is seen as an important tool for building confidence. Many of the case studies that include joint training report that including space for groups of security forces and civilians to identify and then challenge their stereotypes of each other builds trust between participants in the training.

Training Topics

**Conflict Assessment:** Understand the causes and dynamics of conflict and violence

**Democratic State-Society Relations:** Understand the role of security forces and civil society

**Civilian Harm Mitigation:** Prevent, mitigate, count, & respond to civilian casualties

**Protection of Civilians:** Identify legal frameworks and civilian and military roles to protect civilians

**Humanitarian Civil Military Coordination:** Identify civilian and military obligations and guidelines

**Civilian Assistance:** Support development, governance, rule of law, etc.

**Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding:** Address drivers of conflict and support dialogue, negotiation, and mediation

**Trauma and Stress:** Build resilience to stress and trauma

**Civilian Oversight:** Build joint institutional mechanisms to monitor and evaluate security sector accountability and performance
The “Handbook for Civil-Military-Police Coordination for Human Security” is a companion to this report precisely because it fills a gap. It provides a joint training curriculum where civil society and security sector learn shared terminology, appreciate their differences as well as their common ground, and learn how to coordinate their assessments, planning, assistance, and protection activities related to human security. Many of the case studies in this section illustrate how a civil society organisation created a safe space for training for both the community and security sector leaders. Often designed by universities, think tanks, or religious organisations, joint training programmes create unique opportunities for new ways of thinking about human security.

The Philippines: Civil Society-Military-Police Capacity Building
Written with Ariel Hernandez, Myla Leguro, Deng Giguinto, Chito Generoso and Jon Rudy

Following a long period of brutal colonial rule by first Spain and then the United States, Philippine government policies of martial law and authoritarianism correlated with increasing accusations of human rights abuses by military forces and a decline in civilian control of the military. Under these repressive and corrupt influences, internal insurgency movements grew, the main ones being The Communist Party of the Philippines – New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).

An increasingly emboldened civil society opposition to authoritarianism led to a broad-based democratic movement of “people power” that ultimately toppled President Marcos in 1986. Ultimately, civil society-military cooperation contributed toward making the transition to a democratic political system. While foreign security assistance programmes for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) concentrated on train and equip programmes aimed to enable counterinsurgency, Filipino civil society organisations identified the military and police as critical stakeholders in the peace process and reached out to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to begin dialogue.

With a robust and highly skilled civil society, the Philippines became one of the first countries where civil society peacebuilding organisations began to reach out to the military and police to offer training and advice on building peace. A number of Filipino civil society groups have taken part in large-scale capacity building in peacebuilding values, skills, and processes for thousands of military officials, staff, and civilian reserve forces in the Philippines in conflict assessment, facilitation, mediation, negotiation, building a culture of peace and other conflict transformation strategies.

Like most other Filipino civil society groups, Balay Mindanaw had no intention to work with the military when they began their peacebuilding work in 1996. The director of Balay Mindanaw, Ariel (Ayi) Hernandez, first learned to know military officers in a leadership development program. “While all I heard about the military before was their abuses, here I was talking face to face with soldiers who are willing to change, willing to help improve our people’s lot,” Hernandez recalls. In particular, Hernandez built a relationship with then Colonel Raymundo B. Ferrer. Balay Mindanao reached out to the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute to begin discussion on training the military in peacebuilding.
Initial Civil Society Training for Military Officers
The Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute (MPI) was set up as a training ground for civil society in 2000. When military personnel applied to take courses, there was at first resistance. MPI faculty worried that admitting military personnel into their courses might affect the safety of other participants, or would change the dynamic of the learning environment, intimidating other students. There was also concern that the military wanted to spy on NGOs attending the training, to gather intelligence.

Trainers at the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute had previous negative experiences with military forces. Lead trainer Deng Giguiento from Catholic Relief Services, had been on a fact-finding mission in North Catobato, Philippines when soldiers stopped her. The soldiers were drunk and had removed their nametags, so they could not be identified. Six pointed their guns at Giguiento, pushing the rifle barrels into her dress. Giguiento was subsequently hesitant about letting military personnel take her course on conflict transformation. However, other MPI faculty had more positive experiences with soldiers. Another MPI trainer Rudy Rodil (aka Ompong) had been part of a government panel that negotiated a truce with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and had seen, through that process, that soldiers could become respectful and skilled peacebuilders. One particular Filipino military leader was the first to seek training in peacebuilding. Balay Mindanao and another Filipino NGO Pakigdait, whose story is told later in this report, vouched for the good relationship they had developed with then Col Ferrer. As a result of civil society advocating on behalf of their military colleagues, Giguiento agreed to let Colonel Ferrer into her course on conflict transformation.

MPI staff set strict ground rules for military personnel attending MPI: “no guns, no uniforms, no bodyguards, no ranks, just the participants’ first and last names would be used, and no intelligence gathering.”28 Military personnel learned side by side with civilians working for civil society organisations. The mixed workshops were opportunities for the military to engage with groups that they don’t usually engage with such as Muslim peace advocates, grassroots peace leaders, and young peace activists. This allowed for breaking down stereotypes, and developing relationships between civil society and military personnel. Ferrer helped to ease civil society's anxiety by listening closely to other participants, not interrupting others, and demonstrating respect through all his interactions.

Balay Mindanao, the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute faculty, Catholic Relief Services and other Filipino civil society groups planned follow up after these initial trainings. Civil society invited trained military officials to become members of province-based networks of peacebuilders. Various groups established follow-up structures as support mechanisms for the trained military men and women. The support mostly comes informally through follow-up conversations, phone calls, and texts. Formal strategies included the conduct of regular meetings, inviting trained military personnel into local peace networks, and civil society visits to military camps. Local level initiatives between military commanders, local leaders, and communities included joint community-based
peacebuilding efforts such as local zones of peace, local dialogue between warring parties at the village levels, and community development projects. Key leaders in civil society began reframing their perspective of the military from an enemy to a partner in supporting the peace process.

Expanding the “Soldiers for Peace” Approach
Colonel Ferrer continued to reach out to Filipino civil society groups working in peace, development and human rights after he received training at the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute. His promotion to Brigadier General came along with the title of “Peace General” because of his peace leadership and negotiation skills. Recognizing the history of bad relations and military abuses, Ferrer sought to involve soldiers in acts of atonement and reparation.

