Chapter 1
Local Ownership in the Security Sector

This report is about local ownership. It illustrates how civil society groups in diverse geographical contexts from South Africa to Guatemala, from the Philippines to Israel/Palestine, use peacebuilding processes to build relationships between security forces and local communities with the goal of increasing human security. Even though “local ownership” has become a common buzzword, the meaning of the term is often vague, especially when applied to the security sector.

In this report, “local” is interpreted as a geographic term. It designates people affected by security threats – as well as security policies and strategies – because they live in the specific geographic area in which the threats occur. “Ownership” is used as a relative term that describes the varying ability to include local communities in security sector policies and programmes and set up effective oversight mechanisms.

Local ownership is not an end in itself. It is a means of reaching a larger common goal. The programmes described in this report all work towards the goal of improving human security. They aim to democratise and legitimise state-society relations, so that local people in every home and community feel safe. Human security is a population-centric idea; it is measured by the perceptions of whether local men and women, boys and girls feel safe. This distinguishes it from other enemy-centric concepts of security that focus on identifying and deflecting threats from certain groups. Due to the emphasis on popular perceptions of safety, local ownership is a key pre-requisite and intrinsic aspect of human security.

Local ownership engages local communities in a set of processes. This report documents the role of peacebuilding processes such as dialogue, negotiation, mediation and joint problem solving in enabling local ownership of security. These peacebuilding processes enable local people to participate in identifying security challenges, jointly developing and implementing security strategies, and monitoring and evaluating the security sector to ensure it works to improve the safety of every man, woman, girl and boy.

The term “local ownership” relates to other popular concepts. The security sector tends to speak about “community engagement” when they refer to their efforts to have local communities participate in their policies and programmes, e.g. in community policing projects. Civil society favours the term “civil society oversight” to describe their ability to monitor and contribute to security sector policies and programmes. “Civil-military-police coordination” and “multi-stakeholder coordination” relate to the same general concept. All of these terms refer to joint meetings between civil society and the security sector where local people have the ability to participate in security sector programmes and policies.

State-Society Relations
Local ownership of human security begins with an understanding of society’s role in legitimate, participatory and democratic state-society relations. Legitimacy stems from a state that uses its powers and resources to protect and advance the interests of all people and groups in society.
In democratic state-society relations, society participates in making decisions that affect their lives not only through an occasional election, but also through a variety of forums where society participates in solving public problems. State-society relations based on public legitimacy represent the ideal environment for ensuring conditions of human security.

Historically, the right to rule a state came by virtue of the rulers’ “monopoly of force” and military forces justified their sovereignty with their ability to control a population in military terms. Today, this model continues to exist. In some states, groups still compete for the monopoly of force and the group with most military power earns the right to govern. With the widespread availability of weapons to private individuals and non-state groups, today some governments actively take part in violent competitions against their own citizens and other states to earn their legitimacy to govern. Armed rebellion against the state is more frequent in “elite-captured” states that serve the interests of a small group of elite members in society and actively discriminate against other groups.

Excluded groups lack fair treatment or access to government services, such as protection, justice, or access to healthcare, education, housing, or jobs. Both armed insurgencies as well as nonviolent social movements often develop in response to elite-captured governments as local groups attempt to push for either a new or reformed government. Elite-captured governments may then direct security forces to pacify or repress society in an attempt to obstruct their public demands on government for accountability and equal access to public goods. In too many countries, local police or military forces use repressive violence against unarmed people and communities.

An alternative approach sees states earning legitimacy by serving the interests of all groups in society and through non-coercive public engagement via democratic processes such as public dialogue and accountability boards. In stable, peaceful states, citizens support their government and help leaders make decisions that benefit all groups without disadvantaging or persecuting parts of the population such as women, men or other minorities of gender, ethnicity, race, age or religion.

“Citizen-centred states” – which in most cases are democracies - serve the interests of a state’s entire population and enjoy a “monopoly of public legitimacy.” These governments win public support when they work to ensure human security of the whole population and not just the security of elite groups. A government’s public legitimacy is a reflection of public perception of government performance in providing public goods. In a citizen-oriented government, society both is able to hold government to account and to partner with government to provide public goods.

In a citizen-oriented state, the security sector serves the population. Peace and stability are relative to the degree that police, national military, international peacekeepers or military forces serve locally defined human security goals and are accountable to local communities.
Local ownership is not about enlisting an elite member of civil society to participate in elite-centred security strategies. Building local ownership requires listening to the perceptions of security threats from diverse segments of society. Government security policymakers consult with and listen to the interests of all local citizens who are affected by their security operations.

**Security Sector Reform and Development**

In countries such as South Africa, Guatemala, and the Philippines, large social movements pushed for the transformation from an elite-captured government to a citizen-oriented government. Civil society groups organised themselves to push for greater local ownership in security. In most democratic countries, society continues to push for security sector development (SSD) toward a human security model. Now these countries and many others are undergoing a process of developing democratic and legitimate state-society relations. A transformation of how society views and relates to the security sector is fundamental to this transformation, as illustrated in Figure 3.

![Figure 3: Transformation of State-Society Relations](image)

With growing recognition of the links between development and security, donor countries began to see the importance of citizen-oriented states that provide public services and are accountable to citizens as critical to security and stability. The world has many tragic examples of how conflict can rapidly wipe out decades of hard-won development gains. Therefore, donors in the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) developed programmes to assist in the democratisation and legitimisation of the security sector in “fragile” countries affected by violence. Reformed, citizen-oriented security sectors correlated with states being more able prevent and address violence and sustain a peace settlement to end war.3

Donors began urging states emerging from war to take on a formal process of security sector reform (SSR) or a less formal process of security sector development (SSD) to change state policies and practices from ones that protect the security, economic and political interests of an elite group in power to one that protects the interests of all citizens – male and female – including minority groups. Security sector reform and development (SSR/D) is seen as a way to strengthen and transform the state-society relationship toward a focus on human security, as illustrated in the figure here. The OECD defines SSR/D as a process of “seeking to increase partner countries’ ability to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law. SSR/D includes, but extends well beyond, the narrower focus of more traditional security assistance on defence, intelligence and policing.”

