

Towards a
people-state
partnership
for human
security

Empowerment and Protection

Stories of Human Security

Edited by Kristen Wall, Jenny Aulin and Gabriëlla Vogelaar



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Colophon

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The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) is a network of civil society organisations working on conflict prevention and peacebuilding world-wide. Together, GPPAC members work to inform policy, improve practice and facilitate collaboration and action to prevent conflict and build sustainable peace. GPPAC is composed civil society networks in fifteen regions, and brings together members from across the world in thematic working groups and projects. This allows us to link national, regional and global levels of action and learning.

The diverse views expressed in this publication are those of the respective authors and their organisations.

Acknowledgements

This publication is a product of many people, ideas and organisations coming together through the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), a global network of peacebuilding organisations and practitioners. The idea about taking the discussion on human security to the constituencies of peacebuilding organisations working ‘on the ground’ emerged from a Human Security Working Group meeting in 2012.

- The meeting contributed to the following objectives:
- To promote and stimulate discussion about the human security approach as related to conflict issues, raising awareness both in the policy and public domains;
 - To channel voices from conflict-affected communities about what human security means to those most needing it – and how it is defined by them;
 - To provide civil society recommendations on the implementation of a human security approach.

The participating organisations from six GPPAC regional networks formed an editorial board, which was coordinated by Jenny Aulin and Gabriëlla Vogelaar at the network’s Global Secretariat, together principle editor Kristen Wall. Based on a flexible approach to each organisation collecting the information in their respective countries, we produced the articles together through peer review, discussion and ample input from our colleagues within the network.

The editors would like to thank the authors and their respective organisations for making this publication happen, including all those involved in interviewing people or hosting focus groups, and for placing them into context for us.

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Last but not least, we want to acknowledge all the people who agreed to talk to the authors and their colleagues, and were willing share their concerns, opinions and expectations concerning human security. We hope that this publication will contribute to bringing the debate closer to their realities.

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Executive summary

This publication shares and analyses people's sense of threats and safety through the lens of human security. Spanning six regions of the world, it presents the accounts of people living in Afghanistan, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Zimbabwe, Ukraine, Mexico, and the Philippines. As a people-centred approach to understanding threats to people's livelihoods, safety and dignity, human security is useful as both an analytical tool and an operational approach for addressing socio-political problems.

Part 1 presents and analyses people's reflections on threats in Afghanistan, Ukraine and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, with an emphasis on the state as a provider of security and the ways that individuals and society as a whole cope with threats. Part 2 demonstrates ways that human security is operationalised through citizen action and multi-stakeholder dialogues in Mexico, the Philippines and Zimbabwe. In Part 3, we describe the approach, considerations and challenges in producing this information. Part 4 presents a conclusion on cross-cutting themes as well as implications for human security and the field of conflict prevention.

The chapters are based on interviews with community members, leaders and activists in individual and group settings. Their words reveal the potential power of the state is a security provider through the rule of law, but also the ways the state can undermine human security through corruption, abuse of human rights, and failure to provide necessary goods and services. The stories also suggest the potential of civil society organisations to transform the citizen-state relationship and facilitate human security. Security is not only defined by the state's protection capabilities and actions, but also by the perspectives of people from diverse social groups who have different interests. The citizen-state relationship emerges as a primary tool and indicator of human security, where context-specific protection and empowerment strategies go hand in hand.

Based on these reflections, this publication recommends the human security approach as a valuable entry point for dealing with the prevention of violent conflict. Specifically, this publication advocates that the UN, governments, and civil society organisations bridge the gaps that separate their respective work, by establishing a common human security learning and practice platform that will facilitate analysis of and planning for human security at the local, national and regional levels. These groups should invest in methodologies that are people-centred, context-specific, and gender-sensitive to be consistent with human security principles. After analysing threats through the lens of human security, the UN, donors, governments and civil society should develop human security interventions that take into account existing capacity and coping strategies within communities. This requires that governments and civil society invest in building local and national capacities for multi-stakeholder dialogues and citizen-state partnerships. Finally, to breathe life into the human security concept where it most matters, the UN and civil society should support and implement local and national awareness campaigns that promote the articulation of human security needs and the possibilities of protection and empowerment strategies. The perspectives presented here demonstrate the power of the human security approach as both an analytical tool and as a method of engagement to promote individual safety and dignity.

We hope this work provides insight into the ways that civil society, governments, and international bodies can work together towards addressing complex societal problems together. It encourages a shift in the human security debate towards the practical implementation of strategies that elicit local and multi-faceted understandings of what it means to feel – and be – secure.



Stories from



We hope that these accounts will move the human security debate to the contexts where people experience insecurities on a daily basis.

Introduction

Jenny Aulin

Human security offers an opportunity to reorient and broaden traditional security approaches to prioritise the survival, livelihood, and dignity of all individuals. Unlike national security, which emphasises the territorial integrity of the state, human security addresses sustainable peace by recognising the social, economic and political grievances that are often at the root of violent conflict and societal violence. In the following chapters, women and men in six widely different contexts share their everyday experiences of security. Their stories tell us that feeling secure has many dimensions; these are both deeply personal and intimately connected with the broader community, state and society. While the views expressed are illustrative rather than based on scientific samples, they are a striking reminder of the premise of a human security approach, where the understanding and definition of security is in the hands of those individuals and communities that directly experience it.

The combination and relative importance of different types of security, ranging from freedom from fear to freedom from want and freedom from indignity, are unique to each individual and each context. This publication aims to give voice to the concerns of the local communities, leaders and activists interviewed by local civil society organisations in Afghanistan, Ukraine, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Mexico, The Philippines and Zimbabwe. We hope that these accounts will move the human security debate to the contexts where people experience insecurities on a daily basis. They encourage us to listen to multiple voices and respect their experiences as the starting point for genuine discussion about what human security means and how it can be strengthened. In a human security approach, local voices should lead the conversation.

From theory to practice

Twenty years after the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report first introduced the idea of human security, academics and policymakers continue to argue about the practicality, scope and the very definition of the concept. Progress in implementing human security programmes has also been delayed by misgivings over the tension with state sovereignty^a, illustrating just how much the discussions on human security have mainly


been confined to international or foreign policy arenas rather than being explored as a framework for domestic agendas.¹ Disagreements often centre on which threats human security analysis should encompass, and the means by which individuals and communities should be protected.² Yet, the very principles of human security point to the

The understanding and definition of security is in the hands of those individuals and communities that directly experience it.

importance of listening to people and communities as the referents of security themselves. It is high time to move beyond conceptual debate. What is needed is investment in exploring the practical applications of human security, to understand its limitations and dilemmas, and ultimately, to breathe life into the concept.^b

^a A historical association with interventionism through the Responsibility to Protect doctrine continues to colour debates on human security, in spite of United Nations General Assembly (UN GA) resolution 66/290 explicit clarification that human security respects state sovereignty.

^b Efforts to map human security projects have taken place under the UN Trust Fund for Human Security and in the Report of the UN Secretary General 'Follow-up to GA resolution 66/290 on human security' 2013, however their dissemination beyond UN and academic arenas has been limited.



The principles of human security call for a domestic policy framework.

field of human security and peacebuilding practice can be found in the concept of ‘infrastructures for peace’, which emphasises the enhancement of local mediation and conflict prevention structures as translated through institutions, policies and capacities at the national level.^d

Human security as a domestic agenda

Referring to the stories presented here, we argue that the principles of human security call for a domestic policy framework; one which directs the state to address the needs, vulnerabilities and coping mechanisms of society, and where response strategies emerge from and build on existing capacities amongst a variety of local actors. The many views expressed in the country chapters suggest that the existence and agency of a state is

central to achieving human security. But they also illustrate how the abuse of power or negligence of both state and non-state actors can undermine human security, highlighting the importance of addressing power dynamics. The stories from Mexico, Zimbabwe and the Philippines illustrate means for addressing such challenges peacefully and by drawing strength from local structures, traditions and social actors.

Peacebuilding and development interventions can only work in the long term if they respond to local demand, and are accepted and supported by the people they are intended to benefit. It is widely accepted by now that inclusivity and processes that are steered and owned by local actors are key to sustainable development and peace. However, this idea of ‘local ownership’ is often unclear, and needs to be negotiated within each individual context.⁵ By enhancing of methodologies that can take into account subjective and diverse interest groups, the human security approach can make local ownership more tangible. Moreover, while such efforts can be constructively supported by regional and international ‘outsiders’, human security also calls attention to the need for accountability of international interventions to local populations.

Empowerment and protection

The implementation of a human security approach calls for the protection and empowerment of populations, implying the need for both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ measures. The stories from practitioners and communities in their different contexts illustrate the range of coping strategies people resort to in order to feel secure, and whom or what they turn to for protection. Security providers tend to range from self-protection (individual, family, community), to ‘horizontal’ protection by non-state actors (lifelines, humanitarian organisations, militant groups), and ‘vertical’ protection by state actors, foreign state and/or intergovernmental actors such as NATO or UN troops.⁶ The striking paradox that can be found throughout the stories is that these have in some cases also become the threat, either through ‘dysfunctional’ empowerment strategies such as self-arming of non-state actors, or through abuse of power by states and intervening foreign forces, for instance in counter-terrorism strategies that undermine human rights. This calls for greater accountability of all security providers and for heightened civilian oversight of law enforcement.

Comparing the different country chapters, we conclude that the active roles of the state and civil society respectively are both needed to safeguard human security. The possibilities of complementarity between protection and empowerment strategies is a neglected area of study and practice. From an operational point of view, this leads us to focus on the convergence of protection and empowerment strategies, and on how local national and international actors can play specific roles within that. In a 2009 guidance document, the UN Human Security Unit points out the following key questions as integral to the design of human security strategies:⁷

- What are the relationships between the specific protection and empowerment strategies?
- Which protection strategies have the greatest positive externalities [effects] on empowerment?
- Which empowerment strategies have the greatest positive externalities [effects] on protection strategies?

The stories presented in the following chapters only scrape the surface of these important questions. We suggest that the understanding of human security should be further developed through the meeting of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ perspectives, in a process that is driven by real-life experiences and practice.

Stories of Human Security

Part 1 of this publication gives three examples of human security as a tool for analysing security from the ground up. The chapters from Afghanistan, Ukraine and the Occupied Palestinian Territory present views on what is considered a threat to security, on the state as a provider, and on coping mechanisms of interviewees.

Part 2 additionally provides examples of the ways that communities in Mexico, the Philippines and Zimbabwe have put human security into practice through citizen action and multi-stakeholder dialogues.

In **part 3** on methodology, we share the accounts of the authors on how their respective organisations went about collecting the information. We discuss some of the considerations on gathering and presenting this information, where sensitivities of the subject matter were revealed in the process. A concluding chapter, **part 4** identifies themes across the different areas explored. It identifies ways

HUMAN SECURITY PRINCIPLES

People-centred: Human security puts people and communities at the centre of analysis and response strategies; they are both agents and beneficiaries of interventions.

Interconnected and comprehensive: Threats to human security tend to be mutually reinforcing and interlinked; coordination is needed to understand how they relate to each other and how they should be addressed as part of a broader strategy.

Context specific: Human security acknowledges the variations from one situation to another amongst and within countries; response strategies need to be tailored to the situation and locally owned.

Preventive: Human security focuses on root causes and risk factors; it calls for early warning systems and coordinated early response.

Protection and empowerment: Human security highlights the mutual social contract between states and citizens. This implies an equal importance of protection strategies by top-down institutional and governance structures, and empowerment strategies that build on the capacities of affected communities to cope with and respond to threats.

Freedom from fear, freedom from want, freedom from indignity: Types of security and examples of main threats

Economic security	Persistent poverty, unemployment
Food security	Hunger, famine
Health security	Deadly infectious diseases, unsafe food and water, malnutrition, lack of access to basic health care
Environmental security	Environmental degradation, resource depletion, lack of access to water, natural disasters, pollution
Personal or physical security	Physical violence, crime, terrorism, domestic violence, child labour
Community security	Inter-ethnic, religious and other identity based tensions
Political security	Political repression, human rights abuses

Adapted from source: UNDP Human Development Report of 1994.

that local perspectives presented here inform our understanding of key protective and empowerment strategies needed in a human security approach. Finally, we present a brief overview of recommendations drawn from these chapters, in which we challenge not only UN agencies, governments, and academia but also ourselves and fellow civil society groups in continuing the enhancement of human security through its practical application and awareness building.

It is our hope that the reflections, conclusions and recommendations in this publication will serve to encourage practitioners from all sectors to continue implementing and learning from the people-centred, comprehensive approach that human security provides. In doing so, we should seek to take the concept out of the technical, bureaucratic resolutions and rhetoric, and ensure it becomes meaningful and tangible for people who experience varying forms of insecurity every day.

^c Practical examples were outlined in: The Human Security approach in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding - A Civil Society Position Paper - GPPAC, Civil Security Network for Human Security, IKV Pax Christi, April 2013
^d UNDP defines infrastructures for peace as ‘A network of interdependent systems, resources, values and skills held by government, civil society and community institutions that promote dialogue and consultation; prevent conflict and enable peaceful mediation when violence occurs in a society.’ UNDP Issue Brief: Infrastructure for Peace, 2013


A People-Centred Lens on Protection

Afghanistan, Ukraine, the Occupied Palestinian Territory

"If there is no one in uniform around, or if you don't trust them, you can only count on your own self..."

Yana, university student in Kyiv, Ukraine

A people-centred approach to analysis encourages us to listen to the stories of individuals and take their experiences as the starting point for genuine discussion about what human security means. The diverse experiences from Afghanistan, Ukraine and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, provide accounts of people's sense of protection – or the lack thereof – and the means they resort to for coping with the threats they face in their daily lives. Their reflections on the state as a security provider and what they consider as threats to security are diverse. They show that people in a given context identify threats as multifaceted and complex, understanding the effects they have on their personal, communal or physical well-being. They underscore the need for comprehensive responses and strategies.




1



Urban perspectives: Human Security in Afghanistan

Shafeek Seddiq | Mariam Safi | Afghanistan Justice Organisation (AJO)



“As long as the locals are not allowed to shape our government, these structures of insecurity will continue to exist.”

Interviews with Afghan citizens highlight the sense of insecurity that many continue to feel despite a decade of international reconstruction. Mixed progress in economic stability, women’s rights, and the establishment of a central governing authority has resulted in varied experiences of individual security. Persistent violent conflict, illiteracy, and weak governance continue to undermine individual experiences of security, yet economic opportunities, personal freedoms, and feelings of safety are better than in years past. However, international efforts have been insufficient to guarantee good governance or economic security, and the upcoming withdrawal of international forces in 2014 has created anxiety about Afghanistan’s future.



Background

In response to terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, an international coalition led by the United States militarily intervened in Afghanistan in 2001 to oust the ruling Taliban government which hosted al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. Following the fall of the Taliban, the United Nations (UN) convened prominent Afghan political and ethnic factions at the Bonn Conference of 2001 in order to establish an interim Afghan administration and roadmap for a future Afghan government. The Bonn Agreement requested an international force to ensure peace and stability in the country, and designated a role for the UN to aid the new government with the country's reconstruction. The UN subsequently established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), ultimately led by NATO, and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to assist with the political transition. In the ensuing decade, the role of the international community expanded to include a comprehensive reconstruction agenda.

Efforts to bring military security and stability to Afghanistan were coupled with development projects, meant to establish better governance and win the support of local populations. ISAF engaged with tribal elders, religious figures, technocrats, powerbrokers and members of the warring factions to achieve its mission. Though the international effort envisioned social, economic and institutional infrastructure developments as a means to win popular support for and strengthen the central government in Kabul, the central government's legitimacy was never fully consolidated.

The militarised and political logic of the international intervention lacked the conceptual underpinning of human security, which could have bound the social, economic and institutional changes to the priorities of the Afghan people. As a result, much of the progress toward establishing human security – through good governance, human rights, economic opportunities, education, healthcare and information – has been limited. Yet despite the ongoing conflict, rampant corruption, inadequate state institutions, and widespread poverty that continue to plague Afghans, many citizens believe that progress has been made since 2001.

Shifts in power: the rise of the Taliban and the mujahedeen

Prior to 2001, decades of violence had left millions dead and displaced, devastating the social fabric of Afghan society. Occupation by the former Union Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the late 1970s and 1980s, and the imposition of a communist government, fuelled an insurgency of the *mujahedeen* which was backed by the United States in its efforts to limit Soviet influence in the region. In 1989, the USSR withdrew its forces from Afghanistan and in 1992, the communist regime collapsed. Internal struggle broke out between various *mujahedeen* factions and Afghanistan descended into civil war and chaos.¹ The Taliban, composed of the more radical *mujahedeen* groups from the tribal Pashtun areas and fresh recruits from Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan, had a meteoric rise and came to power in 1996. Although many initially supported the Taliban for the sake of stability, the regime failed to provide social services and basic governmental functions. The situation was particularly abusive to women, who were stripped of virtually all rights and subjected to extreme punishments for violation of strict laws.²

The militarised and political logic of the international intervention lacked the conceptual underpinning of human security.

Governance structures after 2001

Though the Taliban initially retreated in the wake of the US-led intervention in 2001, it re-emerged in 2005. Over the past few years, the Taliban have conducted hundreds of suicide bombings meant to drive anti-Taliban forces out of Afghanistan, and have reinvigorated its imposition of strict Islamic law. The Taliban have the support of a significant number of Afghans. In a survey conducted in 2013,

a third of Afghans – mostly rural Afghans and Pashtuns – had sympathy for armed opposition groups, mainly the Taliban.³

The Taliban insurgency has been one factor impeding the central government's ability to exercise its power and influence over its citizens, especially in the periphery. The return of some warlords^a ousted by the Taliban, and the advent of new power brokers formed by the civil war has also fragmented authority across the country.⁴ Many warlords were military leaders from the *mujahedeen* factions who were active in the Afghan civil war prior to the early 1990s. As powerbrokers, they play an important role in local and national politics, competing in local and national elections. Their role is a controversial one, as they often act opportunistically and switch allegiances. Although many hold warlords responsible for past war crimes and current corruption and instability, many also believe their local warlords are the only reliable protection from acts of violence. Some warlords fill the need for stability at local level and provide physical security, enforce religious/tribal laws, and promote economic opportunities in areas where the central government has less authority.⁵

In other areas, the central government has continued to work through informal bodies at the local level, such as community councils (*shūrās*) and tribal assemblies (*jirgas*). The *Loya Jirga* has played a key role in Afghan politics since the fall of the Taliban, for example by establishing a transitional government in 2002, and ratifying a new constitution in 2003.⁶ However, the inability of both the international community and the current Afghan government to build formal institutions in the last decade has further prevented the development of human security.

The current state of human security and development

Despite ongoing threats to Afghans' physical security, Afghanistan's international ranking on development indicators has improved since

a A warlord can be a military commander, a disarmed former military commander or not have any military background. Examples include: Ismail Khan, current Minister of Energy, former popular governor of Herat and Mujahedeen commander, disarmed and sent to Kabul by the central government; Maulavi Azizullah Agha, defected Taliban commander from Kandahar; Abdul Rashid Dostum, Vice-presidential candidate, militia leader allied with former communist regime, popular Uzbek leader, allegedly responsible for the Dasht-i-Leili massacre of Taliban prisoners of war

COSTS OF CONFLICT

CIVILIANS KILLED



14,728
BETWEEN 2007-2012
(UNAMA 2013)

ECONOMIC COST



\$718.6
BILLION
BETWEEN 2001-2014
(COSTS OF WAR 2011)

NUMBER OF TROOPS



NEARLY 150,000
NATO TROOPS
IN 2010
(WEINBAUM 2014:20)

INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE (IDPS)



600,000
(UNHCR 2014)

REFUGEES (ORIGINATING FROM AFGHANISTAN):



2,556,556
AS AT JANUARY 2014
(IBID)

the intervention in 2001. In 2013, the Human Development Index (HDI) report rated Afghanistan amongst fourteen other countries that had registered remarkable HDI gains of more than two percent annually since 2000.⁷ In its 2010 Millennium Development Goal (MDG) review, the Afghan government highlighted major improvements in progress towards the MDGs that were seen in some areas, while in other areas little progress was made, particularly in tackling the eradication of extreme poverty.⁸

In Afghanistan, physical insecurity continues to remain a predominant and critical threat to human security, hindering the pace of development.

While student enrolment figures and the number of primary schools have increased, the quality of education is substandard, and in most districts there are no education facilities beyond primary level. In addition, almost 230 districts do not have female teachers, creating serious barriers for female students, as families do not generally allow their daughters to attend co-education facilities in rural areas.⁹ While unemployment figures remain alarmingly high at 4 million, there are some significant improvements from 2001.¹⁰ The most effective poverty reduction strategies exist in countries that have gained a basic level of physical security. But in Afghanistan, physical insecurity continues to remain a predominant and critical threat to human security, hindering the pace of development.



Views on security threats and protection

Interviews with Afghans offer insights on what human security means to them. As the majority of interviews are of Afghans who are living in Kabul, it largely reflects the lives of Afghanistan's urban population. Nevertheless, the reflections from this chapter are relevant beyond an urban perspective in revealing how the Afghan people express their human security concerns. This section will focus on the leading drivers of insecurity as identified by the respondents. This will be followed by an analysis of what security providers people see as contributing to their security.



Zahid is a 32-year-old ethnic Pashtun who works as a legal advisor in Kabul.

Illiteracy, lack of good governance, absence of national unity, poverty, and unemployment are all factors that add to my insecurity. Mass illiteracy has prevented people from understanding others' opinions no matter how well informed, [which] has led me in many instances to use self-censorship. Weak governance has prevented people from reaching their goals, it has given way to nepotism and weak rule of law. The absence of national unity amongst all ethnicities has led some to feel excluded and this has led to deep-seated grievances.

Poverty has oriented people to worry about meeting only their own needs with no consideration for [...] others. Unemployment has pushed people to join the insurgency. In my village in Wardak province I have asked elders why the youth join the Taliban, and they have told me that it's because they're jobless and the government is unable to provide them with work, so they join the insurgency. But I would say illiteracy is the most important driver.

The factors that contribute to my sense of security are the presence of a government even if it's weak. I say this because a few years ago we didn't even

“Good governance and a country where I can express myself is most important for my security.”

have a government in place at all. When I was living in Islamabad [Pakistan] before 2001, as a student [...] a few of the Afghan students wanted to create an Afghan students union, but since there was no legitimate government in Afghanistan the university wouldn't recognise our student union. After 2001, when a legitimate government was established, we were able to create the student union. This revealed to me the importance of a government, even if weak, on the local population and even on the refugee populations. Also the opportunities for work in the past 12 years have given me much security.

Both factors enable me to exercise my rights and freedoms; they enable me to think of my future and what investments I can make to ensure that I continue to prosper. I believe these issues are different for each individual. But for me good governance and a country where I can express myself is most important for my security.

Leading drivers of insecurity

Respondents name a number of sources of insecurity, including terrorism and ongoing armed conflict, weak governance and rule of law, a lack of human rights, unemployment, limited development, old traditions and patronage systems, illiteracy, and ethnic discrimination. These issues cut across all ethnicities, communities and provinces and represent common and shared fears and threats amongst men and women.

Physical insecurity: foreign troops and acts of violence

Physical insecurity continues to be a common issue for most people in Afghanistan and those interviewed. However, the sources of insecurity vary considerably among different regional groups. As described below, the Taliban insurgency, international troops, private security personnel and warlords are some of the actors identified as posing a threat to physical security. Interviewees emphasise that while the Taliban are an obvious security threat, the presence of NATO forces on the streets also causes much anxiety. They say altercations between NATO and the Taliban almost always lead to civilian deaths and NATO forces sometimes target local civilians.

“Foreign troops and a weak government add to my insecurity.”

Physical insecurity is deemed a bigger threat by those living in rural areas than in urban centres, because military operations against the insurgency are active in rural Afghanistan, such as in the southern provinces. Seddiq Ahmad, a 25-year-old resident of Kandahar province, says, “Foreign troops and a weak government add to my insecurity. The presence of international troops on our roads poses a security problem for them and all of us. I always feel scared when I see troops

roaming the streets because I feel that they will be attacked at any moment and anyone around them will get hurt.”

Suicide attacks are a common a source of physical insecurity in the urban areas. Zohal, a 25-year-old female student from Kabul, says, “The Taliban and suicide attacks make me feel very insecure. These issues I think are caused by bad governance and police. The Taliban disrupt peace and security, and this disturbs everyone in their daily lives, especially young girls as it prevents them from moving around freely and living their lives free from fear. What makes suicide attacks the most serious threat to my sense of insecurity is that it can happen anywhere, at any time and is very difficult to predict.”

Governance failures

The majority of interviewees point to a lack of good governance as a primary source of insecurity. Unaccountable political leadership, rampant corruption, injustice, lack of freedom of speech or access to fundamental rights all contribute to a sense of political insecurity. Irshad, a 32-year-old ethnic Pashtun working as a shopkeeper in Kabul, says, “The current government is the most important driver of my insecurity because it is supposed to be responsible for our safety and security. But instead it's just a collection of warlords, and this makes me feel unsafe as I fear this country will go back to old times again.”

Mizra Ahmad, an ethnic Tajik in Kabul, comments on the lack of political will to provide human security, “Traditions and culture in Afghanistan and promotion of warlords have created a government that does not care for its people. I don't feel secure myself. If there is no international support, this country is going to fall down after they leave. I think these issues are concerns for everyone but especially for those who live in the provinces.”

Dr. Wadir Safi is a Pashtun who works as the vice president of the Afghanistan Justice Organisation and as a senior professor at Kabul University. In his view, “Illiteracy, ethnic divisiveness, lack of good governance, and injustice are issues that contribute to my insecurity and that of the entire country. These issues originate from long standing economic, political and structural issues which in the past, and even now, do not provide locals with the space needed to shape their own socio-

political structures, and so it is always imposed on them. As long as locals are not allowed to shape their government then these structures of insecurity will continue to exist.”

Corruption and injustice

Corruption is a symptom and an outcome of a weak government that adversely affects a country’s economy, public trust in the institutions, and respect for the rule of law. The continuation of patronage systems in Afghanistan is perceived to hinder the government’s ability to fully exercise all its functions. The sentiment is that some people benefit from the state of insecurity as it has created an environment where nepotism and patronage systems flourish. Ahmad Shah, a 63-year-old resident of Nangahar province, comments, “Corruption and no peace are factors adding to my insecurity and this is mainly a result of our corrupt government. No matter which government office you go to, you are faced with these issues and it’s very discouraging.”

“These political leaders are not serious about solving people’s problems; they are just working for their own benefits.”

Interviewees are particularly vocal about their disapproval of authorities who are unaccountable, such as (former) warlords and police. “Warlords in the government and the police force are the greatest contributors to my insecurity. I feel that these issues are due to old traditions. [...] Their power makes everyone in this country feel uncomfortable. Also, the police are unprofessional and they don’t feel the need to be accountable to the public, so as a common man I fear the police,” says Asadullah, a 38-year-old professor in Kabul. Many of those interviewed lack trust in the

“I constantly live in fear that my comments may make me a target of the government or other groups who do not agree with me.”

government because it cannot provide fundamental rights and justice, according to Wadir Safi, an ethnic Pashtun teaching at Kabul University. “No access to one’s basic rights is the most important driver of my insecurity. [There] is no justice, people can’t enjoy their basic rights.” In addition, Wadir points out that “lack of rule of law and injustice is another very important contributor to insecurity because even though we now have a Constitution, which has enshrined our rights in practice, I do not enjoy these rights because of the prevalence of corruption.”

Balancing traditionalism and modernity

Many interviewees discuss orthodox and conservative attitudes and longstanding socio-political structures as factors contributing to their insecurity. Abdul Hamid Ansary is an ethnic 26-year-old Tajik who owns and operates a shop in Kabul. He puts it this way, “The main issues I am worried about are our government and people’s old ways of thinking. These issues originate mostly from a lack of education and no awareness. [It] makes me feel most insecure because people are not transforming their mind-sets and that’s why issues like ethnic differences continue to disrupt our society.”

Some point to a growing chasm between the conservative and progressive or modern segments of society. Limited opportunities in education and employment in the last twelve years has led to a growing class of progressive and modern thinkers in Afghanistan who feel they cannot freely express their views without being judged by others. Khalid, a 36-year-old Pashtun from Kabul who works as a legal advisor, says, “We have difficulties with the various

interpretations of culture and religion, so when I, as a scholar of Sharia, share my views on cultural and religious practices with those at the community level I feel they start judging me. As a result, most of the time I resort to self-censorship. But I would say that the lack of physical security is my main worry. This is actually connected with my sense of lack of freedom of speech. I constantly live in fear that my comments may make me a target of the government or other groups who do not agree with me.”

Orthodox attitudes are seen by some as violating women’s rights and curbing women’s freedoms to realise their full potential outside of the household. Laila, a 27-year-old housewife from Kabul, shares Rabia’s opinion, “The existence of discrimination against girls and women, violence against women and the constant ignoring of women’s rights and in our society feed my insecurity. These issues originate from lack of opportunities for the youth, elders way of thinking and illiterate people. At times those who are supposed to ensure our security like the government and police turn out to be the ones who jeopardise it, especially the police who misbehave with women all the time, and the government which does not do anything about it. In our society, women tend to face these issues more than others, since women don’t have any authority and men treat them like their slaves.”

Sadaf, a 22-year-old Tajik university student in Kabul affirms, “The unequal treatment and position of women in Afghan society is the biggest contributor to my insecurity. For instance, I can’t even leave home without a male escort. This makes me feel

“At times those who are supposed to ensure our security like the government and police turn out to be the ones who jeopardise it.”

“People view women who work outside of the home as indecent while they call those women who stay at home irresponsible.”



Rabia is a 23 -year-old ethnic Tajik who is a university student in Kabul. She is originally from Parwan province.

What I feel contributes to my insecurity is being a woman living in this society, people’s attitudes towards gender and lastly the growing support for the Taliban. I often overhear people say that life under the Taliban regime, though it was difficult, was still physically safer. Since they don’t feel they have security now, they are starting to show support to the Taliban, which means they may support their possible return. All of these issues I believe originate from people’s lack of education. But I would say that the absence of gender equality in our society is the most important driver of my insecurity. People view women who work outside of the home as indecent while they call those women who stay at home irresponsible. This takes down my motivation to do something in life. But the fact that we now have established systems, rules and regulations and legal structures makes me feel more secure, because I know that if I have a problem there are laws in place to help me. Not like during the Taliban time, when we had no legal system to refer to.

very insecure and in fact reinforces the notion that women are not capable enough to carry on substantial roles and responsibilities in our society.”

Illiteracy and lack of education

Many respondents cite illiteracy as a cause of insecurity. The inability to read reduces peoples’ awareness and understanding of their rights and obligations, as mentioned by Zahid. As a result, it is perceived as easier for the government and other security providers to exploit the common people. Illiteracy remains an important security challenge



for Afghanistan, particularly for women. Though it is difficult to estimate the illiteracy rate, a 2010 report by UNICEF found that almost 80 percent of women aged 15 to 24 are illiterate.¹¹ Since literacy has the potential to raise individuals' standard of living it is tied to other human security concerns, such as unemployment.

Unemployment and lack of economic opportunity

Reflecting on the role of economy and human security, many of those interviewed point to the lack of employment, low income levels, declining business profits and general conditions of poverty as factors that greatly contribute to their insecurity. Sohail, a woman from Kunduz province working for the government says, "I feel insecure all the time. My government salary is not enough to sustain my family. I want to move my family to Kabul where my children can get a better education but I can't afford to shift my family with my government salary."

Many interviewees are concerned about the Afghan economy, in particular about the impact that the withdrawal of the international community will have. Businessmen cite a decline in their profit margins, while others are concerned with the lack of social security in the private sector. This issue is cited as a matter of greater anxiety for the poor and those living in rural areas than those in the urban centres. Moreover, as Zahid pointed out earlier, unemployment is often linked to the issue of youth and their vulnerability as recruits for the insurgency.

Gul Nabi, a 46-year-old from Laghman, expresses concern over his business. He says, "I am not happy with my life and from what I see happening around me, the poor are getting poorer and the economy is worsening. My greatest fear is unemployment. [...] I used to get a hundred customers a day and now I don't even get ten, so I fear that when I lose my business it will be very difficult for me to find employment in this environment."

"There is nothing that contributes to my security but my family and friends."

"What makes me feel secure is the opportunities for work."



Razmal is an ethnic Pashtun, who works as a journalist in Kabul but is originally from Kandahar.

In Kabul the most significant contributor to my insecurity is the gun culture. Nowadays all of our political leaders drive around with an entourage of private security personnel who are threatening, because they are not held accountable. This is a trend that has its roots in the civil war period, when mujahedeen leaders depended on guns for their position and power. This has created a hostile environment in Afghanistan where you can't feel comfortable to travel around freely without fear for your security and it's because those with arms tend to ignore the basic rights of others.

What makes me feel secure is the opportunities for work. For instance, I am a journalist and I feel proud when I present myself as one, because it empowers me and enables me to raise my voice against any issue that I feel is important. As a youth I feel that the challenges I have mentioned as contributing to my insecurity are also relevant to other youth. This is because there are no facilities for youth. They are isolated from the decision-making process or are influenced by others' decisions.

Demographic differences and commonalities

Ethnic discrimination

Perceptions of the leading drivers of insecurity differ slightly amongst different ethnic groups. Ethnic discrimination is cited more by Hazara and Tajik interviewees than by Pashtun interviewees. Hazara and Tajik interviewees identify ethnic discrimination, inadequate political representation and lack of national unity or reconciliation as significant contributors to their sense of insecurity. They attribute parochial perceptions of ethnicity to traditionalist mindsets and illiteracy.