Referring to stories of human rights abuses, Ferrer recognised: “Admittedly, we had become part of the problem in the conflict in Mindanao.” The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) had used brute force against armed opposition groups in deterring violence. But the more force
used, the more people joined armed opposition groups. Meanwhile, government services reached only main cities. In recognizing the roots of civilian distrust, Balay Mindanaw and General Ferrer began designing a joint project to provide peacebuilding and conflict management training workshops for the officers and soldiers of the 1st Infantry “Tabak” Division with the goal of deescalating the violence in Mindanao. Ferrer committed his entire division to Balay Mindanaw’s Operation Peace Course (also known as “OP KORs”). Balay Mindanao’s President Kaloy Manlupig supported the project, recognizing that peacebuilding requires involving the security sector, which was at the centre of peace and security issues in the Philippines. Manlupig quoted Albert Einstein, “No problem can be solved from the same level of consciousness that created it.” Trained for war fighting, working for peace would at first glance appear to be contradictory. For transformation to happen in the security sector, security forces needed a new approach. Soldiers needed to learn communication skills so they could deescalate and defuse conflicts through active listening, dialogue, negotiation and mediation processes.

Balay Mindanaw began offering three levels of training in response to Brigadier General Ferrer’s interest in expanding the training of soldiers for peace:

- A two-day course for senior officers, since they can only be absent from their command for a maximum of 3 days;
- A five-day course for junior officers, some of whom were trained as trainers so they could take the lessons to their respective battalions, companies and units;
- A five-day course for non-commissioned officers at the community level. This included training members of the volunteer Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs).

Balay Mindanaw also carried out policy advocacy. First, Balay Mindanaw attempted to institutionalise the peacebuilding and conflict management skills courses in all of the formal academic institutions in the Department of National Defence and the Armed Forces. Second, Balay Mindanaw aimed to change the doctrine of the basis of promotion for the soldiers, so that they would be rewarded for the peace leadership and not just for how many enemies were killed or captured, or how many weapons surrendered or captured.

Through the training and Ferrer’s leadership, soldiers in violence-prone Basilan province improved their relationships with local civilians and worked side by side with them to build houses and water supply systems. Ferrer questioned why his troops had been taught to scowl at people and “to put on a fierce face.” He encouraged soldiers to smile at people and to greet them with respect. Ferrer wanted paramilitary troops to be “peace multipliers” not “force multipliers.” And slowly his efforts yielded results. People began going to the security forces with their concerns rather than running away from them when they drove to their community. BMI’s colourful report called “Soldiers for Peace” includes photographs and stories of the impact of training for the military in peacebuilding. For example:

Photo 3: Training for CAGF. Photo credit: Chito Generoso
The Army’s 403rd Infantry “Peacemakers” Brigade arranged a ceremony for a return to the community for 22 members of the New People’s Army. Living a life of abject poverty in a remote village far from government services, the young men had been easy recruits to the NPA, who promised them a right to self-determination if they took up arms to topple the government. Recognizing the power of offering respect to each human being, regardless of their identity, the Army did not use the more common term of a “surrender” ceremony. They issued an apology to the 22 former NPA members, noting that the Army had committed human rights abuses against their people. Then Army officers helped the NPA to reintegrate, often by pushing civilian government officers to do their job in providing medical care.

Foot soldiers are now perceived as being more respectful in their dealings with people. Police and military officers have started to help mediate large and small conflicts in the communities; including defusing local disputes over land. When the public calls on security forces to respond, police or military soldiers trained in mediation use these skills rather than use force.

When a German national and his three Filipino companions were kidnapped in North Cotabato, Philippines, military officers who were in the midst of attending a peacebuilding course at the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute pursued dialogue with the kidnappers by contacting the police, local government officials, peace negotiators and the MILF instead of sending troops after the kidnappers. The victims were freed within 6 hours.31

Training for Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units
While much of the civil society training for the military focused on the southern, Mindanao region of the Philippines and emphasised top-level military leaders, another group was focusing on training in the northern region. Like other Filipino leaders, the Interfaith Center for Conciliation and Nonviolence (ICCN) viewed a strong partnership between the military and key government service delivery units as main factor to reduce the level of dissatisfaction of the people. ICCN encouraged strong collaboration – especially in the operational level - between the civilian government and the military. This would help ‘capacitate’ civilian units to allow them to handle local peace and order problems without dependence on the military.

From 2010 to 2013, ICCN under the direction of Chito Generoso, partnered with the Office of the Presidential Adviser to the Peace Process (OPAPP), and the Philippine Army’s Civil-Military Operations Office (G3) on a project to train select local CAFGUs (Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units) and their commanders to support peace and human security in armed conflict affected areas. ICCN’s trainings for these paramilitary groups included conflict transformation, alternative dispute resolution, and mediation in ten CAFGU Battalion camps in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, with a focus on trainees from detachments from remote villages not easily accessible for government services.

In the Cordillera region in particular, local government units led an initiative to use mediation to address local conflicts that drive violence between state and non-state armed groups. In 2011 at Lagawe, Ifugao, the Provincial Governor, with UNDP support, formally organised and launched one hundred and six (106) mediators, consisting of local government officials, line-agency employees, civil society organisation members, policemen, and security personnel as the “Ifugao Mediators Club.”
The Oslo Agreement of 1994 instigated a two-fold process. First, it launched Palestinian security sector reform (SSR) aimed to protect Palestinians and serve as pillar of statehood. Second, it mandated Israeli and Palestinian security forces to work together in border regions, jointly supervising various bridges and boundaries.

The Palestinian security forces were chosen for their loyalty to the Palestinian cause. Many were former prisoners. They were trained and equipped in the use of force, but not provided with skills for working with civil society. In spite of their loyalty to their people, and their passion to help, they lacked knowledge on how to engage effectively with civil society.

Like the Israeli and Palestinian populations at large, Israeli and Palestinian security forces have a history of antagonism and violence. They had little opportunity to meet each other and understand little about the other’s culture, experiences and perceptions. This caused tensions and problems with the civilians crossing these checkpoints between Gaza and Israel and between the West Bank and Jordan. Israeli and Palestinian security forces need communication skills and conflict resolution skills to deal with the public and with each other.