SSR/D involves not only developing the military and police, but also addressing the wider security sector including intelligence, justice, security policymakers, and non-state armed groups. Some refer to SSR, or SSD or JSSR, meaning justice and security sector reform. These efforts include three goals:
1. Improving democratic governance with an emphasis on civil oversight of security sector and multi-stakeholder processes that include civil society, especially women, minority groups, and youth in shaping security policy and strategy
2. Recognizing the relationship between security and development policy, and orienting security strategies toward human security for all people
3. Professionalizing the security sector, emphasizing an efficient and effective security sector that holds a monopoly of force over other armed groups in society

In practice, many Western donors under pressure to improve counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts invest primarily in the third area. They professionalise the security sector by training and equipping military and police in enemy-centric tactics, but put little emphasis on democratic governance or human security. This is more accurately called "security force assistance" and not SSR/D. Research on exclusive “train and equip” programmes in Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali and elsewhere emphasises that they can do more harm than good. Often, they may lead to situations where security forces simply use bigger weapons to repress local populations. They risk further undermining human security when they trap populations between increased violence of abusive security forces and the terror of non-state armed groups. The risk of security assistance to escalate violence is especially prevalent in nondemocratic states, where security forces lack public legitimacy and are thus less inhibited to engage in abuses.

Most reviews of SSR/D programmes cite the lack of local ownership as the most pivotal element in success or failure. Donors attempting to foster local ownership and community engagement in security may not know where to begin. At the same time, civil society groups wanting to push for reforms toward a human security approach also do not know how to begin to reach out to the security sector. This report attempts to address that gap. The case studies provide abundant examples of collaborative processes between civil society and state security actors in police, military, justice, and other civil government institutions that are engaged in transitioning towards a human security framework. But first it is important to understand the history of why local ownership of security is so difficult.

Security Approaches to Society: From Pacification to Partnership

The case studies in this volume emerge from a long history of non-existing or adversarial relationships between security forces and local populations. It is important to understand this past to recognise the magnitude of shift represented by the new peacebuilding projects between civil society and security forces that this report displays.

There are at least five distinct approaches or stages in security sector relationships with society. Figure 5 illustrates these approaches with the goal of enabling an analysis of why civil society-military-police coordination and local ownership of security is possible in some contexts but not others.
Historically, states have taken an adversarial and exploitative approach to civilians. Colonial governments predominantly viewed civilians either as potential enemies or cheap labour and waged atrocious wars against them to keep them subdued. Such “pacification” campaigns induced fear and terror in local populations as a means of control. Some governments today continue to repress civil society, executing and torturing civil society leaders and using scorched earth policies, including mass atrocities, against local populations to ensure that they will not press governing authorities for any public services, freedoms, or rights. Journalists documenting such forms of violence by security forces have brought international pressure to expose and prevent violent pacification tactics – sometimes referred to as “state-based terrorism.” However, the legacy of this approach continues to influence the security sector’s attitude towards civil society, including security forces’ distrust of NGOs and other civil society organisations, and civil society’s distrust of security forces.

Today, civil society widely views counterterrorism laws to restrict civil society as a continuation of the pacification mind-set. In this approach, counterterrorism legislation restricts civil society from contact with non-state armed groups identified as “terrorists” even if they have a legitimate set of political grievances and self-determination aims protected by international law. Counterterrorism “lawfare” (warfare by legal means) makes it impossible for civil society to offer humanitarian assistance, development assistance or engage in peacebuilding programmes that might have a moderating effect on non-state armed groups.

But over the last fifteen years, security forces have been adopting less repressive approaches towards civil society. Some aspects of the concept of pacification continue to be found in counterinsurgency literature, which takes a cautious approach toward civilians, viewing them as potential allies or potential enemies. Rather than intimidating civil society, counterinsurgency aims to pacify local populations by winning the hearts and minds through establishing or re-establishing local government responsive to and involving the participation of the people. Rather than attacking civilians, military forces provide civic assistance to local villages to gain acceptance and prevent local populations from supporting hostile non-state armed groups.

A fourth approach emphasises a new era prioritizing civilian safety in security sector-civil society relations where states, regional organisations like the Africa Union, or the United Nations, mandate security forces with the task of “protection of civilians.” New military doctrine and training emphasises military and police roles in protection of civilians as well as...
avoiding civilian casualties and mitigating harm against civilians during military or police operations. New frameworks for international action such as the Responsibility to Protect call on governments to refrain from violent repression of civilians themselves, and to protect civilians from violence from non-state armed groups.

A fifth approach views civil society as service providers, contributing to peace and stability. States, regional organisations and international organisations view civil society organisations as contractors or “implementing partners.” They fund CSOs to provide healthcare, food, water and shelter to vulnerable populations such as the young, old, veterans and disabled members of society, to building the capacity of communities to govern effectively to maintain the rule of law, community safety, and economic development, to countering violent extremism. Many CSOs are wary of government funding, noting they lose their independence; their ability to respond to locally identified needs, and the trust and legitimacy they have with local communities when they are seen as for-profit contractors working on behalf of governments. Civil society specifically opposes the use of the term “implementing partners”, as it implies that CSOs do not have their own assessment or plans to address local needs.\(^{10}\)

This report illustrates a sixth approach where security forces and an empowered and independent civil society build understanding and coordinate with each other to address the root causes of insecurity and coordinate efforts to support human security. In a “coordination for human security” approach, conflict prevention and peacebuilding skills, values, and processes enable less antagonistic relationship capable of joint problem solving. It is important to recognise how this multi-stakeholder human security approach contrasts with other approaches. Unlike other approaches, a human security approach does not manipulate civil society as security assets. Instead it emphasises the empowerment of civil society to participate in identifying security challenges, designing and implementing human security programmes and overseeing the security sector’s performance.

Senior military leaders have come to advocate for this approach. In his book Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces to Support Democratic Transitions, US Admiral Dennis Blair argues armed forces have a critical role to support society’s move toward democracy. “The military heroes that history remembers have acted not to oppress their people but to defend them.”\(^{11}\) Such views represent a major departure from past military attitudes that considered civilians as inferior or even hostile and mark a new era of prioritizing civilian lives and adding human security interests onto national security agendas.

In some contexts, different security actors may each be using a different approach simultaneously. Some national or international military and police units may focus on protection of civilians while others are actively using violent pacification. A government’s development agency may be funding programmes to support civil-military-police coordination on human security while other government agencies use legal frameworks to prevent CSOs from talking to armed groups, or keep CSOs busy with lucrative contracts to provide public services.

**Civil Society: From Protest to Proposal**

As security sector approaches to civil society have evolved, so have those of civil society to the security sector. Broadly speaking, one can distinguish three distinct civil society approaches to the security sector: support, protest, or proposal.