Rural versus urban

Many of the issues mentioned by interviewees in Kabul are similar to those mentioned by people

from the provincial areas; however, the degree of pessimism is higher in the provinces than in Kabul. Physical insecurity is a greater threat to those living in rural areas than in urban centres. This can be attributed to arbitrary military operations that are more prevalent in rural areas than in urban centres. Fears associated with limited economic opportunities, poverty, and bad governance are also higher at the provincial level. The lack of infrastructure development and trickle-down effect of humanitarian aid have also hampered people's access to basic services.

Gender

According to both male and female interviewees, women tend to face insecurity more than men, due to orthodox attitudes and their lower social standing. This leads to the unequal treatment of women both in and outside the home. Women interviewed express a fear of fighting for their rights, and gave many examples of the ways in which their freedoms are restricted.

Security Providers

Afghans named a number of sources of security, including family and friends, the government system, non-governmental organisations, jobs, education, laws and mass media.

Family ties

Most personal interviewees include family and friends as the greatest contributor to people's personal security. Irrespective of the presence of the government or security institutions, most Afghan youth still revert to their family as their main protector and show little trust and faith in the government. This is particularly noteworthy considering that most of the Afghan population is below the age of 30. Qadir, an ethnic Pashtun and university student in Kabul, is a prime example: "without the support of family one cannot survive in such a society." Sadaf, an ethnic Tajik and university student in Kabul, reflects on women's reliance on family: "My family is the main contributor to my security. Their support is extremely important for me in all aspects of my life. For women their family tends to be their best support in all conditions." Abdul Hakim from Kunar province says that, "There is nothing that contributes to my security but my family and friends."

"The government is most important because unlike the past, when there was no system, at least now there is an established government that is elected by the people."

Legal and political framework

Another commonly cited security provider is the government system. Paradoxically, many of the interviewees who mention the presence of the government as a contributing factor to their security also say that they believe the government is weak and ineffective. These respondents believe the mere presence of the government provides some stability, compared to the situation before 2001. The existence of a constitution, even though not adequately implemented, provides a legal framework that is seen to contribute to human security. Hashmat Mustafa, a 29-year-old Pashtun who works for a private company in Kabul illustrates this point: "The government is most important because unlike the past, when there was no system, at least now there is an established government that is elected by the people. The difference this has made in our society today is evident when you compare it to ten years back."

Economic opportunities

Improvements in the Afghan economy coupled with better and more employment opportunities are mentioned by interviewees as contributors to security, irrespective of their backgrounds. Business owners, NGO workers and students all cite employment as a significant source of security.



Many of the interviewees state that having a job enables them to protect and provide for their families, which in return gives them a sense of gratification, while others mention that having a job enables them to fight for their rights. Others believe that opportunities for employment have improved since 2001 and that this has given them independence and hope for a better future.

As Ahmad Shah, a 63-year-old resident of Nangarhar province, reflects, “The economy is the greatest contributor to my security. When I saw that the economy in Afghanistan was improving I decided to return to Afghanistan with my family, leaving my job in Pakistan. I now have a business here and am able to take care of my family’s financial needs.”

“The economy is the greatest contributor to my security.”

Similarly, Abdul Rahim, an ethnic Tajik who is 48 years old and works as a driver, says, “Employment opportunities and the presence of the international community make me feel secure.”

Education and literacy

Utilising education and one’s knowledge of the legal framework is repeatedly cited as a means of creating security. Respondents comment not only on education’s ability to raise income and skill level, but also on how important it is to truly understand constitutional rights when dealing with the police. Asadullah, a 38-year-old professor in Kabul, attests to the value of education: “The awareness of people and more educated people make me feel secure because people now have a sense of their rights. If something happens, you know you can go to the many independent agencies to file a complaint and get help. Education has the power to change anything. Unfortunately, such institutions are limited to cities and have not yet extended to rural areas where people suffer most from these challenges.”

Likewise, Abdul Hamid Ansary, an ethnic Tajik shopkeeper in Kabul, says, “The government, my family and education and my business make me feel secure. For me, both my education and having my own business are the most important factors as they have allowed me to be independent. Education and employment have put me in a position to fight for my rights.” In addition, the presence of mass media is seen as a very important way to enable people with a platform to voice their concerns, and gain satisfaction that these are being heard.

Demographic differences

Differences in age, gender, and ethnicity influenced people’s perceptions of security providers.

Age and gender

Most of the personal stories of those 30 or under cite family, friends, and the government, followed by education, employment opportunities, and improved security as contributors to their sense of security. Amongst this group, female interviewees predominantly see their family and the presence of the government as providing security, while men mostly cite employment, improved security and education opportunities.

Approximately 68 percent of the population is well below the age of 25. The potential implications this demography holds for Afghanistan and the region as a whole can be both positive and negative.

“Education has the power to change anything.”

Stories collected from those over age 30 rarely mention family as a security provider and instead reference employment opportunity, rule of law, institutions to lodge complaints, and the presence of a governmental system.


Approximately 68 percent of the population is well below the age of 25.^{1,2} The potential implications this demography holds for Afghanistan and the region as a whole can be both positive and negative, and depend largely on whether the state is able to address the immediate and long-term needs of youth. Issues such as access to education, employment, and representation at the decision-making levels are some of the immediate needs of the youth that need to be addressed by the government.

Ethnicity


While interviewees from minority backgrounds say that discrimination is still present in society and affects their sense of security, a few mention that improvement in other human security factors, such as employment, has given them more opportunities. Karim is an ethnic Hazara originally from Badakhshan province, who is 43 years old and a professor in Kabul. He says, “For my family, more opportunities for work have contributed to my sense of security, [which] in the last ten years has made a real difference in my life. Now I’m a professor, I have a good job, and I know I can advance further if I want to. As an ethnic Hazara, I would not have had such opportunities or been in this position during the Taliban regime. But there are still many Afghans who think along ethnic lines, and when it comes to the Hazara community, the belief that they are only suited for physical labour still exists. That is why I feel ethnic minorities face these issues of insecurity more than others.”

DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS


EXTREME POVERTY RATE



SCHOOL PARTICIPATION RATE



ILLITERACY RATE



UNEMPLOYMENT RATE



ACCESS TO AN IMPROVED WATER SOURCE (IN RURAL AREAS)



POPULATION AGES 0-14 (OF TOTAL)



○ PRE-2001
○ POST-2001

ETHNICITY IN AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan is a heterogeneous society with many different ethnic backgrounds and languages. The Afghan Constitution mentions 14 ethnic groups. The main groups are Pashtuns, Tajiks, and Uzbeks – predominantly Sunni – and the Hazaras – who are mostly Shia. Throughout history, the ethnic card has been played by those in power to rally support and pit Afghans against one another. After the fall of the Soviet-supported regime in 1992, more than 100,000 people died during the ensuing civil war, which was fought along ethnic lines. Though ethnocentric conflict has been minimal in Afghanistan over the past 12 years, in political circles and the media, the potential for such conflict exists. In 2013, lawmakers in the Afghan Parliament vehemently debated the issue of whether national identification cards should identify citizens as Afghans or whether they should include other ethnicities. Discrimination of minority groups in daily life persists.



Conclusion and recommendations

A lack of good governance and continued physical insecurity, illiteracy, and economic insecurity are the major factors contributing to Afghans' insecurity across all segments of society. The views shared here highlight the complexity of the situation in Afghanistan today. Interviewees share contradictory perspectives, as some of the issues that are mentioned as sources of insecurity are seen by others to be contributing to their security.

Governance

While the government and weak governance structures are described as a threat to security, they are at the same time seen as security providers, as the presence of a government and legal framework offer more opportunities for protection. The state remains the main referent for the provision of human security, even if it is criticised and challenged. In addition, the people interviewed clearly mention warlords or other power figures in the central government as a threat to their security, as they fear continued patronage practices presage a return to old ways of governing the country, and prevents the central government from asserting its authority. At the same time, these leaders are supported in some areas of the country, less represented in the sample here, as a source of protection due to the lack of central authority.

Physical security

While many respondents fear physical insecurity, some feel that the security climate is improving. While not optimal, some believe life is better now than under the Taliban or during the civil war in the 1990s. They believe current security conditions, though precarious, have created an environment that will not give way to an all-out war again, particularly amongst ethnic factions, or allow the Taliban to take over the government.

This sentiment may be very different for the people in rural areas, who are more affected by violent conflict on a daily basis. The level of fear and insecurity experienced amongst the Afghan population that is caused by house raids, bombings and suicide attacks and the trauma of the thousands of deaths each year from the ongoing war is difficult to capture within the scope of the interviews and this chapter. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that the physical, personal security aspect of human security is the most critical to address, given the

history of violent conflict in the country. The level of physical security has impacted Afghanistan's overall development and contributed to Afghanistan's inability to meet its MDGs. Those who do not suffer from violent conflict have more potential to ensure development gains and are more resilient.

Economic opportunity and development

Although development seems to have improved since 2001, annual reviews of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), which aims to reduce poverty, show that much progress remains to be made.^b Failures in prioritising local problems and needs and applying regionally specific strategies have plagued development efforts. The interviews reflect that people perceive the economic opportunities to be increasing on the one hand, and unemployment and poverty rising on the other, underscoring the rural-urban divide and the importance of economic opportunities and livelihoods to foster human security. Moreover, illiteracy and traditional ways of thinking are intertwined with unemployment and education.

The level of physical security has impacted Afghanistan's overall development and contributed to Afghanistan's inability to meet its MDGs.

Ensuring security after the withdrawal

Afghanistan will likely face additional human security challenges in the future. It is currently transitioning its political, economic and security sectors in preparation for the international military withdrawal at the end of 2014. Afghans will also have to find a way to fill the economic gap created

^b A programme launched in 2008 to channel the "multi-dimensional human development cause" of the MDG objectives into a national development strategy.

by the withdrawal. The most difficult transition is the security sector, with signs that some warlords may arm their militias again, as they feel the Afghan army is incapable of providing security against the Taliban.¹³ It begs the question whether these critical transitions will be able to achieve the scale of good governance, economic growth and stability that are needed to ensure human security in the next chapter of Afghanistan's history.

Recommendations

While the regional and international dimensions of the current conflict in Afghanistan clearly demand additional recommendations to address the more acute, physical human security challenges, these recommendations are based on the underlying security concerns that people identified in this chapter, which are relevant to ensure a holistic approach to Afghanistan's human security challenges.


- **The government and international organisations such as the UN should work to promote a sense of physical security by working towards demilitarisation.** While the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) currently stands at 350,000, more efforts are needed to improve public security. For example, decreasing the use of personal security apparatuses, ending the misuse of weapons, and eliminating illegally held weapons would improve public safety.
- **The government should improve state legitimacy.** Afghanistan has been in transition from conflict to peace since 2001. A durable peace is dependent upon consensus building and participatory processes, otherwise it will be deemed illegitimate. The government must earn peoples' trust by improving governance, providing adequate public services, developing mechanisms to access justice, and fighting corruption. Integrity must return to public offices.
- **The government and civil society organisations should continue and increase efforts to reduce illiteracy.** Illiteracy is the root cause of inadequate political, economic, social and cultural freedoms. Illiteracy in Afghanistan is not only leading to self-censorship by the literate minority but it is also preventing the illiterate majority from enjoying their basic rights and freedoms. Comprehensive awareness and education programmes are needed to reach all 34 provinces and bridge the gap between the literate and illiterate.
- **The government and international aid groups should prioritise Afghan economic participation by encouraging local investment and local participation in development design and implementation.** Many of Afghanistan's development programmes have not taken existing individual, institutional or societal capacities into account and have imposed programmes on local populations. Therefore, individuals' skills, knowledge, and needs should be identified to provide a better context for both the Afghan government and international aid groups. Ensuring local participation in this process is crucial in developing entrepreneurship and a sustainable economy.

The authors work for the **Afghanistan Justice Organisation (AJO)** an Afghan-led, non-profit, and non-partisan organisation inspired by Afghanistan's youth—the next generation of Afghans responsible for Afghanistan's continued social and economic development. AJO seeks to empower youth to take ownership of their country and to make a difference in the lives of others through public awareness campaign, application of the law, and freedom of choice. Furthermore, AJO is organised exclusively for the purpose of promoting reform through education and training and to advance free markets and individual liberty under the laws of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. AJO is a member of the South Asia network of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC).



The State and Human Security in Ukraine

Alexander Bogomolov | Iryna Brunova-Kalisteska | Victor Pushkar | Serge Danylov | Association of Middle East Studies (AMES)



“Tensions related to identity politics highlighted in the interviews were visible and had been known long before the conflict broke out, with material conditions exacerbating inter-group and state-citizen relations.”

Interviews with residents of Kyiv and Simferopol in late 2013 revealed widespread mistrust of the police and lack of protection from state authorities, leading many Ukrainians to rely on personal connections or themselves for security. Public outcry through the media and advocacy were seen as main sources to influence government authorities. The lack of accountability and transparency of the authorities, particularly among the police, were some of the chronic issues that fuelled the mass Euromaidan protests in late 2013. These events have since been overtaken by the ousting of President Yanukovich, the Russian annexation of Crimea, and a pro-Russian armed insurgency in eastern Ukraine. While this conflict has brought human security concerns to another level, this chapter points to underlying structural issues which are important for Ukraine's domestic agenda.



Background

Situated in the fertile agricultural lands between Eastern Europe EU member states and Russia, Ukraine is home to 45 million people. While ethnic Ukrainians make up nearly three-quarters of the population, the population also includes minority groups of Romanian, Hungarian and Bulgarian descent. Eastern Ukraine is home to a large minority of ethnic Russians, along with the Crimea Tatars, a Turkic ethnic group native to the Crimean Peninsula.¹

Annexation and resistance

Ukraine's modern day territories have historically been divided among surrounding and competing empires. The dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires after World War I provided an opening for the brief emergence of a unified Ukrainian state, which was soon subjugated and divided once again, with the eastern territories falling to the Russian Red Army in 1920 and the western lands to the Polish. In the first decade of Josef Stalin's totalitarian rule, the population endured famine, mass executions and deportations. Most of Ukraine's modern day territories were united following the Nazi-Soviet pact that redrew Eastern European borders. Heavy losses in World War II under Nazi occupation resulted in the deaths of millions of Ukrainians, including millions of Jews. The victory of the Allied Forces firmly established Ukraine as a satellite state of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) until 1991. The Crimean peninsula, initially part of the Russian Federation within the Soviet Union, became part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954. This was 10 years after Stalin had deported the Crimea Tatars to Siberia. They returned in the late 1980s and 1990s.²

A history of protest

Decades of Soviet repression of Ukraine's language and culture sparked extended nationalist resistance, which led to mass protests in the final days of the USSR and established the foundations for the strong civic activism and mass participation that still characterise Ukrainian politics. Ukrainians voted for independence in a nationwide referendum in 1991, establishing the country as a democratic, independent state after hundreds of years of nationalist struggles. Ukrainian democracy had weak institutional foundations following decades of totalitarian rule. Flagrant fraud and manipulation in the presidential election of 2004 galvanised Ukrainians to take to the streets in mass nonviolent

protests to demand a new round of free and fair elections that eventually brought to power pro-Western candidate Viktor Yushchenko in what is known as the Orange Revolution.³

New crisis and conflict

In 2014, Ukraine again faced a political crisis that reflected many of the challenges of its political transition and its complex geopolitical and cultural legacy. This chapter portrays the public mood in Kyiv and Simferopol in the early stages of the crisis (December 2013), months before the development of the armed conflict currently unfolding in the eastern part of the country.

The 'Euromaidan' crisis which began in late 2013 in response to a governmental decision to turn down an Association Agreement with the European Union (EU), increased incrementally after the interviews in this chapter had been conducted. Mass demonstrations in the Maidan square in downtown Kyiv spread across the country, and grew as clashes and violent government crackdowns left 167 people dead and 2,200 injured – including both protestors and security forces – and 32 missing.⁴ The government attracted international criticism by criminalising the protest movement and authorising riot police to use force against civilians, including stun grenades, tear gas, rubber bullets, and eventually firearms. As the conflict escalated, protesters increasingly called for the resignation of President Viktor Yanukovich and his government. By the end of February 2014, demonstrators occupied government buildings, president Yanukovich had fled the country, and parliament voted to remove him from office.^a Protestors demanded a radical overhaul of government structures and practices.

The events sparked fears among some Russian-speaking Ukrainians about alleged nationalistic Ukrainian tendencies and the distancing from historic ties with Russia. Following the ousting of president Yanukovich, Russian president Vladimir Putin ordered the annexation of the Crimean peninsula in March 2014. New elections were held in Ukraine on 25 May 2014, and were won by pro-European Petro Poroshenko by 54.7% of the votes.⁵ However, due to the annexation, the elections did not cover Crimea, and were marred by safety

a At the time of writing, the course of these events are still being contested.

concerns in the eastern Donbass region. At the time of writing, pro-Russian separatists are fighting the Ukrainian government for control of territories in Donetsk and Lugansk in eastern Ukraine. The conflict continues to unfold, and has escalated into fully-fledged armed warfare. Many fear that the international ramifications of this conflict signal a return of Cold War dynamics.

DEVELOPMENT IN UKRAINE

CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2013



YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT



PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT (% GROSS)



POVERTY AT NATIONAL POVERTY LINE (% OF POPULATION)



This chapter portrays the public mood in Kyiv and Simferopol in the early stages of the crisis, before the development of the armed conflict currently unfolding in the eastern part of the country.



Perspectives on security

The reflections shared in the following sections were collected through interviews carried out in late 2013 in Kyiv in the initial, nonviolent stages of the Euromaidan protests, and in the Crimean capital of Simferopol before it was annexed by Russia. As such, they cast light on some of the domestic conditions that provide the backdrop for the eventual political crisis. The perspectives highlight citizens' perceptions of and experiences with security in their own words, grouped here into the most frequent categories of threats highlighted by those interviewed.

Sources of insecurity

Crimea and identity politics

Interviews in Crimea, taken before the peninsula's annexation by Russia, demonstrated that politics or politically motivated prejudices play a role in the way residents define their security, as the region has been a hot spot for Ukrainian identity politics. It is a majority Russian region with a strong influence of both Russian nationalist groups and communists, and also hosts the Crimea Tatars. In contrast to local Russians, the Crimea Tatars vote consistently for Ukrainian liberal nationalist parties and continue to fight for recognition as an indigenous people and for compensation for the losses incurred in the aftermath of their collective deportation in 1944. In contrast to Kyiv, the perception of political others as a source of insecurity was characteristic of interviewees in Simferopol. These included people of different political beliefs and often of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds. The Crimea Tatars or Western Ukrainians were held in contrast to the ethnic Russians, referred to as 'pro-Russian separatists' by local Ukrainians. One NGO activist's sense of insecurity was related to the feeling of being a political 'other' when openly expressing his pro-European views. Conversely, an

^b Cossacks historically have been associated with the rise of both Ukrainian and Russian identity and nationalism. The Cossack revivalist movement received strong official support in post-Soviet Russia. Most neo-Cossack groups in modern Ukraine, particularly in Crimea and eastern regions, are offshoots of this pan-Russian revivalist movement, whereas others have local Ukrainian roots and are based mainly in Western and Central Ukraine. Cossack revivalists have formed paramilitary groups, wearing uniforms with whips and maintaining horses. In Crimea, pro-Russian neo-Cossacks have been involved in conflicts with the local Tatar population.



Nikolai is a 70-year old-man who works as a car parking security guard in Simferopol. He is a Communist Party member and vividly recalls life under communism.

A very serious threat, even greater than the Tatar issue, [is] intimidation and the issue of neo-Nazism, even here in Crimea, in Simferopol. For example, in a house across the street there is a Cossack.^b He goes out with his whip and snaps it loudly and ostentatiously. He shows off his 'abilities' – be afraid of us, the Cossacks. He frightens people. [As for] the fascist tough guys of Tiahnybok [the Ukrainian nationalist party] – we have to deal with them at public rallies. When we would march [as a column of workers] and quietly conduct our rally at the Alley of Heroes [commemorating those who died, many of them Russian, defending the city in World War II], they come out with their flags and fascist symbols. They aren't afraid of anything. How could the state and the government allow the fascists to march by our holy places? Confrontation is brewing. If they raise their heads again, people won't let them. We won't stand on ceremony with them.

I see a danger in alcohol abuse, especially in the young people. Our children, our grandchildren, our future, are starting to behave immorally. Our children do not know what the state is, what the motherland is, or how sacred it is. This is what frightens me. The young people are not being engaged – we can't make anything out of them. They have nowhere to show their worth – no BAM^c, no great construction sites. They have nothing to occupy themselves with. We have people who have lived until the age of 40 without ever working one day. I don't know what will happen tomorrow. Under socialism, we knew that we were going to be provided for in our old age, we would have social protection. Now, one can't live out of his pension normally. No guarantees, no confidence in the future.

^c The Baikal–Amur Mainline is a broad gauge railway of over 4,000 km traversing Siberia and the Russian Far East and was widely publicised as a construction project of the century during the USSR.

elderly Simferopol respondent speaks on nationalist and generational tensions between the communist legacy of Russia and Ukrainian identity.

Police impunity

Political violence was perceived as a threat in both Kyiv and Simferopol. Kyiv respondents noted police violence against protestors in the early days of the Euromaidan protests. Anatoliy, a journalist in his forties noted, "Among the new things is that the cops appear to have started assaulting people who go to the Maidan wearing EU arm bands – I haven't got it confirmed yet, but I read it in social networks.^d I have friends and acquaintances, who saw that they had been followed at night or in the morning when leaving Maidan by two or three people. When walking on the Maidan there is always a danger that the riot police will capture you and throw you in jail."

Overall, police brutality or harassment represented a common cause of insecurity reported by respondents, with young males being the most affected population. Dima, a 29-year-old mobile coffee shop vendor in the Sviatoshyn district of Kyiv, provided the following anecdote: "We got into trouble with police once. Drunk police dressed in civilian clothes. They were bullying some boys in a shop, and it ended up in a brawl. The next day they came in uniform, took the boys to the police station and beat them up severely. No one ever answered for this. The parents even had to pay money to the police for the boys to be released."

Many respondents had stories of police corruption. Andrei in Simferopol recounted the story of a neighbour and his wife suffering armed robbery, followed by abusive police taking advantage of the situation: "One [of the robbers] was shot dead in the crossfire. The rest left with the money. No one was found, but the cops pulled out a very handsome amount of money from this guy. We too have a similar story. Someone robbed the storage facility. The cops started pumping me for money under the pretext that they were following [the robbers]: 'give us money or else we will run out of gasoline'. Never count on anyone or go anywhere [for help] – just don't let it happen to you. You won't be able to call either the police or the hospital – they are all tied up together."

^d At the time of writing there had been plentiful reports of such behavior in local media including material evidence.

"You won't be able to call either the police or the hospital – they are all tied up together."

Street violence

Violent assaults, robbery, and hooliganism or anti-social behaviour were the most commonly cited cause of insecurity among surveyed residents in Kyiv, particularly for young men, but also for some women and elderly respondents. According to Volodymyr, a storage facility manager supervising young workers in Kyiv, "If you don't get injured in an unlit subway, you may run into some *hopnyks* [thugs]. The young supermarket workers get in trouble often after seeing off their girlfriends on unlit city streets." According to Halyna, a municipal employee in Kyiv, "There have been several cases of beatings on the streets, robberies with beatings, and thefts. I have been robbed myself, and friends are often confronted with violence and robbery at ATMs. This is very much a characteristic of our part of the city, the crime rate is high." Interviewees often associated street crime with social others, referring to *hopnyks* or thugs described as violent, unruly, and intoxicated members of the 'underclass'. Marginally, in Kyiv an ethnic other – such as Asian migrants – also appeared as a source of threat in public imagination.

In Simferopol^e, 40-year-old businessman Andrei described a broader sense of insecurity: "After dark, your life and health may be in danger anywhere: beatings, murders, practically in all parts of the city, though especially in the old city, Zaleskaya, and the public housing estates. Car accidents are an issue too, but this is peanuts [in comparison to] the lawlessness. If you are doing business in the city and if someone knows that you've got some money – be ready. Usually, they rob you first, and then the police come to collect what is left."

Traffic and infrastructure

Traffic accidents and unsafe transport were the second most frequently cited cause of insecurity in Kyiv. Ihor, an academic in his mid-40s in Kyiv, said, "You can get hit by cars, as drivers often do not follow the rules, particularly at crosswalks. Drivers just don't pay attention to people." The issue of traffic safety had a strong social justice connotation, as the media had reported multiple cases of

^e A smaller sample of interviews was done in Simferopol and as such represent more anecdotal information than the broader sample in Kyiv.



intoxicated owners of expensive vehicles killing people on bus stops and sidewalks and then easily escaping from justice. These reports caused strong public outrage. Petro, a 25-year-old car mechanic described Kyiv as unsafe for drivers: “I know lots of cases that resulted from basic traffic rule violations. Young partying rich girls don’t follow the rules. On the roads of Kyiv, motorcyclists simply can’t survive! I know of many deadly cases over the last five years.”

Both street crime and traffic accidents were related to an unsafe urban infrastructure. Interviewees highlighted collapsing sidewalks, unlit streets, dim subways and excessive snow and ice obstructing traffic in winter, which reflect a lack of municipal governance. Volodymyr recounted that, “most sick leaves among workers are due to injuries they get at night time – coming back home, at unlit bus stops or deserted subways, from icy roads in winter. One can be injured easily and there is no chance to get medical first aid [from an ambulance].” The idea

Multiple sources of human insecurity

When comparing responses from Simferopol and Kyiv there were many commonalities, despite the fact that the two regions are usually seen as very distinct. For many interviewees, a combination of security concerns increased their overall vulnerability and a sense of helplessness. Raya, a middle-aged domestic worker in Sviatoshyn, Kyiv exemplified this: “The state doesn’t provide for our [young people], through work or anything else. My one son is a drug addict. My other son got into a car accident. He wasn’t guilty and now he’s disabled and no one needs him. They don’t even want to pay his insurance. This boss, the one who hit him with his car, is asking him not to go to court. [...] I have come to realise that no one needs us, the common people. That’s all.” Drug abuse is an example of a coping mechanism that is also a source of insecurity. It was mentioned by several of those interviewed directly affected as users, family members or health workers.

In addition to the issues presented above, civic unrest was noted as a source of insecurity, even before the Euromaidan crisis grew. Middle-aged residents also reported concern with infrastructure deficits that affect water, electricity and heating, whereas older respondents who remembered the Chernobyl disaster in the 1980s counted natural disasters and technological accidents as potential security threats.

Though respondents did not mention poverty as a primary source of insecurity, social inequality was reflected in whether and how respondents felt in a position to cope with the threats. It should also be noted that both Kyiv and Simferopol have better employment and income opportunities than other areas of the country. To assess the relevance of freedom from want as a human security factor in Ukraine, specific research would need to be conducted in other geographic areas with higher levels of poverty such as Ternopil, Rivne, Sumy regions, and northern Crimea.

“I have come to realise that no one needs us, the common people. That’s all.”

that urban disorder and vandalism contributed to increased rates of crime and anti-social behaviour, known better as the ‘broken window theory’,⁶ resonated with security perceptions expressed by many interviewees.

Lack of health care

Inadequate access to, or poor quality of health services was a concern expressed by health care workers and the middle aged and elderly. Tetiana, a doctor in Kyiv, said, “As a medical doctor I would say that a very low level of public healthcare is a threat to the patient. The equipment is very bad, and the professional level of the doctors is low. That leads to wrong diagnosis and incorrect treatment. Our security is in our hands. Public healthcare doesn’t do its job.” Corruption also affects the health care system. Misha, in Simferopol, alleged that, “In the hospital, unless you pay ‘a voluntary contribution’, they won’t provide help.”

Security providers

The range of security threats and the most commonly cited insecurities pointed to a marked absence of public security provision and rule of law. A 45-year-old lawyer, Alex, who moved to Kyiv from the eastern city of Donetsk described that “The insecurity is in the arbitrary treatment on the part of the authorities.” When reflecting on who to turn to and how to cope with insecurity, many respondents pointed to the failures of the state institutions, and resorted to alternative or individual means for protection and empowerment. Coping strategies ranged from passive avoidance of risks, to more active engagement with authorities.



Anton, a 41-year-old IT worker in downtown Kyiv describes the weak presence of the state.

[I feel threatened] when I don’t know what to expect from the law enforcement when I encounter them in everyday circumstances. What rights do I have, and what rights do they have? You need to enter into an argument with them literally on everything – any baseless questions like ‘who are you’, ‘what are you doing here’, ‘show your documents’. Things like that. How can I explain it? I don’t feel protected in terms of, well, the state system, isn’t it? I don’t know who owes me and what I owe in different situations. This relates to *Zhek*^f, this relates to the police, and even public bus drivers. Every time you have to argue with a particular individual. I would call it minimal awareness and minimal transparency. I don’t feel like there is any sort of local authority, at the district or street level, and in the same sense I don’t feel protection from law enforcement. I am absolutely unsure that police is on my side or that they are interested in bothering with my case.

^f This term refers to the housing office – a superficially reformed relic of the Soviet system – municipal offices that collect payment on behalf of large private utilities providers and provide maintenance and repair services to the majority of urban households.

Some time ago I had to take part in litigation as a complainant’s friend. This was related to a traffic accident. After giving testimony I never saw or heard or any activity on the part of the law enforcement. The owner of the car was a Member of Parliament. Frankly, given the number plate and the car – a Mercedes 600 – [the defence lawyer] couldn’t guarantee a successful trial, even though it drove against a red light and killed a cyclist at the pedestrian crossing. He charged \$500 for his work, and said: ‘there are levers of influence up

“I feel insecure to some extent every day as I don’t understand where I can find justice in this system.”

there, which will simply lead to failure of the case’. And while it was being investigated, they transferred it to the prosecutor’s office. It appeared that the defendant in this case was the son of the MP. He tried to hush the case by ‘gifts’, shall we say. I feel insecure to some extent every day as I don’t understand where I can find justice in this system.



The police and the vacuum of state protection

The police were simultaneously the least efficient government agency and the most in demand as a security provider. The attitude of Tolyk, a 32-year-old security guard in Kyiv was: “In any case, turn to the police, it is their job, we pay them taxes and the taxpayer has the right to protection.” Yet, there was an apparent paradox in how people related to authorities as security providers. On the one hand, police were most frequently cited as necessary authorities. On the other, respondents did not express confidence that the police were either likely or willing to provide for their security needs.

Yana, a female university student in Kyiv illustrated this ambivalence: “[In some cases], out of pure instinct, one goes to the police. But if there is no one in uniform around, or if you don’t trust them, you can only count on your own self. When I was attacked I there were people around who could interfere, but no one did. There are situations when you feel like no one will help you.” Illustrating the point further, Ihor said, “When you see people wearing uniforms, you *a priori* perceive them as a [source] of danger. You don’t know what to expect from them. If a situation doesn’t warrant immediate action, people usually try to avoid the official route if they can.”

Against the backdrop of a dysfunctional police, people mainly relied on their social relations, family, friends and community for physical protection. Anatoliy said, “You can try and call the police [but] this is more like a method to distract attention. But, generally, it’s good to have a few friends who could physically come and stand by you. This is perhaps the best method of protection.” The inadequacy of the police is further reflected in the use of private security agencies by larger corporations and the richer strata of Ukrainians. The fact that the elite rely on private firms for their security needs is another indicator of the failure of the public security sector.

Corruption and nepotism

State institutions often appeared to work more effectively through personal contacts and informal relationships, including those established through bribes. Knowing ‘the right people’ in the appropriate agency was deemed a more important resource than the official mandate of the agency in question. Oxana, a 25-year-old woman who worked with a transport company in Livoberezhna, Kyiv

said about the police, “As always is the case with us, you need to go to a police [officer] you know personally, and it will be efficient then.” Yevhen saw it this way: “Both sides [of the legal system] contribute to the same corruption scheme... one prosecutor who takes a larger bribe by the lawyer, turns the case slightly the other way than the prosecutor who takes a smaller bribe and so on. All is built on corruption, from top to bottom. There are no other mechanisms, or any other motivations.”

“All is built on corruption, from top to bottom. There are no other mechanisms, or any other motivations.”

The least protected people in such an environment were those with the lowest social capital – including the undereducated, the working class, young students living independently of their families, and single elderly persons. The underlying issues were thus closely related to governance and social justice issues. Mykhailo, a civic activist in his forties in Kyiv said, “Police who want to clear a crime go after people who resemble somebody, and if they see that this is not some tough guy, and there is no one who would stand up for him, they may simply accuse him of some crime. A [guy I know] got his kids accused for no reason. It was lucky that he was a judge.”

Rights and access to information

The level of awareness of rights and obligations in relation to security providers was a recurring theme in the interviews. There was a clear sense of information asymmetry that contributed to the power imbalance between the state and citizens. Information asymmetry concerns the lack of information at all levels of public communication, including citizens’ awareness of their legal rights, the transparency in the work of government agencies and informed public opinion in a more general sense.



Misha is a 28-year-old male in Simferopol, Crimea, who describes himself as an NGO activist and private entrepreneur.

You feel insecurity when going to all kinds of authorities, even the passport office. Insecurity in terms of your rights to receive consultation or services. I feel insecure in terms of the knowledge of laws and the ability of influencing the state authorities. You need to be prepared to make inquiries, to call, to read the law.

When you approach [an official] and say that you have read the law, they immediately start working and their attitude changes. I had a case recently with the tax inspection – I read all, learned and spoke the terms that they know, and they already started calling me back, it was a different story then. And when you say, ‘I don’t know’, there are immediately a lot of unnecessary steps you have to take – they tell you go buy something, come back tomorrow. Whenever I say that the law requires that you should do this within two days, they do it. Most civil servants do not know the laws themselves, therefore, they are affected by fear, and they think you know the truth.