A number of local initiatives responded to these challenges. Between 1996 and 1999 several freelance conflict resolution trainers set up a programme to train Palestinian police, security forces, and government employees on how to better relate with the public. The programme was led by the Palestine Center for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation (CCRR), an interfaith centre that provides peacebuilding education programmes to a variety of audiences, including the police, security forces, and government employees, in collaboration with PANORAMA, a Palestinian NGO focused on democracy and civil society, and the Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights. Its purpose was to improve relationships between Palestinian security forces and Palestinian civil society.

In Hebron, Bethlehem, Abu Dis, Jericho, and Ramallah the trainers reached at least 200 Palestinian members of the security forces. The programme focused first on facilitating an internal dialogue between the different factions in the security forces, to help them learn to understand each other and coordinate with each other. The training included an introduction to conflict resolution skills and methods, a self-assessment to reflect on their own motivations and behaviours and how these impact the public, a discussion of the

**The challenge:**
Internal divisions within security forces made it difficult for them to work with each other. A lack of skills in relating to civil society made it difficult for the public to trust them.

**Theory of change:**
Facilitate inter-group dialogue and provide training to security forces on communication, negotiation, and problem solving skills.
impact of internal conflicts within the Palestinian security forces on the public, and an exercise on improving relations with the public.\textsuperscript{32}

In 1998-1999, a separate programme brought together Israeli and Palestinian security forces mandated to manage a 24-hour a day border checkpoint at Allenby bridge at the Jordanian border and at Karmy bridge between Gaza and Israel. Given the history of conflict and animosity, this programme aimed to improve the relationships between Israeli and Palestinian security forces. The CCRR and the Israeli Centre for Negotiation and Mediation designed a model of training material course for 40 hours, co-facilitated and co-trained with one Palestinian and one Israeli facilitator. Senior officers on both sides also attended the course.

The officers had little information about each other’s habits, values and general culture other than the negative rumours and stereotypes each side held of the other. Given the lack of trust and understanding, it was difficult for them to work with each other. This course focused on ways to resolve daily conflicts between the two sides, including communication skills and cross-cultural understanding to change the image each side has of the other. The training began with basic trust building. Facilitators helped participants understand the experiences and perceptions that shaped each person’s understanding and behaviour emphasizing their shared humanity. Each participant was given the opportunity to introduce their culture and values to the others. These courses were the first opportunity for those officers to get to know each other and to learn how each side sees the other. All participants and their ranking officers reported a great interest in these courses, and a commitment to continue attending it. Participants indicated that their relationship with each other has changed after taking this course, and the way they were dealing with each other also changed and became better.\textsuperscript{33}

\textbf{Photo 6: Joint training for Palestinian and Israeli security forces. Photo credit: Noah Salameh}
South Africa: Building Capacity for Human Security

South Africa is perhaps the most important case study of successful, locally owned peacebuilding and human security. Intensive training and coaching of South African leaders in negotiation, mediation and conflict analysis supported the intense transition from apartheid to political democracy. Local level peacebuilding efforts added up to national-level peacebuilding. As one of the most inspiring success stories of locally-led peacebuilding, South Africa’s independent and highly skilled civil society played important roles in both local and high-level negotiation and mediation processes. Growing out of this experience, South Africans are now in a position to assist in peaceful transitions to democracy in other countries through the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). ACCORD takes a non-sectarian, independent stance to advance human security.

ACCORD’s Training for Peace (TfP) Programme began in 1995 to build the capacity of civil society and the security sector in peacebuilding, particularly in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Burundi and countries in the South African Development Community (SADC), but also further afield in Europe and elsewhere. ACCORD runs the TfP programme in collaboration with The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria; the Kofi Annan International Peace Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra; and the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI) in Oslo. Approximately 7000 civilians, police and military – many currently serving in UN and African peace operations – have been trained through the TfP Programme, and about 300 publications have been produced, encompassing research papers, books, reports, manuals, readers and handbooks.

The TfP Programme’s primary purpose is to significantly improve the civilian capacity of African states, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) / Regional Mechanisms (RMs), the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) to prepare, plan, manage and monitor multi-dimensional peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations in Africa. This is done through a combination of training, applied research and policy development, towards:

- Building civilian capacity for AU and UN peace operations;
- Contributing towards the development of a multi-dimensional and integrated approach to African peace operations;
- Assisting the AU and the RECs/RMs in the development of the civilian structures of their standby forces and PLANELMs; and
- Creating awareness on the civilian dimension of the ASF.

Training of civilian and police peacekeeping and peacebuilding personnel take place in “classrooms, boardrooms, in halls of power and the African bush” with a focus on conflict analysis, negotiation and mediation, the role of civilians, particularly women, in peace and security. ACCORD works closely with the African Civilian Standby Roster for Humanitarian and Peacebuilding Missions (AFDEM), whose role is to provide the link between training and deployment. Graduates of the TfP are screened and placed on AFDEM’s standby roster. AFDEM also facilitates deployment to UN or African peace operations, UN agencies or civil society organisations.

ACCORD also takes part in gender mainstreaming and integrating the women, peace and security agenda in peace operations, having over two decades of practical experience in peacekeeping and the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (See Fiji case study on women, peace and security in this report). ACCORD facilitates capacity building for women to understand the UN...
Secretary General’s Senior Women Talent Pipeline Project (SWTP) that aims to increase the number of senior level women in peacekeeping missions.

The first phase of the project led to the identification of 64 women for the Pipeline and deployment of 4 senior women to UN peace operations in the areas of Political Affairs, Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Civil Affairs, Public Information and Communication. The second phase rolled out in November 2014, with an emphasis on French and Arabic speakers, and led to an additional 27 women joining the Pipeline. As part of the third phase of the project begun in May 2015, ACCORD/TfP is working with the UN to identify and train more women to apply to top-level UN peacekeeping missions. ACCORD also plays roles in training UN and African Union staff in gender sensitivity to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and protection of men, women, boys and girls.