In some citizen-oriented states, civil society widely supports and accepts the security sector. They view military and police as legitimate representatives of society and may also decide to voluntarily sign up for service. In such countries, a growing number of civil society organisations are also working as implementing partners providing public services to contribute to the security agenda of governments, regional organisations and international organisations.
The security sectors in most elite-captured states do not enjoy this kind of support. In countries where there is forced recruitment, or recruitment by racial, ethnic or religious group, there may be wide public opposition to security forces. This is also true in countries where security forces repress or violate human rights. Given the prevalence of this problem in the security sector, in many countries, CSOs – especially human rights organisations - adopt an adversarial approach to the security sector. Some groups document human rights violations and publish reports to denounce and protest against abuses committed by security forces and seek accountability. Human rights organisations play an important role in holding governments to account for their duties to protect civilians. The “protest” approach relies mostly on “Naming, Blaming, and Shaming” state security forces and non-state armed groups for human rights abuses.

Figure 6 illustrates that some civil society organisations are shifting from protest to making proposals to improve human security. While sharing the same human rights concerns that protesters denounce, these peacebuilding CSOs use a persuasive theory of change to build relationships with the security sector through direct dialogue, negotiation, and problem solving to address human rights abuses. As illustrated below, peacebuilding skills and processes help civil society to move from a sole reliance on “protest” to also include their ability to make “proposals.” While sharing concerns about human rights violations and firmly supporting human security, civil society leaders in diverse corners of the world have come to the conclusion that they must go beyond protesting security policies. Civil society’s interest in “coordination for human security” developed as civil society reached out to build relationships with the security sector, engaged in joint problem solving, and articulated security policy alternatives. Peacebuilding skills and processes such as conflict analysis, negotiation, mediation, and dialogue often inspired this coordination to support human security. This report documents case studies illustrating how peacebuilding CSOs have coordinated with the military and police to support human security.

Civil Society’s Operational Requirements
In contexts of political conflict, civil society must navigate between state and non-state armed groups to maintain their legitimacy among their constituents and their safety amidst these armed groups. This requires the adherence to operational requirements that guarantee its independence. The more empowered, independent, distinct, accepted, and free civil society organisations are, the better they can contribute to improve human security. Disempowered civil society organisations that are dependent on government funding, indistinguishable from security forces, and lacking operational freedom, will likely be rejected by local communities. The text box below describes the key operational requirements for civil society working in contexts of political conflict.
Coordination for Human Security: Working With, not Against

Civil society and the security sector can work with each other when they have a common goal to improve human security. "Human security" is also known as "multidimensional security" and "citizen security." Human security is distinct from, but may overlap with national security.

"National security” prioritises economic, geopolitical, or ideological interests of the state and, if necessary, the use of military force to protect them. In many countries, national security is tasked solely to the military. In recent years, some states have begun investing more in development and diplomacy as national security strategies.

“Human security” focuses on the individual and community perspectives on security. Human security prioritises violence caused by both state and non-state armed groups, poverty, economic inequality, discrimination, environmental degradation and health and how they affect individuals and communities. Comprehensive human security includes three components: freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity. To address these problems, human security emphasises the need for "whole of society" efforts including security forces but also government, civil society, business, academic, religious, media and other actors. Due to these differing outlooks, national security and human security responses can often be very different.
To contrast national security and human security, one can look at the different understanding of security challenges and the different theories of change underlying both approaches. The text box here explains the concept of “Theories of Change.”

What are “Theories of Change”?

Groups contributing to human security shape their programmes and strategies based on their understanding of security challenges. But they may not share the same understanding of the security challenge, even when acting in similar context. Organisations work according to their own set of ideas about the nature of the challenge they are addressing. Increasingly, civil society and governments are all using a conflict assessment research process to identify security challenges – including the root causes and drivers of violence. Yet even when using similar conflict assessment frameworks, groups still tend to understand security challenges differently.

A “theory of change” (ToC) is a statement – a strategic narrative - about how to address a particular challenge. Every organisation has an implicit or explicit theory of change that articulates how some type of strategy or intervention will address the challenges they identify.

To illustrate the variety of theories of change, each case study in this report contains a text box summarizing the locally identified understanding of the challenge and the theory of change guiding the human security programme described in the case study.

An example helps to illustrate the two approaches. An armed opposition movement is threatening to overthrow a government, which is widely known to endanger civilian lives through violations of human rights. A national security strategy may understand the underlying security challenge as the state lacking a monopoly of force. As a consequence, the national security actor may ask the international community for more weapons and to provide training in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism to security forces. In contrast, a human security strategy will understand the challenge as the state lacking public legitimacy. A human security strategy might therefore focus on empowering civil society to hold their government to account for the grievances that drive support for insurgents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Understanding of the Challenge</th>
<th>Theory of Change and Intervention Design</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Security</strong></td>
<td>Emphasis on government security forces as primary actor in security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats to state-defined economic, political or ideological interests, often emphasizing violence from non-state armed groups and other states as assessed by national security advisors</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Human Security</strong></td>
<td>Emphasis on whole of society or “multi-stakeholder” efforts to address the drivers of violence and insecurity including government, civil society, business, academic, religious, media and other actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats to individuals and communities coming from violence from state and non-state armed groups, poverty, economic inequality, discrimination, environmental degradation and health concerns as assessed by conflict assessment research processes that include broad public consultations to define the drivers of violence and insecurity</td>
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Figure 6: Comparing Theories of Change
Despite their differences, national security and human security goals can also overlap. A state might come to understand that protecting civilians and prioritizing development or democratic governance is in its national security interests.¹² The case studies in this report are examples of collaboration and dialogue between security forces and civil society who share interests at the intersection of national security and human security.

The Logic of Local Ownership in the Security Sector

Every government makes decisions about how much power local civil society will have to participate in the security sector. Elite-captured governments usually have little incentive to expand local ownership, as this would lead them to lose control and possibly their elite status. But citizen-oriented governments see increasing local ownership and community engagement as important aspects of their national security plans.

Although some donor governments recognise the necessity of local ownership and push for greater democratic governance, most foreign donors and interveners have a tendency to ignore it. Nearly every international assistance framework - at the UN, World Bank, OECD, and the recent Busan Principles of International Assistance and the New Deal for Fragile States – mandates the principle of “local ownership.” But in reality, the political and economic interests of donor countries easily hijack the concept of “local ownership.”