“Most civil servants do not know the laws themselves, therefore, they are affected by fear, and they think you know the truth.”

Awareness of legal rights and obligations was a frequently cited coping strategy. Mykhailo explained that, “With police, you need to be calm and explain the situation. If they ask you to come along, tell them you are going to let your friends know, cite all the laws you know and don’t know, talk about what rights you have. They don’t know these [laws] anyway. They will see that you are not a simple one and that it is not going to be easy with you.”

Sources of empowerment

Media, public transparency and collective action appeared to be important sources of empowerment. Several respondents indicated that by taking things to the public, media may help make inefficient government agencies or particular officials do their jobs. While money or political influence may easily help hush a criminal case or make courts produce essentially unjust rulings, public opinion mobilised through media could still exert significant influence. The events of the Euromaidan demonstrated to many how public knowledge on issues of common concern, including human security, could benefit the greater community interest. The most powerful wave of protests was triggered by anti-protest laws promulgated by the government in January 2014 that attempted to limit civil liberties and enshrine greater information asymmetry.⁷ Mounting violence against protestors was restrained when media and citizen journalists exposed illegal practices of the riot police and paid provocateurs to the public.

In the absence of state authorities to check official power, the public sphere was seen as a last recourse. As Dima pointed out, “You need to [be able to appeal] to some authorities [to have security]. Police will have to punish police, or some other organisation. You see, every now and then the police are raping and killing, and then what? Nothing [happens] to them. Only if it is made public, then they may do something about it.”

Another way of claiming citizens’ rights was collective action. For instance, rampant corruption among traffic police has prompted a growing number of drivers to organise into a movement named Road Control which aims to document and investigate police abuse – an example of what is sometimes referred to as ‘human security from below’.⁸ The group grew incrementally and became more politically active during the Euromaidan protest rallies.



Conclusion and recommendations

The start of the political crisis in Ukraine reflected the need for significant governmental reforms in the country. It is notable that the fault lines of the debate generated by the protest movement came close to points identified in the interviews. Protesters began to demand accountability of the public administration and the rule of law, meaningful local self-government, a review of the legal framework and law enforcement structures and the way they relate to society. Furthermore, the tensions related to identity politics highlighted in the interviews were visible and had been known long before the conflict broke out, with material conditions exacerbating inter-group and state-citizen relations.

While common citizens were unable to rely on the police as a security provider, the Yanukovich government in early 2013 was allocating an ever-greater share of the budget for the needs of the Ministry of Interior.⁹ At the peak of the mass protests in Kyiv, media reported on the six-fold increase of state budget allocated to the riot police, at a time when Ukraine relied heavily on foreign loans to fill in the gaps in its national budget. The problems with the police went beyond technical inefficiency, as issues flagged concerned their very mandate and purpose. Police were seen to be concerned with politics and with maintaining the political regime, rather than the maintenance of law and order.

The difference between the actual situation and what the public expected from police reflected two different approaches to security: one derived from the communist system based on a hierarchical system of top-down control, versus a modern bottom-up demand-driven security project whereby police operate as a service provider. This debate came to the fore as a result of riot police behaviour towards protestors, whose excessive brutality became graphically visible to the public.

At the time of writing, the constantly shifting conflict dynamics that currently affect the population of Ukraine and its neighbours pose regional and international challenges of a different nature. The humanitarian consequences seen in over 3,000 violent deaths¹⁰ and some 260,000 displaced people¹¹ in eastern Ukraine clearly pose additional and more acute human security challenges than those presented in this chapter. Nevertheless, the underlying domestic security concerns that in part triggered the political crisis remain relevant for current and future policymakers.

While the government has changed, the same security apparatus is still in place. The armed conflict has focused the country's attention on political and national security concerns such as the protection of borders and sovereignty. However, the risk is that such an approach could emphasise the very conditions that fuelled the conflict, increasing the polarisation amongst some Ukrainian groups and overshadowing valid grievances that all groups have against the state authorities. The stories presented here indicate clear warning signs with regards to the politicisation and corruption of the security sector, as well as the perception of the 'social other' as a source of insecurity. Whilst the survey for this publication was not carried out in the current conflict zones, the dire conditions in areas such as Donetsk and Lugansk – and their effect on the public mood and community relations – have been subject to extensive public concern in Ukraine.¹² Such grievances must be addressed by the Ukrainian government for long-term stability to be a possibility.


As the European Union, the United States and other international donors are signing support packages for security sector reform with the newly appointed government, the risks of a politicised security sector must be carefully assessed.¹³ Frameworks for civil oversight of security sectors, underpinned by free press and civil rights education, must be integral to such reforms. Another conflict factor that inevitably affects this process is the rise of paramilitary groups on both sides of the conflict, a sign of continued militarisation of Ukrainian security.

On the other hand, the past year has also built an unprecedented momentum of Ukrainian civil society groups and social movements. Not only were they instrumental in leading and calling for nonviolent approaches during the Euromaidan protests, they are now key in assisting the protection and humanitarian support of populations affected by the conflict, filling important gaps in the state's capacities. Civil society is a needed partner by the government; this provides important entry points for a longer-term collaboration for human security. However, this will only be a possibility if human security concerns are not completely overshadowed by the political and militarised national security strategies perpetuated in the context of the ongoing armed conflict.

Recommendations


- **Ensure that the public security sector, especially police, effectively protects law and order.** Police have the potential to be a powerful source of human security for the people, rather than a source of insecurity or a political instrument. One of the most immediate priorities for the new government should be not merely a reshuffle, but a profound security sector reform, whose ultimate output would include a democratically accountable police force. State actors can build on the momentum of the increasing space and role for the involvement of civil society, particularly with the growing volunteer movement, to ensure efficient mechanisms for public consultations and public oversight for the reform processes.
- **Tackle widespread corruption by addressing inefficiencies and strengthening the rule of law.** As one of the issues that fuelled Euromaidan, inefficient government agencies feed corruption and hinder citizens' ability to exercise their rights through lawful means. Citizens must be aware of their rights in order to exercise them. This will not only empower citizens, but also strengthen trust in government and the judicial system. Civil society have a role to play in enabling feedback mechanisms and informing citizens about their rights and obligations.
- **Prioritise accountability and transparency in government activities.** Building trust between the citizens, government, and other stakeholders will require freedom of information. Effective governance requires that citizens can hold their government accountable and critique its actions. The media and social networks can be instrumental channels for transparency, and can be used by citizens to hold the government accountable.
- **Support initiatives to strengthen dialogue processes** addressing the current disconnect and divisions between different political, socio-economic and cultural groups. The complexities of the Ukrainian identity should have room for expression as part of a national narrative of peaceful co-existence. A number of civil-society led dialogue initiatives can further inform the reforms aiming to increase both the actual and perceived security.

The author works for the **Association of Middle East Studies (AMES)** is a non-profit organisation based in Kyiv, Ukraine, that conducts research and analysis of the Middle East and of Ukrainian foreign and domestic policy regarding Muslim and other minorities with a particular focus on Crimea. AMES has done numerous projects on mediation and prevention of inter-ethnic tensions (with a focus on Crimea), and increasing civic tolerance in the region. AMES is a member of the Eastern Europe network of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC).



Statelessness and Insecurity in the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Lucy Nusseibeh^a, Middle East Nonviolence and Democracy (MEND)



“Which security are you talking about? We have forgotten the meaning of this word a long time ago.”

The situation of human security among Palestinians is as complex and fragmented as the problem and the people. The pages that follow offer only a snapshot of concerns and responses from focus groups and individuals in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These give voice to some of the daily issues facing a variety of Palestinians. While the Israeli occupation dominates and permeates every aspect of Palestinian life, it is often taken as a given by many of the participants.

^a The chapter was produced with the help of facilitator and researcher Amira Abul Hawa and intern Isobel Whitting



Background

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been a feature of the global landscape for almost 100 years. For the purpose of this chapter, only a brief timeline of events can be outlined.^b This chapter only addresses the human security situation of Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and does not include the 1,694 million Palestinians living under direct Israeli rule and with Israeli citizenship in the territories that have been with the State of Israel since 1948, nor does it include the approximately two million Palestinian refugees living in camps in Jordan, the 442,000 in Lebanon and the 499,000 in Syria.¹

^b Many accounts of these historical events are contested.

The first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 resulted in the expulsion of more than 700,000 Palestinians.² In the subsequent war of 1967, which lasted only six days, Israel seized East Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan, Gaza and the Sinai from Egypt and the Golan Heights from Syria. This marked the beginning of Israel's ongoing military occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and its unilateral illegal annexation of East Jerusalem. Another war in 1973 failed to change this, and uprisings by the Palestinians against the Israeli occupation in 1987 (the nonviolent First Intifada) and in 2000 (the violent Second Intifada) were equally unsuccessful. In 2005, the Israeli army and settlers unilaterally evacuated the Gaza Strip. Since June 2007, the Strip – which has a population density of 4,657 per square kilometre – has been under constant blockade by land, air and sea.

In December 2008, in response to rocket fire, but also at a time when a new cease-fire was being negotiated, Israel attacked Hamas in the Gaza Strip, mostly by aerial bombardment on a captive population. Nearly 1,400 people were killed in just 22 days.³ Another major attack took place in November 2012, and more recently and most destructively in July and August 2014, through the Israeli army's operation 'Protective Edge' in the

Gaza Strip. Every man, woman and child in the Gaza Strip – some 1.7 million people – have been directly affected by the conflict. The bombardment and military ground operations caused the death of 2,153, of whom some 1,480 are believed to be civilians, including 504 Palestinian children. The damage to public infrastructure was unprecedented, affecting electricity, clean water and healthcare.⁴

Oslo's legacy

The Oslo Accords in 1993 and 1995, which allowed for the return of many leading exiles, and the creation of a 'Palestinian Authority', were supposed to bring about an end to the occupation and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state by May 1999. Despite these accords and the official peace process that they initiated, the Israeli state has remained in total control of Palestinian lives. This has created a continuing situation of minimal human security for the entire Palestinian population, and in the case of Gaza, an absence of human security to the extent that the population barely survives.⁵ With nearly half a million people displaced by the latest Israeli attacks, their survival is even more precarious.⁶

Amongst the legacies of Oslo has been the creation of so-called 'security areas', which directly impact the freedom of movement for every Palestinian and thereby their access to health, education, water and other necessities. The West Bank has been divided internally into a patchwork of different security zones: Area A, Palestinian population centres, ostensibly under Palestinian civil and security control; Area B ostensibly under Palestinian civil and joint Israeli-Palestinian security control; and Area C, some 60 percent of the West Bank, under total Israeli civil and military and planning

Every man, woman and child in the Gaza Strip – some 1.7 million people – have been directly affected by the conflict.

control. This area includes the Jordan valley, most of the water and many other resources, and many Israeli settlements. Areas A, B, and C are separated physically by a system of separation walls and around 450 military checkpoints/borders.⁷ In 2002, Israel began the construction of the so-called Separation Wall. Some 85 percent of the wall runs inside the West Bank, with the result that 11,000 Palestinians need permits to live in their homes as Israel treats them as falling outside the West Bank.⁸

Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are severed from each other with almost total restrictions on access to Jerusalem and to the Gaza Strip. The restrictions on movement have fragmented the Palestinian people to such an extent that many are no longer aware that they share the same concerns.

Over-securitisation

Another negative legacy of the Oslo accords has been the militarisation of Palestinian society, which was almost entirely without even small arms until 1993, the year that marked the advent of the official peace process and the 'return' of many exiled Palestinians. One of the major components of these accords was the establishment of a large number of security services, including police, preventive security, intelligence, and marines. This led to a rapid proliferation in the amount and use of arms.⁹ Ironically, the security services are not there so much for the protection of Palestinian security, as for the protection of Israeli security^c, although Israel as the occupying power should be responsible for security of individual Palestinians.¹⁰

As society becomes more fragmented, the dangers from the use of arms increases; this was brought home by the violent split between the two major factions, Fatah and Hamas, in 2007. This split led to the formation of two separate governments, one in the Gaza Strip led by Hamas and the other in the West Bank led by Fatah, and to violence by each side against the other, whether by open use of arms or arrests. The split considerably added to levels

^c "The armed forces' main task was not to guarantee the security of the occupied inhabitants from external attacks or from the occupying power, but to maintain law and order within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and to protect Israel's citizens from Palestinian militants. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin made this blatantly clear when he noted that PA security personnel operated throughout the West Bank with "Israel's knowledge and in cooperation with Israel's security forces to safeguard Israel's security interests." Neve Gordon (2008:40), Israel's Occupation.

IN NUMBERS

MINORS IN CUSTODY OF ISRAELI SECURITY FORCES

192

JULY 2014, WEST BANK (B'TSELEM 2014)



PEOPLE DISPLACED DUE TO HOUSE DEMOLITIONS



AREA C

769



EAST JERUSALEM

121

JAN-SEPT 2014 (UNOCHA 2014)



SETTLERS

438,088

WEST BANK, EAST JERUSALEM (B'TSELEM 2012)

LAND OF WEST BANK ISOLATED BY THE SEPARATION WALL

11.9%

WEST BANK (B'TSELEM 2012)

UNEMPLOYMENT

23% IN 2013

(OPT) (PCBS 2014)



of fear, especially in the Gaza Strip. Nevertheless, at the time of writing, an historic reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas has taken place, with a unity government sworn in on 2 June 2014.¹¹

Amongst the legacies of Oslo has been the creation of different Palestinian 'security areas', which directly impact the freedom of movement for every Palestinian and thereby their access to health, education, water and other necessities.



Palestinian perspectives on human insecurity

The focus groups and interviews covered a wide range of topics, including military security and repression, the Israeli occupation, and societal security. The latter includes social services, including education, social justice, security of employment, and the poverty caused by the occupation. In all contexts, human security was unanimously found to be severely lacking.

While the occupation was discussed, it was not cited as the only reason for the absence of human security. Many security needs that would normally be provided by a state are absent, such as protection from military and personal physical attacks, or from the danger of arrest and possible torture, even for minors. Also missing is protection from land confiscation or having one's home destroyed, or the absence of freedom of movement and other basic human rights.

Although it is clear that the occupation affects almost every aspect of Palestinian life, it would be inappropriate to portray the Palestinians as victims in every sphere, with no autonomy or responsibility over the internal issues within their society. The lack of human security has been exacerbated by other factors such as the internal rift between the two major political factions, Fatah

and Hamas (at the time of the interviews), by the weakness of law enforcement in the areas of the Palestinian Authority, and by the increasing culture of dependency on international aid, linked with decreasing economic opportunities.

However, the effects of the occupation – physical and psychological – cannot be underestimated. As one participant said, “In Palestine, we are still struggling to get our independence, and the whole nation is busy in deconstructing occupation and collecting the pieces of our fragmented identity.” The geographical fragmentation imposed by Israel contributes to concomitant social fragmentation. It was difficult for the respondents to begin to think of rebuilding the three pillars of human security – freedom from want, freedom from fear and a sense of personal dignity – under the circumstances of the occupation.

Life under siege

The occupation has both visible and invisible elements, which equally affect the lack of human security in Palestine. The former include, for instance, the denial of freedom of movement to Palestinians, which is now epitomised by the separation walls, the heavy Israeli military presence in Jerusalem, at the check-points, and the many and multiplying settlements. There are multiple kinds of military and non-military violence, including imprisonment, shooting with live ammunition, bombing, and exile.

The invisible elements demonstrate the use of structural violence against Palestinians, such as land confiscations and the lack of housing rights. These prevent any form of economic development, whilst humiliating and disempowering Palestinians and making their daily lives increasingly difficult. There are highly complex ID and permit systems, primarily around movement and access, but even for the right to continue living in one's home. Israel operates a coloured ID card system to differentiate between Palestinians living in the West Bank and Palestinians living in Jerusalem. Those with green West Bank ID cards are not allowed on the opposite side of the Wall, where Jerusalem is located, without going through a complicated, humiliating and sometimes Kafkaesque permit application process. The process is rarely successful except for medical treatment and very occasionally to celebrate Christian or Muslim religious rites during holidays.



Narmeen Abu Baker lives in Jerusalem and married a Palestinian man from the West Bank.

Like any girl in the world, I loved a man who was my friend at university. When we decided to marry, we realised our complicated situation. I'm from Jerusalem with a blue ID and he's from the West Bank with a green ID. You feel all your dreams could be broken in seconds. But we insisted that we should face this together and we believed that our love was stronger than the occupation. So we decided to marry.

After marriage, my life started getting more and more complicated. I was working in Jerusalem and we had to live in Ramallah in the West Bank because my husband doesn't have a permit to live in or enter Jerusalem. I had to pass through Qalandia checkpoint every day to go to work. After I got pregnant I started getting really exhausted [from standing] in a crowded place for so long. In my last month of pregnancy, I had to stay at my parent's house to give birth in Jerusalem to prove that my baby was born in Jerusalem and has the right to get the blue ID and get health insurance. My husband was able to visit me for one day. He entered Jerusalem illegally because he wasn't given a permit. And when I was in labour he couldn't make it because police were all over the place. It was very heartbreaking to feel that at the hardest moment in my life I had to be alone without my husband holding my hand. And I really cried because he wasn't able to be the first one to see his son.

After that I had to stay at my parent's house to prove residence in Jerusalem in order to give my son the blue ID and health insurance. I was lucky that [the Israeli authorities] came after four months – it takes years for other people. They asked my family questions, they asked our neighbours if they saw me living here, they asked for electricity bills and many other governmental

“My husband was able to visit me for one day. He entered Jerusalem illegally because he wasn't given a permit.”

documents. They even looked at very small details, like if there were clothes for me and my son in the closet and if there was food in the fridge. But they don't come only once.

So my husband had to sneak into Jerusalem for us to live together and prove residence in Jerusalem and start requesting a 'family reunion' which could allow him to live with us. The problem is that to request this in court, my husband must be older than 35 and he's still 33. Yet, we had to stay in Jerusalem because my son hasn't received the birth certificate yet.

We are renting a house while my husband is staying here illegally. We're afraid to move, to go shopping, to do anything in life because we're afraid he could be caught at any time. He had to stop his work as an accountant in the West Bank. He was in Jerusalem without any work for five months until he started working as a construction worker with a very low salary without any human rights.

It is so frustrating to live such a life. We could have lived the best life ever, life as we wanted, but unfortunately fate chose for us to be born here in such a complicated place.

“One of my neighbours had to demolish his house with his own hands.”

fear of their homes being demolished. From 2006 through May 2014, at least 752 Palestinian residential units had been demolished in the West Bank (not including East Jerusalem), causing 3,568 people, – including at least 1,712 minors – to lose their homes.¹² Abdullah Al Khatib, 55 years old, a plumber in Jerusalem, asks, “Which security are you talking about? We have forgotten the meaning of this word a long time ago. Every couple of weeks we see groups of Israeli forces coming to our area to demolish houses. Many of our neighbours’ houses were demolished. Israel doesn’t give permission for Palestinians to build. It takes from two to ten years to receive permission and we have to pay very big amounts of money, which we cannot afford. [...] We pay very high taxes and we receive actually none of the services compared to what Israelis receive. One of my neighbours had to demolish his house with his own hands. They told him if he doesn’t demolish it in two weeks they will come and demolish it for him and he would have to pay for the bulldozer as well.”

The broader sense of insecurity this situation creates was described by a technical assistant from the West Bank, who wished to remain anonymous, “I have land near the settlements on the Ramallah border, but I can’t build a house there because it isn’t safe – there are often confrontations between settlers and Palestinians – and I can’t even sell it, because no one would buy it, because they know the situation. If I ever tried to build a house there they would just come and demolish it.”

Economic security and livelihoods

Lack of economic security – defined as having stable employment and being able to provide for one’s family – was one of the main cross-cutting themes across the three areas. Economic stability is both threatened by, and creates, social instability, and thus becomes the lynchpin of progress and development. The Palestinian economy cannot provide an environment whereby stable employment is available for the majority of the population. A lack of employment opportunities, whether one has a degree or thirty years’ experience, was cited in the West Bank as one of the biggest contributors to the feeling of a lack of human security. Economic security was viewed as even worse in Gaza and in Jerusalem. Even education is seen as a hindrance rather than a way ahead, as it simply delays the moment when people will be able to start earning money; financial gains, rather than academic ones, are prioritised. Amjad al-Ahmad, in the Ministry of Economics in Jenin, says, “Economic security is the basis of development, and as long as there is no economic security, there won’t be any kind of security – whether political, social, or anything else. But there are challenges facing economic security – for example social challenges, environmental challenges, unemployment, poverty and tribal conflicts.”

The closure of Gaza has not only affected students and recent graduates, but also the vast numbers of workers employed in Israel, who used to cross the border daily to get to work. In addition, high levels of unemployment have decreased the worth of education, as a degree is no guarantee of secure employment. This has serious long-term implications for society as a whole, especially since the youth constitutes 70 percent of the population. Many are unable to get any jobs at all, with 88 percent aid-dependency, and this has led to a desperation amongst some to emigrate. A lack of economic security was seen as a serious threat to the security of the family, possibly resulting in instability, violence and fragmentation. If there is a class of disillusioned youth who know that they will never work no matter how educated they are, they will turn to other, perhaps less salubrious means of employment, which will surely only cause even less security.

Another consequence of the occupation which affects livelihoods is access to natural resources. Colonel Hilal Abdul Haq, Director of Preventive Security in Jerusalem and director of Jericho, says,

“Israel defines the depth of drilling allowed for the extraction of groundwater. They [the Israelis] do not allow Palestinian farmers to dig more than 100 meters of water. But, in the settlements they allow them to dig 200 meters and not just 100. Not surprisingly, the water is available when the settlers dig, while the Palestinians cannot find water in their wells. So farmers in areas north of Jericho buy water from Israel at a high price despite the presence of water on their land. They cannot access it as they are banned by Israel from digging artesian wells. Therefore many areas of Jericho now suffer from the problem of water scarcity and crops are beginning to suffer.” A young West Bank Palestinian explains, “There is no port, no airport, we don’t control our resources, and we can’t even import and export without Israel. If the head of the family is not provided with security of employment, how can he provide security and protection for his family?”

In East Jerusalem, the economic situation has deteriorated sharply for many inhabitants. Restrictions on movement, lack of protection from violence from settlers, and economic discrimination have reduced opportunities for many to maintain their traditional livelihoods. Abu Rashad owns a shoe store on Salah Al Din street: “This street used to be called the ‘shopping centre’ but in the last couple of years, especially after the separation wall, the market started getting weaker and weaker. People used to come from many different places to buy from here but now the market is dead. Ten years ago and before the separation wall, my store used to be one of the best stores. Now I’m thinking of selling or renting it. The Israeli market is much stronger than the Palestinian market. The government is supporting them but for us it’s the very opposite. When the Israelis have some religious events, the municipality sticks warning announcements on the doors of the Palestinian stores which say that the stores have to close because a big number of Israelis will be passing by and might cause violent acts.”

Health and food security

In Palestine, food insecurity is driven by high rates of poverty resulting from unemployment, which is in part due to ongoing access and movement restrictions, as well as high prices for food and economic shocks. Food is available in markets, but expensive, so households reduce the variety and nutritional value found in their diet. The majority of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank

“Humans have become the cheapest thing – even animals are treated better.”




In’am Abu Nada is a field worker for Oxfam in Gaza.

My husband had hepatitis, and he began to have problems with his nerves in his face. The doctor was terrible. He didn’t diagnose him properly, didn’t really try and investigate what was wrong. We were just given cortisone, and my husband took two courses. After this his liver failed. We wanted to go to Egypt, but we had to treat him in Gaza. All they gave him was painkillers. The treatment outside Gaza was very expensive – \$50,000. We had to sell the house. We went to Egypt, and as soon as the doctor saw him, he said ‘the treatment of your husband is very simple, as long as he has never taken cortisone’. I told the doctor that he had taken two courses. My husband only lived six months after that... He was an engineer at al-Azhar University, but once he died, that was it, there was no life insurance, they didn’t pay us anything... Humans have become the cheapest thing – even animals are treated better than humans.

spend more than half their income on food. Whilst health security was a recurring issue across the territories, the most extreme examples come from the Gaza Strip. The Gaza Strip suffers specifically from the Israeli siege, which does not allow for even the minimum amount of food to meet the population’s needs let alone luxuries such as building materials, or chocolate.¹³

The blockade on Gaza since 2007 continues to stifle the local economy and prevents any meaningful recovery of the most productive sectors. The already dire economic situation was compounded in 2013 by the curtailment of the unofficial tunnel trade, which meant that low-cost products arriving from Egypt are being replaced by more costly products arriving via Israel. In addition, limits on importing construction materials into Gaza have put pressure on employment.

“My children can’t imagine that Palestine is Haifa, Jaffa, Akka, Jerusalem, West Bank, ...”



Hedaya Shamun, Journalist at Women’s affairs center, Rafah/Gaza:

I took a permit through my work to enter the West Bank and Jerusalem. And when I came back to Gaza I showed my photos in Jerusalem to my children. They couldn’t understand why I went there without them. I tried to explain to them that I couldn’t take them because of the occupation, the blockade, the permits and our situation, but I just saw in their eyes that they still didn’t understand – they only thought I didn’t want to take them. My children can’t imagine that Palestine is Haifa, Jaffa, Akka, Jerusalem, West Bank, etc. They see Palestine as if it is only Gaza, because this is the only thing they have seen since they were born. The new generations in Gaza have never crossed the borders of the Gaza Strip, therefore they aren’t able to understand what Palestine is, and what the Palestinian identity is. They study in schools about the geography and the history of Palestine, but it’s really different to know these facts theoretically rather than in real life. And this is what I call the loss of identity.

I do not care to put the flags of any political party in my house – I only care to put the Palestinian flag. The thing I fear most is the future of my children. I do not see any prospect for them. I always try to raise them as just being Palestinians without mentioning any political party, but the general political environment in Gaza is the opposite. I try to tell them we are all Palestinians and this is our identity, we are all the same people but after a while, they come back and ask me, ‘Mum, who is better, Fatah or Hamas?’ It’s really sad.

The unemployment rate was 40.8 percent in the first quarter of 2014, which amounted to about 180,200 unemployed people – hitting a five-year peak.¹⁴ Mohammad El Baba, a photojournalist at Agence France Presse from the Gaza Strip says, “Gaza now is facing the worst blockade in eight

years. If a citizen had 8 cents for example, and each year he spent one cent, now he has nothing. Their savings have been totally consumed.”

The hospitals and clinics in Gaza are generally of very poor quality, and people often have to bribe the doctors heavily. The alternative is travelling to Egypt, where people may end up paying \$ 1,000 simply to be allowed to cross the border.

Health concerns are also closely linked with the armed conflict and with environmental security. Because of the large amounts of phosphorus that were used in bombs during the attack on Gaza by Israel in 2008 and 2009, the past five years has seen a sharp increase in the number of people suffering from skin diseases and cancer, with many children contracting leukaemia – something which was almost unheard of in Gaza before the war.¹⁵ The levels of agricultural pollution are high, meaning that food produce is not clean, which leads to more health problems. The government is not equipped to provide solutions or the right facilities to deal with such things. The lack of clean water is a serious issue in Gaza, and yet another example of people not being provided with their basic needs.

Geographical, political and societal fragmentation

An interconnecting threat that cuts across all Palestinian society is increasing fragmentation, which is part of a vicious cycle of social disintegration, polarisation and the easy use of violence. The geographic fragmentation caused by the occupation is evident in the isolation of Jerusalem, the severance and siege of the Gaza Strip, the gigantic complex of the separation walls throughout the West Bank along with the more than 450 military checkpoints. In Gaza, societal solidarity is seen to have disintegrated totally. Internal divisions in Palestinian politics have rent divisions in society at all levels – from politicians to neighbours who were once friends but who now, resulting from different political affiliations, do not communicate. Along with the plethora of Palestinian security services and the internal divisions, the militarisation

¹⁴ " White phosphorus landing on skin can burn deep through muscle and into the bone, continuing to burn unless deprived of oxygen." Its use in civilian areas is prohibited under international humanitarian law – see Amnesty International. “Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territories: Israel’s use of white phosphorus against Gaza civilians ‘clear and undeniable’”. 19 January 2009. <http://www.amnesty.org>

of Palestinian society is reflected in the ubiquitousness of small arms, and the spilling over of tensions and frustrations into violent fights. This cuts across communities and across community groups as the tribal loyalties still come into play and quickly exacerbate minor quarrels. Internal political division is thus exacerbated by the physical and psychological effects of the occupation.

“People have just started to surrender.”

Another reason for the lack of social solidarity – a major issue in both Jerusalem and the West Bank – is the feeling that people can no longer afford to concern themselves with the problems of others, as they have so many themselves. People are living day by day, surviving without being able to think of the future, or how to improve their situation. Because people feel that there is no hope, there is “no motivation other than just living another day.” As one participant from the West Bank said – or worse, to quote from Gaza – “they just want to forget and to escape even if it means death.” In’am, an NGO employee in Gaza, reflects on the psychological effects of the occupation: “There is despair and depression, because people are insecure, their rights have been stolen, and there is no one to turn to. People have just started to surrender.” Dr Ismael Abu Zaid a psychologist originally from Gaza, says, “There are pressures everywhere, all over, and there are only two ways to deal with such poverty; to turn to religion or to turn to drugs. If you go to the mosque and pray you may get extra food.”

This fragmentation is not along religious or gender lines; for instance, the Christian minority has always been integrated, and Palestinians have been one people. Nevertheless, recent emigration of Christians has been high, due to the lack of economic opportunities, and the overall lack of security. These, coupled with strong networks abroad, for instance, in Latin America, and more recently, fears from the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, have led many Christian Palestinians to leave.

WEST BANK: AREA C MAP



United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
occupied Palestinian territory

February 2011



Border - - - International Border - - - Green Line Israeli Unilaterally Declared Municipal Area of Jerusalem	Barrier — Constructed / Under Construction - - - Planned
	Oslo Agreement Area (A), (B) Area C & Nature Reserves

Note: This map does not feature Gaza

Community and community identity are under constant threat from the occupation. This was strongly reflected by respondents in Jerusalem, where the residence permit system drives people out of the city and basic public services have been absorbed into the Israeli system. In the historic Old City of Jerusalem, whole neighbourhoods have been taken over and the inhabitants moved, as in the Moroccan quarter, which was destroyed in June 1967. Residents are threatened so much that the community and its identity are destroyed.¹⁶

The result at the local level is a general sense of disempowerment and frustration, especially among the youth. The realities of the occupation have had a profound impact on people’s sense of dignity.

¹⁶ In ‘Assessing International Peace Efforts in Palestinian-Israeli Affairs: a Human security perspective’ (2010), Elena Aoun describes the Palestinians’ “world of cumulative exclusions that threaten collective identity and individual lives.”



Rinad Abu Gharbieh is a project coordinator in Beit Hanina, Jerusalem, describing a scene at a checkpoint between a Palestinian woman and a male Israeli soldier.

She took off her *Jilbab* [traditional body covering] to show him that there is nothing under it and to pass without any beeping. This drove me crazy! This is really humiliating. If it was the *Jilbab* or her clothes he should have asked her to go to a private room to be checked by a female soldier!! But he seemed to be happy to see an ignorant girl like her who didn't know her rights! This is how much we get humiliated every day. This is how they practice psychological pressure on people until they feel fed up with this situation – either by limiting their movement, humiliating them, preventing them from having building permits, demolishing their houses, taking over their lands, etc.... And that's what we are facing now, a war that is much more complicated than any usual war, a war that the world cannot see – it's what is called a 'psychological war'."

Security providers

The complexities of governance are one reason why security providers in the Palestinian territories are failing to address the basic needs of the Palestinians. An NGO worker says, "It is hard to find an official body from which to get human security, because you are missing something that has not been given to you. In order to overcome certain problems, one could go to the police, tribal methods, the family, the mosque or church, political parties and through them human rights centres and international organisations." Although theoretically one could turn to such places, in reality, people have lost trust in them. The various political parties are ridden with internal rifts, and are partly responsible for the lack of

human security in Gaza. Whilst the advent of the Palestinian Authority should have helped to focus national goals, it instead put the focus more on money and militarisation. People no longer have faith in international or human rights organisations – the employees come, take pictures, listen to people's stories and leave. This disaffection with such organisations was expressed in the West Bank focus groups for almost identical reasons.

For Palestinians in East Jerusalem and in Area C, there are only the Israeli state security forces, who are more likely to arrest than to help Palestinians in need of security.^f In the West Bank, there is a multiplicity of often conflicting and/or overlapping security and intelligence services, but considerably dominated by political factions, and often in contradiction with each other.¹⁵ The civil police do their best but are severely hampered by their inability to work in Areas B or C – and they are in practice not even fully able to work in Area A. In Gaza, it was impossible to get people to talk at all about security forces due to their fears about saying anything to do with security.

As for the Israeli police, who represent the hostile occupying power, many respondents reflected the belief that they will use any pretext possible to break up and undermine the Palestinian family unit. Secondly, there was an awareness of the inevitable judgement from the community that would befall anyone who had gone to the police of the occupying force rather than to their family to solve their problem. An abused woman in Jerusalem therefore may face an impossible dilemma: turn to the Israeli police and risk her husband being sent to prison, her children taken into care, and being ostracised/perhaps persecuted by her own society; or resort to the tribal methods of justice, and risk the violent incident being swept under the carpet and returning to her husband, potentially facing more violence.

^f In the first five months of 2014, the weekly average of search and arrest operations recorded across the West Bank was 86. Since the kidnapping and killing of three Israeli youths on 12 June 2014, this number went up drastically, with a total of 1,454 such operations recorded, and around 2,100 Palestinians arrested in the week of 19-25 August 2014. OCHA. "Protection of civilians, reporting period: 19-25 August 2014". OCHA. Web. 29 August 2014.