ACCORD’s Peacekeeping Unit focuses on improving the capability and professionalism of UN Civil Affairs; the development of a strategic framework on protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping operations; clarifying the peacekeeping-peacebuilding nexus; and enhancing civilian capacities. It has specifically focused on civil affairs, and has conducted research to understand the specific context and needs of Civil Affairs Officers. The Unit conducts specialised tailored in-mission conflict management training courses and supports the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Peacekeeping Best Practices Section (PBPS) in the roll out of the Civil Affairs Skills Training Methodology. It has also developed a Civil Affairs Handbook (launched in April 2012) that serves as a reference guide for (Civil Affairs) Officers in the field.

Photo 7: South African service members with community members.
Photo Credit: SPC Taryn Hagerman, Wikimedia Commons
Civil-military relations and security sector reform in the Caribbean and Latin America face distinct challenges. During Spanish and Portuguese colonialism, the conqueror’s military forces used a strategy of pacification to put down rebellions and to control or even to destroy native peoples. Afterwards, this repressive attitude toward society continued, defining most of the history of military-civil society relations in Latin America. Yet in general, since the 1980s, there has been a transition away from military-led governments toward greater democracy and citizen participation in all aspects of public life. Latin American governments are increasingly working together on regional issues, particularly in response to regional challenges of trafficking in drugs, weapons and people.

Civil-military relations in the Caribbean and Latin America are distinct from Western countries in a variety of ways, due to a different historical evolution of the security forces and different governance arrangements. Since 2012, there has been an effort to build up a civil society network of university scholars and NGOs to work with military officers to improve civil-military relations in the Caribbean and Latin America. This “Military and Security in Latin America and the Caribbean” network aims to produce an overview on the recent experience of safety, different reports, and possibilities to create a human security/human rights oriented policy. It has been mostly a joint effort spread among military and scholars.

Brazilian efforts to use universities as an intermediary to provide a safe space for civil-military-police dialogue on issues of public safety and national security could eventually spread throughout the region. Formulas that connect civilian scholars, civilian graduate programmes and military graduate courses – or even hybrid graduate programmes – have been part of this recent Brazilian experience. If analysed in its first outcomes, and adapted respecting local dynamics and expertise, this model could be translated more widely in Latin America, using this kind of cooperation established with military schools.

Photo 8: Rio Do Janeiro/Favéla. Photo Credit: Wikimedia Commons
Brazil itself has assisted in SSR/D efforts in other countries such as Haiti, Guinea-Bissau, and Timor-Leste, both bilaterally and through organisations such as the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP). Yet as with other countries assisting with SSR, civil-military relations within Brazil and internal SSR/D efforts still need attention.

Within Brazil, the history of military interventions and military rule has created lasting mistrust between the military, police, and civil society. Historically, the military viewed political opposition as “the internal enemy” that must be “eliminated” rather than addressed through democratic processes. While democratisation occurred within the government’s political sector, the military and police sector still run based on a model established during the authoritarian regime (1964-1985). This model gives to the military police a primary repressive task in ordinary law enforcement activities and a secondary competence as National Army’s auxiliary troops (exactly the same as during the dictatorship period). In Brazil, each state federal unity in Brazil has its own military police corps. These police corps are militarised in a gendarmerie-like corporation under state Governor’s authority.

On the other hand, the National Army has a contradictory history. Officially, the Army main prerogative is to protect national sovereignty, and as a second level of competence, to act in internal issues such as law enforcement. It means that training and weaponry is geared toward identifying and fighting enemies and not as much on protecting and serving the population.

Nevertheless, Brazil’s military has had a significant role in responding to internal humanitarian crises, such as floods or the recurrent support to minimise desertification effects on vulnerable populations. This degree of competence has increased since the beginning of the deployment of Brazilian troops to lead the security work in UN missions, especially in Haiti (2004 onwards). In preparation for this mission, Brazilian forces trained in urban combat simulations in order to act in Port-au-Prince slums. This experience exposed Brazilian forces to training on UN values and concepts on Protection of Civilians and related concepts.

The Brazilian military experience of policing operations in Haiti could lead to a shift in how the Brazilian military operates side by side in public safety issues within Brazil, particularly in favelas (slums). The Brazilian Ministry of Defence, answering to a formal request by Rio de Janeiro’s Governor, formed two “Pacification Forces” that occupied three sets of slums in two phases, the first one from December 2010 to July 2012, and the second between May 2014 and April 2015. Part of the Army’s troops operating in Rio’s slums included former UN troops in Haiti. Besides that, the operations were connected to a state Military Police programme called Police Pacification Units (UPP) aimed to occupy communities where drug trafficking takes place. There are many questions stemming from this kind of collaboration between the Armed Forces and the Military Police. The memory of the military participation in the so-called “dirty war” against political opposition during the 1960’s and 1970’s ignites a difficult debate among scholars, military staff, politicians, and civil society organisations.

If it is true that the move toward civilian governments in Brazil has opened the door to new conversations on security, Brazilian society has not had practice in participating in security discussions. Brazilian academics point out that in a democratic country, society must think about these issues and provide oversight to ensure that the military is accountable to civilian leadership and the civilian population. On June 20th, 2013, close to 1.5 million people marched in over eighty cities across Brazil in the largest public demonstrations since redemocratisation...
in 1985. Then, state Military Police used extreme force on the protestors, indiscriminately using tear gas, pepper spray and rubber bullets.\(^{38}\) Political leaders and media portrayed the protests as illegal acts, while civil society perceived the protests as legitimate acts of political opposition. After the Military Police brutality even traditional political parties and the media turned against the security forces.

In such a context, Brazilian academics and NGOs are trying to build bridges of communication between the military, police and civil society to offer forums for dialogue on the emphasis on public safety versus national security. However, there is an increasing consensus of the importance to discuss these issues more openly among Brazilian society, not only in silos of those directly involved. The educational field seems to be a respected intermediary to provide forums for civil-military-police dialogue. In Brazil, universities can provide a safe space for civil society and the military to interact, and therefore serve as an entry point, whilst overcoming stigma from talking to the military.

The Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS) of the Universidade Federal Fluminense, in Niterói, Rio de Janeiro is the first academic institute in Brazil devoted to civil-military relations. ISS opened its doors in 2012 after a ten-year process of consolidation within the Political Sciences Department. Scholars engaged in its creation had a historical involvement with civilian-military issues and had helped to establish organisations such as the Brazilian Association for Defence Studies (ABED), in 2008. ISS has cooperation agreements with high-level military schools in Brazil (Army, Navy, Air Force), with special attention to their graduate courses. Besides that, ISS offers an undergraduate course in International Relations and a postgraduate course devoted to civil-military relations. There are around 20 military officers in the institute, under civilian supervision, and among its professors there are former military officers.

Following ISS experience, other Universities in Brazil started their own graduate programmes on Strategic Studies or Defence Studies, including the Army’s and Navy’s high-level schools based in Rio de Janeiro. The Institute is establishing connections between these two separate worlds in Brazil – the world of the military and police’ and their perspectives on security and the world of civil society and their perspectives on public safety.

**Fiji: Training on Trauma and Conflict Transformation**

*Written with Koila Costello Olsson*

A series of military coups has left Fijians on all sides of the conflict with a sense of trauma and fear. The military and police have suffered in particular. Many of them perpetrated violence when taking part in repressing public protests against the coups. Those who are part of Fiji’s longstanding commitment to UN peacekeeping witnessed or experienced violence when serving in peacekeeping missions in Iraq, Lebanon, Sinai, Golan Heights, Sudan, or Timor Leste. Finally, some of the ex-military personal also committed or suffered from violence when participating as mercenaries/private contractors in other conflicts. Fijian security forces thus had ample exposure to trauma, although it was never addressed institutionally. As in many other cultures, state institutions do not address stress and trauma. This work is left to religious authorities or the individual’s private realm. For the most part, superiors simply taught the forces under their command “be tough” and encouraged them not to let stress or trauma affect them. But given the stressful nature of international military deployments and the tense situations with local communities, institutional leaders recognised they needed better understanding of trauma and stress,

**The challenge**

Trauma and stress impact the wellbeing of many people in society and in the security forces.

**Theory of change:**

Build the capacity of the security sector to understand the impact of trauma and stress on their society.
and ways of handling it.

The Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) first requested training from civil society organisations to broaden their understanding of conflict analysis, restorative justice and trauma awareness for the Officers Training School in 2003, following the coup in 2000. The Fijian civil society organisation called ECREA (Ecumenical Centre for Research, Education, and Advocacy) was tasked with developing a course.

Then after the 2006 coup, they also commissioned training on community engagements. After the coup, a lot more military officers began taking up posts in government. The military was extending their role into policing and often conducting joint military-police operations within Fiji. But relationships between the military and civil society were hostile. NGOs had largely opposed the military coup. Some NGOs had affiliations with political parties. For these reasons, the military largely distrusted NGOs and questioned their funding and motivations. The experience of Fijian forces abroad, primarily in Iraq, and the experience in the coup contributed to a growing concern that on the military and police use of force on Fijian citizens at home. Despite these mixed feelings and perceptions about NGOs, the military again turned to civil society - this time the Pacific Centre for Peacebuilding (PCP), a local peacebuilding NGO that works to transform, reduce and prevent conflict in the Pacific - to conduct debriefing sessions with the military, Fiji Police and Fiji Correction Services about their relationships with communities. Their work began in 2007.

![Photo 9: Joint training in trauma. Photo Credit: Pacific Centre for Peacebuilding](image)

Both organisations developed an interactive training approach that emphasised relationship building, peacebuilding skills and processes, and whole-of-community participation.

While trauma and stress are not often topics included in peacebuilding training for either civil society or security forces, understanding these concepts and how to develop resilience is necessary for all stakeholders in any context where violence is present. It is important for civil society and security sector personnel to recognise how trauma at work or in the public can translate into violence in the home as well. Trauma can contribute to gender-based violence. Training in trauma awareness can help people understand the cycles of violence and why traumatised people often go on to traumatisate others. Training on how to manage stress and trauma can reduce the likelihood of violence, especially between security forces and civil society.
PCP held discussions with military leaders to assess the needs and types of participants who should be invited for a training on trauma awareness and to conduct a context analysis to ensure workshops took into account the needs and interests of all stakeholders. Together they decided to include all branches of security forces, as all groups needed to learn how to interact with civilians by using communication skills like dialogue and negotiation instead of using force. Workshops covered a range of topics, beginning with conflict analysis, to help security forces recognise that there are different ways of perceiving events and that people’s behaviours are motivated by their diverse perceptions and experiences. Workshops also included lessons on stress and trauma, as well as conflict transformation skills in dialogue, negotiation and mediation.

Often military and police personnel were directed to come and had no choice in attending and/or had no idea what they were attending. They were very experienced officers who worked in both peacekeeping operations, and logistics. They were mostly Indigenous Fijians or “iTaukei” military personnel. The military’s usual mode of instruction was 55-minute lectures, with very little time given for question and answer. Given PCP’s recognition that lectures only make a limited impact, PCP’s teaching style was elicitive and participatory using a combination of visual and interactive methods that reinforced key ideas.

Growing out of the relationships made in these initial trainings, other joint work with the police became possible. PCP staff works with the Fiji Police Force to teach secondary school students and leaders the value of restorative justice. Restorative justice is a process that holds offenders accountable by directly engaging with the victims or those they have harmed. A dialogue between victim and offender allows for both of them to make amends to each other. Unlike punishments that focus on the motives and sentences for perpetrators, restorative justice focuses on how to recompense victims for the suffering they have experienced. Since Fijian teachers can lose their jobs for improper uses of punishment, teachers and school administrators were eager to learn about restorative justice and come up with alternative options for correcting student behaviours.

When 45 Fijian peacekeepers were kidnapped and held in the Golan Heights by a Syrian rebel group in September 2014, there was concern that anti-Muslim feelings from the kidnapping would increase the possibility of violence toward Indo-Fijians, some of whom are Muslim, in the run up to the National Elections. PCP provided advice to assist the Fijian military on how to handle this situation with the affected families in Fiji until the Fijian peacekeepers were eventually freed.
Experiencing violence causes trauma for individuals, organisations, communities and whole societies, including the security sector. Both victims and perpetrators of violence experience trauma. Trauma affects the body, brain and behaviour, as well as the ability to make meaning or make sense of the world.