Critics of SSR/D argue that the term SSR/D itself has come to imply an unequal power relationship; a situation where those “reformed [are] reforming the unreformed”¹³ rather than local people reforming their own system. It is true that donor approaches to SSR/D are fragmented, lacking coordination and mechanisms for listening to local communities or communicating transparent goals or processes. Foreign governments donating money for other states to undergo an SSR/D process also have their own national security interests in mind. This leads some of them to push counterterrorism lenses onto their SSR/D programs. Local ownership then serves as a fig leaf, as a nice and uncontroversial idea, but certainly not a strategic necessity.

Often SSR/D processes involve a few token elite, male civil society leaders to “check the box” of local ownership. These elites are not actually invited to shape the analysis or design and implement the program. Rather they are asked to “comment” on plans already made. The International Network on Conflict and Fragility’s review of donor support to justice and security concluded that, “ownership’ is often conflated with ‘buy-in’. Structures are meant to enhance local buy-in to donor-conceived and -led activities, not to enable local actors to take the lead in programming decisions.”¹⁴ Often this approach to community engagement just causes further division within civil society.

Meaningful local ownership asks critical questions listed in the figure below and requires the participation of civil society in decision-making, control, implementation and evaluation of human security programmes.
Local ownership of security needs a makeover. Security sector reform and development (SSR/D) needs to move from externally guided processes toward internally generated analysis and solutions carried out by diverse local stakeholders. Local people in every community can and should play roles in monitoring and oversight of security programs. The effectiveness of SSR/D should be measured by local perceptions and definitions of human security. The case studies in this report illustrate that donors can create and support incentives or mandates for local ownership in an SSR/D process.

National governments and international donors need to recognise the clear strategic value of local ownership:

**Time and Speed Implications**
Donor governments who focus on train and equip programmes to meet the urgent security threats or to support fragile peace agreements often argue that that this is the fastest way to remedy security challenges. While it is true that local ownership takes time to construct, it is ultimately the faster route. Train and equip programmes will ultimately fail or cause even more violence, unless they are accompanied by programmes aimed at preventing human rights abuses by security forces. To build legitimate state-society relationships with local ownership in security, “you have to go slow to go fast.” There is no end-run around authentic local ownership.

**Security Implications**
Local ownership improves state-society relationships. A public that perceives the security sector protects human security is more likely to view their government as legitimate. Legitimate, citizen-oriented states face fewer threats from non-state armed groups. Local perceptions of security and justice may be very different than those of national elites or foreigners. In countries where non-state groups fulfil up to 80% of the security and justice roles in society, tribal, traditional, religious and other citizen-based groups must be engaged in order to achieve human security for all. Local ownership puts local perceptions of security at the centre of all SSR/D efforts.

**Long-term Political Stability Implications**
If outsiders take down a government and attempt to rebuild it themselves, local groups may never have the incentive or the time to build coalitions among themselves. This can hamper the emergence of stable and functional governance in the long run. Without outside intervention, insiders have greater incentive to build broad coalitions between social groups to improve state-society relations. This coalition building among local groups that negotiate with each other to identify common ground proposals and platforms is essential to sustainable SSR/D.

**Sustainability Implications**
Without robust local ownership, any SSR/D efforts may simply fail. If insiders are not committed to changing the security sector, national elites or international donors may just be...
wasting their time and effort attempting to force such changes. For example, a review of the Burundian SSR/D process questioned the impact of Dutch funding for the SSR/D process in Burundi. On the one hand, the funding mandated community engagement but may have encouraged national elites to withdraw financial support from SSR. Once the national elites were no longer financially invested in SSR/D, there is some concern they are less invested in making the reforms succeed. In Somaliland, the lack of international financial support for the peace process meant that the local business community had to step in. They were willing to do so and increase their influence, because they realised that reconciliation and stability would benefit the pastoral economy. More research could help to determine the conditions that warrant outside funding. Donors might be able to provide needed funding in ways that foster local accountability and do less to discourage local ownership.

**Gender Implications**

Local ownership is especially important to ensure that security threats to both women and men are taken into consideration in all efforts to improve security. SSR/D needs to be *gender sensitive* to ensure all men, women, girls and boys have equal access to justice and security, including their protection from sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). SSR/D needs to be *gender inclusive* to involve all genders in planning and implementing security strategies. SSR/D also needs to be *gender accountable* so that all genders participates in overseeing the security sector.

**Broadening Local Ownership**

Local ownership should be broad, including as many stakeholders as possible. In order to broaden local ownership, diverse stakeholders must participate in policy-making and programming in the security sector. Involving just a handful of local elite men in a consultation cannot yield an accurate picture of the interests or needs of all social groups in society. True local ownership includes mechanisms to engage every individual in society, from children to elders, males and females, working in every sector of society, with different levels of education, religious beliefs, economic status, and with diverse gender, ethnic, racial and linguistic identities. Meaningful local ownership is not only about *whom* to engage but also about *how* to engage, i.e. which oversight or engagement mechanism to use to create meaningful and sustainable ties with local communities. Oversight and engagement mechanisms can be institutions or activities that provide citizens the ability to contribute, influence and control security sector policies and programming.

**Civilian Government Ownership**

The traditional mechanism to increase local ownership in the security sector is the civilian government. The government's executive branch and representative bodies such as parliament or congress hold effective oversight functions. They administer and control the security sectors authorities, mandates and budget to ensure that all security sector policies and programmes represent and satisfy the needs of citizens.

However, civilian government oversight is not always able to guarantee the human security of all citizens. If a parliament is made up mostly of men, it is not surprising that violence against women is not a priority for them. If a congress is made up primarily of one racial group, it is not surprising that the civilian government does not take action to ensure diversity within police departments or to stop police violence when the police belong to one racial group and the community belongs to another. Even in states with democratic electoral systems, an elite-captured government may make security decisions based exclusively on its own political and economic interests, such as making profits through weapons manufacturing.

All states should provide additional participatory mechanisms that offer opportunities for civil society and the wider public to have an input into security sector policies and programmes. These mechanisms enable the full participation of all sectors of society in security sector policies and programmes. They enable women, who represent half of every community and
nation, to be included and apply their distinct skillsets and perspectives on human security, but also other gender groups such as LGBTI individuals or men who can be marginalised due to their belonging to a particular ethnic, racial, religious, social, or age group.

Figure 8 illustrates the two types of local ownership in security sector policies and programmes: civilian government, consisting of the executive branch of the government and the parliament or congress in an elected representative system of government, and civil society, which also includes the media.