The lack of protection was particularly noticeable amongst women, because as one participant said, "[women] not only suffer from domestic issues, but they are also affected by the wider societal issues." In other words, women often suffer twice over – from the occupation itself and also from its effects on the society around them - such as the humiliation of the Palestinian men. Women often bear the brunt of the lack of human security.



Yacoub Rujoub is a security officer and lawyer from Durra, in the district of Hebron, who works in Izaroyya in area B on the edge of Jerusalem.


In Area B there are Palestinian areas that are neither under the authority of Palestine nor Israel. Israel refused to give these areas to the Palestinian Authority. The suburbs around Jerusalem are all considered Area B. And Israel does not allow Palestinian security forces to work there. Palestinian security officers could be arrested if they were caught in that area with any kind of weapon or even just in uniform, unless they take a permit from Israel, so we actually face armed force while we aren't in fact armed. This increases the theft, crimes, drug dealing and all kinds of insecurity, as all the criminals escape to these areas. For example a man broke in to Al Quds University and started shooting in the campus and shot someone,

"How could I arrest him? I have no authority in that area."


and after that he just escaped. How could I arrest him? I have no authority in that area. The Israeli police also do not care about such issues because it's a Palestinian area. They don't get involved in any kind of provision of security, they just practice the opposite. They have broken into to Al Quds University many times and they threw tear gas and rubber bullets inside the campus! It's a very insecure area, nobody can be arrested for any breach of the law. It's also very dangerous for the Palestinian security and police officers when they get attacked in such areas because it's known that they won't be armed there.

GAZA STRIP



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
BLOCKADE EFFECTS BETWEEN 2007 AND 2012 (JUNE 2012)




UNEMPLOYMENT (2012)



FOOD INSECURITY (2012)



AID RECIPIENTS (JUNE 2012)





Salih al-Kurd from Wad al-Jowz is a nurse and an entertainer for sick children in Jerusalem.

Once, when I was on duty, a woman came to the hospital who had clearly been beaten; she had lots of bruises, but when I asked her what had happened, she said that she had fallen down the stairs. I think she was afraid that if she told the truth I would go to the police. I tried to reassure her, and said that I wasn't going to go to the police, but that it was important that she tell me so I knew how to treat her. She said that her husband had hit her, but that she didn't want anyone to know. I asked her why she had refused to tell the truth, and it was obvious that she was scared that the police would find out and that her husband would go to prison. Also, it's the traditional method of dealing with these sorts of issues – women are discouraged from going to the police, because the community would blame her for her husband's incarceration. Normally the community doesn't let the police interfere in these sorts of things.



Mahmoud Qara'een from Ra's al-'Amoud is a field researcher in Jerusalem.

The [Israeli] police are only interested in women's issues. In situations not relating to women, the solutions according to the police or the measures the police take are minimal, and don't solve anything. By focussing only on women's issues, the police are trying to make people believe that the Arab man is a violent one, who can't take responsibility for his family, and behaves like a criminal.

Legal framework and rule of law

Rule of law is only partially effective. There are parallel traditional practices, even for instance in cases of traffic accidents, which generally have to be respected at least as much as official security.⁸ The traditional method of justice, known as *sulha*, is still often used to address both individual and community level tensions, by facilitating members of families to meet and discuss a conflict until they reach an agreement. The fact that this approach is deeply based in tradition has its advantage in so far as it can help agreements to hold; nevertheless, there are many issues that do not lend themselves to a traditional approach.

“Normally the community doesn't let the police interfere in these sorts of things.”

Participants especially in the West Bank expressed concerns about the lack of an effective legal framework that both deterred people from committing crimes and punished them if they did. Each of the focus groups highlighted that this was the case especially for the most vulnerable groups in society, such as women and people with special needs. But there are also problems with out-of-date laws from Jordanian and even British Mandate and Ottoman times. This problem of outdated laws is compounded by the fact that the Palestinian Legislative Council has not been able to meet since 2007 because they cannot gather between Gaza and the West Bank, and due to the detention of members by the Israelis.

While there are individual women as well as women's groups that work to uphold women's rights, the legal framework was deemed insufficient and insufficiently enforced to protect women.

⁸ This means that if for instance a driver hits a pedestrian, even if there are no injuries and the police are satisfied that there is no cause for prosecution or complaint, according to traditional law, the driver will still have to visit the pedestrian's family and pay perhaps quite substantial compensation.

Although there are women's rights written into law, they need both improvement and rigorous implementation. For example, obsolete laws which refer to honour killings are from the time of the Jordanian occupation.

In a case from Gaza, one participant spoke of how after her husband's death, his family took her to court in order to get possession of their house. She explained that although there is a law in Islam that states that when the son dies, the possessions go to the parents, she and her husband had worked for and owned their house for twenty-five years. The fact that it could potentially be taken from her, leaving her homeless and with no insurance, demonstrates the lack of legal support for women.

The role of the *sulha* in relation to women, and to violence against women, is not always so clear, since it is based on tradition, and its judges are traditionally all male. Especially in reference to women in Jerusalem there could be times when there was the dilemma: whether to seek help against domestic violence by the traditional *sulha* process? Or by going to the police – in Jerusalem, therefore, the Israeli police? In the West Bank, while mechanisms for women seeking protection from domestic violence are not very reliable, but do exist, at least the police are Palestinian.

Another example of the inadequacy of the legal framework was in reference to the subject of food goods. Because people are using outdated Jordanian laws, there is nothing to prevent people from selling expired goods, which happens regularly. Food is sold past its sell-by-date, with people who are unable to read – a separate issue in itself – falling prey. Because of a lack of monitoring and the absence of an effective legal system to punish such actions, these problems persist.

The absence of monitoring and regulating the provision of services, whether regarding food, medical services or customer services, means that people are not held accountable for any lapses or shortcomings. The provision of an effective and satisfactory service is simply not considered a priority. People do not experience security in the goods that they buy, and the hospital treatment on which they rely are of poor quality. One feels secure if the basic essentials are provided for: food



Anonymous respondent employed at a Ministry in the West Bank

My mother in law came to visit from Jordan, so we held a little gathering to welcome her, and I had bought some *kanafeh* [a local sweet made with white cheese]. I noticed that people were only eating the top and not the cheese. When I tried it I could barely smell it, it was so disgusting.

“The problem is that there is no monitoring of food goods.”

So I went to the Ministry and they sent some people to the bakery where we had bought the *kanafeh*. When they got into the kitchen, it was filthy, things were rusting and there was a terrible smell, like a rubbish bin. They wrote a report on the bakery and the case is still going through the courts. They closed the man's store, and I do think that he will be punished, but the problem is that there is no monitoring of food goods.

and water, health and education services. But when the quality or even the provision of such things is not guaranteed, this leads to feelings of fear and want, and also a lack of dignity.

Conclusion and recommendations

There are many gaps in the existing security structures in the Palestinian territories. The major gaps are due to Israeli control and hostile occupation and therefore can only be addressed by ending the occupation. Internally, there are gaps in the enforcement of the law and in the laws themselves. While there is some progress on this front, the confusion around the laws themselves leaves too much leeway for abuse and criminality. Without even a legal government, rule of law is hardly enforceable.

At the national level, there is a need for forms of security that can unite rather than divide the population, and for efforts that build social cohesion and revive disintegrating values. While traditional practices can be oppressive in some cases, they also have their cohesive and positive side, insofar as they help to solve internal disputes. Palestinian society also has strong traditions of openness in relation to women and to different groups of all kinds, from Gaza to Jerusalem and Ramallah, to villages and refugee camps. Another national need is for the protection of natural resources and for the development of the economy via control of borders and full human rights. This includes freedom of movement, which is one of the most ubiquitous of Israeli abuses of Palestinian rights. Palestinians are not able to travel freely within or outside the occupied territories. There is no control of borders for Palestinians – the Israeli state has to approve all entries and exit. Not only are visas granted by Israel, but so-called Palestinian passports also have to be approved by Israel.

The primary international implications are that the human security threats against Palestinians undermine international law. The history of the conflict, at least since 1948, has been an example of the continuous violations of international law.^h This indicates a need for far more advocacy and awareness raising to encourage the application of international law. Both regionally and internationally, the absence of human security for Palestinians increases the risk of global terrorism,

whether by angry and disaffected Palestinians or by others exploiting the Palestinian cause.

The contributions of the Palestinian perspectives add up to an urgent need to focus on Palestinian security and empowerment. An interconnecting threat is the absence of a state and therefore state protection. The stories that contributed to this chapter fuel the argument for a human security approach towards a solution, so that the real needs and interests of the Palestinian population can be addressed. Human security needs to be taken seriously as the essential ingredient for peace.

Israel has overwhelming military and economic advantages over the Palestinian population. People who are frustrated and fragmented and unable to see a positive future are far more likely to be violent, especially against those who they see as immediately responsible for their condition. Since the root cause of the conflict and of the absence of human security (including freedom from fear, want and indignity) for Palestinians is the Israeli occupation, in place since June 1967, the occupation needs to be brought to an end. This would restore a level of dignity to the lives of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, who have by now lived for so long under hostile and humiliating occupation, that humiliation has become internalised and barely figured in the focus

Human security needs to be taken seriously as the essential ingredient for peace.

group discussions and interviews. While there might be considerable risk from factional disagreements or from the far from perfect Palestinian security services, if these services were able to focus on the protection of the Palestinians, individuals would begin to feel safer. Therefore, to ensure the longterm human security also of Israelis, granting human security to the Palestinians is key to paving the way for true peace.

Recommendations

- **Take a broad and overarching human security approach**, focussing on the Palestinians (as well as the Israelis), to be explored as an option towards the solution of this long-standing conflict. Ideally it would be the foundation for a new approach that would be based on reciprocal dignity and would therefore negate some of the gross inequalities of power and economy that currently make real negotiations impossible. The focus on the official peace process itself – even on details such as dates for its prolongation or non-prolongation – should not take precedence over what people need as components of peace.
- **Ensure the immediate implementation of international law**, such as in particular the Fourth Geneva Convention as it applies to territories occupied by war, and UN resolutions that pertain to Palestine. A proper adherence of Israel to international law would immediately improve the situation of Palestinians. For instance, it would halt Israel's settlement expansion in the West Bank, which is illegal under Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which states that "The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies" (Articles 33 and 53).
- **Focus on a participatory, bottom-up human security approach** towards the achievement of human rights for all, in such a way that it encourages the contribution of all to the process of state-building and community building. Such a process is essential to assure that individual security needs, including those of women and girls, are fully understood and met. It is also an essential part of the empowerment process that is necessary to overcome the profoundly negative experience of constant humiliation. This should also be done in a way that overcomes the 'culture of dependence' that has been built up in recent years by the international community – however well-intentioned. A participatory approach will also generate a strong locally directed and oriented civil society.
- **Work towards demilitarisation of the region and Palestinian society**, as the militarisation brought about by the influx of former fighters, along with small arms and the insistence on

The Middle East Nonviolence and Democracy (MEND) is an organisation that promotes active nonviolence and encourages alternatives to violence among youth and adults throughout Palestine. Having built its reputation on a holistic and creative approach to violence in schools, MEND has taken this approach further to reach the general population. MEND employs innovative methods, especially with the media. MEND is based in East Jerusalem, and has eight regional centers for active nonviolence and eleven community centers/libraries. It is an active member of the Middle East and North Africa Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (MENAPPAC).

creating and arming more and more security services, has had a strong adverse effect on human security. Even for instance on happy occasions, such as weddings or celebrations of exam results, people are killed through the irresponsible use of guns shot in the air.

- **Uphold and enforce civil laws as a clear reference point for justice and rule of law.** This should ensure the fair and equal treatment of all Palestinians, including the protection of women.
- **Educate throughout the school and university system regarding human responsibilities and rights.** This should be based on a charter that would promote a value-based society, and encourage nonviolent approaches to conflict and the primacy of respect, including reciprocal respect and respect for difference. With such a bottom-up approach that would encourage the participation of all in building a value-based society, internal human security issues, such as domestic abuse and corruption, would be pushed into the realm of the non-acceptable.

^h See for instance International Court of Justice: Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I. C. J. Reports 2004 and UN General Assembly, GA/11317: 'General Assembly votes overwhelmingly to accord Palestine 'non-member observer state' status in United Nations'. UN. Web. 29 November 2012.



2

"We decided to leave the feelings of frustration and impotence behind and we took over the streets on our bikes."

Chihuahua en Bicicleta sin Miedo, Mexico

Empowerment in Practice

Mexico, the Philippines, Zimbabwe


Along with another set of human security analysis, this section presents an additional dimension of how human security is put into practice through empowerment strategies. Local community members, leaders and activists in Mexico, the Philippines and Zimbabwe reflect on how citizen action, advocacy, and community and multi-stakeholder dialogues have led to the empowerment of local actors towards collective human security strategies. They also demonstrate the importance of collective action and social movements in influencing security policy, and the important role that knowledge of human and civic rights plays in empowering civilians to protect themselves.



Decreasing Violence in Mexico through Citizen Participation

Sylvia Aguilera | Nadjeli Babinet | Luis Gómez Chow | Centro de Colaboración Cívica (CCC)

MEXICO



POPULATION




122.3 MILLION IN 2013 (WORLD BANK 2014)

↑10,000,000

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY AGE

27,9% 0-14
18,1% 15-24
40,4% 25-54
7% 55-64
6,6% 65+
(INDEX MUNDI 2014)




GLOBAL PEACE INDEX 2014



138/162
(IEP 2014)

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX 2013



71/187
(UNDP 2014)

“...the idea was to bring together the different groups and help them generate a common agenda to address the security crisis.”

The past decade has seen a wave of criminal and state violence in Mexico, broadly linked to the rise of violent organised crime and human rights violations. Since 2006 between 47,000 and 70,000 people have been murdered and more than 25,000 people have been victims of enforced or involuntary disappearances.¹ Reflecting the government's inability to enforce the law, the situation has galvanised a number of citizen initiatives. High-level, multi-stakeholder dialogue platforms have influenced public policy and legal frameworks. Local groups have reclaimed public spaces, and victims of violence have organised social movements demanding the improvement of security and justice institutions and the recognition of victims' rights. These efforts have pressured the government to abandon its militarised approach towards crime in favour of strengthening the institutions of rule of law through justice system reforms. Yet violence persists and much remains to be done.



Background

The United Mexican States, commonly known as Mexico, represent the world's 14th largest economy. The country is home to 120 million people, making it the 12th most populous country in the world. The country is a member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and is one of the eleven emerging powers of the Group of Twenty (G20).² However, according to the World Bank, the distribution of wealth in the country remains skewed, and Mexico's overwhelming economic and social inequalities undermine its people's standard of life.³ 80 percent of Mexicans live in urban areas, and 50 percent of the population is living in poverty according to national standards.⁴ The Human Development Index of the United Nations Development Programme ranks Mexico 71st globally, which is well below other economies of its size in Latin America.⁵

During most of the twentieth century, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) dominated Mexico's political landscape, holding an overwhelming majority in both chambers of the Federal Congress and most of the state governments. In 1997 the PRI lost its majority in Congress and in 2000 opposition candidate Vicente Fox, from the National Action Party (PAN), won the presidential election, ending 70 years of uninterrupted rule by the PRI.

Despite the change in the federal government, many claimed that little was done to address the myriad of problems afflicting the country, including corruption, impunity, economic and social distress, and the increase of organised crime. Illegal drugs had been produced in Mexico and then smuggled to the United States as early as the 1960s. In the 1980s, smugglers in South America shifted their routes from the Caribbean to Mexico, a more direct and easier pathway to the United States. As the drug cartels grew wealthier, they amassed power.

In 2006, President Felipe Calderón (PAN, 2006-2012) announced tough action on the increasing rates of violent crime. Mexico's security situation had deteriorated to the point that criminal gangs had assumed *de facto* territorial control in some areas. However, rather than addressing these important threats through strengthening the local or state police and the justice apparatus, Calderón

decided to carry out military operations to tackle organised crime and drug trafficking.

Insecurity and violence in Mexico

The country has since experienced an alarming increase in levels of crime, violence, and impunity. Since 2006 between 47,000 and 70,000 people have been murdered and over 25,000 people have been disappeared.⁶ There are many different perspectives on the causes of increased violence. According to the International Crisis Group, the end of the legislative ban on high calibre assault weapons in the United States in 2004 marked the beginning of increased violence in Mexico.⁷ The Mexican government and some civil society representatives believe that the violence is caused primarily by armed confrontations between drug cartels.

“The military response led to more fear and the suppression of activities in the public space.”

Others emphasise factors related to inequity that has never been addressed by the local or federal authorities. For example, in the case of Ciudad Juárez, an interviewee says, “The city had a great number of youths with social resentment, without any real education, employment, and development opportunities. For a long time, crime and violence in the city were quite stable, so we did not perceive this factor as a serious threat, but it was.”

Other nongovernmental organisations and grassroots community members, including many interviewed for this publication, suggest that the government's territorial deployment of military forces to combat violent drug cartels, coupled with the weakness and corruption of the security and justice apparatuses, directly contributed to the unprecedented increase in human rights violations, violence and crime. As an interviewee from Nuevo León in northern Mexico said,

“The military response led to more fear and the suppression of activities in the public space. A lot of soldiers took over civilian positions related to law enforcement in the local government. Marines and soldiers started patrolling the streets and we witnessed an unprecedented increase in human rights abuses, including torture and enforced disappearances.”

Some groups have been more vulnerable than others, “[E]nforced disappearance victims belong to the poorest and most marginalised strata of Mexican society.” An interviewee from the la Laguna region in northern Mexico comments, “insecurity was particularly intense for youth; armed attacks caused lots of deaths of young people.”

In 2012, newly elected President Enrique Peña Nieto (PRI) promised a completely new strategy to address insecurity and violence in the country, focusing more on crime prevention and reconstruction of the social tissue, and less on the territorial deployment of police officers and military and navy personnel. The strategy was formalised in the administration's 'National Development Plan 2013-2018'; the government-opposition coordination mechanism known as the 'Pact for Mexico' and ultimately in the National Program for Crime and Violence Prevention.

“Insecurity was particularly intense for youth; armed attacks caused lots of deaths of young people.”

The announcement of the new strategy was applauded as a much needed shift from the one privileged by the previous Calderón government. National, regional and international policies to reduce both the demand and supply of drugs have increasingly been accused of having failed, with Mexican drug cartels today bringing in \$19 to \$29 billion USD annually.⁸

IN NUMBERS

PEOPLE KILLED



80,000
SINCE 2007

(HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2014)

DRUG CARTELS



DRUG CARTELS BRING IN
\$19 TO \$29
BILLION
USD ANNUALLY

(CNN WORLD 2014)

DEPORTED, DISAPPEARED OR MISSING



26,000

(HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2014)

ALLEGED ABUSES

ALLEGED ABUSES BY SOLDIERS
AGAINST CIVILIANS,
OPEN INVESTIGATIONS:

5,600
FROM JAN 2007
TO MID-2013

(HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2014)



YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

9.4%
IN 2012

(WORLD BANK 2014B)

Although several positive developments have taken place during the current administration, much remains to be done. Continued and systematic human rights violations, the ever-growing presence of violent criminal organisations, the emergence of civilian armed groups, and rampant government corruption and impunity still threaten human security in the country.



Perspectives on citizen security in Mexico

The diverse views shared in the making of this article demonstrate that violence, crime, and fear have become part of the Mexican context. Human rights defenders recount how the situation has restricted freedoms, broken social relationships, and damaged public confidence in governing institutions.

An interviewee from La Paz in the state of Baja California Sur says that even in his city, where the crime rate is below the national average, “citizen panic has created an ‘exodus’ from the streets.” Common criminal offenses are frequent, and organised criminal groups and gangs have established strong territorial control. In several communities they function as a ‘parallel government’, as they demand money in exchange for protection and exercise ‘justice’ on those who do not obey their laws. The authorities have been known to allow this, in many cases being complicit. A young Mexican woman described this phenomenon: “They have permission to act with complete impunity [...] I feel as if I have my hands tied, there are too many economic interests.”



THE HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDER Paulina Vega

Paulina Vega is a human rights attorney and Vice President of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH). She reflects on the rise of violence in Mexico in the past 15 years.

The rise of violence in Mexico

Violence and crime started to rise during Vicente Fox’s presidency. This happened because criminal organisations, especially in western Mexico and on the border with the United States, saw power vacuums that they could fill. The ineffectiveness of the Fox government was the breeding ground for criminal groups to emerge and flourish. But it was

when President Felipe Calderón decided to carry out an aggressive, militarised strategy to contain rising crime rates that violence and insecurity really began increasing exponentially in 2006 and 2007. Calderón and his cabinet chose the use of force over a preventive approach. They saw the corruption, ineffectiveness, and neglect of law

“Violence is now coming not only from criminals, but also from the people and institutions in charge of maintaining order.”

enforcement institutions at the municipal and state levels and decided to rely on the army and navy to go after the criminals. But no real effort was made to address the structural causes of such deficiencies.

I believe that the government’s aggressive strategy caused the criminal organisations to respond in the same way. Also, at least in the beginning, the capture of some criminal leaders generated tensions inside the cartels, and many ‘second-level’ leaders started fighting each other to get control of the organisations.

The impact of violence

Violence is now coming not only from criminals, but also from the people and institutions in charge of maintaining order: the police, the army, and the navy. One of the main consequences of this shift has been an alarming increase in grave violations of human rights, specifically torture, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings. There has also been an increase in the use of some legal strategies that I would say are incompatible with human rights standards, like *arraigo* (pre-charge detention). All this was bound to happen because army and navy personnel are not trained to carry out public security duties, let alone human security strategies.

Apart from the human rights violations, there was a very aggressive communication strategy from the

government to demonstrate that the frontline fight against crime was working. Any fatal victim of a violent episode was presented and ‘counted’ as a fallen criminal. Even students and children killed by crossfire or by mistake by army or navy officials were accused of being criminals. When there was public uproar, the government justified its actions by saying that the fight against crime had some necessary ‘collateral damage’.

Responsibility for the current situation must in part be borne by the international community, who supported Calderón and his frontline strategy at the beginning of his term. For example, there was a very public and direct support from the U.S. government with the Mérida Initiative, through which the Mexican government obtained financial and military resources.^a



THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST Antonio Cerezo

Antonio Cerezo founded Comité Cerezo in August 2001, an NGO that protects human rights activists, after he and his brothers Alejandro and Héctor were illegally detained, tortured, and confined in maximum-security federal prisons.

The lack of human rights and insecurity

Politically motivated illegal detentions, extrajudicial killings, and enforced disappearances persist. Also, there have been some legislative changes that criminalise social protests and the authorities are starting to abuse the term ‘terrorism’. Now, everyone that protests is a potential terrorist. It is quite obvious that these reforms are further limiting our rights.

^a The Merida Initiative was set up as a partnership between the United States and Mexico governments to fight organised crime and associated violence: www.state.gov/j/inl/merida/

“All this was bound to happen because army and navy personnel are not trained to carry out public security duties, let alone human security strategies.”

In the alleged interest of guaranteeing security, we have witnessed a limitation of our rights. We are witnessing the creation of states of emergency outside the rule of law. This discourse led to a war dynamic in the country where the objective of war was not to investigate and prosecute ‘the enemy’, but to eliminate it. Calderón justified all the violence and deaths – over 100,000 – by saying that he was fighting a war against crime and that every victim was a criminal.

Apart from the abuses committed by government officials, there is also a debate on whether private actors can be held responsible for violating human rights. In *Comité Cerezo* we say that only the state can be held responsible for human rights abuses, while private actors commit crimes, they violate the law. One of our main concerns is that the state is not only committing abuses, but it is not even enforcing the law.

Concerning drug trafficking, it is true that the state has to do something to tackle this crime; but its strategy must conform to human rights norms and avoid torture and other illegal procedures. Sadly, the government sees human rights as an obstacle to guaranteeing security. This explains the increase in human rights abuses.

The objective of the state should be to guarantee security and the rule of law; but it could be argued that the state has only focused on going after the criminals (drug traffickers, kidnappers, etc.), while ignoring the rampant corruption and impunity of its own agents and institutions.



Citizen empowerment and security

The crisis of insecurity, violence and human rights violations that exists in Mexico has led to a myriad of responses from the population. As one interviewee from Ciudad Juárez describes, “People were outraged. Everyone knew what was going on and how law enforcement institutions were in part responsible for the increase of violence. But we were also very scared.” Citizen responses range from individual strategies – avoiding going out at night, installing alarm systems in homes, armouring automobiles, hiring private security – to collective responses. Some citizens have resorted to non-functional, semi-legal responses that perpetuate the cycles of violence.⁹ The main non-functional response is the self-arming of civilians, a growing phenomenon in western Mexico. As an interviewee said, “If the state cannot guarantee my safety I must do it myself, and the easiest way of doing that is getting a gun. This logic explains the recent emergence of the *autodefensas* [armed civilian groups or vigilantes] in some parts of the country.” Others have initiated functional collective responses that both complement and/or monitor the state. Two types of collective, functional responses to insecurity stand out: multi-stakeholder dialogue platforms that enable citizens and civil society to influence public policies and legislation, and national social movements whose

emergence has drawn national and international media attention and forced the government to start a dialogue with those affected by violence. As stated by an interviewee, “These movements have expressed their weariness of the government’s ineffectiveness, yet they are not asking for ‘iron fist’ policies that could generate more violence or abuses. They are asking for integral solutions.”



THE STATE-CIVIC PARTNERSHIP Hugo Almada

Hugo Almada is the dean of the graduate program on Humanist Psychotherapy and Peace Education of the Autonomous University of Ciudad Juárez. He is also a social activist and one of the members of the Mesa de Seguridad initiative, which originated in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, which was classified as the most dangerous city in the world from 2008 to 2010.¹⁰

The origins of the Mesa de Seguridad

This initiative emerged because of three different factors. The first one is the security crisis itself, which prompted the participation of different stakeholders: universities, nongovernmental organisations, and business groups. Second, several civil society efforts were already in place when the violence escalated, like the 'Citizen Observatory for Security' and the 'Juarenses for Peace Group', which were both groups of citizens that met regularly to discuss the security situation in the town. Finally, the third factor has to do with Calderón's idea to invite civil society to participate in an initiative called *Todos somos Juárez* (We are all Juárez) to address the seven most urgent issues of the city, including insecurity and violence. The *Mesa de Seguridad* is the committee that was created within the *Todos somos Juárez* initiative to discuss issues regarding insecurity and violence and to identify solutions in a collaborative way.

Citizens and representatives from the three levels of government participated in *Mesa de Seguridad*. It was a true multi-stakeholder dialogue. The basic assumption was that civil society and government acting together could better identify the priority areas, generate and implement concrete proposals, and follow-up and evaluate the results of those proposals. This committee was so effective in generating trust and carrying out different strategies that it is still in place, even though the *Todos somos Juárez* initiative officially ended in 2012.

Today, the *Mesa de Seguridad* has several subcommittees that address access to justice, immediate response to threats, violent theft, human rights, and performance indicators. All three levels of government continue to participate in the *Mesa de Seguridad*.

Accomplishments of Mesa de Seguridad

Mesa de Seguridad has fostered sincere dialogue between citizens and authorities and it has contributed to developing trust among different stakeholders from civil society and between them and the authorities. It has also fostered collaboration between different levels of government and different authorities.

Thanks to the pressure of the *Mesa de Seguridad*, the federal government had to change its strategy from 'territorial control' – the massive deployment of soldiers, marines and police officers – to strengthening the investigation and intelligence capacities of the authorities. Through the *Mesa de Seguridad* we citizens were able to tell the president that we did not want 5,000 more police or army officials, but 200 public prosecutors. In the end he accepted our request and sent 40 public prosecutors to strengthen the state attorney's office (he told us he did not have 200). He also sent an anti-kidnapping group and an anti-extortion group.

Mesa de Seguridad has become an informal communication channel between citizens and public officials. It has brought the government closer to ordinary citizens. It has also contributed to transparency and accountability, because the citizens that participate in the subcommittees and the plenary sessions can evaluate what the authorities are doing.



THE CIVIC MEDIATOR Dolores González

Dolores González is a conflict resolution professional and human rights activist. She serves as the executive director of Services and Advice for Peace (Servicios y Asesoría para la Paz, or SERAPAZ) an independent, non-profit Mexican organisation that provides services for the peaceful transformation of social conflicts. SERAPAZ was founded to support the mediation work of the “Comisión Nacional de Intermediación” a civil society initiative to find a peaceful solution to the armed rebellion of 1994 in Chiapas in southern Mexico.

Forming the Dialogue Programme

The Dialogue Programme on Citizen Security is a dialogue and consensus-building platform between representatives from different civil society organisations and academic institutions. It was launched in 2009 by a group of NGOs and academic institutions. Now, over 160 organisations are part of this platform.

At the time of the launch, there was growing polarisation between organisations and individuals that were demanding more security through harsher punishments, more police officers, and 'quick justice,' and others that were concerned with increasing human rights abuses and the implementation of violent measures to tackle insecurity. These two groups were accusing each other of worsening the dire situation. At the same time, the government was taking advantage of the division within civil society to carry out its own strategy without transparency or accountability. In this context, the idea was to bring together the different groups and help them generate a common agenda to address the security crisis while respecting the human rights of all people.

“If the state cannot guarantee my safety I must do it myself, and the easiest way of doing that is getting a gun. This logic explains the recent emergence of the *autodefensas* [armed civilian groups or vigilantes] in some parts of the country.”



Achievements of the Dialogue Programme

It has contributed to building trust relationships and capacities for dialogue and collaboration between actors with diverse perspectives and agendas. It also engaged government officials and legislators in a productive dialogue at a time of great social and political polarisation. I think it was a huge success just because of this. Another accomplishment was the establishment of an inclusive, coordinated, and effective coalition able to overcome differences and advocate for security and human rights issues.

Some concrete proposals became legislation or public policy; for example, the General Law for the Social Prevention of Violence and Crime, the General Law on the Rights of Victim, and the executive decree to include five citizens as permanent members of the National Council of Public Security.



THE CYCLING ACTIVISTS

The following stories are from citizen groups based in northern Mexico. They are united in their aim to transform their cities into inclusive communities by promoting the use of bicycles and sustainable transportation systems, respecting life, equality, inclusion, and conviviality.

Emergence of the biking movement

During the escalation of violence, according to a young activist in Monterrey, Nuevo León, “people felt really vulnerable; many stopped going out, they didn’t want to leave their homes.” In Chihuahua, another interviewee says, “Parks and public spaces that once were filled with kids were no longer safe. There were a growing number of victims of kidnappers. Violent car thefts were rampant; also, many restaurants were burned down. Cops colluded, and those who we once considered protectors were no longer of any help.”

“Our movement began about four years ago in this violent context. Despite it all, we decided to

leave the feelings of frustration and impotence behind and we took over the streets on our bikes to reclaim the public spaces. Those who saw us were amazed; they couldn’t believe that, given the violence and insecurity, a group of people could have fun, could be free of fear. Other groups and collectives approached us and we became *Chihuahua en Bicicleta sin Miedo* [Chihuahua on bikes without fear].”

Chihuahua en Bicicleta members believe that “organised crime feeds on fear and uncertainty from the people. We don’t want that, no one wants that. We want to change perceptions, to create a sense of respect for one another. We are those that share public spaces, those who greet a total stranger out of courtesy and sympathy just because he or she rides a bike, and those that act on conviction and use the bicycle as an instrument of change. The authorities’ response was to close their eyes, but we have figured out that it is only us, the citizens, who are in charge to solve the situation.”

Reclaiming public spaces

In the city of La Paz, the biking organisation *BCSiclotos*, “has helped the state attorney’s office to implement a project called ‘pedaling for crime prevention,’ which promoted the use of bikes to recover the public space. This year we are carrying out several other projects, which include outdoor movie projections, theater, and storytelling.” David, from *Pueblo Bicitelero* recounts, “Violence had a huge impact on groups promoting the use of bikes as a means of transportation because of the collective fear of violence. People opted to reduce biking at night, especially in zones considered ‘hot’ because of violence and crime levels. There were also changes in the type of routes taken to avoid areas where shootings were frequent. At *Pueblo Bicitelero* we are trying to promote peace and non-violence through civic participation. For us, the bike is an instrument for peace, for conviviality.”

In la Laguna region, *Ruedas del Desierto* (Wheels of the Desert) “started as a group of people whose main objective was to reclaim the public spaces through night tours on bikes. These tours had a lot of impact on the local media and they have contributed to overcome fear. Nowadays lots of people join us on each night tour. We are indeed reclaiming what’s ours: the public space, the streets, the parks.”



THE VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACTIVIST

Ximena Antillón is a psychologist working with victims of violence and human rights abuses, and a researcher at Fundar: Centro de Análisis e Investigación, one of Mexico’s leading think tanks.

Beyond the discourse

The situation is quite dire. There are thousands of people killed in the context of the fight against drugs and crime. It is true that the discourse has changed, the new government no longer uses a war discourse, and it no longer refers to victims as ‘collateral damage.’ But we do not see a real change in the strategy to tackle crime. It is a paradox that the new government is putting in place a system to attend to the needs of victims, while nothing is being done to avoid additional victims.

During the past administration we counted over 25,000 enforced disappearances. We do not have the official data for the first year of this new administration, but it is quite possible that the trend continues. Some institutions have been created, like the Specialised Unit for Missing Persons within the Attorney General’s Office. However, the Attorney General himself has recognised that they are overwhelmed by the number of cases and that his office does not have the capacity to respond. The situation for the families of victims continues to deteriorate.