Security forces who participate in violence may experience “participation-induced trauma syndrome” and may suffer from “moral injuries” for participating in violence. Psychosocial healing and resilience help people to recover, and are important elements in assisting organisations and societies to function in the aftermath of violence.

In the US, trauma is widespread amongst both military and police personnel. Military personnel returning from wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as those in other regions of the world are suffering from high levels of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This affects the communities and families where they return to live as civilians.

Strategies for Trauma Awareness and Resilience (STAR) is an educational program, based at Eastern Mennonite University’s Center for Justice and Peacebuilding, to strengthen the capacity of leaders and organisations to address trauma, break cycles of violence, and build resilience. The programme began for religious and community leaders in New York and Washington DC after the 11 September 2001 tragedy. The weeklong programme now runs for community leaders all over the world and includes work with the US military. A 2.5-day seminar called “Journey Home from War” was designed to help veterans, primarily from Iraq and Afghanistan, and veteran’s families and communities understand the impact of trauma and how to foster recovery, resilience, and reintegration for veterans returning to their community. Military chaplains also attend.

All trainings include information on the physical, emotional, cognitive, behavioural, and spiritual impact of trauma, awareness on different types of trauma, insights on the brain’s response to trauma, and strategies for coping with trauma and stress.

STAR wanted to help military veterans and their families and communities. But they also had reservations about helping to reduce PTSD symptoms that would allow soldiers to be redeployed, where they would both experience and participate in more trauma for themselves and others. STAR also felt it would be necessary to be as independent as possible, and not work directly under contract with the military. This independence was deemed as important for protecting the relationships STAR trainers have with communities in other parts of the world, who may oppose US military interventions in their countries. (Learn more about trauma awareness and recovery in The Handbook on Human Security: A Civil-Military-Police Curriculum, the companion to this report.)

Mali: Training Military staff on IHL and Human Rights

Written with Cynthia Petrigh

Historic patterns of distrust between the Malian army and the tribally diverse population following the ending of colonial rule in 1960 contribute to on-going cycles of violence between northern Mali’s Tuareg tribal group, Islamist groups, and the Malian military, which led a
military coup in April 2012. International assistance to the Malian military focuses primarily on providing weapons and tactical training. Civilians are often caught in the middle of fighting.

When the European Union Training Mission in Mali’s (EUTM) requested a civilian trainer on International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Human Rights, the Paris-based civil society organisation Beyond Peace was tasked to carry out initial research on military patterns of abuse. Beyond Peace worked with local and international NGOs, human rights groups, and the Malian Ministry of Defence to identify patterns of military forces abuse. Documented accounts of arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearance, use of torture, sexual violence, attacks on civilians, looting, and attacks on schools indicated a systemic lack of attention to protection of civilians and international law.

The Beyond Peace training on IHL and human rights faced a variety of challenges. Most of the Malian forces were illiterate. Soldiers receiving training did not share a common language, though many knew some French. The design of the military training that they were receiving in parallel to Beyond Peace’s course was cumulative, moving from simple to more difficult manoeuvres. The Beyond Peace training on IHL and human rights was on separate topics (such as distinction, proportionality, or treatment of prisoners) making it difficult to build on topics alongside the military training. And finally, there was only one IHL trainer, compared to 185 military trainers. The IHL trainer had to negotiate with military trainers for time allotment and inclusion of key themes into interactive scenario.

To address these challenges, Beyond Peace developed and delivered a 10 week course for 700 Malian military personnel, all men and mostly illiterate, who were preparing for immediate deployment to conduct policing, area control and counterinsurgency. The training focused on IHL and human rights to address these major incidents and prepare them with “right reflexes” when facing fear, hatred and violence, particularly with civilians. The training was not academic or highly technical. The main ideas of key international legal documents were translated into simpler and more accessible concepts that were then practiced in interactive scenarios. Training on IHL and human rights is about sharing values and changing mind-sets. It can only be achieved if the mission itself believes in these values and is ready to challenge its own mind-set.”

To evaluate this training program, Beyond Peace measured the acquisition of knowledge as well as changes to behaviour after deployment. A pre and post-training questionnaire was given on Week 1 and Week 10. Comparative results illustrated improvement on knowledge of IHL and human rights. In addition, trainers met weekly to reflect on group learning objectives and

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**The challenge:**
Illiterate military forces that speak different language are fighting non-state armed groups in a context where security forces had previously neglected protection of civilians.

**Theory of change:**
Create a basic training on protection of civilians accessible to illiterate soldiers who speak different languages and then integrate training themes into a practice-based scenario.

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Photo 11: Beyond Peace in Mali. Photo Credit: Cynthia Petrich
subjective progress in meeting these. Training exercises were adapted to reflect challenges in meeting learning objectives. In addition, the trainer gathered feedback from partners and observers about violations of IHL and human rights. No major violations were reported after the training, in contrast to the frequent reports of violations before the training. During a refresher course for one of the battalions, soldiers’ anecdotal reports indicated that they had used the IHL and human rights training and that it did change their behaviour in military operations. They indicated their relationship with the local population had improved.

Burundi Leadership Training Programme
Written with Elizabeth McClintock

Burundi’s complex history and the challenges and flaws in the Arusha peace process motivated conflict management experts to challenge common assumptions about post-agreement peacebuilding processes. Could adversarial politics replace war and violence in a transition to democracy? Could building new institutions lead to stability? Would donor efforts to apply moral and political pressure, combined with legal sanctions, deter further violence or corruption? Local leaders’ attitudes and behaviours needed to shift, especially those leaders in charge of implementing the Arusha Accord. A rational or technical solution was unlikely to work in such a complex conflict where deeply traumatised people held onto deep antagonism toward each other. Capacity building created an opportunity for addressing these challenges in new ways.

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (WWICS), a Washington think tank and a US-based consulting firm, Conflict Management Partners (CMPartners), collaborated to create the Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP). The aim of the BLTP was to build a consensus on the new rules of the game, based on a understanding that the interests of all stakeholders are interdependent and thus, they must work together rather than compete with each other in adversarial politics based on a “winner take all” mentality. The BLTP’s skills-based training curriculum used interactive exercises, simulations, and role-plays, designed to strengthen communication, negotiation, and conflict management skills of Burundi’s leaders and to rebuild the trust necessary to solve problems together. The trainings included both mixed and homogenous groups: the security sector (both Army and Police); political party leaders and government officials; and community-based leaders, including youth.