**Civil Society Ownership**

Local ownership must be expanded horizontally to include broader segments of civil society, as illustrated in Figure 9. This requires moving from international NGO (INGO) and elite local participation toward processes that involve large numbers of diverse segments of society. INGOS must map local capacity and recognise the principle of “Local First.” They should provide entry to local civil society in order to widen public involvement in dialogue on security priorities and strategies. Women and men of different ages, regions, languages, religions, and ethnicities as a diverse set of representatives of distinct civil society groups should all participate in security sector policy-making and programming.

Sometimes, international NGOs (INGOs) act as intermediaries between the security sector and local civil society. They provide support structures such as forums and dialogues and capacity building to strengthen the ability of civil society to oversee security sector policies and programs. In some cases, INGOS engage and hand over functions to national “modern” civil society organisations, which in turn draw in “traditional” civil society organisation such as tribal leaders. But this chain of engagement does not always proceed without tensions. INGOS may be effective in applying models and lessons they have learned elsewhere, as is evident in the work of international peacebuilding NGOs including Saferworld, International Alert, Conciliation Resources, Search for Common Ground, and Partners for Democratic Change. But some accuse other INGOS of holding onto neo-colonial attitudes toward local civil society, underestimating their capacities and tending to speak for local people. Local civil society sometimes critiques INGOS for taking over the role and funding for local civil society. International NGOs and elite local civil society representatives should not be gatekeepers, but instead step back and open doors to more diverse individuals and groups that truly represent aspects of society.

**Figure 10: Broadening Local Ownership of Security**
Deepening Local Ownership

While it is important to broaden local ownership by including more diverse segments of local civil society, it is also important to deepen local ownership, so that civil society engagement evolves from isolated, project-based efforts toward platforms for joint implementation and joint institutional oversight. There are a great variety of institutions and activities that enable civil society to contribute to security sector policies and programs. Not all of them are effective in creating sustainable relationships between civil society and security forces. To strengthen their ties, civil society and security forces need to build long-term relationships and trust. They need to come together, discuss their respective interests and find joint solutions that optimise their respective outcomes.

Coordination Wheel for Human Security

This report documents various activities to coordinate civil society and the security sector in five areas, illustrated in Figure 10.

**Joint capacity building:** Joint training, coaching and support can build relationships and develop a common set of skills, concepts and processes for working together to support human security.

**Jointly assess human security challenges:** Joint conflict assessment can include jointly designing research questions and data collection methods and jointly analysing data.

**Jointly plan human security strategies:** Jointly determining appropriate programs and strategies to support human security, and determine relevant theories of change.

**Jointly implement human security strategies:** Jointly implement a project together, such as increasing the gender sensitivity of police, developing a civilian harm mitigation plan, or addressing trauma in local communities.

**Jointly monitor and evaluate security sector performance in oversight mechanisms:** Joint institutional oversight mechanism to identify the baselines, benchmarks and indicators for monitoring and evaluation of the security sector and discussing the outputs, outcomes, and impacts of security strategies.

The coordination wheel of activities produces a vision for what local ownership looks like at its most robust. But often, as illustrated in many of the case studies in this publication, civil society and the security sector may only be coordinating in one set of activities, and not in all. Case studies such as the Philippines illustrate joint work in all five activities in the coordination wheel. Other case studies indicate only one or two joint activities, such as joint capacity building in Brazil, or jointly implementing a DDR programme in DRC.
Exact measurements of the vertical “degrees” of local ownership are difficult. However, some forms of coordination and local ownership seem to be more robust than others. Levels of local ownership relate to at least two factors: the number of joint activities that civil society and the security sector perform together, and the level of civil society empowerment within those activities. Local ownership is most robust where civil society and the security sector are coordinating with each other in all five elements. Second, local ownership is most robust where civil society is empowered, independent, distinct, accepted, and free, as discussed in the section on civil society's operational requirements.

For example, sharing information with civil society or setting up a dialogue to listen to civil society indicates less local ownership than setting up joint implementation of human security programming with civil society or institutionalizing a joint oversight mechanism. A community policing dialogue where the police just listen to citizen complaints is less robust than a community policing programme that involves local neighbourhood watch committees where citizens work with the police to manage community conflicts. And a permanent citizen-oversight committee where the community can assess threats to their human security, and report and take action to address incidents of civilian harm illustrates even greater local ownership. Institutionalised oversight forums that give civil society a seat at the table to monitor and evaluate the security sector indicate that the state-society relationship is seen as legitimate, democratic and citizen-oriented.

In order to deepen local ownership, it is important to increase and institutionalise the functions of civil society in relation to the security sector. Figure 11 illustrates a rough framework for deepening the levels of local ownership in the security sector.20 The darkest blue colour illustrates the most robust levels of local ownership, where civil society both is involved in multiple activities in the coordination wheel and where civil society holds institutionalised power to monitor and evaluate the security sector’s performance with government. Capacity building is a necessary pre-requisite to achieve any level of local ownership, which is why it stands as a separate but permanent category.

Each of these levels of local ownership should build on the prior levels of engagement. However, Figure 11 is not necessary a linear path to local ownership. It is possible to innovate a programme in “joint implementation” before there are dialogue processes. But the case studies in this volume illustrate that often there is first dialogue to assess human security threats and/or an initial effort in capacity building. Joint implementation and institutional oversight mechanisms are more likely to grow out of these “lighter” forms of engagement. Figure 11 shows an approximate progression from the most superficial to the more meaningful types of engagement.
Capacity Building
Training for civil society and the security sector to support human security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Local Ownership</th>
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| **Information Sharing**                       | Governments identify human security threats to civilians  
Civil society identifies human security threats to government |
| **Dialogue and Consultation**                 | Governments, security forces, and civilians identify human security threats and jointly design potential human security strategies |
| **Joint Implementation**                      | Civil society and the security sector participate in joint problem-solving and programming to implement human security strategies |
| **Joint Institutional Oversight**             | Civil society representatives have institutional capacity, and legal authority at the local, regional, and national level to participate in assessing threats, designing and implementing security strategies and monitoring impact. |

Figure 12: Levels of Local Ownership

**Information Sharing**
Information sharing is a one-way channel of communication, where one party simply receives information from the other. At a minimum, “local ownership” means governments should share basic security information with the public. It also means civil society groups share information with the government.

Governments may share information with the public or may encourage the public to share information with them. Some governments may decide to publish their policies on a specific security issue to increase transparency. Or they may encourage the public to provide information about security threats. Some governments may request information from civilians through hotline phone numbers, a complaints desk, or a web form that will allow individuals to report concerns related to security. These can be information sharing portals where citizens share information about security problems or they can be grievance mechanisms to report directly on the performance of a security officer. Some governments offer grievance mechanisms that simply register private complaints. Others are more transparent, enabling reporting to the public the pattern of complaints or grievances and how the government or security sector are attempting to be accountable to the public by responding to the complaints. But these one-way strategies prevent long-term relationship building and trust.