Emergence of the victims' movement

Given this context, there have been many types of responses from society. One of the most notable has been the organisation and empowerment of victims. In the seventies, the families of victims of politically motivated enforced disappearances of the so-called ‘dirty war’ began to organise themselves. During the nineties other victims’ organisations and movements emerged, especially

“It is a paradox that the new government is putting in place a system to attend to the needs of victims, while nothing is being done to avoid additional victims.”

in northern Mexico due to the femicides^b in Ciudad Juárez and the increasing levels of enforced disappearances.

One movement that has drawn a lot of national and international attention is the *Movimiento por la Paz con Justicia y Dignidad* (MPJD) a national victims’ movement started by Javier Sicilia – the Mexican poet whose son was murdered on March 28, 2011 with six other people. He called for a national protest and denounced the results of the security strategy of Calderón. The movement made visible the unacceptable costs of the militarised strategy. Apart from giving a voice to victims and demanding the government to find disappeared persons, the MPJD has urged the government to change its militarised strategy to a more integral approach.

The MPJD advocates a human security approach, with a special focus on prevention and public policies for youth: health, employment, education, etc. They have also asked for an improvement of the democratic institutions and practices in Mexico and the end of the monopoly over media outlets. So the movement is not only focused on victims, but on deep and meaningful transformation of the country.

^b Homicides of women began increasing in 1993 and grew to crisis proportions from 2006 to 2012. A report issued in 2012 by the Nobel Women’s Initiative documented “alarming increases in violence against women over the past years, with evidence of the negligence of governments in protecting its citizens and direct participation in acts of violence.” See <http://nobelwomensinitiative.org>



Conclusion and recommendations

As the perspectives here demonstrate, many citizens view impunity, corruption, the presence of *de facto* powers outside the law, and human rights violations as the main obstacles to improving human security in Mexico. From a ‘top down’ perspective, institutions, procedures, and rules face several challenges in adequately protecting citizens from threats to their safety.

Impunity is a key challenge to building a peaceful social environment and trust in public institutions. For example, the public prosecutor agencies solve only 13 percent of the preliminary investigations initiated.¹¹ In 2011, less than 20 percent of reported murders were solved.¹² The failure of the state to enforce the rule of the law generates even more illegal behaviors. As one interviewed community member said, “impunity is an incentive to act outside the law.” *De facto* powers, both criminal and official, that act above the law, further weaken the ability of institutions to deter crime. Impunity is closely related to concerns about corruption and the lack of transparency and accountability. Interviewees from different sectors agree that corruption is rampant in all levels of government. In a vicious circle, corruption and impunity feed crime and empowers *de facto* powers, all of which weaken government institutions.

These failures of the state to guarantee human security and human rights impact public confidence in government institutions. According to México Evalúa, one of Mexico’s leading think tanks, the rate of non-reported crimes has increased in recent years. In 2004, it was 80 percent and in 2007 it increased to 87 percent; and in 2010 it reached 92 percent. Two out of three people have little or no confidence in the police. Only 10 percent of respondents said they were very confident in the public prosecutors.¹³ This shows growing public mistrust of the institutions responsible for providing security and justice.

Openings in government reforms

The human security approach expands people’s capabilities and freedom of development. From this perspective, it is necessary that institutions and public policies protect the security of all persons through the rule of law and human rights. Human security also emphasises the importance of empowering citizens. Democracy and citizen

participation are necessary for legitimate security policies because they promote resiliency and accountability.

Since the federal administration changed in 2000, several key institutions have been reformed. Those reforms intended to promote a more democratic and transparent regime capable of decreasing impunity. President Calderón’s administration made significant institutional changes to reduce violence. In 2008 the Constitution was reformed, deeply changing the criminal procedures and courts in order to promote a greater access to justice, the presumption of innocence, and the respect of human rights.¹⁴ In 2011, a constitutional reform on human rights was approved, which recognised the *pro homine* principle, and the preeminence of international treaties on human rights.^c In 2012, President Peña Nieto announced a new security strategy, summarised in the ‘National Development Plan 2013-2018’ and the government-opposition ‘Pact for Mexico’. Among the government’s new priorities are strengthening the legal framework on the rights of victims, implementing changes in the new criminal justice system, launching a new model of public security and law enforcement to create greater capacities for investigating and prosecuting offenses, and creating a National Program for Crime and Violence Prevention.¹⁵

Experts and civil society interviewees highlight some key achievements of the first year of the new administration and the sessions of the Federal Congress in 2013. As an interviewee stated, “the new government’s discourse is a little bit more open concerning human rights. Some measures have been taken. For example, thanks to social pressure the new government published the Law on the Rights of Victims^d and appointed a Federal Prosecutor for Enforced Disappearances.” Another example mentioned by interviewees is

c The *pro homine* principle emphasises providing broad as opposed to limited protections for individuals and human rights. The presumption of innocence requires the state to prove defendants are guilty in court. The constitutional reform also requires the Mexican government to abide by international treaties on human rights.

d The General Law on the Rights of Victims was approved by chambers of Congress in April 2012. After the general elections, the President sent observations to the text approved by Congress, delaying the enactment of the law; however, Congress considered that the period to send observations had expired and ordered the law’s publication. The President filed a lawsuit in the Supreme Court. The enactment of the law remained uncertain during the lawsuit, until the new President, Enrique Peña, withdrew the lawsuit.

the enactment of the National Code on Criminal Procedures, an important instrument needed to enable the new criminal justice system. It is important to note that these legislative and judicial reforms were widely promoted by social movements, experts and civil society organisations. Thus, civil society played a significant role in influencing public policy and promoting a more human approach to security challenges in Mexico.

Continuing challenges

Although the new administration has made some progress, academics and civil society members continue to debate the depth of changes in the national security strategy. While victims’ movements have succeeded in getting the attention of the President, their impact on policy has been less evident, according to Ximena Antillón, “Thanks to the strength and international visibility of the movement, the government had to open a dialogue with the victims. During these dialogues, the President made a lot of promises; sadly, deep down nothing changed. It was just a media strategy from the presidency.”

Continued human rights violations, the presence of violent criminal organisations, and rampant government corruption and impunity still threaten human security. One interviewee said, “There is no official strategy to tackle impunity, nor is there any serious commitment to bring to justice those responsible for the human rights abuses.” The security and law enforcement apparatus still has numerous deficiencies and lacks the trust of the population, while the military operates without proper civilian controls. The emergence of armed civilian groups in different parts of the country also represents a serious threat to human security. At an institutional level, experts believe that reforming the system of public security and criminal justice, to ‘restructure the public security institutions, transform the criminal proceedings and professionalise criminal defense’, is still one of the most important pending issues.¹⁶ Constitutional reforms in 2008 called for a transition of the justice system to an accusatorial system by 2016. Nearly six years later, constitutional reform still lags. Reforms to the public security system are also still pending, especially those concerning the police and the prison system. As long as this is the case, individual citizens, civil society and social movements will continue to seek to fill this gap – for better or for worse.

The authors work for the **Centro de Colaboración Cívica (CCC)**, is a non-partisan, non-profit civil society organisation that aims to promote a culture for dialogue, collaboration, and peaceful resolution of conflicts and to enable processes that strengthen democracy, sustainable development, and the rule of law in Mexico. CCC is a member of the North America network of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) and of Partners for Democratic Change International.


Recommendations

- **National and international organisations such as the UN should help build and strengthen an inclusive and pluralistic civil society in Mexico.** Civil society has a key role in promoting a human security approach in both social and official initiatives. Civil society organisations help to strengthen the trust between various stakeholders and empower citizens and those affected by violence to participate in policymaking. Mexico’s civil society is smaller than that of other regions and needs greater support and capacity building.
- **Civil society organisations should promote pluralistic and inclusive spaces for multi-stakeholder dialogue and the construction of agreements on violence reduction strategies and national security policies.** It is vital to reinforce participation in productive multi-stakeholder dialogues in order to create spaces for deliberation and coordination that foster information exchange, generate new proposals, and promote the development of collaborative advocacy strategies. The complexity of roots and causes of violence in the country cannot be engaged from a single perspective or discipline.
- **The government must allow for NGO-facilitated initiatives that engage citizens in monitoring authorities’ implementation of laws and policies.** The government should be accountable to the people through oversight strategies such as publicised public opinion polling. This would help ensure laws and policies are implemented efficiently and transparently, as well as with respect for human rights.



Tri-people Voices on Human Security in Mindanao

Raul Antonio A. Torralba, Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID)



“We now see that peace does not come from high above, but from within ourselves.”

Located in the southern region of the Philippines, Mindanao has been the site of armed conflict for decades, if not centuries. Complex patterns of conflict as well as attempts at fostering peaceful coexistence have evolved among and between Mindanao’s ‘tri-people’: the native indigenous peoples (IPs), the Islamic ‘Moro’ communities, and the predominantly Christian Filipino settlers from other regions. Against the backdrop of an internationally acclaimed peace process, this chapter presents the reflections of experienced civil society and indigenous leaders on the efforts to bring human security to Mindanao and its diverse peoples.



Background

The Philippines is a 7,100 island archipelago in Southeast Asia with an estimated population of 100 million. Its population is made up of diverse ethno-linguistic groupings of primarily Indo-Malay and Sino origins. Its colonial past under Spanish and American influences gave birth to the prevailing socio-cultural, political and economic dynamics today.

Historically serving as a trading hub between Asia, Europe and later the Americas, the country is divided into three geographical regions. The northern and central Luzon region is home to the capital, Manila, and is the site of the country's industrial production. The island-filled mid-archipelago region of the Visayas is dominated by agricultural production and trade, while the southern Mindanao region remains the frontier of the country, with resources and territories opened for exploitation and development as late as the 1950s. A government-sponsored resettlement programme that in part sought to open the south to resource development for the industrialising north brought a wave of settler migration. Coupled with the government's pacification efforts through resettlement, this contributed to much of the insecurity in the Mindanao region which prevails today.

History of conflict, subjugation and insecurity

Before the arrival of European explorers in the 1500s, the Philippine islands already hosted an indigenous population that shared a common tribal ancestry, gathered under different groupings and clans. Intertribal wars and conflicts were part of tribal life along with traditional peace and brotherhood agreements celebrated with ceremonies, offerings, and celebrations. Islamic missionaries passing via the southern corridors of Malaysia provided the toehold for the Islamic faith in the islands, and some Indigenous Peoples (IP) tribes converted. With the opening of the southern corridor, slavery became an economic opportunity for Islamised traders and their communities, spurring attacks on non-Islamised IPs for captives. Conversion to Islam was at times enforced on captive IPs, though more peaceful attempts at harmony and co-existence, based on acknowledgment of the ancestral links between Islamised and non-Islamised IPs, also remained in collective memory. This was the norm and way of

life for many of the island's inhabitants until the first wave of European colonisers. Beginning in the 1500s and continuing for over 300 years, the Spanish Catholic colonisers carried out multiple pacification campaigns on the Muslim "Moros" of Mindanao, then a pejorative term they used mainly for the Islamised tribes they found in the south, who they perceived as savages. After the Spanish defeat in the Spanish-American War of 1898, U.S. forces assumed forced control of the islands, committing massacres and displacing the population in the south. These historical injustices form part of the Moro people's long-simmering resentment toward the colonisers and eventually the Philippine government, which is perceived to continue similar policies.

From the 1970s through to the mid-1980s, martial law under President Ferdinand Marcos fuelled repression in the region. *Desaparecidos*, or those forcibly 'disappeared,' numbered in the thousands. Practices such as the introduction of a 'low intensity conflict' pacification strategy, which the Philippine military patterned after the U.S. military campaign in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, rendered rural villages ghost towns, turned communities and neighbors against each other and wrought havoc on the area's simple economies and socio-political systems.¹ Local grievances were further fuelled by perennial conflicts between business conglomerates expanding their access and control over the region's rich resources and the rural populations already living there.

Intensifying repression and human rights violations perpetrated under martial law gave rise to secessionist and separatist movements. To this day, these movements continue to pursue their causes in armed struggle. Two of these armed movements, the Communist Party of the Philippine's-led New People's Army (NPA) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), were established more than forty years ago. At its peak during the martial law years, the MNLF claimed a force of 45,000 armed men, while the NPA claimed a number close to half that.²

The two armed movements outlived the Marcos regime, but eventually splintered due to internal divisions. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), an offshoot from the MNLF, declared itself a fundamentalist Islamist movement fighting for 'Bangsamoro' (Moro Homeland) independence. The

NPA experienced a similar ideological splintering, which diminished its support base. The Mindanao region remained a theatre of dissident operations, split among the NPA in the northeast sections of the island, the MILF in the south-central region, and the MNLF in the southwestern peninsula of Zamboanga down to the southern island provinces closest to Malaysia.

It is estimated that the Moro conflict has cost the government at least 100 billion pesos (US \$2.3m) since 1970. It has claimed the lives of more than 100,000 people and displaced over 2 million, some repeatedly.³ Meanwhile, decades of violent conflict have also undermined economic development and left millions in poverty. The lack of economic opportunity and legal protection for women and children has spawned widespread human trafficking. Despite the constant state of insecurity brought by conflict, the region's oppressed populations exhibit an admirable level of resiliency and perseverance.

A promise as yet unfulfilled

In 1986, the People Power-EDSA Revolution^a toppled the Marcos dictatorship in a near-bloodless, civilian-led uprising. The newly established democracy led by President Corazon C. Aquino enshrined its vision for the future in a revised 1987 national constitution that sought to ensure greater freedoms, representation and parity for all. It provided openings for greater civil participation in governance, enhanced guarantees for human rights and dignity, and recognised a national identity. In an eventual peace deal with the MNLF, it also established the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) as an acknowledgment of Muslim Mindanao's desire for self-governance. However, more than a quarter century since, the Philippines has yet to consistently and comprehensively live up to the spirit and intent of this landmark agreement. Entering the millennia, the country has had a second president overthrown, a former president investigated and arrested for plunder, its electoral process cast into doubt, a chief justice impeached and its legislature embroiled in corruption and financial scandals.

On the other hand, this history of repression and resistance generated strong popular advocacy

^a The revolution is named for the main thoroughfare in Manila, the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, or EDSA, which was the site of the main protests that ended the Marcos regime.

IN NUMBERS

PEOPLE KILLED IN
MINDANAO CONFLICT



100-150
THOUSAND
(PLOUGHSHARES 2014)


ESTIMATED DISPLACED PEOPLE



2 MILLION
SINCE MINDANAO CONFLICT
(PLOUGHSHARES 2014)

PRIMARY SCHOOL
ENROLLMENT (% NET)

88%
IN 2009
(WORLD BANK 2014C)



YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

14.9%
IN 2012
(WORLD BANK 2014B)



and a rich civil society, which has nurtured Mindanao's tri-people perspective, advocating equal rights and respect for settlers, the Moros, and IPs. Furthermore, the country has high hopes for the end to a 16-year peace negotiation process between the Philippine government and the MILF, which seeks comprehensive and equitable resolutions to key issues.⁴ The peace process has

This history of repression and resistance generated strong popular advocacy and a rich civil society.

led to the ongoing drafting of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), which aims to describe a vision, identity and formation process for the proposed Moro homeland, to be known as the Bangsamoro. The Bangsamoro would supplant the ARMM and be enabled with greater socio-economic and political powers than any of the previous frameworks. A plebiscite will be held in the region to ratify the BBL once it is passed through Congress.

While it is hoped that the development of the BBL will address many of the demands for greater self-governance and autonomy of the Moros, many feel that it does not comprehensively address the concerns of IPs in the proposed Bangsamoro territory, most of whom allege to have been largely excluded from the peace process. As a result, IPs fear that they will continue to face displacement, killings, and the subversion of their rights to their ancestral domains and lands.



Three Mindanao Perspectives on Human Security



THE MORO PEACEBUILDER Ismael G. Kulat

Ismael “Mike” G. Kulat was a self-described child combatant during the early years of the MNLF and later of the MILF. He became a peace advocate and works with various nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and community-based organisations (CBOs). He is currently the Administration Officer of the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS), the largest network of Moro CSOs engaged in peace and development in the Bangsamoro. One of CBCS’s flagship efforts over the last decade is their kinship reaffirmation project that seeks to end clan war between and among Moro and IP communities through rekindling and strengthening lost and fragmented ties with the Moro’s non-Islamised ‘brothers.’

Living with intertribal violence

The culture of war has been our norm. You could say that over the past forty years, our normal life has actually been quite abnormal, with guns always an option for settling conflicts. So the Moro *rido* (clan war) response prevails; it has become the quickest and accepted response to perceived wrongs and injustice. But the notion of *ridos* as exclusively localised also needs to be corrected. True *ridos* are sudden and short-term in nature. A long-running *rido* would require a stable support base, which makes it likely that there are backers to these pseudo-wars, usually either politicians or as part of the pacification efforts of the government.

“The core to resolving these conflicts has been the common roots we share.”

The consultations we have done across the 11 *barangays* (villages), the smallest units of local governance, have shown that the government may also perpetuate conflicts. In its drive to counter the Moro insurrection, the military has been known to arm settlers and IPs as paramilitary forces in Moro territory. With the state’s apparent stamp of approval, paramilitary forces such as the Barangay Self Defense Units continued human rights violations and helped perpetuate the conflict between peoples. This has caused bad relationships to fester and propagated the conflict for decades. When strategic MILF and IP areas have overlapped and escalated, pulling in the MILF and government forces, these small clashes oftentimes turned into ideological conflicts between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Moro fronts.

Identity and rediscovering bonds

Even now, there is a continuing debate on the perceived problem of identity. Is there a clear definition of the ‘Moro’? In defining the Moro, do we go with the 13 ethno-linguistic groups where, historically, even IPs participated in the conflict against the Spaniards, earning them the moniker of ‘Moro’ as well? Through time, the definition of Moro as Islamised has become divisive.

The core to resolving these conflicts has been the common roots we share. Despite some of us having been Islamised, we stress the common IP roots and blood we all shared at some point in our common history. The *Dyandi* kinship reaffirmation ceremony we have been working towards is a traditional renewal of relationships between major groupings of IPs in Mindanao, both Islamised and non-Islamised, who trace their lineage to a common Manobo ancestry. Through consultations, summits and ceremonies with key leaders, this effort has established 11 peace covenants with the various tribes and government units in the conflict-affected areas of Muslim Mindanao. This has helped resolve festering feuds and provided a mechanism for resolving disputes.

It was primarily with colonisation that our differences and the sense of separateness between our tribes became emphasised. Now, the Bangsamoro must try to involve and include the non-Islamised to stop the cycle of conflict and violence that has split us apart. The reality of our common bond is clearly seen in the patchwork

of Moro and IP territorial claims over Muslim Mindanao. The proposed plebiscite on the Bangsamoro – to ratify the BBL after it is passed in Congress – is an opportunity for both sides to decide on the final delineation of the Bangsamoro, and whether a joining of the people will take place. At the same time, it shows us that we are all living in the same house. The history and changing of it is now in our hands.

Traditional conflict resolution and governance

We found value and merit in community mechanisms like having a council of elders, where we are all linked by a common tradition and history, working together to resolve conflicts peacefully. We advocated joining these together into common mechanisms, and now into common support for the peace process through joint statements. With the revival of traditional methods of conflict resolution, the cases of violence have dropped. We are now lobbying for *barangay* officials of the Local Government Units (LGUs) to recognise the councils that have proven themselves capable so they can become part of local governance systems and structures.

By emplacing simpler and accessible systems we actually show that there is no need for complicated and diverse structures or mechanisms. We’ve also realised that frameworks introduced from the outside usually don’t work, since conflicts and realities are context-specific and localised. The respect for culture, traditions and beliefs, particularly for community people, should be observed, as this has time and again proven to be effective.

Transitioning towards peace

To accomplish normalisation, it is necessary to attain peace. Many of us now have to prepare ourselves to shift from MNLF-MILF combatant status to civilian or even peace advocate. We must move from foe to brother, from intolerance to tolerance. It will take a long and phased approach to reintegrate all of us back into community life as equal civilians.

After having been conditioned over the past 40, and even 500 years of constant armed conflict, there is a need for substantial social transformation, as well as personal transformation and maturation, to lead us all back to a peaceful and normal life.

“We must leave the final resolution with the people.”

There is a need for a sustained effort both by the government and the rest of us, to recondition and disabuse those who have been exposed to constant conflict. We need to ensure this shift, from the current abnormal being seen as normal, to a truly normal and peaceful situation.

Fully realising human security

Our sense for human security was markedly awakened under martial law. Now there is this push for normalisation, towards peace of mind and domicile becoming part of the Bangsamoro life. Resolving this requires a massive five to ten year transformation and education campaign, supported by the consistent application of justice by the government. *Rido* is fed by the lack of justice delivery by the prevailing system. It is the weakness of the current government that prolongs insecurity that in turn fosters violence.

The challenge for now is that honouring human security principles will be difficult with people hardened by a long history of conflict. From the immediate armed response provided by *rido*, we now have to shift its adherents to a more legalised and structured justice response, which also requires capable government structures. Such changes will not be attained in the blink of an eye.

On our end, what we have started is the process of people coming together and talking, particularly at community levels. In over ten years of work, the communities have now reached the point where they don’t need us to monitor them. The work is now seen more as a community responsibility. They’ve reached maturation, allowing them to become empowered through our facilitation. We now see that peace does not come from high above, but from within ourselves. We must leave the final resolution with the people.



A TAPESTRY OF IP VOICES

The text below is a synthesis of the viewpoints of many IP leaders, including traditional leaders such as Datus, (IP leaders) and Bae, (traditional women leaders), who wish to remain anonymous for safety reasons. It includes perspectives from such people as C. B., an IP woman in her forties working as a volunteer organiser in the hinterland communities of various IPs. Her work brings her in contact with IP realities and issues from poverty, hunger, land-grabbing and conversion, to illegal resource extraction, counter-insurgency and arbitrary killings. While staying true to their words, the narrative below paints a composite picture of the complexities facing IP communities.

Caught in the middle

It would be fair to say that IPs have reached the end of their patience, or their boiling point. They feel anybody can take advantage of them with impunity. How can IPs feel secure when they are the ones being killed in their own territory because of the struggle of forces they are not part of? The army and guerillas were accepted as guests, yet wound up killing and marginalising their hosts. In a 2010 meeting of some 17 IP leaders and organisers, we noted the number of IP leaders and key persons killed since the 1997 promulgation between the government and the NPA [meant to ensure adherence to human rights principles and international humanitarian laws, and protect civilians during the conflict]. By our count, we tallied more than 500 individuals killed from 1997 to 2010. These killings were purportedly done by military forces, the NPA as well as unidentified killers, and for various reasons. Ironically, as many as 70 percent of the NPA in our territories are IPs, and 80 percent of those were recruited from the youth. Why? Because they never had the opportunity to go to school. These conflicts are just reflections of these realities and the lack of attention given to root causes. To establish our security, we need to be educated – in our culture, in our rights, in our identity. But the reality now is that there is little access to that education. Who should provide it for us?

Traditional spirituality and leadership

Among lumads or IPs, we treat all things as interconnected; nothing exists on its own. Our history, our territories and the land interconnect

us. Human security is comprehensive and it is a given right to us as well as an obligation. I give it and I expect it at the same time. What we IPs are basically saying is that in the same way that all things are interconnected, anything you demand or any privilege you ask for requires a corresponding obligation on your part.

In tribal history or lore, there are lineages that are historically blessed with leadership. In the areas where the traditional leaders still prosper, there is a capacity to relate the traditional ways and means to current realities. For example, there are traditional folk leaders, who also serve as very good church leaders, and they perform these tasks with equal respect for both sides. They also help in a rediscovery of the traditional ways, or at least show the merit in these practices and beliefs.

In our culture, the highest women leaders are the ones we call *Bae*. They have authority in the community that even men must respect. Women play an important role as culture-bearers, nurturers of peace and the essential cultural elements of a tribe. With the absence of security, stresses that affect women ultimately have a negative effect on almost all aspects of IP life such as continuing education, on traditional cultural practices and on the life rhythms of the communities overall. ‘Pretender’ Datus picked to represent IP communities by the NPA, the mayors, governors and politicians do not last because their lineage does not have the required blessing from the *Magbabaya* or Creator, a God-given blessing granted to their lineage and ancestry. Communities will not fully support someone like this. Political actors find it difficult to penetrate and sustain their call among the IPs, as they basically deny the spiritual aspects important to the IP way of life.

Threats to identity, challenges to security

Nowadays, traditional beliefs, our interconnectedness, our need to care and share as a result, are no longer honoured. This leads to insecurity for many. The trend is more to acquire and exploit without responsibility or accountability. Many have forgotten that human security, particularly for IPs, emphasises that all is interconnected.

The strongest of forces now dominating this discussion is driven by the need to secure economic rights. Historically, IPs survived and prospered in a non-cash economy. But they failed in dealing with the introduction of a cash-based economic system, where what had been interconnected was reduced to commodities and their value pegged in cash.

Cultural respect and external intervention

NGOs who help and introduce technologies, such as using chemicals or varieties new to the area, need to gauge their impact on traditional practices. Non-IP organisers organise along non-tribal lines, like forming umbrella organisations entrusted to speak for all the clans within a given territory. This runs counter to the ancestral domain principle, which recognises the clan rather than the organisation. These organisers sometimes insist on their methods, consolidating power among a few instead of collectively. Such organisations might ask IPs to join political rallies and burn flags and effigies, but do not address IPs’ own right to self-determination, nor help IPs reclaim lost territories or reestablish traditional plant varieties as an assertion of IP identity and territory.

To strengthen the tribes, you have to strengthen the basic units, the clans. The common territory is what the tribes build their alliances on, their basis of strength, as well as the basis on which they make their decisions. In any situation with IPs, it is best to be consultative rather than rushing in with offers of resources, services and whatnot. Otherwise, you will be taken advantage of for your mistake, and your efforts won’t garner you any respect or support. You must consult the leaders and honour what they say.

The Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA) and governance

We were amongst the first to push for the institutionalisation of IP governance. The 1997 Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA) itself was drafted and passed as the mechanism to reconcile the social injustices of the past, as well as dealing with IP matters and their territory. IPRA is about governance, a smaller government run along IP lines, similar to what the Bangsamoro desires. As such, it has as much right to be implemented for IPs as the BBL that is envisioned for the Bangsamoro. The government has basically surrendered IP rights to the Bangsamoro, or its precursor, the ARMM through 16 years of non-enforcement of the IPRA within the ARMM. There was no political will or mechanism. This is a clear case of abandonment. In the IP areas, governance is very fragmented. You can have as many as three local governance units functioning in parallel: the official one run by the government, another by the NPA, and the third as asserted by the IPs through their right to self-determination.

“IPs are under constant pressures from the outside and we are often forced to make impossible choices that split communities apart.”

When forced to make a choice, those in power will likely follow the mainstream process of implementation such as the Local Government Code, rather than the traditional structure and mechanisms allowed for by the IPRA. All this prevails because higher politics dictates this arrangement. Again, IPs are made powerless because of the uneven application of the law.

“Like logs floating in the sea”

We are not secured by our government. Even with the international declaration of IP rights, the national declaration of such rights or laws and their regional promulgations, all of these are just recognition and declarations. In reality, there is no actual implementation in our areas. We are not secured in many aspects of our lives, such as our sustainable development, which has no support, and our ancestral domain, another issue that remains floating. We feel we are like logs floating in the sea, visible to all but unable to anchor ourselves onshore.

The bottom line here is that the state can’t protect our people. In fact, when we asserted our rights to the local authorities, we actually experienced more attacks on IPs as a result. By declaring our stand, we became targets of other vested groups who saw our legal claims as a threat to their own interests. IPs are under constant pressures from the outside and we are often forced to make impossible choices that split communities apart, forcing some to fight back with arms, or others to pursue legal means. Yet guns need bullets. The legal system is pro-rich – you need to pay for every action. More often, the IPs last choice is to flee conflict. In our case for now, we still prefer setting up a new community, our “safe zone” where we can have peace, rather than fighting. In these instances, it is the women’s negotiating skills that are brought into play.

IPs don’t have a clear or accessible method of documenting their histories and experiences other than their traditional ways of oral recall. We have realised that we need to document the incidents we’ve endured, and we need a clear and defined mechanism for reporting such violations that guarantees action. The judicial courts have jurisdiction over such acts, but historically for IPs these have moved so slow that witnesses have died waiting to testify or for filed cases to move forward.



THE ADVOCATE

Andrea Maria Patricia M. Sarenas

Andrea Maria Patricia “Pat” M. Sarenas prefers to be described as a retired grandmother who remains involved and noisy with her advocacy. “Pat” as she is simply known was a party list Congresswoman for the 11th and 12th Congress from 1998 to 2004. She continues to sit as Chair of the Philippine national NGO platform, the Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO), and the Mindanao Coalition of Development Networks (MINCODE). She is the only party list representative who championed the passage of three landmark laws in Congress covering the trafficking of persons, violence against women and children and support for single parents.

Interconnected insecurities

Through my work [as an advocate and Congresswoman], I have begun seeing the factors affecting society, the many dimensions of true poverty. Many of my old assumptions about poverty changed. I began to learn more about the root causes of poverty in the Philippines. People had no education, many were marginalised, and the two were interconnected. Through the work I got to see how these realities were affected by political decisions, even global trends. All were connected with the various processes and systems, even the business world. There were connections to these sources of insecurities.

“Many of my old assumptions about poverty changed.”

Poverty is a manifestation of the complex problems faced by the poor. Then, once poor, they spawn more problems that manifest in further social ills. This population has no access to opportunities or any enabling mechanisms with which to change their fate. The poor will continue to have more children, building pressure on our social infrastructure. This perpetuates the imbalance and

insecurity we continue to feel about society overall. There is too great a push to ‘unrich the rich,’ for society to take back some of the excess they now have; instead there should be a greater effort to ‘unpoor’ the poor, to concentrate more on uplifting them from their present condition.

I am also frustrated with the military protecting vested interests like businesses, particularly in the remote areas. But I am supportive of the ongoing efforts with security sector reform. We can see some results of this, but the fear of the military remains dominant. There is still a distance between security forces and the people. Ideally in a secure society, there should be no need for any marked police or military presence.

Lessons in anti-trafficking and gender advocacy

Some of the insecurities we women had long faced were addressed through legal reform. We learned how difficult it was to work with the male-dominated legislature. The need for closer networking with like-minded NGOs became more pronounced. So I also got involved in organising NGO/CSO networks, both local and national. As long as our work was guided by our coalition work, we persevered, even if it was a difficult struggle.

Aside from legislative work, we needed lobbying to get support in solving the insecurities we addressed. We lobbied and advocated and won victories by having sexual harassment declared a crime. We also undertook the further detailing of Violence Against Women (VAW) laws, lessening the opportunity for the male-dominated judiciary to interpret these details by themselves. We basically made clear to them what the key definitions, issues and roles concerning women were.

Even within Congress, we began with defining a common understanding of trafficking when we worked on drafting and passing the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act. We organised gender and development committees. We involved the rank and file of the House, to check and monitor the mainstreaming of gender concerns in legislation and even the processes within the legislature. These internal groupings and mechanisms became the driving forces within the committees and the House. In a microcosm of organising, we strengthened these groups until they knew the issue, they were educated and finally reached the

“I find it ironic that some countries that come across as rich and abusive on the one hand, continue to provide development aid on the other.”

point of awareness wherein they were raising issues on sexist language, work hours and the like, within the legislative branch.

Our legislative work also prepared us to work even with the opposition. The practical benefit of linking with the opposition is a smoother process. By having them informed on the issues and processes, we got a better grasp of the questions they’d raise, and where they were coming from. Such work emphasised the need to always be consultative and meet with people and allow them to make the decision themselves.

Public participation and empowerment

Ultimately, people should be involved in the solution. They should know the dimensions of their situation and enabled to act for themselves. The purpose is not to make them angry but to seek and develop solutions to the issues. We saw the need to demystify the lawmaking process to the people and educate them. We had the people attending sessions and consultations and showing them the details that were important.

In our legislative advocacy we made use of other methods of educating people, such as the audio-visual presentation entitled ‘WE ARE SO SYNDICATED’, a video tape used to educate and raise general consciousness on women trafficking overall. Such innovative processes, for those times, helped spark initiatives to address these issues on a larger scale, and educated a wider audience. Such efforts stressed the importance of involving the

Local Government Unit at the lowest levels.

Many of our population have no access to the law, another factor for insecurity. People will be more willing to defend their environment, their livelihood sources, even their homeland if they know what they can legally do. This situation provides another venue to educate the people, learn about laws, legal options, securing necessary writs and orders. It teaches people how to go up against the rich even in the big and developed countries. It teaches them about their legal options and the mechanisms they can use to protect themselves through legal writs, injunctions and orders.

Even now, I continue to look at all factors causing or impacting poverty. I see the value of education such as family development sessions. They have led to better discipline, and taught members the value of education, health, family and children. I have learned that people begin to address value issues only after they are able to establish a more stable way of life with less insecurity.

Looking to the future

I think we all need to rethink globally the issues that require global intervention. Some things can be addressed locally, but other dimensions, like trafficking in persons, require all our attention. There must be a strengthening of our global-wide response mechanisms to address unfair global trade rules for example, which in turn affect other issues. We must begin to discuss how the global dynamics are influenced by various forces, and in so being become unfair to the rest of us.

I find it ironic that some countries that come across as rich and abusive on the one hand, continue to provide development aid on the other. We have donors who are strong on gender here, but in their home country there are mining concerns that exploit women as well as communities. Despite this, we still need to engage them; our intent is to challenge them on their inconsistency. Overall, we must realise that issues like trafficking themselves are not solved by simply removing the trafficker. There are many connected points as to vulnerabilities and insecurities of the people. It is our responsibility to expose and link these.