Participating in a BLTP training was a first step toward building relationships and trust between former enemies. In the first trainings, the facilitators used negotiation case studies from other contexts, which created enough distance from the conflict to enable the participants to explore new ways of thinking and behaving. Over the course of the program, the role-plays began to more closely reflect the real life challenges faced by stakeholders. For example, a high level military official asked the trainers to use a role play related to a ceasefire when in real life he was having a difficult time getting key stakeholders to negotiate a ceasefire. The BLTP implemented a two-year programme with military officers and police. In all, the programme trained over 350 officers in the high command of the military and police; 15 police trainers and 30 army trainers. Three successive commanders of Burundi’s military academy participated in the training of trainers program.
US: Alliance for Peacebuilding Training

How does the US military work with NGOs and relate to civilians? How does it participate in or contribute to conflict prevention, governance, and humanitarian assistance? The US military’s experience in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as involvement in humanitarian assistance in Pakistan, Haiti and the Philippines and elsewhere prompt US military leaders to ask these questions and invite civil society to provide training on a range of topics related to these questions.

The Alliance for Peacebuilding is a network of peacebuilding organisations with the shared goal of improving human security. After 9/11, the US peacebuilding community began exploring how to impact US foreign policy, concerned about the reliance on military force rather than skills and processes from the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. While first emphasizing outreach efforts to Congress, AfP learned that it was challenging to make an impact influencing Congress without speaking the language of security. Experimenting with translating conflict prevention and peacebuilding language into security discourse, AfP eventually emphasised the concept of human security.

AfP engaged directly with US military leaders to help shift US policy toward human security. Throughout this work, AfP learned to build a “narrative bridge” to explain how conflict prevention and peacebuilding approaches could address some of the same security threats facing the US military. AfP stressed that civil society had an important role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and improving coordination between civil society, military and police – as well as policymakers – was essential to peace and security. AfP sought to both highlight common ground between the US military and civil society organisations working in conflict prevention and peacebuilding while also highlighting the differences in the approaches.

AfP highlights civil society’s contribution to peacebuilding and human security by enabling local civil society leaders from countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to share their perspectives on human security, the impact of current US policy, and alternative strategies to better support conflict prevention and peacebuilding leaders in these contexts. AfP publishes policy briefs and conducts research to improve US government and military support to peacebuilding and human security.

AfP provides training to a variety of US military training centres for military personnel at all levels. This includes teaching new cadets, such as at West Point Military Academy, in their course on “Winning the Peace”, training senior military leaders who are preparing for future deployments, such as Special Operation Command University or Quantico Marine Center, or training specific military units who are about to deploy, such as the 101st Airborne Division or the 12 PRT commanders and their teams preparing to go to Afghanistan. AfP also provided training at the US Foreign Service Institute several times a month for over 1,000 US Foreign Service officers and embedded military personnel who were preparing to work in the US Embassy in Afghanistan. (Learn more about this training in The Handbook on Human Security: A Civil-Military-Police Curriculum, the companion to this report.)
US and Global: Training on Civilian Harm Mitigation
Written with Marla Keenan

The number of civilians killed in today’s armed conflicts continues to increase despite the Geneva Convention and the protections it affords to civilians in the midst of armed conflict. From Afghanistan to Yemen, Syria, the DRC, and South Sudan, civilians are caught between armed groups. While human rights groups have traditionally based their strategy on “naming, blaming and shaming” human rights violators, new approaches in civilian protection are focused on engaging directly with state and non-state armed groups who have the power to prevent civilian harm. While some groups intentionally target civilians, many armed groups do not try to harm civilians. The cause of civilian harm is often a lack of knowledge of what patterns of military action cause harm and failure to prepare and to take proactive steps to avoid harm.

The Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) works directly with civilians, international organisations, governments and their militaries and other armed forces in conflict zones. CIVIC listens to and documents the stories of civilians including their harm, perceptions, wants, and needs. CIVIC then uses this research to develop specific recommendations for policy and practice on better civilian protection and advises parties to a conflict on ways to better protect civilians from their operations and to appropriately respond to harm when caused.

CIVIC believes all harm to civilians should be prevented to the greatest extent possible. Change should be rooted in the wants and needs of civilians caught in conflict. CIVIC brings their voices to those making decisions about conduct in conflict. Like the other organisations featured in this report, CIVIC believes changes in the behaviour of parties to a conflict will result from working directly with decision-makers, helping them understand the effects of their actions and providing them with practical policy solutions to limit and address civilian harm. By adopting a pragmatic approach based on policy and practice rather than law, CIVIC is able to secure the cooperation of key actors and motivate them to adopt additional measures to ensure the safety of civilians. CIVIC believes working in partnership to protect civilians is more effective than working alone. The organisation works with civilians themselves as well as civil society, governments, military actors, international organisations, thought leaders, and the media as passionate advocates and pragmatic advisors.

Like other human rights organisations, CIVIC presses militaries to do what’s right and what’s smart when it comes to civilians on the battlefield. Governments, militaries and other armed groups, and international organisations listen to CIVIC because their civilian harm mitigation recommendations are based on solid research and tested expertise. CIVIC develops concrete steps and recommendations that militaries can take to make smarter choices in their operations, by advising on prevention of civilian harm and response to harm caused. CIVIC’s approach has been proven effective. The US military, NATO and its national militaries, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the UN, African Union forces, Afghan forces, and others have changed policies, training, doctrine, tactics, and mind-sets with the help of CIVIC’s unique work. CIVIC provides training to both troops on the ground and their leadership on how to take a modern, strategic, and ethical view of civilians in the battle space.
As much as possible, training involves “showing” through scenarios and role plays more than “telling” the information through lectures. This includes advice, training, and guidance on keeping “the civilian” front and centre when planning operations, avoiding harm during operations, and responding to harm caused including by tracking casualties, learning lessons through analysis, and dignifying losses. CIVIC documents best practices and aims to institutionalise lessons learned on civilian protection, tracking and analysis, and making amends for civilian harm.