Civil society also uses information sharing channels when advocating for improvements to human security, such as submitting reports on security or policy recommendations. Civil society organisations play a “watchdog” role and serve as “an index of public contentment” with the security sector to ensure that it respects human rights and serves the public.
Until the last two decades, civil society relied mostly on these one-way information-sharing approaches that often take an adversarial stance within a “protest” paradigm described earlier in this chapter. Independent human rights commissions; indigenous people's rights groups, women's rights advocates, refugee advocates, and anti-nuclear advocates are some examples of the types of civil society groups and movements that exist in most countries. These groups may denounce human rights abuses by security forces publicly, push for internal complaint mechanisms such as phone hotlines, or external oversight bodies such as or Ombudsman Offices, or work to strengthen legislation to protecting victims of abuses.

Watchdog mechanisms are important because they hold the security sector accountable. If they are successful, they force police or military to change their policies or to apply punitive measures to perpetrators of abuses, which certainly contributes to human security. But these mechanisms may entail the sacrifice of long-term relationships and trust. Due to their one-way direction and adversarial nature, advocacy efforts may make it more difficult for civil society to build the necessary relationships with security stakeholders to reorient the security sector toward human security.

This report focuses on civil society’s move from relying almost entirely on one-way information sharing and the “protest” method of security oversight toward civil society's ability to work directly in relationship with the security sector on human security “proposals” that develop out of “two-way communication” settings where people meet together. This does not mean suggest neglecting accountability, but achieving accountability differently by creating meaningful and long-term institutional relationships and trust. Permanent, institutionalised civil society-security sector coordination mechanisms on as many levels and as many security issues as possible may provide the most effective guarantee for human security.

**Dialogue and Consultation**

The terms dialogue and consultation refer to a process during which civil society and the security sector jointly assess threats to human security and jointly plan how to improve human security. These forums are different from a mere information-exchange during which one party simply explains their point of view. This approach by definition includes at least a two-way exchange of information.

Successful dialogue and consultation forums – like all coordination mechanisms - require professional facilitation to foster effective cross-cultural communication. Stakeholders listen each other’s interests and perspectives. Without skilful facilitation, coordination meetings often break down as participants engage in unproductive conflict or walk out of the meeting. Communication skills and knowledge of civic responsibilities also contribute to improved outcomes.

In practice, many country’s security sectors are open to engaging in dialogue and consultations with civil society because they recognise that civil society has information and insights needed to achieve national security priorities. For example, many military forces receive training on humanitarian civil-military coordination, given the likelihood that they will need to communicate with humanitarian organisations, including civil society groups, operating in the midst of a humanitarian crisis. Civil-military coordination or cooperation (CIMIC) centres and other mechanisms to support a “comprehensive approach” that includes civil society would also fall under this category. However, few military forces receive training on interacting with local civil society or other types of CSOs that are involved in long-term development, human rights or peacebuilding efforts. This limits their possibility to engage effectively, as many security forces are not even aware that other civil society groups exist and are working to support human security. Coordination is not possible where there is not first a mapping of this local capacity.

Where national security overlaps with civil society’s human security priorities, these dialogue, consultation and coordination forums may be productive. The local ownership platforms
discussed in this volume are examples of such civil-military-police coordination to support human security.

**Civil Society-Led Dialogues on the Local Level**

CSO driven dialogues are forums that CSOs initiate and organise at the local level to foster exchange and understanding between security forces and civil society around a certain topic related to security. In Nepal, civil society conducted comprehensive joint security assessments on the district level including 80 focus groups with more than 800 individuals altogether to develop an approach to community policing. In Kenya, the University of San Diego's Institute for Peace and Justice assembled youth leaders and policemen to talk about urban violence. In Tanzania, Search for Common Ground gathered security forces, civil society and representatives of private companies to discuss the security of mining operations. These dialogues usually happen *ad hoc*, i.e. only for a particular purpose and duration and rarely include national leadership.

**Consultations to Define Regional and National Security Policy**

National Consultations are mechanisms that enable civil society to take a permanent seat at the table to defining a country's national security agenda. In Yemen and Guinea, for example, Partners for Democratic Change helped to facilitate a series of national dialogue forums that enabled joint analysis of human security challenges and strategies.

Dialogue and consultation has its limits unless it is institutionalised and accompanied by accountability mechanisms. Governments may seek to understand and review the community's point of view on an *ad hoc* basis only when the political climate makes it necessary. They may credit and acknowledge civil society perspectives anytime without having to commit to actually include them in their strategies and programs.

**Joint Implementation**

A step beyond dialogue and consultation, ‘joint implementation’ involves civil society participating with the security sector in the development and/or the implementation of human security strategies. Civil society not only provides input but may also take on certain programmatic functions, such as participating in neighbourhood patrols Civil society and the security sector can carry out joint implementation in a wide range of efforts in diverse sectors, including community policing, restorative justice, criminal justice reform, transitional justice, security sector reform and development, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, demining, preventing sexual and gender-based violence, mitigating civilian harm, protecting civilians, and many more sectors. It can also mean civil society plays a role in mediating with non-state armed groups. The UK-based peacebuilding NGO Conciliation Resources documents how civil society uses mediation to end violence between state armed forces and non-state armed groups.

There can be two kinds of joint implementation:

**Joint Programming at the Local Level**

This report provides examples of joint programming such as a community policing projects in Pakistan, in which local populations work with the police to report threats and hold perpetrators to account or DDR programmes in Mozambique, DRC, and Afghanistan, in which civil society innovated new models of joint implementation of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants. The case study on private companies and community-based security in Tanzania also shows how, members of local communities, police and business representatives developed and implemented a security strategy at a mining site.

**National Peace Infrastructures**

National Peace Infrastructures are permanent institutionalised mechanisms that enable civil society and security sector on all levels to address the occurrence of violence. The National Peace Councils in Ghana provide the best example for such an infrastructure. They show how
local peace committees work to provide early warning and address local tensions. In the case of escalation, the infrastructure provides recourse mechanisms at the regional, national and also military level. The National Peace Council in Kenya is another example of a peace infrastructure that has also successfully stopped the escalation of election-related violence.