Conclusion and recommendations

The perspectives shared show just a fraction of the genuine efforts to protect and empower the populations at risk, however they continue to lack a comprehensive and cohesive approach. This is evident in the examples of NGOs introducing specific technologies into IP communities for agricultural production without matching these to community capacities, agrarian reform that is too focused on land redistribution and not production, and the vagueness of ongoing peace talks with regards to the state of non-Islamised IPs and their territories.

Failure of governance and its mechanisms remains a pressing problem. The incapacity of government to provide the stable superstructure and mechanisms for good governance is sounded repeatedly in the discussions from all three perspectives. The prevailing politics of patronage, power and favour, the inefficiency of the justice system in providing accessible redress measures, the inability to ensure stable peace and order and even the cases of security forces committing human rights violations are failures in governance. The marked inequality between the rich and poor is both a result and cause of the marginalisation of IPs, women, and the poor, and contributes to a perception of an imbalance in how human security is addressed. The proportion of the population in poverty continues to grow but there are diminishing resources to address the needs of the poor. Without active advocacy and actions for their rights and entitlements, these same peoples and sectors are further marginalised. This is linked to the state's perceived incapacity to respond comprehensively to issues, particularly safeguarding the welfare of the most disadvantaged.

High-level legislative advocacy is only successful if new laws are effectively implemented. Legislative advocacy has proven to be only part of resolving security issues. The marked success of introducing landmark legislation such as the IPRA or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 is seen as a positive yet incomplete step. Guaranteeing effective implementation mechanisms of such mandates remains necessary. Some laws remain constrained by mechanisms that are ineffective, inappropriate or incapable of delivering on their mandate. Successful governance systems and mechanisms require access and familiarity with their operation. Implementation mechanisms that involve the affected communities have greater chances of being accepted, effective and sustainable. Local

communities appreciate mechanisms that they themselves engage, understand, and are linked to existing or traditional practices. Such mechanisms are effective and convey respect for local communities.

Recommendations

On engaging traditional communities

- **Prioritise traditional and community-based practices**, such as traditional governance mechanisms, which promote human security as effective solutions. The best-crafted laws must fit the local context. Include affected communities as a critical partner in the implementation mechanisms crafted. Communitarian processes and decision-making, oftentimes based on traditional and/or existing practices, continue to resonate strongly with local communities, in turn making their adoption and practice realistic, participative, representative and sustainable.
- **Be attuned and sensitive to local realities and sensibilities.** When seeking to assist IPs, respect traditional leadership customs and lineages and cultural values.

On developing successful advocacy

- **Hold governments accountable and responsible for implementing laws** that protect local communities, such as IPRA. Hold governments to the higher standard of ensuring human rights.
- **Refer to history and the past in plotting a direction for the future.** A clear understanding of the history, sources and relationships of the roots of prevailing insecurity issues is necessary to craft an effective response.
- **Sustain education as the cornerstone of all advocacy efforts.** Advocacy must incorporate an education component to build awareness that leads to popular action. Later stages of advocacy should ultimately be aimed at enabling and empowering people to act as their own advocates.
- **Engage women as change agents in traditional and non-traditional roles.** Support the development of women in both traditional roles as healers, educators, and leaders and in expanded roles as peace-builders, negotiators, and political leaders.

- **Engage the younger generation.** Help youth to develop their advocacy for shared as well as emerging issues. Utilise appropriate media – micro, mass, social – to engage and inform them. Aim for goals that span generations, not just years.

- **Develop comprehensive, globally oriented and forward-looking advocacy programs.** Advocacy programs must emphasise the interconnected nature of human security concerns and engage the global dimension of issues such as human trafficking and economic parity.

On government engagement

- **Guarantee and deliver essential rights, services and entitlements**, and consistently pursue a foreign policy based on beneficial support and development rather than competitive advantage. Government consistency and constancy to these tenets allows communities to realise their growth and development potentials more fully.

- **Rationalise and harmonise legislation and policy.** Consistency and coherence of socio-economic-political agendas is necessary to ensure no overlap or marginalisation of interests. Legal instruments such as laws, orders and promulgations need to be rationalised and made consistent with other laws. This reduces occasions of conflict and insecurity due to varying or conflicting levels of appreciation and interpretation of such laws.

- **Ensure transparency of policymaking through representative participation and multi-stakeholder engagement.** By building trust-based relationships and engaging a broad spectrum and number of stakeholders, there is a greater appreciation of the message and less doubts about its desired outcomes. Reducing suspicions and doubts through transparency encourages greater participation and involvement.

Recommendations from Datus on IPs and the Ongoing Peace Process

Our most pressing security issue as IPs is how our territories will be administered as part of the identified Bangsamoro territory. This has ramifications for our identity, our governance, our territory and our opportunity to develop as a distinct people. There are several actions that we might take to ensure that IP interests are safeguarded in the Bangsamoro delineation processes. We have several recommendations to make this happen:



The author works for **Initiatives for International Dialogue - IID**, a Philippines-based advocacy institution promoting human security, democratisation and people-to-people solidarity. IID conducts policy advocacy and campaign programs on Burma, Mindanao, Southern Thailand, West Papua, and East Timor. In 2000, it established the Mindanao Peoples Caucus (MPC) – a platform and network of grassroots organisations, communities and NGOs affected and engaged in the conflict in Mindanao. Together with other peace networks, IID led the establishment of the Mindanao Peaceweavers (MPW), the broadest peace network for Mindanao in the country, and currently serves as its secretariat. IID coordinates the Southeast Asia network of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC).

- Push the call for federalism. Ensure that this call sustains the identity and recognition of IPs under the law. This initiative can make use of the IPRA because this is already a nationally and internationally recognised law and ratified for full implementation.
- Utilise the United Nations' recognition of the universal rights of IPs that in turn acknowledges how IPs predate Christianity and Islam. Given that the Philippines is a signatory to the UN declaration on IP rights and has promulgated the IPRA, this can be used to bolster the IP position for recognition.
- The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) should take up the cause for IPs and ensure their best interests are protected at every level of the negotiations and preparation towards the establishment of the Bangsamoro.
- The integration of the IPRA provisions into the BBL should be ensured. It may be easier to incorporate the IPRA law into the BBL rather than the BBL developing its own expression of its IPRA elements. IPRA is already a law whereas the BBL will still need to go through the legislative process.
- Proponents may pursue recognition of certificates of ancestral domain titles of IPs within the BBL as well as the proposed territory. Proponents could file a mandatory injunction with the Supreme Court calling for the full implementation of the IPRA, national and international laws pertaining to IP rights, including domain, territory and identity, before the BBL is ratified.
- As a fallback, efforts should ensure that the BBL provisions for equal rights applies to all, particularly those who have expressed their desire to not be a part of the Bangsamoro territory.

**POPULATION**

14.15 MILLION IN 2013 (WORLD BANK 2014A)

10,000,000

URBAN-RURAL DEMOGRAPHIC40% Urban population (2013)
(WORLD BANK 2014B)60% Rural (2013)
(WORLD BANK 2014C)**GLOBAL PEACE INDEX 2014****HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX 2013**

Community-Based Healing and Reconciliation in Zimbabwe

Bishop Emeritus Dr Ambrose Moyo^a, Ecumenical Church Leaders Forum (ECLF)

“Local Peace Committees build peace in their communities through dialogue spaces where people engage each other in search of solutions.”

Zimbabwe's government and people face challenges today that range from development to economic sustainability and livelihoods. Combined with the aftermath of a violent past, these challenges impact on Zimbabweans' sense of security in more than one way. As religious and traditional leaders, politicians and other community members reflect on sources of insecurity, national healing and reconciliation emerges as an important priority. Community-driven Local Peace Committees that combine traditional and contemporary governance structures have contributed to fostering a stable and inclusive political atmosphere.

^a This chapter was the product of team work of several ECLF colleagues, coordinated by the author, Executive Director of ECLF.



Background

Zimbabwe gained independence from Britain in 1980 after years of wars and struggles, the impact of which is still felt today. During the pre-independence war and episodes of violence in the post-independence era, the country experienced displacement of people, loss of life, and conflict among communities, leading to a traumatised society.¹ In the post-independence era, Zimbabwean citizens have been repeatedly divided by violent conflict and political polarisation. Though outright conflict officially ended with a unity agreement between the main political parties in 1987, lingering hostilities remain to this day.

After a decade of economic shocks and decline, marked by peak inflation at 231 million percent in July 2008, the introduction of a multi-currency regime in 2009 began to stabilise the economic environment. The GDP growth rate grew as high as 11.4 percent and 10.6 percent in 2010 and 2012 respectively, though it dropped to 3.4 percent in 2013.² As a result of this macro-economic instability, citizens felt an overall deterioration in their quality of life, with 62.6 percent of households remaining below the poverty line, with the highest concentration of poverty in rural areas.³ The state of the economy has caused a sharp decline of standards in other fields such as education, social and health care.

Environmental factors including climate change and deforestation have affected food security and

caused acute malnutrition in the country. Drought has struck communities dependent on rain-fed agriculture, and 63 percent of people use firewood as fuel for cooking.⁴ Millions of hectares of land have been destroyed due to serious veld fires, leading to plant and animal species decline.⁵

Long-lasting grievances and the poverty prevalent in communities threaten social cohesion and peace at the local level.

Moreover, in 2005 nearly 700,000 people lost their homes as a result of a government programme code named *Murambatsvina* ('remove the dirt'), to rationalise the construction of urban dwellings and to remove shacks which had been illegally constructed. The housing crisis continues today, as there is a severe lack of affordable shelter. This political and socio-economic background provides insight into some root causes of human insecurities in Zimbabwe. Long-lasting grievances and the poverty prevalent in communities threaten social cohesion and peace at the local level. The minimal research in this field shows that conflicts in communities are rooted in deep structural and policy issues that have not been addressed.

As part of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in 2009, the Government of Zimbabwe recognised the need for healing and reconciliation, and established the Organ for National Healing Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI). More recently, the constitution of Zimbabwe, adopted in 2013, makes provision for the establishment of a National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC), acknowledging the importance of national healing and reconciliation in fostering peace, well-being and development in the country.⁶

A communication and knowledge gap exists between national policymakers and long-standing community practices.

As the country moves towards a national healing and reconciliation process, the emphasis has been on collaborative efforts not only among the government, ONHRI and civil society organisations, but also with traditional leadership. It is widely acknowledged that the complexity of Zimbabwean society and politics must be understood within the contexts of historical struggles, and this requires finding a balance between modern and traditional conflict resolution and mediation mechanisms at community levels. However, a communication and knowledge gap exists between national policymakers and long-standing community practices, posing challenges in implementing a nationally-agreed peace and reconciliation programme that is truly representative of all Zimbabweans.

IN NUMBERS


POPULATION IN SEVERE POVERTY



INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS



SECONDARY SCHOOL PARTICIPATION



YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT



As a result of this macro-economic instability, citizens felt an overall deterioration in their quality of life.



Community perspectives on human security

Interviews with a number of community representatives, including political leaders, church leaders and traditional leaders provide first-hand testimonies of the way that human security is perceived at the community level.^b These present perceptions of people predominantly from the Nkayi District in Matabeleland in Zimbabwe's North province, but also from other regions across the country.

^b Given the sensitive subject matter, the testimonials have been kept anonymous and the names provided are pseudonyms



THE POLITICAL LEADER

Nicholas Sibanda is a senior political leader of ZANU PF^c in the Nkayi District, Matabeleland North Province, as well as a lay church leader, and Vice Secretary of the Local Peace Committee.

The first, perhaps the most important, personal human security concern I have is the slow pace of development in the area, which almost everybody in the district feels. I would have loved to see the economy performing better and everyone rallying around the plans and programmes that were set by government after the elections.

I am an old man now and naturally fear that I may pass on and not have done enough to secure the future of my dependents. Lack of development poses a threat to human security. Without development there can be no peace. In Nkayi, we are disgruntled because the necessary infrastructure for education, health, transport, etc. is very inadequate especially when compared with developments taking place in other parts of the country. Children have to travel long distances to go to school. The same applies to the long distances people have to travel to ferry patients to the nearest clinic or hospital. Some have died on donkey or ox drawn carts before they got to the nearest hospital.

One of the biggest problems here is the water shortage due to the sinking water table. People are unable to have the standard of living enjoyed by

others in other areas. Water is a human right. We rely on a sand abstraction system and this means that when there have been poor rains, which is usually the case, water dries up quickly and we have nothing. We can't even embark on small income-generating projects.

When I was growing up there were a lot of rivers with water flowing throughout the year, but today there are hardly any such rivers. In the past if one dug a well one did not need to dig very deep before reaching the water table. But today one has to use a drilling machine to find water and it will not be everywhere.

"Water is a human right."

For me, the issue of climate change has become a human security challenge as it is also responsible for movements of people crowding in areas where they can find water. It is also an environmental issue as livestock also have to walk long distances in search of water and green pastures, and in the process some die and are left to rot in open spaces, polluting the air.

^c Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front party

Sources of insecurity

The accounts shared here demonstrate that human security encompasses a wide range of factors linked to development, social cohesion and peaceful coexistence. The concerns identified by community leaders and members refer for instance to the pace of development, issues of poverty, access to water, food security, environmental degradation and economic opportunities. They also emphasise the importance of women's empowerment and women's participation in decision making at the community level. Domestic violence and a history of violence within communities are mentioned. Concerns are raised when it comes to service delivery, health services and education as well as shelter and housing. Finally, some of the interviewees also mention the issues of witchcraft and tribal tensions which affect their community.

These responses came from various areas and there is a growing view that their communities are deliberately marginalised and segregated. The feeling of social ostracism on development, access to water, food security, environmental degradation and livelihoods opportunities resulting in poverty is taking on an ethnic and or regional slant. All the threats to human security mentioned by interviewees could potentially become causes of serious conflicts given the economic challenges faced by the nation.

Resource management and livelihoods

Access to natural resources, and hence livelihood and employment, is central to most interviewees' concerns. These are linked to social tensions and anti-social behaviour, but also to loss of dignity and disempowerment.

For a senior Movement for Democratic Change – Tsangirai (MDC-T) political leader and ward Councillor in Nkayi district, the issue of water is very high on his list of human security concerns. As a community leader he is aware and very much concerned that: "Most people have no water for domestic use and for subsistence agriculture programmes like irrigation." Food security is very much connected with water. For him "water is life." This critical shortage of water "has weighed down heavily on our personal dignity as people when we compare ourselves to other people in other areas.

It hurts when we read in the paper when some political leaders describe us as lazy and failing to take advantage of government programmes when they are the ones who are failing to lift us up by addressing our water challenge." Water is not an issue to be politicised. It has to do with human dignity and is therefore a human security concern for the people of Nkayi.

"Shortage of water has weighed down heavily on our personal dignity."

A traditional leader from the Nkayi district underlines the same issue: "As a traditional leader, my major concern is that of water and that is the complaint I get from my subjects every other day. We only have one water pump in the area and it is hardly enough for domestic use and other livelihood purposes." In Nkayi district, another respondent adds that as a result of the poor rains and inadequate farming inputs, the harvest was poor, resulting in food insecurity. In Chivi, on the other hand, the Secretary to Chief's Advisory Council laments that: "Livelihoods are a problem as in some areas there was too much rain and farmers lost their produce. We have not been able to assist people who have lost their crop and it is troubling us as traditional leaders."

A village head in the Chivi district points out the connection between livelihood, employment and social tensions: "Many young people in the area are unemployed thus they are idle and end up involving themselves in socially unacceptable behaviour. I would want to see those who are interested being allocated agricultural land or being assisted to embark on livelihood projects such as nutrition gardens and irrigation schemes." Similarly, another respondent in Bulawayo adds that: "The major human security threat that I may dwell upon is the closure of industries and the increased rate of unemployment in the city of Bulawayo [which] has also fuelled the increase of burglaries and muggings by unemployed individuals."



“I am scared to think about the future of my children.”

Economy

Zimbabwe’s financial troubles and the effects of the economic challenges is a frequently cited source of insecurity. The following testimonial from a respondent in Bulawayo illustrates this: “I am scared to think about the future of my children. I

The interviews reflected on the issues caused by the importation of labour. There are a number of companies that operate in Bulawayo and employ people from the outside. This is a security concern to most residents: “The main question is why the government allows the transfer of human capital across provinces rather than focusing on reducing the unemployment rate at every province.” The manager of a guest house in Nkayi highlights the increased rate of unemployment caused by foreign companies’ ownership of the timber industry. According to her, they do not employ locals but they bring their own people, and this negatively affects the economy in the area. She notes that there are a number of backyard industries such as carpentry, welding, and hairdressing, that, if strengthened, could provide people with an income. A respondent in Silobela added that, “there is capacity for income-generating projects, but there is no money for start-up capital. Women are running money-lending schemes but they generate very little from them.”

A respondent in Bulawayo points out that: “In order to earn a living, many people resort to various ways, such as trading in second-hand clothes imported from Mozambique. Some resort to illegal border jumping in search of jobs in neighbouring countries with better economies, such as Botswana and South Africa. Some have died in the process swimming across crocodile infested rivers and playing hide and seek with security forces guarding the borders.” He further points out that because of the economic hardships, corruption is rampant in the country and, “What seems to be lacking is the political will to face it head on.”

“Some of the worst political violence has taken place in this district.”



REFLECTING ON COMMUNITY TENSIONS

A number of interviewees in the Nkayi district discussed the issues of tribal or political tensions, which affected the sense of security and the community relations.

“My area is predominantly populated by the Ndebele people. It is one of the areas that was perceived as sustaining the ZIPRA^d dissidents shortly after the attainment of independence and mostly Shona-speaking soldiers were sent to flush these out. But I feel that the methods used created a great deal of animosity on the part of the Ndebele against the Shona people. After the Unity Accord, many of those who were believed to have been involved in committing atrocities then settled in Silobela. The tension between the two communities has been very intense and they hardly ever mix in social gatherings.”

“Some youths in Makhaba Ward perpetrated violence due to political differences. They burnt houses that belonged to their political opponents and caused major disturbances in the Ward and it left scars on families and community members. This explains the slow pace of development and the fear of participating in any initiative that comes from outside the Ward. The fear arises from the perception that those who come from outside the Ward can only be enemies trying to influence locals to rise against government so as to once again get them into trouble.”

“General peace has always been a challenge in Nkayi. You will know that some of the worst political violence has taken place in this district. That concern will remain with us for a long time though things have been stabilising of late. There is also a concern on matters of domestic violence and other instances of violence on the social front. If you read the papers, Nkayi is known for some of these violent crimes like physical fighting, stabbing, axing and abuse of women.”

^d The Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) was the armed wing of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU).

have nothing to bequeath to them as I lost every penny that I had saved in the crisis of 2007 to 2008. No matter how much education I might give them, chances of their being employed are very slim with such a high unemployment rate. In 2007 to 2008 the challenge was the hyper-inflation that led to the collapse of the Zimbabwe dollar, but today the challenge comes from deflation. Unlike last time, goods are available on the market but there is very little money in circulation. Those who have money seem to be afraid of keeping it in the bank for fear of a repeat of the 2007 to 2008 experience, where their funds were confiscated by government and up to today have not been returned. This has left many people hurting and angry. They would rather keep their monies hidden elsewhere. The vast majority of people are living from hand to mouth and therefore fear for their security and that of their children. I live in fear.”

Public services

A number of issues raised relate to the provision of public services such as housing, health and social welfare. On housing, the authorities’ recent attempt to enforce building standards and remove unauthorised housing, whether for legitimate reasons or not, has resulted in a housing crisis. A respondent in Nkayi postulates that: “The local authority intends to destroy homesteads that are surrounding the growth point. It has been said it’s for the purposes of expansion. But this will create a lot of other issues such as homelessness and destruction of people’s livelihoods. This is exacerbated by resource exploitation by foreign companies.”

A female traditional leader in the Nkayi District highlights that “education is a serious matter in our area as there is very little infrastructure. Many times we have had to rely on well-wishers and local businesspeople to build facilities. It is only recently that the first crèche was built in our area, and it had to be donated by a local politician. The shortage of resources and infrastructure within the area has caused the community to be worried that it is not a good area for our children to learn, due to the absence of learning facilities, and that this will in turn lessen their life chances.”

In Mashonaland East, another respondent says: “The major human security issue where I reside is shelter and housing. Many people were allocated

houses and stands, some in the wetlands and others in areas that were not fully serviced. The problem is that now the local authority is threatening to demolish the houses as they are either on unsuitable or unauthorised land or irregularly built. These are ordinary people who invested their life savings in building homes but are now faced with the threat of homelessness. Some have used their entire life investments to build beautiful and comfortable houses on those stands. They are now threatened by the local authorities with demolition, resulting in homelessness and poverty.”

Related to this housing challenge is the issue of political abuse. “I feel that this housing crisis is triggered by some politicians who, at election times, go out of their way to promise things that they are not really in control of. In the heat of the political moment, they by-pass procedure and we are the ones who bear the brunt at the end of the day. It is really distressing for people to be stressed about shelter and where the next meal will come from and it is shared across Chitungwiza.”

“These are ordinary people who invested their life savings in building homes but are now faced with the threat of homelessness.”

On health care, the secretary to the village head and local farmers’ organisation in another Nkayi ward is concerned for his area: “There is only one hospital in the ward and it is located at the very end. We wish there were clinics to support the hospital that are located centrally so that everyone can access them.” The lack of drinking water compounds health insecurities: “There is only one water pump in the area. This has caused the festering of diseases such as diarrhoea and cholera, which are minor and preventable.” His community is experiencing many water-borne diseases.



In Mutare, Manicaland province, a counsellor talks of how poor health services affect the most vulnerable in society: “I do counselling for orphans in the area who have been left destitute or in the care of elderly grandparents. Most of them lost their parents to HIV/AIDS and now have to head households or go to orphanages. This weighs down on the community as most of these children need to be schooled.” Last but not least are the issues of poverty and corruption: “There is a problem of corrupt local officials who solicit bribes from widows to process their claims. I feel that what drives their behaviour is that the local authority has been failing to pay their salaries for more than six months now and they then have to resort to unscrupulous ways of earning a living.”

Traditional and gender roles

The interviews highlight the sometimes negative effects of traditional or conservative views on human security. On gender roles, some of the interviews illustrate that many men have not as yet accepted equality with women; for many, women must remain subservient to men. The national media often report on women battered regularly by their husbands and some of them are eventually killed. Many women cannot take leadership positions because they believe men are superior to them. Women need to be empowered so that they can claim their rightful place of being equal to men and demand equal treatment and respect for their human dignity. The absence of that recognition should be seen as a human security issue in many communities.

In the Nkayi district, a MDC-T political leader and ward councillor speaks of the problems caused by traditional beliefs in witchcraft. In his community it is “a major source of conflict.” He points out that: “I was once involved in defusing one such incident. The local soccer team which played in the ECLF peace tournament was involved in a conflict with a local entrepreneur over payment for a service. Their failure to pay led to the businessman threatening them with witchcraft and other unspecified action and our Local Peace Committee, of which I am a member, was called upon to quell the situation.” Issues of witchcraft feature very prominently at the chief’s courts. It is illegal in Zimbabwe to accuse or threaten someone with witchcraft but such beliefs continue to prevail and are indeed a human security challenge.

“Out of 33 traditional leaders in the area, only three of us are women.”



REFLECTING ON WOMEN'S SECURITY

Both male and female respondents raised the issue of the role and security of women.

“Our area is still a patriarchal community and women seem to fear to venture into areas of leadership. I think the problem is now psychological as there are no real barriers in their way. We encourage them but maybe culture is a hindrance.”

“Gender is a serious human security factor in the community. Out of 33 traditional leaders in the area, only three of us are women. Men traditionally take us for granted and many are not even pleased that we were made traditional leaders though it has been improving slightly. Such a patriarchal attitude is not good for the dignity of women and it sidelines them in playing an equal role in community development.”

“Women in our area are not responsive to taking up leadership positions. If you are an outsider you might get the wrong impression that women are oppressed or undermined here but that is not the case. For some reason they shy away from taking the lead and prefer to be led by the men. We try very hard to push them to participate in community platforms.”

“There are many instances of violent cases like assault, public nuisance and domestic violence. I feel that some of the issues are to do with endemic disrespect for women. The traditional courts are always inundated with such cases. I also deal with some of the cases personally at home.”

“I work with widows and these are some of the most insecure and vulnerable people in the community. They face a lot of problems in accessing their pensions or those of their deceased spouses. Most of them are elderly and struggle to gather the paperwork. Some struggle to transfer their deceased spouses’ properties into their names. Commercial sex workers are also vulnerable as they are arrested all the time. Even innocent women are arrested in leisure centres for alleged prostitution.”

Security providers and empowerment

In coping with sources of insecurity, Zimbabweans look to the state, to their community and to traditional leadership, with varying expectations and results. On the question as to who people look up to for their security, one female respondent says “The community has tended to provide its own security working with community-based organisations, various non-governmental organisations and local peace committees.” Another interviewee in one of the urban suburbs echoes the same sentiments: “I rely on my community for support. For example, in my community we have what we call neighbourhood watch committees. These work on the protection of inhabitants of my suburb. Unfortunately, the police are not doing a good job in terms of protecting civilians; they abuse people and they delay in responding to crime, which makes people vulnerable. The local authority is not giving my community adequate lighting services, and it is when we experience power cuts that the thieves pounce on innocent people.” Another respondent who expresses distrust in the police says: “they are not an institution that one may turn to, to provide security for an individual. They are more public enemies than people that may be confided in.”

“The community has tended to provide its own security.”

In the absence of a strong security infrastructure provided by the state, community-based human security strategies have emerged, building on traditional roles and networks of faith and community leaders. Although these roles are not without their own challenges, they also present great potential to contribute to human security through their deep-rooted presence in Zimbabwe’s diverse society. The following sections elaborate on the role of traditional leadership and explore the potential of community-based local peace committees.

Traditional leadership

Traditional leaders, today referred to as chiefs, were the rulers and custodians of the land and tradition before colonialism. British colonial rule drastically reduced the powers of the traditional leaders to eliminate traditional forms of leadership and replace it with a ‘modern’ system.

“Some of our subjects feel insecure in their areas especially if they are viewed as hostile to the political persuasion of the local traditional leader.”

This has failed to date as the traditional leadership, particularly the chiefs, continue to wield a great deal of power and influence over all their subjects despite legislation and efforts to reduce it. Over the decades, traditional leaders have insisted on keeping their role as the custodians of the land and the traditions of their people. The attainment of Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980 did not do much to change their status as legislated by the colonial powers. Many Zimbabweans, particularly among rural residents who form the majority of the population, believe that traditional leaders are responsible for the safety of their subjects and must ensure that all their subjects live in peace. Modern political systems have undermined the institution of traditional leaders. One of the few female traditional leaders in Zimbabwe says: “As traditional leaders, we are usually divided along political party lines as a result of interference by political parties in our traditional duties, and many of us find ourselves unable to serve our people objectively. Some of our subjects feel insecure in their areas especially if they are viewed as hostile to the political persuasion of the local traditional leader.” As traditional leaders they are supposed to be non-partisan in order to command the respect of all their subjects in the community. Given the influence traditional leaders wield in their



communities, it is not surprising that the political parties, in particular the ruling party, put a great deal of pressure on leaders to become members and to influence their communities against the other parties. This compromises their impartiality when dealing with all their subjects, thus posing a serious threat to human security.

Nevertheless, the traditional role of these leaders is that of uniting people through conflict resolution at a community level; their justice system is meant to build relationships rather than simply punish the offender. The feeling among some interviewees is that some of the traditional leaders no longer provide human security as was the case in the past. They are deprived of their power to deal with criminal cases and their judicial role is confined to civil cases. This issue is being raised as a human security issue because the chiefs continue to challenge the modern system and wish to have their traditional roles restored. It is also a human security issue when it leads to conflict on the ground when party politics begin to influence the role and activities of the traditional leader.

Although the powers of the chiefs have been reduced, there still remains great potential and opportunity embedded in the institution of traditional leaders insofar as it relates to conflict resolution and community cohesion. These leaders are custodians of decision making at the community level. This potential can be used effectively to build peaceful communities.

Local Peace Committees

The engagement of traditional leaders alongside other forms of leadership at the community level – such as politicians, civil society activists and local authority representatives – has been harnessed in the development of Local Peace Committees (LPCs). These arose from a community outreach and capacity building programme run by the Ecumenical Church Leaders Forum (ECLF). The training methodology, which encompasses Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution and Transformation (CPMRT), speaks to the inner person so that peace begins within an individual. The CPMRT training sessions challenge communities to own the programme and ensure its continuation. The programme has been supported by international and regional partners, as well as some local donors, and has increasingly been highlighted as an important community

“Many people in the area feel that we are marginalised with regards to national development programmes.”



THE CHURCH LEADER

Mkhululi Ncube is a pastor in the Brethren in Christ Church and is based in Gwanda in the Matabeleland South Province.

We are afflicted by drought almost every year in our area. This leads to general hunger and poverty. People are unable to feed their families and to take the children to school because they are unable to earn a livelihood. I think what is required is the construction of dams and boreholes. People in the community also need to be capacitated with agricultural knowledge and expertise. This will also enable the young people to have livelihoods and [make it] difficult for them to be abused by politicians for violent missions.

Gwanda is an area which is populated by various ethnic groups including the Ndebele, the Sotho, Venda, and the Shona people. I usually witness clashes of interests among these groups. Each of these communities wants to assert their authority in their areas where they are influential.

Many people in the area feel that we are marginalised with regards to national development programmes. They feel that because they are from Matabeleland, we do not matter much in the national picture. We have poor road networks and generally we lag behind in development. We hear about loans for youth – we assist our youth to apply but we hardly ever get the loans.

‘infrastructure for peace’ which has the potential of complementing and feeding into the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission.

LPCs are structures established by community members to be responsible for peace within their community. As a practical response to ensure that peace prevails, communities choose members to

constitute a committee. The composition of LPCs varies but includes civil servants, church leaders, traditional leaders, state security sector actors, political party leaders, women, youth and other stakeholders such as organisations operating at the community level. LPCs build peace in their communities through creating dialogue spaces where people engage each other in search of solutions to their challenges. They also facilitate peacebuilding sessions. In some situations, they mediate conflict and act as early warning systems and work towards addressing human security concerns in their areas.

Aaron Chimiti, a member of the Kraal Head’s advisory committee who chairs the ward Local Peace Committee, says the LPCs have helped to keep the Kraal Head’s advisory committee intact. Through the conciliatory work he has been doing, drawing on the skills he acquired from the trainings, he has been able to resolve community conflicts: “It has changed the way we do business in the local traditional court. If it were not for this programme, there are people who could have been expelled from the chief’s advisory committee. I played a conciliatory role to block the expulsion.” Chimiti adds that that he has learned to respect the law through the peacebuilding trainings: “[They] taught me never to take the law into my own hands as I am not a lawyer, a magistrate or other trained officer of the law. People in the community know that I am a trained peacebuilder and I am seconded to most cases that require conciliation in the community.”⁷

A respondent in Chivi reflects on how the LPCs have helped address the challenge of peace: “There have been a lot of violent conflicts between political parties, particularly towards election time. We are only starting to manage it now that we have structures such as the Local Peace Committee. After attending the training, we agreed to form an LPC consisting of members of our community from different backgrounds and political persuasions. It is through our committee that we are now able to manage some conflicts. There are also incidents of domestic violence that we deal with as LPCs as well as traditional courts.” Police in Nkayi have reported a significant reduction of crime and violence since the launch of the programme in the district. The interviewee is an active member of the LPC which was established by the community itself.

Community ‘infrastructures for peace’ have the potential of complementing and feeding into the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission.

Another example is the Mutasa for Peace Committee in Manicaland, which involves various stakeholders across the socio-economic, political and administrative landscape of the Mutasa district. The committee was set up as a purely community initiative to address the specific peace challenges in the community. In recent testimony, Munodawafa Dube of the Zimbabwe Republic Police said that the committee had seen a noticeable change in police records thanks to the LPC’s work on mitigating political conflicts: “The Mutasa for Peace Committee has made our policing work easier. In the run up to the elections last year we hardly got any serious cases of politically motivated violence as compared to previous elections due to the peace work of this committee. The more common cases these days are domestic violence, boundary disputes and public nuisance cases. I think we have reached a point where we can refer some cases to the committee. I urge them to set up a reference desk in a public area. We work very well with them and they never do anything without the involvement of the police.”

A spokesperson from the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare in Mutasa also noted the decrease in injuries caused by politically motivated violence at the district referral hospital: “At the hospitals in the district we had become accustomed to treating people with axes in their heads. We have seen some of the ugliest wounds caused by all sorts of dangerous weapons, mainly due to political violence towards the 2008 elections. This has changed drastically in the community as we have been seeing fewer cases of politically motivated violence. People say that this committee, with members from various parties, has played a role in bringing down the violence.”⁸



Conclusion and recommendations

Human security issues facing many Zimbabweans are multifaceted and ever more complex, as they have economic, socio-political, historical and environmental aspects. Addressing these issues through a national healing and reconciliation approach enables local communities to actively engage and seek solutions alongside authorities and security providers.