In Somalia, CIVIC advised on an African Union civilian protection policy and are supporting African Union forces to build a cell to track, analyse, and respond to civilian harm. In Afghanistan, CIVIC developed a seven-step process for responding to civilian harm for international and Afghan forces. With the US military, CIVIC helped draft the first civilian harm mitigation doctrine. CIVIC conducts training exercises that explore civilian harm prevention and response at US bases and for thousands of officers in the Afghan National Security Forces.

Like other civil society organisations, CIVIC will not take money from warring parties themselves, preferring to remain independent. CIVIC functions in a neutral advisory role, as advocates for civilians caught in armed conflict.

Armed groups have legal, strategic, and ethical reasons to ensure they reduce the potential for and mitigate civilian harm. Rather than simply advocating from a human rights point of view, it is important to also look at the interests of armed groups to figure out how best to communicate and motivate attention to civilian harm mitigation. Armed groups often recognise that harming civilians can result in further attacks on their soldiers and increased support for opposition groups. Making the case for prevention and appropriate responses to civilian harm from the point of view of armed groups makes it easier to build relationships, dialogue, and problem solve with armed groups to address the problem.

The decision to engage or not engage with an armed group is important. CIVIC has an internal guidelines document that aids in decision-making about whether to engage an armed group. One of these principles is the need for the armed group to have some type of responsible chain of command structure. Without this, there is no way to implement civilian harm mitigation policies and the organisation risks the advice they have given being used as a ‘fig leaf’ by the armed actor.

Amplifying local civil society voices has been an important to validating CIVIC’s approach. Some of the work on the impact of drones on civilians, for example, is politically sensitive. Documenting local civilian voices in reports, and/or actually providing an opportunity for civilians to meet with military leaders to discuss the impact seems to have an impact on military leader’s understanding of the importance of civilian harm mitigation. (Learn more about civilian harm mitigation in The Handbook on Human Security: A Civil-Military-Police Curriculum, the companion to this report.)
Global: Training on “Do No Harm”

*Written with Marshall Wallace*

Any intervention into a conflict can cause harm, particularly if groups attempt to intervene without first understanding the local context. The “Do No Harm” approach includes two key ideas. First, analysing the local context to identify “connectors” and “dividers” will help any group – civil society, military, or police – understand more about how their intervention might help or hurt the local context. Connectors are institutions, values, people, or processes that help people connect with each other across the lines of conflict. Dividers are institutions, values, people or processes that increase divisions between groups. As with the medical profession, the concept of “do no harm” implies that the first responsibility of any interveners is not to make the conflict worse through their intervention. Second, the Do No Harm approach provides a set of tools for planners to ensure their planning is “conflict accountable.”

The diagram below illustrates the Do No Harm assessment and planning tool. Any intervention should attempt to reduce the possibility that it could create unintended negative consequences or second order effects that would increase divisions between groups, increase the likelihood of violence, or fuel corruption.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Connectors</th>
<th>Dividers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>List of Connectors</strong> that links people across conflict lines, particularly those forces that meet human needs</td>
<td><strong>Design programmes that decrease the dividers and increase the connectors between groups</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>List of Dividers</strong> or the tensions or fault lines that divide people or interrupt their human needs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 13: Connectors and Dividers Analysis Tool**

Civil society peacebuilding efforts as well as police and military operations should all be “conflict accountable.” All groups should ensure that they anticipate potential impacts of the efforts, identifying how they might inadvertently increase divisions within a context and how they could maximise connections between groups so as to foster better relationships across the lines of conflict.

The Do No Harm approach is the product of a collaborative learning project involving thousands of people from 1993-2014, organised by CDA Collaborative Learning Projects. Because of the collaborative nature of the learning process, training is available from several organisations and individuals.

Many NGOs operating internationally have received training in the Do No Harm approach, recognizing that in the past NGO humanitarian and development efforts have inadvertently increased conflict and violence, fuelled corruption, disempowered local volunteerism or leadership, and led to a variety of other unintended impacts. As military forces engage in more humanitarian crisis, and become involved in a wider range of civilian tasks, there is a greater need for them to recognise the potential for causing harm when building a school, setting up a humanitarian camp for displaced peoples or delivering medical aid.

**The challenge**

Any type of assistance can unintentionally cause harm.

**Theory of change:**

Training can help groups anticipate potential negative impacts and plan to minimise harm while maximizing connections.

In Kosovo, in the early 2000s, a consultant trained the US military in the Do No Harm approach in a brief workshop. A checklist was developed out of the training to help the US military identify the connectors and dividers in the context so as to avoid potential unintended impacts and maximise opportunities for supporting local connectors.
In Afghanistan, the Australian government’s aid agency AUSAID moved into forward positions with the Australian military during the period 2010-2012. AUSAID developed a training module for deploying soldiers on relating to NGOs that included a section on Do No Harm to help explain what NGOs do, how they do it, and why it matters to the Australian military operating in Afghanistan. The positive feedback on the Do No Harm approach was so strong that while it was only given a one hour block in the first round of training, it was given an entire day in the second training course. One Australian major reported it was the most important part of the training. The operational reports were not as positive. Despite preparation to analyse the connectors and dividers in Afghan communities where the Australian military and AUSAID were serving, they ended up inadvertently supporting projects with a warlord that increased conflict between Australian forces and Afghan communities. However, a US-based NGO, the Center for Civilians in Conflict, found that the Australians were far ahead of other countries intervening in Afghanistan when it came to addressing civilian harm.

In the Philippines, local civil society initiatives to train the military and police (see other case studies in this report) emphasised the Do No Harm approach through short workshops for the Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process (OPAPP). The Filipino military reported that the Do No Harm training has been very useful for helping them interact with civilians. Trainings that involve both police and community together are on-going as of 2015.

An organisation working on security sector reform in Zimbabwe and Honduras, among other countries, has used the Do No Harm approach as part of the toolkit they teach to stakeholders. An evaluation of the now completed work in Zimbabwe said their contribution was “invaluable.” The work in Honduras is on-going (2015).

(Learn more about “Do No Harm” and other conflict assessment and planning tools in The Handbook on Human Security: A Civil-Military-Police Curriculum, the companion to this report.)