**Joint Institutional Oversight**

Joint institutional oversight provides institutional mechanisms for accountability, monitoring and evaluation of the security sector including official, institutional platforms for civil society involvement. They represent a new generation of oversight mechanisms that complement the watchdog and protest functions mentioned earlier by enabling civil society and security forces to build long-term institutional relationships and trust. In Guatemala for example, the UN-brokered peace plan enshrines accountability mechanisms for civil society to provide oversight to all areas of the security sector, including intelligence, military, police, criminal justice and national security policy formulation. In the Philippines, a new permanent civil society oversight platform allows civil society to meet monthly with security sector at the national and regional level to identify security challenges, formulate joint strategies and monitor and evaluate the performance of the security sector. This permanent institutional engagement between civil society and security sectors is the ultimate guarantee of an accountable, democratic state response to violence and a “whole of society” approach to human security. In Burundi, two civil society representatives participated in the National Defence Review, serving as official representatives to help monitor and evaluate the reform process.

Most states are still reluctant to set up permanent institutional structures to enable civil society oversight. Dialogue and coordination and joint implementation are thus second-best options that enable civil society to contribute to security sector policies and programmes and complement civilian government oversight in order to ensure local ownership in the security sector and thus human security for all citizens.

**Capacity Building**

Capacity building for both the security sector and civil society is necessary to enable them to reach each of these levels of local ownership. A lack of capacity can often represent a major obstacle to building an effective working relationship. Traditional security sector training programmes do not include raising awareness of civic roles and responsibilities nor dialogue and consensus-building skills such as communication, negotiation, mediation and facilitation. Civil society also rarely has the opportunity to increase their knowledge about traditional national security approaches.

This report documents the efforts of peacebuilding CSOs to provide training to civil society groups and security forces, so that both sides have the necessary skills and knowledge to effectively coordinate human security programs. Joint trainings are particularly effective in preparing security forces and civil society for joint problem solving. When civil society representatives and security sectors are gathered in the same classroom, they may often experience the very first institutional opportunity to meet. Interactive training curricula that favour discussions and interactive exercises will enable the participants to already start building common ground and increase their understanding and appreciation for each other, before their formal joint problem-solving process starts. As of now, opportunities for joint training for both civil society and the security sector are still rare.

The “Handbook for Civil-Military-Police Coordination for Human Security,” which is a companion to this report tries to fill the gap in curriculums for joint training. Building on the insights of the case studies listed here as well as existing curriculums for separate trainings, it provides modules for joint training enabling civil society and security sector to learn shared terminology and appreciate their differences as well as their common ground.

Ideally, capacity building can support a planning cycle where governments, security forces, and civil society learn how to jointly identify human security threats, design and implement human
security strategies, and then monitor and evaluate the impact of these strategies together. Dialogue and consultation, joint implementation, and joint institutional oversight all contribute to this planning cycle. Together, these joint activities create opportunities for strengthening the state-society relationship and ensuring human security.

**A Peacebuilding Approach to Local Ownership**

Peacebuilding analytical tools, values, skills and processes help to support all the big ideas discussed in this chapter: legitimate state-society relations, human security, security sector reform and development (SSR/D), local ownership and civil society oversight of the security sector, and civil society-military-police coordination.

In a parallel way, this report illustrates how civil society uses peacebuilding processes to navigate a state-society relationship that can support human security.

Peacebuilding organisations work to advocate and support more robust levels of local ownership. The case studies in this report all illustrate inspiring efforts of how peacebuilding CSOs are playing a mediating role to engage in governments, police, military and local communities in order to achieve dialogue and consultation, joint implementation or joint institutional oversight to improve human security.

Peacebuilding includes a wide range of efforts by diverse actors in government and civil society at the community, national, and international levels to address the immediate impacts and root causes of conflict before, during, and after violent conflict occurs. Peacebuilding values, skills and processes such as dialogue, negotiation, and mediation support human security. Peacebuilding includes activities designed to prevent conflict through addressing structural and proximate causes of violence, promoting sustainable peace, delegitimizing violence as a dispute resolution strategy, building capacity within society to peacefully manage disputes, and reduce vulnerability to triggers of violence.24

From the various case studies in this report, some common principles of peacebuilding have emerged. They characterise the approach that pioneering CSOs have taken in order to strengthen local ownership in the security sector and thus advance human security. They include:

**Peacebuilding Analysis: Root Causes**

Peacebuilding stands apart from other approaches to armed conflict because it focuses on the lack of legitimate, democratic governance as a root cause of violence. Other approaches focus less on structures and more on individuals or groups as the cause of violence. Conflict assessment frameworks emerging out of the field of peacebuilding can help to improve shared understanding of security challenges.25 Such a shared analysis of violence between diverse stakeholders in the security sector as well as civil society is necessary to enable multi-stakeholder coordination for human security.

**Peacebuilding Values: Respect and Trust**

Security forces and civil society can jointly advance human security when both groups respect each other as human beings, even though they may distrust or disagree with each other on issues. Mutual respect is a fundamental peacebuilding value. Focusing on relationships does not mean to accept or accommodate adversarial interests. A peacebuilding approach does not back away from conflicts or tensions. It is "hard on the problems, but soft on the people."26 This means that it encourages individuals to distinguish between opinions and the persons who hold the opinion. It encourages them to criticise ideas or reject types of behaviour, while maintaining an appreciation for the person behind it. Such an attitude is the pre-requisite for building strong and sustainable relationships and trust.
Peacebuilding Skills and Processes: Facilitation, Negotiation & Mediation

Peacebuilding skills and processes enable women and men in civil society and the security sector to understand each other’s interests. Peacebuilding forums for dialogue and consultation, joint implementation and joint civil society oversight enable both groups to jointly solve problems. A lack of contact and communication between civil society and security forces increases tensions and decreases their ability to understand how to support human security.

Individuals and CSOs engaging in peacebuilding are often known for their ability to facilitate dialogue processes and build consensus. They are able to help diverse stakeholders to either come to an agreement or agree on a disagreement. They guide people through a dialogue process. They help participants to communicate with each other effectively and ensure that all stakeholder’s interests and perspectives are heard. They ensure that the results of joint meetings are constructive and that there are no communications break downs, for example when participants walk out of the meeting due to arising conflict. They help create a safe space by setting ground rules or guidelines to keep dialogue participants focused on listening to and working with each other. Peacebuilders are “process experts” rather than experts on a subject area. They keep a dialogue focused, help participants consider a variety of views, and summarise group discussions. They model active listening and respectful speaking. Facilitators and mediators help groups explore similarities and differences of opinion.