While there is no one-size-fits-all solution, strengthening the existing national peacebuilding efforts is one way to address various human security issues, as the integrative and cross-cutting nature of peacebuilding addresses almost all the issues discussed in this report. Recommendations to national policymakers and their partners are as follows:

- **Operationalise the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission** to ensure a nationally-agreed healing and reconciliation process, with particular attention and measures to include marginalised groups such as women, youth, people with disabilities and ethnic minorities.
- **Launch advocacy and sensitising campaigns** not only to ensure consistent and strategic collaborative plans among key stakeholders, but also to inform the general population of current peacebuilding mechanisms and the importance of further collective efforts for peace.
- **Strengthen the peace architecture's building blocks** such as the Local Peace Committees (LPCs). LPCs represent the diversity of their communities and include participants such as civil servants, church leaders, traditional leaders, state security sector actors, political leaders, and most importantly women and youths. Further strengthening community-based conflict resolution forums can positively increase the political participation of all of these groups in their communities.
- **Implement community-based disaster risk management mechanisms** in order to prevent and mitigate the risk of natural and/or manmade disasters in order to build community resilience against potential conflict and shocks. This could be done for instance through the Local Peace Committees.

- **Implement community-based activities** such as income-generation projects to empower vulnerable populations through which the communities can benefit from economic empowerment as well as cohesion-building.
- **Increase collaboration between civil society, faith-based organisations, development partners and government departments** around human security issues.

LPCs represent the diversity of their communities; Further strengthening community-based conflict resolution forums can positively increase the political participation of all groups in their communities.

The authors work for the **Ecumenical Church Leaders Forum (ECLF)**, which is a grouping of Christian leaders from Zimbabwe's church umbrella bodies that brings together a variety of church leaders at all levels, both clergy and lay, male and female from all denominations. ECLF's mission is to contribute towards the creation and sustenance of a peaceful, just and democratic nation by capacitating and empowering the entire Church leadership for peacebuilding through dialogue and constructive engagement with the motto 'Church and community working together for peace'. ECLF is a member of the Southern Africa network of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC).

A Methodology for Human Security

Gabriëlla Vogelaar

If applied consistently with its underlying principles, methodology can pave the way towards operationalising human security from a theoretical framework towards a practical approach.


It is worthwhile to look more closely at the ‘how’ of applying the human security approach towards the local and individual level. Drawing from the experiences of producing this publication, this section reflects on the relevance of a methodology for human security. First, a brief description of the process to develop this publication is provided, including our approach to developing a common yet flexible method to capture the individual experiences of people in all the featured countries.

In the second section, the authors and the organisations involved share how they conducted the interviews, and some of the challenges they faced in their respective contexts. Their observations regarding methodology are revealing about the levels of fear associated with discussing ‘security’ or human security issues. It shows that human security concerns are also part of the process, and not merely an outcome.


In the third section, we elaborate on why a focus on methodologies for human security is important. It has the potential to lead to a better understanding of how to operationalise the human security approach in research, policy and practice.

The range of different types of security, from freedom from fear to freedom from want and freedom from indignity, are unique to each individual and context. This publication does not aim to provide a comprehensive overview of all the human security threats in the featured countries, nor does it attempt to describe all the country facts. It tries to build on the existing efforts of others and on the experience of the participating organisations. Given the flexible approach, the sample size and limited scale, the findings of these studies cannot be interpreted as representative. Instead, it aims to reflect a snapshot of lived experiences of insecurity, and to inform recommendations from a civil society perspective, which can counter-balance dominant top-down narratives.

A small number of statistics and figures were featured in the country chapters to relate to the relevant themes and connect the stories to existing larger scale indexes and quantitative data. However, it should be noted that statistics are also subject to interpretation and inaccuracies, and, in some cases, contested between the discordant actors. They were used here only as background information.



3



Our approach and process

To better understand how people experience human security, and perceptions of empowerment and protection, we asked six GPPAC member civil society organisations in different countries to conduct a small-scale study in each of their contexts. Together with several authors we formed an editorial board to guide peer review and support the editors with input on content.

A ‘terms of reference’ was developed in collaboration with the editorial board, to guide the overall process, including methods, objectives and style for each study. It included guidelines from the 2009 UN Human Security Unit’s Handbook on Human Security, which addresses issues of planning and design as related to the human security approach. In addition to the terms

Observations regarding the process of interviews and methodology were insightful in their own right about the level of fear associated with discussing ‘security’ or human security issues.

of reference, participating members were also provided with a template for consent forms for participants. The purpose of the consent forms was to ensure that any name attribution or use of photographic material in this publication was done only with explicit permission of the participant. Participants could also choose to only show their name and not their picture. Those who preferred to remain anonymous have been featured without any associations. Therefore, all the persons that are featured by name or picture in this publication have given their consent. Finally, the terms of reference also included a template – to be adapted and translated by participating organisations as appropriate – describing the concept of human

security and explaining the purpose of the project to interviewees and focus group participants.

Variations in method and data collection

For each country study, authors and their organisations followed the guidelines as set out in the terms of reference to ensure a level of consistency. These guidelines allowed flexibility for them to choose the specific methods of interviewing and gathering information as suitable to the local contexts and to the type of expertise and approach of the respective organisations. It is important to allow human security concepts to be locally defined and realised.

The data collection methods used were mainly face-to-face interviews and focus groups, supported by survey-style questions in writing or by phone. Sample selection was done in different ways, including group discussions and workshops, with snowball sampling and street interviews. For the composition of the sample, the aim was to have a diverse demographic in terms of age, gender, and employment status, and including minority groups. It was an attempt to capture how different sources of insecurity interact, how it is experienced by different segments of society and what the implications are for communities.

While guidance was provided on open-ended interview questions, the actual questions posed were adapted to the context and circumstance of the interviews. To understand how elements of protection and empowerment are manifested, people were asked not only about their perception of safety and threats to their security, but also about their security providers and their coping strategies to deal with insecurities. The prioritisation of issues as presented in the chapters is based on outcome of the interviews, not by a predetermined set of indicators or issues. Most of the interviews were conducted in different periods for each country, between December 2013 and June 2014.

Country chapters and security concerns


This section describes how the authors gathered information in each of the countries. Most based their analysis on personal accounts described in interviews and focus groups, aiming for a balanced demographic composition, often combining accounts of community or civil society leaders with those of ‘ordinary’ citizens.

In some countries, prevailing human security concerns affected the ability to gather diverse and representative accounts. From the inputs we received from our contributors, we found that their observations regarding the process of interviews and methodology were insightful in their own right about the level of fear associated with discussing ‘security’ or human security issues.

We felt it pertinent to bring that out in this section, as it shows that human security concerns were part of the process, and not merely an outcome. This underscores the importance of a process that is informed by human security principles. In the following sub-sections, the authors described the methods used in their respective country chapters. In some cases, the subject matter was deemed too sensitive to link to a specific country, and are discussed separately below. The sections below are presented by the authors themselves.

Afghanistan


A series of stories were collected from Kabul, Nangarhar, Laghman, Kandahar, and Kunduz provinces to form a narrative of how locals view human security in Afghanistan. Face to face interviews, off-the-street interviews and telephonic surveys were conducted. Twenty-three interviews were conducted with representation from the Pashtun, Hazara, and Tajik ethnic communities. While the Afghanistan Justice Organisation tried to balance the gender representation by incorporating the participation of women in street interviews, face-to-face conversations and telephonic surveys, only seven women were interviewed for the chapter. This is often a challenge faced by researchers in Afghanistan because societal sensitivities and pressure prevent women from participating. As acknowledged in the chapter’s title, the interviewees were predominantly from an urban setting, mostly from Kabul, and should therefore not be understood as representative of Afghanistan’s vast rural population. Nevertheless,



AJO interview in Kabul

The purpose of the interviews was to give people a chance to talk about what is most important to them.

a focus on urban areas, where many residents originate from other provinces and rural areas, contributed to revealing the urban-rural divide in the country.



MEND focus group in Ramallah, OPT

The data collection methods used, were mainly face-to-face interviews and focus groups, supported by survey-style questions in writing or by phone.

The purpose of the interviews was to give people a chance to talk about what is most important to them, to share their perspectives or stories, and to allow them to freely state how they define human security. They were asked a series of questions which tried to identify the issues they saw as main contributors to their insecurity, where they felt these issues originated, which issues are the most important in driving their insecurity and how that played out in their daily lives. In contrast, they were also asked to identify local issues that contributed to their sense of security and to highlight which ones they considered most important and why. Additionally, interviewees were also asked if they felt that one group of people or ethnicity was affected by them more than others, and why.

Mexico

This chapter was based on in-depth interviews and/or conversations with stakeholders from different sectors, and an analysis of stakeholder and conflict assessments carried out by Centro

de Colaboración Cívica (CCC), which is part of several international peacebuilding networks. The interviews/conversations were conducted between December 2013 and February 2014 by the authors. All interviews were conducted in Spanish and translated by the authors. When explicitly permitted by the interviewees, we have used their real names and personal information.

While having a limited sample, it is important to note that we intentionally selected the interviewees, to cover the different angles of the security and human rights situation in Mexico. Interviewees include an attorney that has litigated human rights cases in the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights; members of several nongovernmental organisations that promote the use of bikes as a means to recover public space in northern Mexico; a conflict transformation professional close to indigenous rights and other social movements; a university professor and social activist from Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua – one of Mexico's most violent cities; and a psychologist working with victims of violence and human rights abuses.

In addition, the key findings of stakeholder and conflict assessments carried out by CCC over the past two years were integrated to identify the primary concerns regarding human insecurity. These assessments cover the topics that the interviewees linked to human security. We considered it pertinent to include the findings of these assessments because all of them are based either on in-depth personal interviews, sectorial focus groups, and/or multi stakeholder dialogue sessions.

Occupied Palestinian Territory

Focus groups were organised in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza, with around six female and six male participants in each group. The participants came from a variety of backgrounds: cities, villages, and refugee camps spread across different geographical areas. Twelve additional interviews were conducted with individuals from Jerusalem and the West Bank, and two in Gaza. There were almost 70 participants in total.

It is a reflection of the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory that it was logistically impossible to hold focus groups that united Palestinians from East Jerusalem, the West Bank and

Gaza. The Palestinian people are so fragmented that many are not even aware that they share the same concerns.

While we filmed the groups in the West Bank and Jerusalem and received detailed quotes from them, we only obtained summaries of the work of the three focus groups in Gaza. There were very high levels of fear connected with any kind of discussion on security among the people from Gaza. People were afraid they might lose their income or their slight chance of obtaining a permit to leave the strip, due to the occupation. They need to have permits from the Israeli side to travel between Gaza and West Bank. For example, a facilitator told us: "Sorry for my late answer, it was really very hard to find people from Gaza to participate in the focus group for many reasons. They were afraid to talk about any case [because they think speaking about it could cause problems due to Hamas and because] they are afraid of the [Israeli] occupation. Also, some of them are working with the Palestinian Authority [so they do not want to participate]." A doctor, originally from Gaza, also tried on our behalf to interview some of the people who had come from Gaza to the West Bank for medical treatment in a hospital in Nablus. He told us, "I'm really sorry, I tried my best. I went to the Nablus Alnajah Hospital to find people who can talk but they refused. I even asked my colleagues in Gaza to do it but they refused."

Due to these difficulties regarding Gaza, we had to work with summaries of the three focus groups that were organised there, and held additional interviews with an NGO worker and with a psychiatrist. Very few participants were willing to share personal stories, worried that doing so would have implications for their families if certain people found out that they had been critical of the situation in Gaza. This in itself speaks volumes regarding the possibility of freedom to live without fear in Gaza.


The methodology thus reflects some of the difficulties and divisions and absence of human security for Palestinians, as well as the higher sense of fear in Gaza as compared to the other areas. There are fears of retaliation if people speak openly about security issues.

The Philippines

The respondents identified were primarily opinion leaders from the community, NGO, CSO and


network levels who were involved in development and peace advocacy in the region. They represent Mindanao's tri-people perspectives of the native Indigenous Peoples, the Moros (Islamised IPs), and Christian Filipino settlers from other regions, primarily through the work that they do in their communities. They were interviewed individually and as a group. The IP leaders including the Datus (Indigenous People's traditional leaders) wished to remain anonymous for safety reasons.

In addition, the analysis and recommendations are based on countless public gatherings, civil society and community meetings facilitated by Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID) in our ongoing work for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Notably, IID's Human Security and Peacebuilding Programme involves partnership building, policy



Capturing Palestinian perspectives on human security

Focus groups were organised in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza.



advocacy, awareness raising, multi-stakeholder dialogues and direct actions. These are done in partnership with grassroots communities, civil society organisations and networks, non-state actors, and multilateral and state bodies. Within and across these contexts, core issues such as armed conflict, impunity, culture, ethnicity and identity-based marginalisation, culture of peace, citizens' participation, peace process, and people-centred security are addressed.

Ukraine

A total of 71 people were interviewed in two culturally and geographically distinct localities: Kyiv, the capital city of Ukraine, with a population that together with the commuters and incoming labour migrants is an estimated 4 million, and Simferopol, the administrative centre of Ukraine's southernmost region of the Crimea with a population of slightly below 400,000. Fifty-five people were interviewed in Kyiv and sixteen in Simferopol. The interview samples are based on the best local demographic estimates available for both research sites, and, at least in the case of Kyiv, were also deemed to be proportionally representative. Interviews included three questions:



1. What are the situations that could happen in Kyiv/ Simferopol that you would call insecure?
2. Did any such situation ever happen to you, your friends, people you know?
3. Whom can you turn to for help in such situations?

The analysis of this information involved grouping the responses into the main categories of issues that people raised, and may be read as a collective statement on what people fear, how they cope and the adequacy of the state. On issues related to poverty, the authors point out that both Kyiv and Simferopol have better employment and income opportunities than other areas of the country. To assess the relevance of freedom from want as a human security factor in Ukraine in general, specific research would need to be conducted in other geographic areas with higher levels of poverty such as Ternopil, Rivne, Sumy regions, and Northern Crimea.

Zimbabwe

The Ecumenical Church Leaders Forum (ECLF) team collected the data through in-depth interviews with community individuals. The interviewees were selected on the basis of their positions of leadership and influence in the community, to provide insights on the views of community members. A total of 153 people were interviewed. To guarantee a variety of responses and to capture the different experiences, the respondents were selected amongst both employed and unemployed people (with different employment sectors represented). Both consideration of gender and age were taken on board. Interviewees included ordinary members of the community, community leaders, chairpersons of residence associations, as well as traditional leaders, village heads, church leaders, political leaders, chaplains, peacebuilders, and government workers amongst others. To avoid sensitivities and ensure that participants felt free to share their views, the ECLF team chose to conduct direct interviews – instead of having focus group discussions – starting by building confidence and trust with the participants. Due to sensitivities, the research team met some challenges in accessing the interviewees, some refusing to have their picture taken, or to sign the consent forms, while others wanted their testimonies to remain anonymous. It was therefore decided that the identity of the interviewees will be protected in this report.

Before starting the field interview research, it was critical that the ECLF team had a common understanding of human security before delving into an in-depth discussion on the subject. A number of areas which needed investigation

regarding human security were identified. The concept of human security was understood as a broad issue and not limited to violence or politics or food security only. With this background in mind, interviewees were encouraged to explain what they consider human insecurity factors, be it at home, at their workplaces, or in the wider community, both collectively and individually.


Challenges faced by the interviewers

Practical challenges were often related to people's sense of insecurity, and in some cases, a direct result of them. Specific issues that were sensitive in some contexts were ethnicity, political parties, and historical references to conflict dynamics, which could not be mentioned in some of the country chapters as such. It is important to be aware of the need to be especially careful when working with local organisations in this regard. From this point of view, the studies and recommendations are primarily aimed at supporting the participating organisations to use human security as an entry point for 'insider strategies' for constructive dialogue, to help them change things from within their respective contexts.

The degree to which people were comfortable to talk about security varied, also influencing the methods and processes to gather the results. The process revealed the negative connotations with the word 'security' and misunderstandings about the purpose of the study. Evidently, the term 'human security' needs more explanation and has not yet 'landed' at the local level. This is relevant because the idea of thinking beyond traditional security paradigms can encourage people to tackle their problems differently, and deal with security issues through more collective and empowered responses. Furthermore, the issue of translations of the term into local languages and the possible change in meaning is often not considered. For instance, in Latin America, the term citizens' security is a more widely used concept which is in line with, but not strictly the same, as human security.

Specific issues that were sensitive in some contexts were ethnicity, political parties, and historical references to conflict dynamics.

To enable these discussions, it was important to create an environment where people felt they could safely express themselves, which civil society organisations that are rooted in local communities are often well-placed to do, as trust is key. This process can be seen as also indirectly contributing to awareness-raising on human security. This suggests that safe spaces are needed to debate human security issues, while ensuring the relevance of the concept in the specific context. These challenges highlight the need for further investment into human security methodologies.



A case for human security methodology

Methodology challenges us to consider our basic assumptions about what we study and the techniques adopted by the researcher. The underlying methods and assumptions of the human security approach influence their outcome and effect. Methodology is important as it can to a certain degree address the critique on human security as too all-encompassing and vague to be put into practice.

There has been a lack of attention on the methodological implications of the shift from traditional notions of security, to one that is localised and focused on the individual. In their recent article on this very issue, Mary Martin and Denisa Kostovicova assert that, “while critical thinking about security has sought to change understandings and produce new analytical perspectives, it has relied largely on methods of inquiry and decision-making which are rooted in established conventions about the nature of security, its objects and goals.” A critical first step towards making the concept useful is therefore to incorporate this referent shift into the methodology and design of human security efforts and initiatives. Methodology should be considered carefully as a way to give meaning to the human security approach in processes that influence policy and practice.

Subjectivity

Ideally, a study would combine both qualitative and quantitative methods and analysis. However, this is not without its own challenges, and there is no ‘perfect’ model. There are several different types of human security methodology, based on very narrowly chosen indicators or a broader set of threats. The studies featured in this publication were mainly based on qualitative approaches, in order to focus on capturing individual experiences of a broad set of threats and contributors to security. According to Martin and Kostovicova, qualitative approaches “capture both the breadth and depth of insecurities experienced ‘on the ground’, in contrast to data collection carried out by surveys.” While this is also subject to a degree of political and cultural bias of the interviewers, some argue that ‘geographically referenced determinants’ are the most useful way of dealing with human security methodology challenges. As individual experiences are subjective, perceptions may at times not correspond to more quantitative or ‘hard’ data. However, perceptions are intrinsic to understanding

people’s experienced level of freedom from fear or freedom from want – which underpin notions of human security. ‘Feeling’ secure is important in this regard, as it affects communities’ sense of empowerment or disempowerment.

Bottom up, context specific

While proponents of the human security approach agree that a bottom up, localised approach is important and can be more effective, it is often not sufficiently addressed in the development of strategies or methods. This results in a lack of local ownership in the process. Individuals and local populations are more than the passive referent object of security; rather, they should be active agents of efforts to improve human security in their respective contexts. This is also related to the notion of empowerment, as human security should

Methodology should be considered carefully as a way to give meaning to the human security approach in processes that influence policy and practice.

reinforce peoples’ ability to act on their own behalf. Consulting local researchers after a process is already in place is not the same as working together on equal terms in the design of the research or in the drafting of policy and advocacy strategies.

Relevance for practitioners and policymakers

To adequately measure insecurity at the local level, the notion of human security measurement must be (re-)defined, time and again, by local actors themselves. Applying a human security lens to processes and methodology is important to reach a better understanding and locating it in the field. It influences choices, approaches and

To increase the policy relevance, new methods would require moving towards the subnational level to capture and monitor threats to human security which are manifested locally.

relevant resources that inform policy responses. In other words, when research or projects on human security are developed on assumptions which are still based on traditional notions of security, how can they effectively contribute to the applicability of human security in practice? That said, it remains challenging to devise practices and policies that are consistent with human security principles without it being superficial. It needs to be highlighted in the international security discourse that this shift is essential to operationalise the concept, if it is going to effectively drive policy. To increase the policy relevance, new methods would require moving towards the subnational level to capture and monitor threats to human security which are manifested locally. It can be an important way of ensuring that human security is meaningful beyond the global policy level and in academic circles.

As argued by some, human security is both a means and an end. Even with human security principles applied to methods and processes, it comes with its own challenges. Nevertheless, if applied consistently with its underlying principles, methodology can pave the way towards operationalising human security from a theoretical framework towards a practical approach.

Human Security and the Citizen-State Relationship

Kristen Wall

People interviewed in the six diverse contexts presented in this publication give a picture of human security from the ground up. Respondents demonstrate an acute awareness of the ways various aspects of security are interrelated. Human security is described as a subjective experience with economic, health, environmental, food, personal, community, and political dimensions. The stories offer insights into the key role of the state in ensuring individual security through public goods and the rule of law. They also demonstrate how states can undermine human security through weak capacity, corruption, and abusive behaviour. Local human security strategies demonstrate that people-powered initiatives are needed to complement and transform the role of the state. The citizen-state relationship emerges as a primary tool and indicator of human security, where context-specific protection and empowerment strategies go hand in hand.

Human security is not only an outcome but a process of dialogue and relationship-building.


The first part of this chapter is rich in context. Across the diverse regions portrayed, people paint a paradoxical picture of the state as both a main provider of security and a key source of insecurity. While governance contexts vary greatly, the case studies highlight the necessity of rule of law in protecting people from state predation, including corruption and abusive or negligent security forces. They also demonstrate the importance of collective action and social movements in influencing security policy, and the important role that knowledge of human and civic rights plays in empowering civilians to protect themselves. Throughout these stories, intangible factors such as cultural integrity, values and social trust hold an essential place in individual experiences of security.

The second part of the chapter examines the implications of these findings for the further development and use of human security as a tool for conflict prevention. Human insecurity is heightened in situations where the state is absent, weak, or unaccountable to its citizens. The stories presented demonstrate that human security is not only an outcome but a process of dialogue and


relationship-building, both among social groups and between people and governing authorities. Human security strategies are those that transform the social contract towards greater state responsiveness, accountability and representation on the one hand, and increased citizen empowerment and participation on the other.

The chapter concludes by exploring avenues for ‘scaling up’ human security approaches, by examining two global security processes: the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (and related resolutions), and the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. Though still in development, these initiatives can serve as models for designing future human security policies, and could themselves benefit from a more explicit focus on human security.

Finally, it is necessary to consider the challenges, limitations and unintended consequences of a human security approach. This includes the challenge of reconciling diverse priorities and individual perceptions of conflict contexts, and the sensitive question of the role of the military and security forces in ensuring human security.



4



People's perspectives on human security

Holistic experiences of security

Across contexts as different as Afghanistan, Zimbabwe, and the Philippines, people's perspectives on security show complex, diverse understandings of human security that encompass far more than survival or freedom from fear. Respondents view their security and the security of their communities as a multi-faceted, interrelated experience that includes physical safety, access to education, livelihood, government protection, health care, the right to residence, and development. At the same time, intangible factors such as trust in others, being treated with dignity, and protection of cultural identity and community are just as integral to perceptions of security. The interviews clearly reflect the broader notion of human security adopted by the UN in 2012, encompassing freedom from want, freedom from fear, and freedom to live in dignity.

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Environmental security

Environmental insecurity threatens individual survival and economic opportunities. In Zimbabwe, the government's inability to address water shortages and support development in rural areas leads to economic insecurity and endangers educational rights, according to a church leader: "[Due to the drought] people are unable to feed their families and take the children to school because they are unable to earn a livelihood [...] what is required is the construction of dams and boreholes." In the West Bank, barriers to water and land access fuel economic insecurity, as a respondent in Jericho explains: "Farmers in areas north of Jericho buy water from Israel at a high price despite the presence of water on their land, as they are banned by Israel from digging artesian

wells – [due to the water scarcity] the crops are beginning to suffer." Natural resources are a determinant of economic opportunities, which in turn affect many other dimensions of human security.

Economic and political security

Economic insecurity is both a result and a cause of other forms of insecurity, and is intimately linked with political security. One shop owner in Kabul clearly equates his education and the opportunity to run his own business with increased security: "Education and employment have put me in a position to fight for my rights." In Zimbabwe's Matabeleland, respondents are concerned with a lack of development that they see as linked to their political marginalisation and the legacy of severe historic conflict that still feeds community tensions. A Filipino respondent draws the connection between political power, economic opportunity, and security by pointing to the lack of opportunities of poor people to change their fate, perpetuating an overall sense of insecurity in society. Poverty, political marginalisation, and insecurity go hand in hand.

Youth and employment

Many respondents see economic opportunity for others as an important element of security. They describe work as an important way to empower vulnerable people, particularly youth, who otherwise could be recruited for violent causes or become socially disruptive. A respondent in Mexico links the violence in Ciudad Juárez to a lack of opportunities for youth. A respondent in Zimbabwe feels that education and livelihoods of young people is key as it "becomes difficult for them to be abused by politicians for violent missions." Part of respondents' emphasis on work is the perception that it keeps people busy and less likely to engage in violence. An interviewee in Kabul is relieved that "everybody is so busy with their own work, that they do not interfere or disrupt the lives of others." However, in other areas of Afghanistan, "unemployment has pushed people to join the insurgency." In Ukraine, one mother laments the lack of economic opportunities for her son: "The state doesn't provide for our kids."

Cultural norms:

source of protection or insecurity?

Cultural values are less tangible factors seen across regions as influencing personal and community

Poverty, political marginalisation, and insecurity go hand in hand.

security. Some indigenous peoples (IP) leaders in Mindanao trace the loss of their traditional world view with greater intertribal conflict. In contrast, many Afghan respondents see cultural norms as a source of insecurity and refer to 'old ways of thinking' and illiteracy as causes of discrimination and violence against minorities and women in particular. A housewife in Kabul describes the discrimination against girls and women, violence against women and the constant violations of women's rights as "issues that originate from lack of opportunities for youth, elders' way of thinking, and illiterate people."

Symbolic disrespect of cultural norms is a source of community insecurity. A respondent from the West Bank recounts the humiliation he felt seeing a young Muslim woman remove her body covering, or *jilbab*, in public at an Israeli checkpoint. In Crimea, an elderly communist expresses his distress at demonstrations of Ukrainian nationalists at the graves of Russian veterans of World War II: "How could the state and the government allow the fascists to march by our holy places? Confrontation is brewing." These stories demonstrate the ways that cultural humiliation can foster greater conflict and generate future insecurity. People's experiences of security encompass both tangible and intangible dimensions.

Women's security

Women's security emerges as a distinct problem with similar characteristics across the six diverse contexts featured. Direct violence against women often exists within a larger cultural context in which a lack of social respect and equality reduces women's freedom of movement, economic and educational opportunities, political participation, and recourse to justice. In Zimbabwe's Matabeleland, a women's rights activist highlights the economic vulnerability of women in accessing pensions or in exercising their inheritance


rights, as well as the discrimination felt as "even innocent women are arrested in leisure centres for alleged loitering for prostitution." In Mexico, the phenomenon of femicide, the deliberate murder of women, is one of the more extreme examples of the chilling security threats women face. Cultural norms in many societies inherently undermine women's human security.

Traditional security providers – law enforcement, their communities, and their families – often do not address the specific security threats faced by women, and in too many cases contribute to women's victimisation and deny them avenues of recourse or self-protection. One woman in Afghanistan highlights the security dilemma she and other women face: "Those who are supposed to ensure our security like the government and police turn out to be the ones who jeopardise it." In East Jerusalem, a Palestinian nurse explains that in cases of domestic violence, women are discouraged from going to the police, as the community tries to protect men from Israeli arrest. Ensuring the security of the community can compromise the security of women. In these and other examples, women face human security threats that are uniquely related to their social inequality, exposing them to greater security threats and simultaneously limiting their sources of addressing them.

Human security and the state

While human security emphasises the security of the individual, people's views of security confirm that the state plays a central role in providing their security. Many of those interviewed see provision of public goods and the rule of law as the state's greatest contributions to their security, rather than referring to state military strength as protection. Rule of law and public goods affect political rights, cultural preservation, economic opportunity, environmental access, and health and food safety.

While citizens highlight the importance of the state as a main provider of security, they often do so in the context of describing the state's failure to live up to its responsibilities. The state can foster insecurity indirectly, through its inability to provide necessary public services such as education, water, or policing against crime. It can also directly threaten civilian security through military campaigns, predatory policing, or discrimination against its own citizens. Inadequate policing or prosecutorial power, whether due to incompetence, corruption, or the



politicisation of security instruments, leaves citizens vulnerable to violence from non-state actors or the state itself.

The rule of law protects citizens against external threats, such as organised and petty crime, and against internal threats from the arbitrary use of state power against its own citizens.

People's experiences of the state vary considerably according to the state's capacity and structure, and the identity and histories of communities living under it. The following section outlines four types of governance contexts reflected in the respondent stories: a newly formed democratic constitutional system, transitional states, indigenous communities within states, and statelessness. In each of these contexts, we see the paradoxical role of the state in both ensuring and undermining human security.

A newly formed democratic constitutional system: Afghanistan

The importance of an existing state and justice system is most evident in Afghanistan, where many respondents refer to the newly established democratic constitutional system and functioning government as an important source of security. As an NGO worker in Kabul notes, "The factor that contributes to my sense of security is the presence of a government, even if it's weak. A few years ago we didn't even have a government." Specifically, the legal system is seen as an important guarantor of security – while the courts and police are unreliably effective or protective, their presence contributes to a sense of security.

The new democratic constitutional system exists alongside a political order that many respondents see as a source of insecurity. Many citizens express scepticism that political leaders or security forces

are serving the population, referring to self-interest and political dynamics. The contrast between the security derived from a system of law versus the insecurity from unaccountable leaders and weak governance was most clearly stated by a respondent in Kabul who felt that: "The current government is the most important driver of my insecurity because it is a collection of warlords. I fear this country will go back to the old times. But the presence of a system in Afghanistan makes me feel secure [...] now there is a system in place for everything even though it doesn't work." While the presence of a new system is better than a total lack of governance, its incomplete application is a source of insecurity.

The ability of the government to provide protection against direct violence remains a key source of citizen security or insecurity. Those who do not feel protected by the government will seek physical protection where they can find it. According to another respondent, people were often heard saying that life under the Taliban regime, though it was difficult, was physically safer.

Citizens in Afghanistan highlight the central role that the existence of a state plays in their experiences of security. Most essentially, citizens refer to the rule of law and provision of physical protection as the basis for their perceptions of security or insecurity. When political leaders and security forces are not accountable to the law, ordinary people are more vulnerable.

Rule of law: Ukraine and Mexico

In Ukraine^a and Mexico, two states with a history of one-party rule, people's concerns about insecurity stem largely from a perceived lack of state ability or political will to establish and enforce the rule of law. The rule of law protects citizens against external threats, such as organised and petty crime, and against internal threats from the arbitrary use of state power against its own citizens.

In Ukraine, respondents in late 2013 described weak rule of law as a key source of insecurity. A lack of police accountability resulted in lax enforcement of laws, impunity, and rising crime. A majority of Kyiv respondents reported high crime

rates as the biggest source of insecurity. Police were not seen as sources of protection – instead, citizens felt vulnerable to police abuse of state power and saw police as threats to security rather than as protectors. With security forces unaccountable to citizens or the law, the state was at best negligent and at worst a predator.

Corruption undermined the legal system and deepened insecurity. In place of a predictable system of rules and their enforcement, the state acted in ways that were perceived as arbitrary and personality-dependent: "When you see people wearing uniforms, you *a priori* perceive them as a [source] of danger. You don't know what to expect from them." As a result, citizens had very low trust in state institutions, and fell back on themselves and their personal networks for security. In some cases, citizens had withdrawn all social trust: "Count on yourself. That's all."

While many Ukrainian respondents seemed to express resignation in the low performance of the state, some respondents believed the state's duty was to provide security. One respondent explicitly called for regime change, which is indicative of the mass unrest in Kyiv at the time. While the state was maligned as a source of insecurity, the expectation that it should provide security still prevailed.

In Mexico, respondents similarly describe a state in which weak and corrupt law enforcement and justice systems have resulted in citizen insecurity and violence perpetrated by both non-state and state actors. The weakness of the justice system and law enforcement capacities, compounded by corruption and collusion of the state apparatus in illegal activities, leaves the state unable to protect citizens against the twofold threat of drug cartels or predatory state behaviour.

Insecurities resulting from the weak rule of law intensified when the Mexican government initiated a militarised campaign to stop drug violence in 2006. Devastating violence against citizens grew exponentially. According to an interviewee of Nuevo León in northern Mexico, "[a militarised approach] led to more fear and the suppression of activities in the public space." With the rule of law already weak, the militarisation of the conflict left citizens with few avenues for state protection or redress.

A citizen security approach developed by civil society in collaboration with government has proven more effective in protecting citizens from violence. By aiming to strengthen the accountability of local officials to their communities, many of the reforms that have been instituted to address the violence have focused on rule of law reforms. This has included reform of the legal framework, the judicial system, and strengthening law enforcement mechanisms. Strengthening citizen voices in security policymaking helped to demilitarise the conflict in Mexico, increasing human security.


In both Ukraine and Mexico, the absence of state services and state protection has left citizens vulnerable to violence from crime, and the impunity and negligence of police forces and the ineffectiveness of the justice system are also significant threats to security. Citizens' efforts to develop greater security involve strengthening the rule of law and making the state more accountable and responsive to citizens.

Strengthening citizen voices in security policymaking helped to demilitarise the conflict in Mexico, increasing human security.

Indigenous societies and the state: the Philippines and Zimbabwe

In Mindanao, the Philippines, and Zimbabwe, the existence of traditional tribes presents a different relationship between the rule of law and human security. The role of the state vis-à-vis indigenous governance structures is complex and simultaneously a driver of conflict as well as a potential source of security. In traditional societies, establishing contemporary rule of law can impose a foreign and sometimes hostile system of governance that complicates or destroys traditional customs and identities. Yet if used to carve out legal space for traditional governance structures and leadership within the state, it can be a source of community security.

^a Interviews were conducted in Kyiv and the Crimean capital of Simferopol in the period preceding and during escalating street protests that resulted in the removal of Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich.



Rule of law can undermine cultural integrity and the freedom to dignity or community security if imposed on traditional cultures. But if it is used to protect traditional values and governance structures, it has the potential to be a source of human security.

IPs characterise the state as a negligent or destructive force that encroaches on their land and endangers community members. The Philippine government has not adequately acknowledged tribal leadership, but instead appoints its own IP representatives who are not seen by IPs as authentic or legitimate. Lack of authentic representation in the Philippine state has increased the vulnerability

of IPs and is a threat to their cultural identity and dignity. IP leaders have sought to engage the legal process through the Indigenous People's Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997, as a way to balance preservation of their own governance structures within the rule of law. While IPs seek representation in the state, they uniquely request state recognition and inclusion of their own distinct governance structures and traditional territorial rights.

By contrast, the Moros have achieved fuller governance autonomy through the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro, and expect to develop their own culturally derived systems of governance. While the Moros have gained greater cultural representation through the peace process, the security of IPs in the same region is less assured. IP leaders fear that IPRA will not be implemented under Moro governance. Both communities seek culturally congruent systems of governance, and express the need for the Philippine state to enforce the implementation of laws that preserve order and grant greater cultural autonomy and protection.

In Zimbabwe, ancestral leadership structures continue to play a significant role in rural life. Traditional courts take community violence cases, dispensing justice in a way that is meant to build and repair social relationships rather than punish offenders. The chiefs and village heads respond to community grievances such as domestic violence, lack of access to healthcare, food insecurity, and health concerns. Violent conflict in the recent past has left a legacy that traditional leaders must address: "The tension between the [Shona and the Ndebele tribes] has been very intense with [the Shona] continuing to vie for supremacy in their spaces of influence." Security in traditional communities is at risk from political conflicts that trace their roots back to the colonial era and Zimbabwe's war of independence.

Traditional leaders have historically been impartial and expected to serve all of the people in their area. However, they have been heavily courted by political parties for their influence and some have been co-opted by political interests. One traditional leader explains that: "Some of our subjects feel insecure if they are viewed as hostile to the political persuasion of the local traditional leader." Politicised traditional leadership creates unrest and provokes grievances over unequal treatment at the grassroots

level. Political polarisation has negatively influenced traditional sources of community governance.

For indigenous cultures, the role of the state is complex. The state may carry the legacy of colonial era practices and social divisions that continue historic repression or marginalisation of indigenous groups. A lack of indigenous influence on state behaviour or the co-optation of traditional leaders can leave traditional communities vulnerable to state violence and exploitation from commercial actors. Rule of law can undermine cultural integrity and the freedom to dignity or community security if imposed on traditional cultures. But if it is used to protect traditional values and governance structures, it has the potential to be a source of human security.

Insecurity is heightened for a population when they lack a state that legally or functionally represents them.


Without a state: the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Insecurity is heightened for a population when they lack a state that legally or functionally represents them. Extended military occupation^b of Palestinian territories has meant that generations of Palestinians have lived without state representation or protection. Instead, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are governed by Israeli military law, with some local governance provided by the Palestinian Authority and Hamas respectively, while Palestinians living in East Jerusalem^c are 'permanent

residents' of Israel. In theory, these territories are also governed by international humanitarian law (IHL), but in practice, international rule of law is weak and provides little protection and few operational mechanisms to which Palestinian individuals can appeal. Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem suffer from an overwhelming list of insecurities. These can be attributed in large part to a lack of international capacity to enforce international law under the Israeli occupation, and the occupation's preclusion of a sovereign Palestinian state capable of promulgating and enforcing domestic rule of law.

Violations of international law create multiple experiences of insecurity. In the West Bank, the continued building of Israeli settlements, which violate IHL prohibitions against settling occupied territory, limit access to land and water and directly endanger Palestinian livelihoods. Periodic Israeli military action compounds the sense of insecurity. In Gaza, even before direct hostilities in 2014, the closure of borders and naval blockade had diminished many aspects of human security, chief among them economic opportunity. The blockade has made medical care difficult to obtain, and daily electricity cuts, a lack of clean water, and poor health care facilities compromise civilian health. The blockade limits freedom of movement, cutting off Gazans from their families and cultural peers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. In East Jerusalem, Palestinians' permanent resident status can be revoked and their homes demolished, leaving them stateless or homeless.

As a result of the ongoing occupation and internal political divisions, Palestinian territories have been unable or unwilling to form functional governance structures. Although the Oslo Accords delegated some governance tasks to the Palestinian Authority (PA), Israel retains ultimate authority. The PA lacks authority over its borders and the autonomy to establish security, regulate and develop the economy, and ensure the free movement of Palestinian civilians. A resulting lack of a functioning state affects food quality and safety, health care quality, and government responsiveness. Similarly, while the Oslo Accords created Palestinian security forces, they have limited jurisdiction and autonomy to protect Palestinians in the West Bank or Gaza. This has led to an increase in theft, crime, and a growing drug trade. A lack of governance is compounded by deep, sometimes



violent political divisions within the Palestinian community, which further undermine human insecurity.

The convoluted, multi-layered framework of international law, Israeli military law, and domestic policy that governs Palestinian life creates the effect of a lack of governance or order. The complex situation in the Palestinian territories reveals gaps in the system of international law, the vulnerabilities of living under hostile occupation without a state of one's own, and the weakness of an incapacitated and divided domestic authority. The international community, Israeli military law, and Palestinian national leadership are often in conflict and have largely failed to ensure the dignity, economic wellbeing, or even survival of average civilians. As a result, many individuals report a growing sense of futility and disempowerment.

Social movements have been sources of profound citizen empowerment that can change government policy.

People's empowerment

In their influential 2003 report *Human Security Now*, Amartya Sen and Sadako Ogata introduced the protection/empowerment framework distinct to human security. Protection strategies are top-down practices by the state and other external actors that shield people from threats they cannot overcome on their own. Citizen empowerment reflects the agency of everyday people in ensuring their own security. "Empowerment strategies enable people to develop their resilience to difficult conditions," write Sen and Ogata. "People empowered can demand respect for their dignity when it is violated. They can create new opportunities for work and address many problems locally. And they can mobilise for the security of others."¹

Respondents across the six contexts presented demonstrate a range of empowerment strategies – from individual pursuit of equal rights to collective action. Some of these depend upon protection

from the state or recourse to external authorities, such as NGOs and international organisations. Ideally, they require a degree of political freedom, where challenging or contesting the ruling powers is possible. As Sen and Ogata write: "Protection and empowerment are mutually reinforcing. People protected can exercise many choices. And people empowered can avoid some risks and demand improvements in the system of protection."²

Rights and literacy

The existence of a legal framework or other mechanisms for recourse to legal or community action supports citizen empowerment. In Ukraine, some respondents found that they can protect themselves from abuse by state actors when they are educated and demand their rights. Citizens can force state actors to be more accountable when they are informed about the laws and are empowered to demand their own fair treatment and protection from the authorities. In Afghanistan, several respondents refer to human rights and literacy as key sources of empowerment and individual and collective security. Literacy is also mentioned by several respondents as an important component of human security in the context of being protected by an educated society. Societies can become collectively empowered. As a professor in Kabul says: "People now have a sense of what their rights are, so if something happens, you know you can go to the many independent agencies to file a complaint and get help."

Including citizens in policymaking

Governments can facilitate citizen empowerment by inviting their participation in policy-making. President Calderon's invitation to Mexican civil society for collaboration on security issues in Ciudad Juárez resulted in the civil-government security partnership *Mesa de seguridad*. The result of this long-term multi-stakeholder dialogue was an agenda to demilitarise the government's security strategy. It began to address deficiencies in the legal and enforcement system, while increasing the participation of citizens in local city government.

Social movements

Other citizen empowerment strategies increase human security by transforming social relationships outside of the formal state, thus developing greater social cohesion, trust, and power. Such movements are less dependent upon external authorities

or organisations, and involve generating social solidarity through mediating social conflict at a grassroots level. Collective empowerment can transform the cultural norms and relationships that foster insecurity.

Mexicans have been able to build social movements capable of pressuring the government to reform security policy. One national victim's movement, the *Movimiento por la Paz con Justicia y Dignidad*, has conducted mass actions that have raised awareness of the victims of the violence in Mexico. The movement also calls for broader social transformation: "The movement is not only focused on victims' attention, but in a deep and meaningful transformation of the country." Social movements have been sources of profound citizen empowerment that can change government policy.

Conflict resolution mechanisms old and new

Civilians have found empowerment by turning to community conflict resolution processes. In the Philippines, civil society and tribal leaders have de-escalated longstanding intertribal violence by reconciling tribal differences and emphasizing their shared kinship. Through bottom-up consultative processes, tribes have forged intertribal covenants and revived traditional conflict resolutions processes. In the absence of rule of law, pre-existing traditional customs have filled the void of governance. These traditional conflict resolution systems have reduced the length and escalation of violent conflict.

In Zimbabwe, the Ecumenical Church Leaders Forum (ECLF), a grouping of church leaders from all denominations, succeeded in bringing together diverse political leaders, traditional and church leaders to equip them with mediation and dialogue skills for conflict prevention, management, resolution, and integration (CPMRT) to decrease community violence. In the district of Nyaki, one of the sites of extreme political violence in the 1980s, police have noted a decrease in crime and violence since the programme began. The success of the CPMRT program and the need to sustain it in their communities prompted participants to form local peace committees (LPCs) on their own. According to an advisor to a traditional leader in Masvingo, the LPCs have enabled the community to de-escalate political violence.

The other side of empowerment: arming civilians

Citizen empowerment strategies are not always nonviolent. The chapter on Mexico distinguishes between functional empowerment strategies such as lobbying and holding the state accountable to human rights standards, and dysfunctional empowerment strategies such as forming armed militia groups. The latter might solve immediate security problems but create larger problems in the future. Similarly in Mindanao, in the face of ongoing violence and few avenues for protection or recourse, IPs have armed themselves, sometimes forming small militia groups. Empowerment in the short-term may lead to greater insecurity in the long-term.

Disempowerment

There are also varying level of empowerment. Palestinian accounts, particularly those in Gaza^d, stand out for the extent of disempowerment expressed by respondents. A lack of state protection and avenues for redress of grievances has fed resignation, and respondents say that the multitude of problems is psychologically overwhelming: "there is despair and depression, because people are insecure, their rights have been stolen, and there is no one to turn to. People have just started to surrender." Experiences of cultural fragmentation have also contributed to the erosion of internal sources of resilience. This sense of a cultural lack of empowerment was also visible amongst the more vulnerable respondents in other contexts, such as Ukraine, where respondents expressed extreme pessimism that they could find protection or help anywhere in society. As Sen and Ogata point out, empowerment often depends on the existence of legal systems and alternate avenues of power that citizens can leverage to advocate on their behalf. Empowerment and protection go hand in hand.

^d Interviews were conducted in early 2014 prior to the Israeli aerial and ground campaigns in July 2014.



Implications for human security

Human security and the rule of law

A key finding to emerge from the six contexts examined here is the central role of the citizen-state relationship in shaping individual experiences of security. The case studies present a range of governance contexts, from centralised states to weak states to statelessness. Across the majority of contexts, respondents refer to the rule of law – a legal system of rules applied equally to all citizens, enforced by governing authorities – as one of the greatest contributors or missing sources of security.

Rule of law reflects the conditions of the social contract. In a democratic society, laws articulate widely shared norms and agreements about rules to govern society, and reflect citizens' interests and perspectives. As noted by Ogata and Sen, the rule of law not only protects citizens through law enforcement, but empowers them by establishing systems of recourse and legal standards to which they can hold the state accountable. The rule of law is one expression of the state-society relationship.

Citizen trust in the institutions of rule of law – the judiciary, the police, and the legal system itself – may be one useful indicator of the levels of human security in a population. If citizens do not trust state institutions, it is likely that the state is not providing key aspects of human security. Respondents in all contexts express their fear or mistrust of police and military forces.

The citizen-state relationship

Effective human security strategies transform the citizen-state relationship. They make the state more responsive, trustworthy, and accountable while empowering citizens to participate in governance and address social conflicts. Successful human security strategies both improve the state's effectiveness at protecting citizens and simultaneously empower those citizens. For example, the existence of civic-government policy platforms has enabled Mexican citizens to become

more powerful in their relationships with the state. Their influence helped lead to a change in state protection strategies from a militarised model to a rule of law model. In Zimbabwe, the formation of local peace committees brings together state and non-state community leaders to resolve conflicts ranging from community to domestic violence.

Strengthening the rule of law and improving the citizen-state relationship can be key human security strategies


While limited attention has been paid to the link between human security and international law, rule of law as part of the domestic policy framework has not garnered adequate attention in literature on human security.³ The perspectives of citizens presented in this publication suggest that strengthening the rule of law and improving the citizen-state relationship can be key human security strategies. Future study of the operationalisation of human security should therefore further examine the role of rule of law in achieving human security.

Complementarity

The importance of the rule of law in providing human security addresses what is frequently perceived as a tension between a national security versus a human security approach. When national security strategies undermine the rule of law, they erode a key source of present or future state protection for citizens. A human security approach calls for complementarity between national security policies and the rule of law. When national security strategies undermine the transparent and fair use of civil and criminal courts, introduce military forces to conduct police operations, or violate domestic and international law, they undermine the foundations of human security. State protection strategies should, to the degree possible, reinforce each other, rather than conflict. To be effective in the long-term, state

Effective human security strategies transform the citizen-state relationship.

THE VALUE OF A HUMAN SECURITY APPROACH




protection strategies should at the least do minimal harm to, and ideally protect and strengthen practices and institutions of the rule of law. State protection approaches can also complement bottom-up empowerment approaches. For example, police have referred cases to the local peace committees in Zimbabwe, which include traditional, civic, and political leaders, to manage and resolve community conflicts using traditional mechanisms.

The principle of complementarity applies to citizen empowerment strategies as well. When citizens arm themselves and form militia groups, their response may effectively win security in the short term, but

A human security approach calls for complementarity between national security policies and the rule of law.

may create the conditions for prolonging conflict in the long-term by undermining rule of law and creating future sources of insecurity.



Applications in conflict prevention

In The Palestinian territories and the Philippines, some have taken up arms to defend themselves against violence. This approach has sometimes triggered retaliation and has militarised communities, creating a new set of security challenges. Both bottom-up empowerment approaches and top-down protective security strategies should be complementary, so that they contribute to rather than diminish each other. The interconnected and multidimensional nature of human security also necessitates complementarity among interconnected sectors, for example, natural resource management and economic policy.

Democratising security

Human security encompasses both an outcome and a process. The outcome is the preservation of citizen life, livelihood, and dignity. The process is a democratic one that requires engaging local people in dialogue on their security perceptions, needs,

Successful human security strategies mediate social conflicts and generate new social capital.

and solutions. Human security calls for opening up security policy formulation to greater democratic participation and to greater accountability to the rule of law and international human rights. Advancing democracy in the security sphere by empowering citizens to participate in public policy and hold the state accountable is the primary way that human security strategies transform the relationship of the citizen to the state.

Some argue that human security is a logical extension of democracy and human rights. The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) argues that human security is the logical extension of the basic liberal democracy paradigm, where state legitimacy is based on the ability of the state to protect fundamental individual rights. “States have

responsibility not just to provide for welfare, or representation, but – first and foremost – to ensure the security of their citizens. This is arguably the basic compact or contract that led humanity out of the Hobbesian anarchy.”⁴ A similar conclusion is made in the chapter on Ukraine, which suggests that Ukraine needs a modern ‘demand-driven’ security approach that puts police in the role of service providers rather than armed semi-military forces.

By democratising security, human security strategies also require the transformation of social relationships beyond the citizen-state relationship. Successful human security strategies mediate social conflicts and generate new social capital. The citizen-led biking initiative started by activists in northern Mexico is generating new civic relationships by demonstrating public ownership of public spaces and building public trust and respect. In the Philippines, tribes have overcome longstanding violence through a series of reconciliation ceremonies that rekindle traditional kinship alliances. Civic collaboration has enabled people to engage government more effectively and promote more holistic approaches to deep-seated security problems. Increased civic collaboration has empowered government to more effectively address the needs of previously polarized social groups. Thus, human security strategies also enable the state to meet diverse security needs more equitably. Democratising security requires that the state and civil society increase collaboration and responsiveness to a more diverse set of groups.

Expanding the traditional security discourse

When applied to the traditional security sphere, human security principles have the potential to transform security policies and approaches by involving affected individuals and communities in redesigning security goals and strategies. As this publication argues, more inclusive security processes change security outcomes. Inclusive policymaking can yield innovative solutions that protect individuals and their communities more effectively.

Rather than proposing a wholly new approach, inclusive security imports concepts and approaches more familiar in governance and development to reframe and expand traditional security discourse. People-centred, participatory approaches are widely accepted in the development sector. For example, the World Bank through their ‘Voices of the Poor’ project in 1999 conducted a large scale survey of more than 60,000 poor individuals from sixty countries in order to make economic and development policies more effective and people-centred. Some of their recommendations run parallel to those advocated for in a human security approach, including a focus on protection and empowerment, and strengthening the citizen-state relationship. In their conclusion, ‘*An Empowering Approach to Poverty Reduction*’, authors Deepa Narayan and Patti Patesch advocate promoting equal and effective relationships between poor people and the state. Fostering such partnership processes requires a dual focus on actions that, on the one hand, improve state capacity to grasp poor people’s needs and [...] strengthen poor people’s capacity to mobilize, articulate and defend their interests, and hold government accountable.⁵

Such people-centred approaches are increasingly identified as best practices in food security, health care access, and community development. Human security advocates for a similar approach in the security sector, applicable both in the analysis of security threats and in the design of intervention strategies. While innovative case studies of people-centred security strategies can be harvested from civil society organisations in the peacebuilding field across the world,⁶ these continue to be isolated

approaches yet to be accepted as ‘best practices’ by many governments and intergovernmental organisations.

Gendered security

The practical application of a people-centred approach in the security field can learn from recent global efforts to address women’s specific security needs and the development of gender-sensitive approaches. The UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1325 on Women Peace and Security is built on a strategy of prevention, participation, and protection, which are also key human security principles. By emphasising consultative processes and women’s participation in formulating security policies, SCR 1325 provides an opportunity to ensure women’s participation in public dialogue. Women’s voices are usually missing from official state policymaking and discussions: “Precisely because states and state security systems are gendered, women’s experiences and analysis are not often captured in the dominant discourse.”⁶ Cultural and psychological barriers, particularly in traditional societies, often prevent women from participating in community decision-making or in disclosing their experiences of gender-based violence. Such obstacles reinforce the need for a people-centred approach and an emphasis on empowerment to ensure women’s participation.⁷

Inclusive policymaking can yield innovative solutions that protect individuals and their communities more effectively.

In addition, gender advocates have also made great strides in developing gender-sensitive approaches to conflict analysis and programming.⁷ Such approaches go beyond a focus on women to identify the ways that socialised gender roles support cultural values that condone or enable

^e See for example the mapping of such initiatives conducted by GPPAC and the Alliance for Peacebuilding under the Civil Society and Security Sector Engagement for Human Security project, and the People’s Peacemaking Perspectives Project implemented by Conciliation Resources and Saferworld.

^f While this publication focuses on women’s security with regards to gender, it recognises that gender-specific forms of violence and related security needs go beyond women as a group, and merit their own analysis and people-centred solutions.



violence. Male and female gender experts' experience in navigating diverse perspectives can be important resources and models for managing the subjectivity of human security.

Women's rights advocates argue that women's participation is not only important for a truly inclusive human security, but that human security, broadly speaking, is dependent upon women's security and empowerment. Research suggests that women's security and equality supports broad economic development, improves health for children, and is correlated with lower levels of state violence. The participation of women in politics, economic life, security forces, and peacekeeping supports the economic security of families, the effectiveness of police forces, lowers corruption, and is correlated with lower rates of state aggression.⁸ Women's security can be strengthened by a focus on human security, and can be used as an indicator to assess overall human security.

Gender experts' experience in navigating diverse perspectives can be important resources and models for managing the subjectivity of human security accounts.

Scaling up human security

At a coordinating level, conflict prevention efforts can benefit from using the human security framework. Human security's broad focus can enable the mobilisation and integration of diverse sectors – government, health, food, economic development, natural resource management, etc. – that can work together to analyse root causes of conflict, identify overlapping goals and interests of stakeholders, and design multidimensional intervention strategies and public policies. By taking into account the diverse vulnerabilities and capacities of individuals and their communities, human security offers a deep and wide set of

analytical frames and intervention points with which to address root causes of conflict.

A key challenge for human security lies in 'scaling up' the types of intervention approaches presented in the preceding chapters. Human security is context dependent, which complicates efforts to mainstream it as a large scale approach. The example of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (the New Deal) provides a possibility of a global human security approach that remains context-driven by focusing on inclusive processes and building the relationship between the state and society.

The New Deal addresses the impact of prolonged conflict on development. Initiated by the g7+, a self-identified group of 19 conflict-affected, so-called 'fragile' states, the New Deal establishes new partnerships between donor states, fragile states, and civil society to create "country-led and country-owned transitions out of fragility."⁹ While not explicitly endorsing a human security approach, the process embodies human security principles in several ways.¹⁰ The New Deal agreement commits signatories to 'inclusive and participatory political dialogue' and identifies civil society actors as primary partners in the process.¹¹ It states that 'people's security' is one of five primary peacebuilding and statebuilding goals (PSCs) that it seeks to achieve. It recognises that, "Constructive state-society relations [...] are at the heart of successful peacebuilding and statebuilding."¹²

As a result, in several countries piloting the New Deal, civil society, governments, and international actors have come together to engage in new dialogues on how to create the political, economic, and security conditions for peace and stability. A practical example of how a people-centred approach has been applied in this process is the development of perception-based indicators, which reflect actual citizen experiences of, for instance, security, freedom and health, to measure the impact of state policies.

The successful implementation of this relatively new framework is challenging and still uncertain. There is limited evidence that the 'peoples' security' goal has been implemented substantially. Some civil society participants are calling for a more explicit focus on human security as a way to strengthen the agreement. This would promote more robust national dialogue, open up civilian and civil society space for greater participation in the

process, strengthen civil society, and highlight the interdependency of transnational threats and local security.¹³

In spite of the challenges it faces, the New Deal is an example of the kind of unifying framework that a human security approach could provide in designing integrated approaches to development and peace. It has catalysed the formation of broad civil society coalitions spanning human rights, natural resources management, women's rights, poverty reduction and others. It has facilitated new collaboration by actors across the development and governance spectrum. The New Deal creates a platform for government, civil society, and donors to identify root causes of conflict and strategies for addressing them. As such, it is one example of the way human security can work at the global level to support conflict resolution efforts. In global conversations on the post-2015 development framework that will replace the Millennium Development Goals, many civil society organisations are advocating for the inclusion of peacebuilding and statebuilding goals like those found in the New Deal.¹⁴


Challenges and unintended consequences

As it democratises security, human security brings with it the challenge of addressing subjective and conflicting security needs and perceptions. Security is no longer solely defined by state actors, but with the input of people from different social groups with different and sometimes competing needs and interests. Multi-stakeholder dialogue processes are necessary to mediate these myriad interests and develop understanding and consensus on solutions to security problems. Human security brings the challenge of integrating and addressing the needs and sometimes conflicting perspectives of groups in society. As the Mexico and Philippines case studies demonstrate, social polarisation can be reconciled through structured multi-stakeholder dialogues over time, and can give direction to government policy. Such processes are complex and challenging to initiate and facilitate, and require long-term engagement. Human security approaches should give greater support to civil society, the state, and international actors in developing the political will and capacity to organize ongoing, inclusive dialogue processes.

The subjective and psychological dimensions of individual security are also vulnerable to influence or manipulation by outside forces. In many contexts, political leaders may target outside groups as security threats and mobilise citizens in perceived self-defence or retaliation. To avoid the manipulation of subjective experiences of security, particularly the phenomena of scapegoating and xenophobia, that can provide simplistic understanding of the sources of insecurity, it is important to emphasise the preventive, multidimensional aspect of human security, as well as uphold the principle of complementarity with the rule of law.

Security is no longer solely defined by state actors, but with the input of people from different social groups with different and sometimes competing needs and interests.

Expanding the definition of 'security' has potential drawbacks as well. There is a danger that rather than humanising security, human security can inadvertently support policies that 'securitise' development as has been observed in such contexts as Afghanistan, where development projects have been undertaken by the military as a means to win military objectives. Analysis of such an approach in Afghanistan has found that these development projects often fail to deliver economic or social benefit for local communities, and diminish rather than contribute to security because they feed corruption and do not address the political drivers of conflict.¹⁵ While it is important to draw the conceptual link between development and security, there must also be the awareness among proponents in the human security community that 'security' is often equated with militarised approaches in policy communities.



The concept of human security, if superficially understood, may expand the reach of traditional military-based strategies to areas originally considered outside its scope, including development, education, food security, etc. This unintended consequence can be avoided by emphasising human security as a process of inclusive dialogue that involves citizens and non-state actors in identifying sources of insecurity and policies to address them. Emphasising the multidimensionality of human security threats and the importance of preventive action is another important way to build shared understanding that the task of providing security is often a civilian one. Human security should result in the democratisation of security policymaking, not the securitisation of development.

Human security should result in the democratisation of security, not the securitisation of development.

A complex and sensitive question for human security advocates is the role of the military and security forces in ensuring human security. A human security approach should proactively identify principles of military engagement to provide guidance to states on this security tactic. Current guidance on civil-military interaction and cooperation needs to be expanded to inform military and broader security sector relations to civil society beyond humanitarian and aid sectors.¹⁶ However, such an attempt should also go further and analyse the impact of militarised state protection strategies on other sources of human security, including rule of law, citizen empowerment, and such types of security as community security, health, and food security. Precisely because a national security strategy that includes military engagement is a dominant traditional state approach to security, human security proponents need to engage directly in discussions about the effects of military force on people's experiences of security in a variety of contexts.

Where national security strategies undermine rule of law, human security advocates should highlight the short- and long-term risks of such an approach. On the other hand, actors such as the DCAF warn that: "Encouraging good governance with lower military spending may actually, in some cases, leave a state prey to lawlessness and anarchy. Of course, the goal is to contribute to the construction of strong and legitimate states, but the potential dilemmas or unanticipated consequences that human security policies may trigger must be recognised."¹⁷ A state must be capable as well as responsive. This is a difficult balance that must be engaged and addressed.


Other critiques of human security argue that the focus on the individual disempowers rather than empowers because it doesn't sufficiently acknowledge the international political, economic, and military factors that shape or coerce state policy, particularly in weak states directly influenced by the international community. One critique argues that: "Through pathologising the weak or underdeveloped state and recasting sovereignty in terms of responsibility, international institutions and states have potentially greater freedom to intervene in or regulate weak or failing states.... the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than under the old pluralist security framework."¹⁸ Related critiques have been that human security gives legitimacy to military interventions conducted by powerful international actors.

While some of this critique has been addressed through the explicit recognition by the UN that human security does not compromise state sovereignty, it is an important point that international institutions often lack accountability to citizens of nation states, though their influence on them may be significant. To avoid diminishing state accountability to citizens, international interventions should support the transformation of citizen-state relationship and seek to support locally owned institutions such as Zimbabwe's local peace committees that mediate social relationships. International actors should support human security as a process of local dialogue and relationship-building to fully respect the principle of empowerment. Approaches that seek to achieve these objectives, such as SCR 1325 and the New Deal, address the democratic deficit in many multilateral institutions and processes by

International actors should support human security as a process of local dialogue and relationship-building to fully respect the principle of empowerment.

recognising that peacebuilding and statebuilding must be led by affected countries rather than by donor states. They also recognise that state-led implementation is not sufficient and that building peaceful societies requires a partnership between states, international institutions, and affected communities.

The applicability of human security as a policy framework is not limited to conflict-affected states that receive international aid. Human security is a useful tool and approach that can be used in higher income, politically stable nations to advance the economic, political, social, and environmental security of their residents. As argued by Sharbanou Tadjbakhsh, an important breakthrough for the application of human security will occur "when industrialised donor countries, together with developing ones, apply the concept to their domestic policies."¹⁹ While the people-centred principles of human security remain universally applicable, their practical application must be responsive to local contexts, gender-sensitive, and enable the empowerment of the people they aim to support.




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Invest in national and local infrastructures and capacities for multi-stakeholder dialogue and state-citizen partnerships that can link human security analysis to possible solutions.

Recommendations

Empowerment and Protection – Stories of Human Security

1. UN, governments, business and civil society should work towards a common human security platform of learning and collaboration for different sectors and practice arenas. This could support information exchange, joint analysis and planning at different levels. As follow up to UNGA resolution 66/290, a global working group could explore and enhance the operationalisation of the human security approach, linking human rights, development, peacebuilding, humanitarian and environmental concerns with effective governance and citizens empowerment.
2. UN, governments, academia, donors and civil society should invest in enhancing and applying methodologies that are consistent with human security principles. These should focus on process, and specifically address the subjectivity and agency of diverse people and groups targeted by research, projects or other interventions. They can build on existing experience in devising qualitative, bottom-up and gender-sensitive methods which can complement larger-scale indexes and surveys.
3. UN, member states, donors, and civil society should develop and implement protection and empowerment strategies which address, take into account and (where appropriate) build on existing coping strategies of the individuals, communities and societies of the context in question.
4. UN, member states and civil society should invest in national and local infrastructures and capacities for multi-stakeholder dialogue and state-citizen partnerships that can link human security analysis to possible solutions. Such initiatives can be supported through brokerage, resources and the provision of safe spaces by ‘outsiders’, but must ultimately be locally initiated and owned. As such, they should take into account cultural and gender sensitivities, roles and limitations to interactions such as civil-military engagements and local power dynamics.
5. UN, member states and civil society should support and implement public and policy-oriented awareness raising on the pillars and added value of human security at national and local levels. This should help to promote the articulation of human security needs and response measures, and make it meaningful beyond the global academic and policy circles.
6. Academia and think tanks should explore and position rule of law within the human security debate, and focus more on the empowerment aspect of human security strategies as well as on the interface and complementarity of protection and empowerment.



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
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
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*Note: For Afghanistan and the Philippines, the information on ethnic groups presented in the fact box is sourced from [Index Mundi](#) and the [CIA World Factbook](#) and has been included for the purpose of illustrating the diversity of these two societies. In both cases there is a lack of official statistical data on ethnicity. In Afghanistan, it is a contentious issue – see for instance: Emma Graham-Harrison, "Afghan census dodges questions of ethnicity and language", 3 January 2013, The Guardian. In the Philippines, the composition and interrelation of different ethnic and tribal groups is much more complex than the broader regional and cultural groupings presented in the fact box.



Picture credits

*Most personal pictures were provided by the participating organisations or by the persons themselves.
We thank them for the permission to use these pictures.*

Front Cover: The streets of Kabul, Afghanistan
Credit: Afghanistan Justice Organisation (AJO)

Afghanistan: Daily life in Kabul, Afghanistan
Credit: Afghanistan Justice Organisation (AJO)

Palestine: Separation Wall in Jerusalem, Occupied Palestinian Territory
Credit: Institute of Modern Media, Al-Quds University
West Bank Area C Map: United Nations OCHA, February 2011

Mexico: Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico - August 6, 2007: A street scene from the city of Juarez, Mexico. With more than 3,000 homicides in 2010, Juarez has become one of the most dangerous cities in the world.

Philippines: The IP leaders meet in Davao City to discuss a common peace agenda they can get behind
Credit: Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID)

Zimbabwe: Local Peace Committees
Credit: Ecumenical Church Leaders Forum (ECLF)


Ukraine: Peaceful protests on 1 December 2014, in the centre of Kyiv, Ukraine
Credit: Viktor Pushkar, for the Association of Middle East Studies (AMES)

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- AJO Interview in Kabul | AJO
- MEND Focus group in Ramallah, OPT | Shadi Barakat
- Capturing Palestinian perspectives on human security, at a focus group meeting in Ramallah, OPT | Shadi Barakat
- Ukrainian interviewees | AMES

List of abbreviations

AJO	Afghanistan Justice Organization
AMES	Association of Middle East Studies
ARMM	Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
ATM	automated teller machine; cash dispenser
BBL	Bangsamoro Basic Law
CBCS	Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society
CBOs	community-based organisations
CSO	civil society organisation
ECLF	Ecumenical Church Leaders Forum
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPPAC	Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
HDI	Human Development Index
IHL	International humanitarian law
IID	Initiatives for International Dialogue
IPRA	Indigenous People's Rights Act
IPs	Indigenous Peoples
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
IT	Information Technology
LGUs	Local Government Units
LPC	Local Peace Committees
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MP	Member of Parliament
MPJD	Movimiento por la Paz con Justicia y Dignidad
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NPA	New People's Army
NPRC	National Peace and Reconciliation Commission
ONHRI	Organ for National Healing Reconciliation and Integration
PA	Palestinian Authority
PAN	Alliance for Change Party
PRI	Institutional Revolutionary Party
UN	United Nations
UN SCR 1325	United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics



"Our history, our territories
and the land interconnect
us. In the same way that
everything is interconnected,
human security is a given
right to us as well as
an obligation. I give it and
I expect it at the same time."

Indigenous Peoples' traditional leader, Mindanao

This publication shares and analyses people's sense of threats and safety through the lens of human security. Spanning six regions of the world, it presents the accounts of people living in Afghanistan, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Zimbabwe, Ukraine, Mexico, and the Philippines. As a people-centred approach to understanding threats to people's livelihoods, safety and dignity, human security is useful as both an analytical tool and an operational approach for addressing socio-political problems. Reflecting and comparing these stories, we focus on human security as not only an outcome but as a process of dialogue and relationship-building. The citizen-state relationship emerges as a primary tool and indicator of human security, where context-specific protection and empowerment strategies go hand in hand.