Peacebuilding Evaluation: Measuring changes in attitudes, behaviours, and knowledge

One last unique characteristic of a peacebuilding approach is its ability to measure changes in attitudes as well as behaviours and knowledge. CSOs usually measure human security, at least in large part, by the perceptions of safety held by civilians, including women who might experience different types of threats and violence. Do men and women feel safer? Are men and women able to work, travel, and live in their homes without fear of violence? If they do not feel safe, which parts of society do they see as a threat and why? A common peacebuilding indicator of human security is to measure whether the public perceives security forces as “protectors” and not “predators.” Such indicators show how that dualistic stereotypes may have transformed, as adversarial attitudes have turned into cooperative ones and discriminating social norms into more egalitarian thinking.

To measure changes in beliefs and values, CSOs develop context-specific indicators that they develop based on their knowledge of the factors that caused mistrust between perpetrators and victims. For example, in the DRC where rape was often committed close to water sources, Search for Common Ground would ask civilian interviewees questions such as “Would you feel confident going to water sources if there are military vehicles in the area?” or they would ask soldiers questions such as “do you feel that to be a strong man you need to beat your own wife?” or “how would you interact with a civilian at a road block?”

Since these perceptions evolve constantly, especially in situations where conflict is still ongoing, assessment has to happen almost on a continuous basis. In DRC, Search for Common Ground monitored awareness and perceptions through pre- and post-project surveys, baseline and evaluations at the 12, 18, and 24-month stages.

The case studies in the following chapters will all reflect these principles to varying degrees. They will show how they can be put into practice in different areas of the security sector to enable civil society leaders and security sector to find joint solutions to problems of human security.

Creating Entry Points to Local Ownership

Local ownership in security cannot be built overnight. Changing attitudes and setting up adequate oversight mechanisms takes time and requires a strong commitment from both sides. Security sector reform and development requires “decade thinking” and looking beyond one-year programming. The political environment, historical legacies, or short-term oriented donor policies may all represent obstacles for achieving meaningful and long-term local ownership.

28 LOCAL OWNERSHIP IN SECURITY
Nevertheless, the civil society organisations showcased in this report were able to set up initiatives for joint action even if the systemic conditions were not promising. They were able to create entry-points to local ownership that could extend into increased engagement in wider areas and strengthen institutionalised cooperative mechanisms. Joint activities that are particularly useful as entry points are:

**Community Policing Programmes**

Community policing programmes are a low-cost entry point to wider efforts to improve local ownership in the security sector. One key advantage of community-based policing initiatives is that they require relatively little resources. Since local staff rather than foreign experts run them, costs related to salary are relatively low and no sophisticated equipment is required. These initiatives provide a low-cost opportunity to change local attitudes and increase trust between the state and civil society. Peacebuilding groups can build on the cooperative networks that these projects establish in order to work on other reform areas such as issues related to reducing Small Arms and Light Weapons, implementing DDR programs, creating external oversight bodies or transforming existing legal frameworks.

**Capacity Building Programmes**

The case studies showed the need for capacity building in both civil society and in the security sector as a key prerequisite for local ownership. Learning about different stakeholder's roles and responsibilities and acquiring skills for effectively engaging in coordination is a necessary first step for civil society and the security sector when they want to begin working together on human security. Many of the capacity building examples illustrate that training can prepare civil society and the security sector to work together by building shared understanding and interpersonal relationships. In the Burundi Leadership Training Program, for example, scenario-based training provided skills for listening and negotiating effectively, but also a forum that enabled key leaders to interact and build trust that increased their ability to then work together on security governance. This was also true in the Philippines, where an initial one-time training was the gateway to a sustained and institutionalised relationship between the security sector and civil society that included regular dialogue, joint problem solving and institutionalised civil society oversight of the security sector. Training can serve to create relationships and trust on a small scale.

**National Dialogues**

National dialogues such as those held in Guinea and Senegal provide the security sector and civil society a first opportunity to meet and exchange views. They enable both sides to learn about each other and jointly identify security challenges and responses. The case studies of Yemen and Libya also show how national dialogues can increase local ownership by providing civil society an opportunity to express their voice. They are a necessary step to achieve a national consensus on a vision for how security, justice and other key elements of governance will evolve.

**Need to Go Beyond Entry-Point Initiatives**

Although entry-points are helpful in building first contact and establishing trust, the case studies show how peacebuilding organisations work hard to go beyond the entry-level and increase the ability of the security sector to coordinate with civil society while increasing the commitments of national governments and donors to local ownership. The case studies in this report show how peacebuilding organisations use training to also engage in other areas of work, such as operational programmes aimed at setting up consultative processes, joint initiatives, or advocacy at different levels in order to create real and sustainable change.

Most donors only want to fund isolated trainings at the country level without putting the structures in place for on-going coaching and relationships that enable on-going learning. Moreover donors may fund initial training programs, but then move onto the next crisis. In
many contexts, training only represents the “lowest-hanging fruit.” But training is not a fix-all solution or an end in itself.

Capacity building can serve as a veneer to cover over systemic problems such as corrupt behaviour that enables individuals or corporations to profit from security threats and priorities or different security strategies. If motivated by political or economic interests, the security sector resists governance initiatives that entail civil society oversight, but they may be more willing to commit to short-sighted “train and equip” programmes that enable them to keep the existing power structures in place.

Peacebuilding organisations working on community-based policing initiatives make great efforts to embed their programmes into wider policies and practices on local, district and national level. They are advocating for institutional structures and guarantees on all levels of government so that these programmes can be adopted on a wider and more regular scale and be aligned with other security sector reforms, such as improvements of court procedures, prison reforms, DDR programs, or vetting mechanisms. The level of local ownership in the security sector will always depend on the ability to institutionalise isolated community policing projects that are isolated and limited in duration and make the accompanying structures of these projects more inclusive and accountable.

Peacebuilding organisations working on national dialogue also make a great effort in helping civil society to play a more permanent and institutional role in national security policy-making and programming. They provide civil society participants with civic education, set up mechanisms to deepen dialogue on issues that are difficult to resolve and provide other support structures mechanisms that increase the potential of the national dialogues to result in institutionalised joint action and a permanent oversight role for civil society.

The case studies in this report bring to light a peacebuilding approach to local ownership that encourages shared understanding of human security challenges and strategies, as well as joint implementation, monitoring and evaluation in order to achieve accountability. They show civil society working to encourage and increase direct and constructive two-way exchanges in individual or multiple phases of security sector policy-making and programming in order to find joint solutions to human security challenges.